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MISCELLANIES;

CHIEFLY

ADDRESSES,

ACADEMICAL AND HISTORICAL.

BY

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[Vol. I]

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PREFACE.

REQUESTS from time to time have been made for a selection from my anonymous writings: in consequence, a volume was planned and arranged. But my Publisher, on learning how much material, hitherto unprinted, lay in my drawers, requested me to furnish it to him in preference. Nor is it all yet exhausted. On the reception given to this volume it must depend, whether others shall follow.

Although the Lectures have received recent correction, I have carefully avoided to alter any allusions which indicate the year or place of original delivery. The last article appeared in the *National Review*, an unfortunately short-lived quarterly. The Lecture on Elocution was delivered at a Ladies' College.

F. W. N.

June, 1869.

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MISCELLANIES.

LOGICAL FRAGMENTS.

NOTICE.—Thirty-four years ago I delivered a short course of lectures on Logic to a class of young pupils. I was induced to publish them. On reading them with fresh eyes I was annoyed at their many blemishes, which nevertheless did not hinder the whole edition from selling in a few years. Various applications were (and are still from time to time) made to me for a new edition of my very unpretending little book; but I was quite indisposed to reprint it without large correction. Correction became an entire new writing; and I at length elaborated it into a treatise called "Ancient and Modern Logic," which had so much pretension to completeness, that I was distressed at my inability to satisfy myself in one part of what I was then essaying. Before I could complete the part alluded to, Mr. J. STUART MILL's Logic came out. It did not supersede mine in my own estimate; for I was sorry to find myself at variance with him on some fundamental points. Nevertheless his great powers, learning, and high reputation made it difficult for another book of Logic to enter the market: and if otherwise, to pass him by in silence might seem arrogant, to enter controversy would have been vexatious. In short I had other studies than Logic to attend to; and my MS. has in consequence lain in my drawer to this day. *Fragments* of it nevertheless admit of being separated from the rest, and after final revision laid before the public. Such is the origin of those which follow.

(1.) Abstraction.

It has often been said that the geometrical conception of a Triangle is devoid of colour and material. It is an *abstract* Triangle. This is true, *only* if it mean that the colour and the material are never adverted to in the argument. The same may be said of the thickness of lines, and of absolute magnitude. Practically I accept every geometrical figure as of the same hue as the paper on which it is drawn. If any one remark to me that my triangle is white, or its side an inch long, I reply: "True; but that is nothing to me geometrically." It may immensely help me in conducting a geometrical argument, to have before me a figure which I know to be extremely inaccurate. Crooked and thick lines are to my eye symbols of lines straight and wholly without thickness. I do not let their crookedness and thickness enter my argument, yet I can ill dispense with the aid which the figure (however rude) gives to argumentation. The same *cube* the sight of which aids me in Geometry, where its weight is wholly disregarded, may aid me also in Mechanics, where its weight enters my argument, and possibly its form is disregarded. Yet in neither case do I really suppose (or conceive or imagine) it to *be really* without colour, weight or form. This is just as in a lawsuit about property the stature or weight of the suitors does not enter the argument, yet we do not conceive or imagine suitors without weight or height. It is no peculiarity of abstract Science; but it belongs to all argument, as such, to disregard, as irrelevant, numberless particulars of an object.

If "conceiving" mean a pictorial setting before the mind, our power of conceiving is very limited: yet that does not affect our power of understanding, and of accurate reasoning. I understand a million as easily as a score, but I cannot

(pictorially) conceive a million. I can reason as accurately concerning a polygon with a billion sides, as concerning a triangle. I cannot conceive the former, but I can conceive *of* it, and in reasoning concerning it I may urgently need a rude and obviously inaccurate drawing of it.

All this applies to Theology. We cannot conceive GOD, but we can conceive *of* Him, and reason about Him. Symbols of Him, metaphors concerning Him, notoriously inaccurate, may often, not only not damage, but help our severest reasoning.

(2.) ABSTRACT TERMS.

To distinguish the Abstract from the Concrete belongs in some sense more to Grammar than to Logic. Adjectives are often said to be Concrete, as Just, Good, White, and substantives derived from them to be Abstract, as Justice, Goodness, Whiteness. Be it so in Grammar; yet this is accidental. A language is possible which may have no Adjectives, and not miss them. In some barbaric languages they are rare; nay, and in the most highly cultivated tongues we see a tendency to discard them. We say: A man of quality, A man of celebrity. Latin says: Moris erat, for, it was customary. In Arabic and Hebrew this superseding of the adjective is notorious. On the contrary, THUCYDIDES wonderfully supersedes the abstract noun by the neuter adjective. It is evident that we mean the same thing, neither more nor less, whether we say: "There was a redness on the snow," or, "The snow was somewhat red:" they differ as to the *form* of the expression, which concerns Grammar; not in the substance, which alone Logic regards. If we see three red objects, we mentally *abstract* the colour which they have in common, which we regard as a *quality possessed* by the objects: but whether we denote that quality by adjective or by substantive, it remains equally an abstraction.

Colour, being presented to the eye, so possesses the pictorial imagination that we seem able to conceive it in isolation; but of course our conception is of something with form, though we are not thinking of the form. But when the abstract idea is more purely mental, a pictorial idea may be impossible. We have not in this sense "conceptions" commensurate with our abstract terms. If I try to think of Beauty, I can but summon to my mind a series of beautiful *objects*, as, a statue, a prospect, a noble animal, a building. It is not the adjective "beautiful" which is concrete, but the *combined* adjective and substantive "beautiful object," which the word *concrete* was invented to denote. It seems impossible for us to conceive "The Long" in the abstract, (adjective without substantive,) any more than Length. We have to pass rapidly over a number of long *objects;* a long road, a long stick, a long discourse, a long illness.

Thus we can answer the old question: Is Justice, Is Virtue, a *real* existence? and if so, where is it? Justice exists, wherever relations exist, which admit of just or unjust actions. The question has no greater mystery or difficulty, than, Does Superiority exist, and if so, where? Every adjective or abstract noun is the index to a special classification of objects, external or mental. (Mental phenomena, when observed and named, are objects to the observing mind, as much as external objects to the perceiving sense.)

The indefinite article A An often denotes that a word becomes concrete: as in the difference of Pain and A Pain, Belief and A Belief, Action and An Action. This gives sometimes to our language greater perspicuity than has Greek or Latin. The neglect to distinguish Nature from A Nature, Existence or Being from An Existence, A Being, would involve grave error.

(3.) Logical Lessons of the Old Geometry.

Geometry had the following valuable results. 1. It silenced objection and incredulity as to the adaptation of the human mind to Truth. With the barbarian intellect, there is no worse enemy to truth than scepticism as to power of learning, from which must follow listlessness and laziness. To have established that certain knowledge is attainable in at least one branch of thought, gave hope that the same must be true in others. 2. It showed one principal condition of success,—coherent and continuous thought in a succession of minds. As in material efforts civilization is characterized by the co-operation of hands, so in intellectual inquiry must minds co-operate if science is to be attained. 3. In this science peculiar care is taken to distinguish *what* we prove from *what;* and *how much* in that which we make our basis is necessary to our superstructure. For instance; if a square be presented to the eye, every body understands, [1] that its sides are equal, [2] that its opposite sides are equidistant or parallel, [3] that its angles are all equal, [4] that its angles are all right. Which of these is known from which, and how much suffices as hypothesis to secure the rest, it does not concern the vulgar to discuss: but the habit of such inquiry is of great importance.

(4.) Pernicious Effects of Geometry on other Science.

Geometry, for reasons which need not here be stated, begins from Definitions: hence arose the notion, that to begin from Definition is the very law of Science. Cicero lays this down concerning Duties; yet in fact he does not do it: his good sense was too strong for his creed. Plato desired to start

with a general definition of Virtue, from which all the properties and relations of Virtue should be deduced. In the opening of the Menon, he represents SOCRATES as saying: "I am so far from knowing whether virtue is communicable by instruction, that I do not know even what Virtue is: and when I do not know the essence of a thing, how can I know its qualities?" According to the moderns, we know qualities and properties first, and if we ever learn the essence, it is only at the last.—So PLATO would begin a proof of the immortality of the soul by definitions of life and death made off hand.—So ARISTOTLE eagerly and rapidly (though not without efforts at analysis of fact) sets up definitions of Happiness, of Virtue, of Pleasure. Facts were not neglected, but they were unduly subordinate; and, it may seem, were rather used to illustrate and confirm opinions formed by independent thought, than treated as the material out of which each Science and its special form was to be evolved. For the evil may be stated more widely. From geometry, as above noticed, they learned the powers of the human mind. True: but they learned to *overrate* its powers. They imagined that in the highest and most complicated questions, they could (to use a popular phrase) take the bull by the horns; and rushed by a few bold arguments to a commanding generalization, (comparable to our *Laws* of Mechanics,) from which they attempted to reason downward to all truth.—This I find to be THIRLWALL's judgment in his History of Greece; and so far as I know any thing of the facts, they lie decidedly in that direction. Professor BADEN POWELL's remarks on even ARISTOTLE, are to the same effect.

(5.) Essence and Characteristics.

If there be any set of properties which belong to *every individual* of a class, and to *them alone*, they are called Characteristics. Thus, if it be admitted, that every human being, and no other animal, is competent to laugh or to cook, power of laughter or of cookery becomes a Characteristic of man, and the word Man becomes *commensurate with* Laughing animal, or Cooking animal: that is, each phrase embraces precisely the same group of individuals. Yet the phrases are not admitted to be identical: for (it is said) the *essence* of man does not consist in either power; and for this reason neither phrase is a fit definition of man: for the definition ought to tell what is the *essence of a thing*:—(rather, it should be, what is the essential *meaning* of a *word*).

But all this does but show more forcibly, that Definition (except provisionally) must come at the end, not at the beginning. We classify, and give names, with reference to leading and obvious properties. Whether they are, or are not, possessed exclusively by this class, is matter of outward research and infinite detail. Definition thus made is apt to be overthrown suddenly by some new discovery. It is easier to know what is *not* the essential meaning of a word, than what is. If we admit the hypothesis for argument's sake, that an animal, of form and other instincts quite unhuman, were found to practise cookery, no one would on that account allow it to be a man: that is why we decisively reject the power of cookery as an appropriate definition of Man. The fact is clear, that we start from some central point, such as, our own nation, and say: "*We* are men." How many besides are to be taken in to the family, is long uncertain. While we are wholly ignorant of a foreign language, we may mistake barbarians for apes. But, little by little, we enlarge the basis

of humanity. Ere long we lay down : "Whoever are in *body* and *mind* like enough to US to enter into practical relations of life and intermarriage, *they* are men." The word US forbids this to be logic or science ; but it is a practical test, and quite decisive. Meanwhile we do but grope our way towards the collection of properties, which is to be admitted as the essential meaning of the word MAN.

(6.) APPROXIMATE DEFINITIONS.

If Definition is the goal at which we drive, it is to be expected that we shall have at first only imperfect and provisional definitions. Even in Geometry this has happened ; but in general it ought not to happen there. EUCLID'S definitions of similar figures, of parallelism, of tangents, of diameters, of centres, are all needlessly limited, and have to be enlarged in the stage beyond. But consider the popular word Level, which seems to belong to elementary Physics. It is at first regarded as a horizontal plane ; that is, a plane perpendicular to the plumb line. But on observing the bulge of the sea, we modify the definition, and perhaps say, that a Level is a spherical surface concentric with the earth. When further research judges the earth to be spheroïdal, a Level is said to be a spheroïdal surface, similar to and concentric with the earth. When the spheroïd equally is found to be inaccurate, the Level is defined as "the surface which at every point is perpendicular to its own plumb line." Even this may be exchanged in Hydrostatics to "a surface of *equal pressure*" (below the surface) or "*of no pressure*" (at the surface).

We cannot wonder that in more recondite sciences, as chemistry and physiology, successive approximation towards a just definition is the only mode of proceeding.

(7.) Innate Ideas.

Is a man's beard *innate?* No one would think of using such a phrase. But if any one did use it, no one would understand him to mean that the beard was *connate* with him. He could only mean, that it grew out from an inward nature, sooner or later. So if any one call the idea of Justice innate, he does not mean that we have it at birth, but that it grows up in the normal man sooner or later. Nor does it avail to object that experience is needed and a supply of *facts* from without, in order that the idea may arise. Of course. So also *food* is needed from without, in order that the beard may grow from within. The faculty or organs within, the supplies from without, must in each case co-operate for the result. It is senseless to contest whether experience or the Mind furnishes the ideas. Neither alone will suffice.

Yet we could not rightly call any developement innate, unless it arose normally to our whole race under normal, nay, inevitable circumstances. Nor is it perhaps wise to use the word Innate without occasion, when it has been so strangely misinterpreted.

(8.) Intuition.

A man holds out to me the twig of a tree, with green leaves and red cherries, and asks me to name the colours. I reply,—Green and red.—How do you know that? says he.—Because I *see them.* Now a metaphysician has plenty to say in proof that "sight" is a very compound process; that the faculty is gradually earned, slowly (perhaps) perfected, and withal very fallible. All true. But that does not make my reply less just: "I know it because I see it." How we earned the faculty of seeing, few (if any of us) can trace. That the

faculty is, beyond certain limits, or in unfavourable circumstances, liable to error, we all are aware. But no sound-minded man will permit himself to doubt his sight without special and powerful reasons. So, when we say, that we know a Truth by Intuition, we do not claim infallibility; nor do we imply that Intuition is a special primary faculty irresolvible by analysis. *Intuition* (as any Latin dictionary will show) means simply *a gazing upon*, and though practically it is confined to the discernment of mental truth, this is but as in other cases we take words of our own language either literally or metaphorically, but reserve for metaphorical use words borrowed from the foreigner. The analogy nevertheless of Sight and Intuition, as to their trustworthiness and fallaciousness is easy to understand. Two thousand years passed after ARISTOTLE, before BERKELEY discovered his theory of Vision. Before him neither common men nor philosophers had been aware that we gradually learn to see distance; but all had known, that the power of the eye to judge of distance is highly trustworthy within certain limits and very uncertain beyond them. The theory is of interest; yet it has not given us practical power to see better or more surely, nor has it had the slightest tendency to make us distrust the organ within the limits within which we formerly trusted it. Much of this applies to the Mind,—to Intuition.

If different men's *eyes*, ostensibly equal and equally favoured by circumstances, report different objects, the accuracy of sight in one or all is doubted. The same is true when the intuitions of different *minds* are at variance. But if in any matters our intuitions either agree, or converge towards agreement in proportion to cultivation, we have in so far a basis for truth, just as in the things attested by outward sense. See farther below concerning SPECIFIC INFORMANTS.

(9.) Verbal Truth.

Every Dictionary is a storehouse of Verbal Truth. Such are the assertions, that *vingt* (in French) means *twenty* (in English) : that *roi* means *king :* that a *score* means *twenty*, and a *myriad ten thousand.* Such Verbal truths are also matter of fact, to be attested by external inquiry.

But, the meaning of words once settled and agreed upon, many sentences made by their combination are such as no one seeks to verify by external inquiry ; but solely by asking what the separate words mean, and what is the force of grammatical forms. The proposition is then possibly either verified or refuted without looking beyond the words. As extreme examples consider the sentences : "A thing cannot be its opposite. Uneven ground is not even. The crooked is not straight. No tall man is short." He must be a fanatical devotee of Experience, who should confess that he knew these propositions to be true by Experience alone ; that he had therefore no absolute conviction of them ; only, since (in his own limited Experience) he had never yet found a tall man who was short, (and other observers, even experienced tailors, reported the same thing,) he was disposed not to expect it in the future.—But is it at all less absurd to appeal to Experience in proof that a man six feet high is taller than a man five feet eight inches ? Surely it is to the words, and the words only, that we look for our ground of conviction. The same must be said of the propositions, A hundred is greater than a score : and : The whole is greater than its part.

All Arithmetical truths appear to me to be Verbal ; because the definitions are verbal, and the truths flow out of, and were from the beginning implicated in, the definitions. Some of these truths are extremely obvious, and others very obscure : yet phraseology alone may make the difference.

The truth which in one language is obscure, in another might be obvious; and conversely.

Etymology generally warns us what are the *definitions* of numbers: else it would often be uncertain whether a numerical proposition be a definition, or a truth inferred from definition. In English, to say that eighty is eight tens, is a definition; and that eighty is four score, is a proposition deduced from the definitions of the words. But in French the latter, (if we translate eighty by *quatrevingt* and score by *vingtaine)* is an unveiled identical proposition. *All* arithmetical truths are nothing but identical propositions *veiled;* veiled by mere phraseology; and are to be proved by substituting one phrase for another which is equivalent.

Languages in general agree very nearly in their organization of numbers. This is referred to our having five fingers on each hand. A six-fingered family, it is thought, would have counted by twelves: twenty would have been called *twelve-eight,* and twenty-four *twelftwy,* (or, a lot,) thirty-six *thirtwy*: a hundred and forty-four would have been called by some single short word, like a *heap;* which would have been written duodecimally 100: while a hundred and forty-six would be called "a heap and two," and written 102. It was equally possible to count by *nines;* then 20 would mean *twice nine* or eighteen, and 100 would mean *eighty-one,* while 121 would mean eighty-one + eighteen + one, that is, a hundred. Manifestly a proposition which with us is all but a truism, such as "eighteen hundreds make a thousand eight hundred," might be any thing but obvious in the phraseology of a numerical system differently organized. In the duodecimal system it would be expressed (symbolically) by $84 \times 16 = 1060$; in the *nonal* system by $121 \times 20 = 2420$, which here happens to be easier. Take instances however complicated, however lofty, and the propositions (if true) are always reducible to *identity* by mere substitution of equivalent words. In this consists their proof, and this makes the truth Verbal.

A language is possible, in which the numbers might be

organized irregularly, vacillating from decimal to nonal or duodecimal or tredecimal: or again, it might have no organization at all, but every number, from one to ten thousand, might have a new name, as wholly unconnected in etymology, one with another, as *one two three*. In any such language, the proposition "A hundred and one added to two hundred and two makes three hundred and three" (which with us is obvious) would need elaborate proof. Nevertheless, the *nature* of the proof would be precisely that, by which we prove that "two and three make five." It stands thus: $5=4+1=(3+1)+1=3+1+1=3+(1+1)=3+2$; by that substitution of equivalents which the definitions permit.

Suppose a language with its numerical system wholly unorganized. A man who taught the people a new artificial way of *counting* (which he might call the Science of Arithmetic) would instantly facilitate to them problems previously unmanageable. Notation is the new power which he imparts. Our higher Arithmetic, which we call Algebra and Calculus, does the same thing by a more comprehensive notation and proportionably comprehensive results; and the short cuts to truth thus obtained disguise to us the fact that in principle these Sciences are on the same plan as our popular Decimal organization of language. As, in order to multiply by ten, we do but add a zero, and think this the easiest of processes, though it would be a stupendous mystery to a people who had no decimal organization of numbers; so are the compact and powerful processes of algebra to a person wholly untaught in them.

A few words may be fitly added concerning its elementary rules. Suppose that in a case similar in kind to the proof that $5=3+2$, but more complicated, we brought the equation *which is to be proved* into the form $7+9+a=7+9+b$, where a and b represent certain combinations of numbers. Inspection shows that we shall have proved identity if we can prove that $a=b$. Since then this alone remains, we strike out $7+9$ from each side. Out of this comes the RULE, that it

is permitted to expunge *any quantity* from both sides of an equation at once. So; if we had reduced it to the form $a+a=b+b$, or twice a = twice b, we should see it sufficed to prove that a = b. Hence the RULE, that you may *divide* each side by 2 (or by 3, or by 4, &c.). These rules, perfectly simple and obvious as they are, enormously assist the processes; but certainly ought not to blind us to the fact that *in principle* we are arguing just in the same way, as in the proof that $5=3+2$.

Of Geometrical truths, beyond the chief Axioms, which are not exclusively Geometrical, few (if any) are verbal. They cannot be inferred from the definitions by a mere substitution of equivalent words. Geometry, like the doctrine of Statics, needs *some* appeals to Experience, (whether by laws of movement or by other experiment,) before it can get even the ideas of a Straight Line and Plane; nor can the celebrated difficulty of Parallels long be evaded. Its truths are therefore, I think, comparable to those of Mechanics, as truths of the outer world, based on Experimental laws; which is not true of the doctrine of pure Number. Only within very narrow limits, by a play of useless ingenuity, we may construct some Geometrical propositions which are purely Verbal, resolvible by a comparison of Definitions. Such is the following: "An equilateral rectangle is a rightangled rhombus." This is not logically comparable to ordinary Geometrical truth, but with such verbal truths as, "The antiquity of the world was the youth of mankind."

(10.) AXIOMS.

AXIOM in Greek is nothing but the Latin POSTULATE, viz. a thing *claimed*. Owing to the celebrity of EUCLID, it has passed to mean a sure truth, carrying conviction without proof. All of EUCLID'S irreprovable Axioms are mere verbal truths. Thus, that Things equal to the same are equal to one

another, is verified by the meaning of the word Equal. But the 12th Axiom, the great scandal of Elementary Geometry, is widely different from the rest. Neither is it a mere verbal truth, nor can it be verified by trials or any direct experience; while to discern its truth by Intuition is too high a demand on the intellect untrained hitherto in Geometry. The moderns in general regard this Axiom as injudicious, and several substitutes are proposed; of which the honestest* may be: "If, in any plane, a series of points are equidistant from a straight line, their locus is a straight line." We may (with more or less plausibility, more or less self-satisfaction) dispense with the Axiom by some doctrine of Infinites or of Homogeneity: yet the remarkable fact remains, that the ancients, who knew none of these theories, were as thoroughly convinced of the truth of this Axiom as any of us can be. Perhaps, if they had momentary mistrust of their Intuition, they verified it to themselves by the harmonious results of Geometry, and by the power which it gave them in practical calculations and prediction. Concerning the Straight Line also EUCLID has an Axiom, (which might be superseded by a legitimate definition,) and he *ought* to have had one concerning the Plane. These also we must either discern to be true by gazing at a diagram, or must prove by outward experience. As to straightness, Instinct suggests its identity with shortness of path. A young dog, making for a gate, runs in as straight a line as he can: yet, it may be replied, Light, moving to his eye in straight lines, probably guides him. To us, the experience of pulling a string tight suffices to demonstrate, that between any two given points there is *one* path shorter than every other path; and this will amply suffice to establish the doctrine of the Straight Line. So also, easy experiment convinces us,

* (NOTE) I say the *honestest;* because some that have been proposed are made plausible only by a juggle concerning the word Parallel, which EUCLID has defined in an arbitrary unpopular sense. Popularly, it means *equidistant*; as we see in Parallel Circles on a sphere.

that if a polygon have given rigid sides, but moveable joints at their ends, the angles may vary; that this is true, even when there are four sides; but if there be only three, then the angles are rigidly fixed: in other words, "If the lengths of the sides of a triangle be given, the angles are determined:" and out of this the doctrine of the Plane may be proved. Yet, resort as we may to these or other improved methods, it is not the less true that men have believed for ages, intensely, absolutely, rightfully, *without* our methods, which are mere after-thought. Here are three clear instances of the force of INTUITION, concerning things not verbal, as the basis of Geometry itself, which is the historical type of certain, perfect, infallible truth.

(11.) CONFUSION OF VERBAL WITH REAL TRUTH.

Verbal Truths are often of great value in argument. For instance, they give warning of a change of nomenclature, which, unless carefully conducted, may involve fallacy. Or again, they bring unreasonableness and injustice into strong light: as, to say, in rebuking religious bigotry: "A heretic is a man. To murder a heretic is to murder a man." Each of these is a purely verbal truth; yet certainly not superfluous or impotent. Yet if there be any uncertainty whether a statement is meant to be verbal or real (owing to some ambiguity in a word), confusion or juggling may follow. It is an old joke: "Treason never prospers: where 's the reason? Why, when it prospers, none dare call it Treason." The first statement, that "Treason never prospers," sounds like a *historical* proposition, attested by the experience of nations. But the words that follow turn it into a *verbal* truth, or even truism, from which the whole supposed meaning has evaporated. This is a type of a numerous class of statements,—

sometimes highly important. Examples may be useful to elucidate the topic.

Equal and opposite forces neutralize each other. This is a truism, if we have no criterion of the *equality* of forces, except the fact that they neutralize each other when directly opposed. But if any independent estimate is attainable, the proposition expresses real truth.

Motion always takes place in the direction in which an unimpeded force acts. If we have no means of testing the direction of a force (or perhaps even its existence) except by the motion and its initial direction, this is of course a verbal truth. But it becomes a real truth, if the force be a pressure cognizable prior to motion.

The rate of acceleration is proportional to the accelerating force. This might be a verbal truth; but in the experiments on ATTWOOD'S machine it becomes real; for the forces are there weights measurable without any estimate of velocities.

A man on every occasion acts according to the strongest motive which at the time urges him. If we have some mode of measuring *a priori* the strength of motives, this (if true) is a real truth. But if we have no test of their strength but by observing whether (on that occasion) they prevailed, the proposition merely asserts that on every occasion a man acts as as he does act, and we *call* those motives (momentarily) *strongest* which prevail.

He always thinks his own opinion to be right. To the letter this is a verbal truth, fitly called a truism. But people mean to say by it, that the man is *too confident* that his opinion, based on his present knowledge, may not need to be modified by fuller knowledge and sounder faculties.

The will of God is holy, just, and good. If the epithets have an independent measure, this is a real proposition of infinite importance. If we have no measure of their sense, except by an appeal to the "will of God," the proposition evaporates into a truism, which the votaries of every Pagan deity may hold.

Many verbal truths depend in part on Grammar for their verification. They *remind* us perhaps of the sense implied in a grammatical form. Such are the following.

He who is dead, must have died at some time.
He who was born, must have been born at some time.
If he was murdered, some one must have murdered him.
Every son must have had a parent.
Every effect must have had a cause.
Every cause produces an effect.
Design implies a designer.

But fallacy arises, when a verbal proposition is confounded with a real proposition, such as the following :

He who was born, was previously non-existent.
Every child must have had parents.
Every phenomenon must have had a cause.
Every state of things must have had a cause.
Like causes always produce like results.
Fitnesses imply design.

On the other hand, *apparent* verbal truths are sometimes made false by the high colour which a word has received : as :

A man whose creed is amiss is a mis-creant.

Yet such are oftener jokes than fallacies.

(12.) Scholastic Definition.

Logicians are accustomed to prescribe, that the definition of a term shall recount its *genus* and *its specific difference.* Thus to say that Man is a talking animal, or, is a cooking animal, or, is a religious animal,—whether true or false, are all (in form) logical definitions, because they assign, 1, the genus, Animal ; 2, the specific difference,—to talk, to cook, to be religious. But a definition may be quite unexceptionable, without marking out which part is Genus. Thus, if a Square be defined as "a four-sided figure whose sides are all equal

and angles all equal," it admits the comments, 1, that the Genus is *Rhombus*, and specific difference *equal angles*: or 2, that the Genus is Rectangle and specific difference *equal sides:* or 3, that the Genus is *Parallelogram* and the specific difference *equal sides and angles;* or 4, that the Genus is *Equiangular and Equilateral Polygon*, and the specific difference the having *four* sides and angles: or 5, that the Genus is *Four-sided Figure*, and the specific difference *all the other particulars of the definition.* In short, we may divide the definition *any how*, and always make out one part to be Genus and the other Specific Difference. I take from JOHNSON'S Dictionary the definition of Brothers, "males born of the same parents." Here we may either say, that "those born of the same parents" are Genus, and "to be of male sex" is the Specific Difference. But again, we may say, that "Males" are the Genus; and that to be born of the same parents is the Specific Difference. Of what imaginable use is such logical doctrine?

In fact, when we pass beyond mathematics, the chief use of definition is to secure ourselves against the *ambiguities* of words half popular, half scientific. Thus it is with regard to such terms as Material, Spiritual, Natural, Preternatural, Miraculous, Inspired. "Matter" with some means, "that which gravitates;" with others, "that which affects the human senses;" with others, "that which possesses extension and resists pressure;" with others, "that which exists in space;" with others perhaps, "that which is subject to geometrical laws;" with others, "that which is incapable of thought or spontaneous action." Nay, the same person may unawares shift from one of these meanings to another in even a short argument. But provided the definition given be self-consistent and fixes the meaning; be not opposed to popular use, nor so subtle as to embarrass; we need *no scholastic rules* concerning it. The common sense of the dictionary-maker is the best guide.

(13.) Necessary Truth.

There are those who, in telling us that Truth is of two sorts,—Truth that *is*, and Truth that *must* be ;—add that *the latter is known by our "inability to conceive"* the contrary.*

Yet an ignorant person is perfectly able to conceive that the three angles of a triangle are together greater (or together less) than two right angles. He can conceive that the ratio of a sphere to its circumscribing rectangle is $3\frac{1}{4}$ to $4\frac{2}{3}$, as easily as that it is 2 to 3. Were it otherwise, we might, without study or reasoning, reject by a sort of instinct every false mathematical statement, from our mere inability to "conceive" it. What proof could ever establish this doctrine, I avow myself "unable to conceive." Will this avowal be accepted, in proof that the doctrine is "necessary falsehood."

If the ignorant man may fancy that he does conceive what he cannot, or fancy that a thing *must* be, which only *is ;* no test of necessary truth can be based on the assumption that the educated man is proof against a like delusion.

But though "conceiving" has nothing to do with the question, this is not to say that no truth is justly called Necessary. Verbal truth, such as most of the Axioms of Euclid, is obviously necessary and irreversible. (As said the Greek comedian : To make undone what has been done, is the one thing which even God cannot do.) To say that two and three make four, or that the part is equal to the whole, is not merely contrary to truth, but is a *self*-contradiction. But though Geometrical Axioms be necessary truth, Geometrical Propositions are not *obviously* so ; nay, nor are those of Arithmetic, for we may be diffident of our processes of proof. Boys, when they have proved an algebraic formula, delight in

* (Note.) Hence the recent ungrammatical jargon, "unthinkable." To *think* is not an active verb. To say, "I think a horse," is neither true nor false, but simple *nonsense*. The same is true of, "A horse is unthinkable," or, "An assumption is unthinkable."

verifying it in detail, and, by actual trials with numbers taken at random, earn a faith in the validity of general reasonings. It must have been the same with the earliest students of Geometry. Confidence in the generalizing power of the human mind, confidence in the validity of certain processes of proof, grows up gradually; but when it is attained, the truth thus established appears *as necessary as its foundations.* Then *all* geometry and algebra appear necessary, because the axioms are necessary.

It is alleged that the law of gravity *might* be other than it is. No doubt we find nothing contradictory or obscure in the hypothesis that it is as the inverse cube of the distance. But when we observe that emanations, as light and heat, *necessarily* vary as the inverse square of the distance, I (for one) cannot doubt that the time will come, when the laws of celestial mechanics, now known, will be recognised as equally necessary with the propositions of geometry.

But it is asked;—Are you not improperly assuming that Space is a something external to our minds, and not a mere mode of apprehension invented by the mind? So to put the question as to be intelligible to myself, and not run the risk of being said to misrepresent a celebrated speculative doctrine, is probably beyond my power. Yet the topic is here virtually obtruded on us. Notoriously our interpretation of our sensible experience is often delusive. When we feel a mass of lead to be "heavy," we suppose this quality to *inhere* in the lead, and are slow to believe that the weight might change, without any change at all in the substance, by a mere change in the globe of the earth or by carrying the lead higher or lower. To reveal to us that we have misinterpreted our senses does not involve us in universal distrust, but only inculcates caution and wise scepticism: for it does not impugn the sense itself as fundamentally unveracious. But, inasmuch as the earliest revelation, on which all knowledge whatsoever is built, is the revelation of Matter, of Self and of Space, as things contrasted; I cannot believe that Matter, nor yet that Space, is an illusion of my Mind, without

total distrust of every thing. To say that Space has no existence external to my mind, is to say that it is an illusion. Change of phraseology may be good, bad, or pedantically absurd; as to say *A congeries of forces,* instead of a *particle of matter;* but this does not impugn the truthfulness of sense nor the trustworthiness of perception: on the other hand, to deny that Matter is an object external to the mind, would be fatal. So too, a change of mere phraseology about empty Space, cannot concern logic; but fundamentally to deny the existence of Space is to me a proclamation of universal disbelief.

(14.) Infinity.

Infinite is merely the Latin for Boundless, and it is hard to understand by what right any one ever uses the word to mean any thing else. Some metaphysicians appear to go astray from a very superficial understanding of the higher mathematics. When a mathematician talks (for instance) of an infinite circle, they have evidently no idea that this means a varying circle, of uncertain magnitude, not merely indefinite, but liable to increase, at *his* mere will, beyond any limits which *you* may assign. The metaphysician who talks of the Deity as infinite, will often imagine that he employs the term as the mathematician does. This would amount to saying that the Deity is a *varying magnitude;* nay, that I can make him vary beyond any limits which you assign. Alike in mathematics and in metaphysics Infinite means *Boundless:* so far they agree. In both it is obviously a negative term. To say that Space is infinite, is merely to say, that it has no bounds,—or that we cannot conceive bounds to it: and that is all that can be meant in applying the word Infinite to Time or to Deity. He co-exists with Space and Time.

Of course, the above does not touch the question, whether it be a delusion in us to suppose Space or Time or Deity to exist at all; but simply what we mean by calling them Infinite.

(15.) Transcendental Truth.

Whether Coleridge's Literary Remains, picked up often from his pencillings, represent his deliberate convictions, others may inquire. I find them to reason on the most arduous questions with unshrinking confidence, and when contradictory results are elicited, to put forward as excuse the transcendental nature of the subject, instead of confessing that some mistake has somewhere been made.

But who is to draw the limits of Transcendental Truth,—that Elysian field within which a speculator may self-complacently indulge in contradicting himself, without reproof, as often as he likes? To imagine our notions to be clear, and the transcendentalist's dim, might seem a gratuitous insult. If his ideas are clearer or juster than ours, his business is to help us to precision and truth, to lessen confusion, to separate the known from the unknown; not, to teach us to rest complacently on avowed contradictions. It avails not to plead in excuse, that his words (suppose, *Angel, God)* inadequately "express the things" intended. Neither do Man and Horse express "things" adequately. It is enough if words express *our notions* of things. But in fact, Time and Space, Self and Non Self, Life and Death, may all claim to be *transcendental*, —for any thing that appears to the contrary. May then geometers and astronomers, metaphysicians and physiologists contradict themselves knowingly and avowedly, without being abashed; and throw the blame on the difficulty of the subject? No one obliges them to treat it, if it is too hard for them.

A very different man from Coleridge has gone marvellously far against logic, and as I think, against good sense; I mean the Rev. Professor Sedgwick, in his Discourse concerning the Studies of the University of Cambridge. He therein

severely rebukes PALEY for "shutting up the Almighty into a syllogism," because PALEY demonstrates the Divine Goodness as follows. "The Creator either sought the happiness of his creatures, or sought their misery, or was indifferent about both. The two latter hypotheses are refuted by numberless facts: therefore the first hypothesis is true."—It is open to any one to deny that the three hypotheses exhaust all the possibilities. It is also open to any one to contest the alleged refutation of the two latter hypotheses. Mr. SEDGWICK makes no objection on either head: but, barely because the argument is dealing with the "Creator," he objects even to draw a pious conclusion by a process of logic which he would approve if the word Creator were changed into Angel or Man. This is to say, that we are not to argue *at all* about Deity; in which case, the less we think of Him, (or of Theology, which is the Science of Him,) the better.

(16.) PREJUDICE AND PRESUMPTION.

Lawyers are popularly believed to maintain, that "Possession is nine points of the Law." Undoubtedly to displace—whether an opponent or a belief—requires an effort; therefore we are apt to demand, in the cause of truth, that the mind shall not be *prepossessed*. Yet in strictness this is simply impossible, except as to a world from which the mind has been totally excluded; otherwise it inevitably makes assumptions, and generally unawares. Indeed without it we could not reason at all, for we should have nothing to start from. Our starting point is from *ostensible* truth, not from any thing demonstrated; and even under what we regard as sensible fact, assumptions lurk. Some of the ancient reasoners, (perhaps to evade supposing the Sun to get under and through the Earth,) suggested that a new Sun might be born every morning and perish every evening. This odd hypo-

thesis may first reveal to us that we have made an assumption unawares; viz. we have *assumed* that the Sun seen to-day is the Sun of yesterday. It may be added, we assume that the Sun of 12 o'clock is the Sun of 11 o'clock; and that the man whom we meet to-day is the same as one (wholly like him) whom we saw yesterday.

Many such assumptions are made, and generally made unawares, by every one; yet they are not always justified by their universality: cases are sometimes found in which our whole race has made the same error, and it is especially where we are not aware that we assume any thing, that the danger of error is greatest. When we are aware that there *is* an assumption, and yet on deliberate consideration we justify it, this is scientifically called a *Presumption.* The word usefully marks, that while on the one hand the proposition is not yet proved, on the other it deserves to be received until disproved. By reasoning upon it, and remembering its nature, we may often arrive at confirmation or refutation, as will further appear below, under Verification.

But when we hold as true, what has not been proved, and we do not know that we are assuming any thing, one who holds it to be either untrue or needing proof, and not deserving to be accepted as a Presumption, (that is, as Provisional truth,) calls it a *Prejudice.* The word may of course be applied against one who deliberately propounds as a Presumption (admitting that his proof is not complete) a proposition which we reject; but I think this is rare. It ordinarily imputes to the holder an *unconscious prepossession,* or an unjust belief concerning the state of the argument.

(17.) Deduction.

The simplest form of inference, is to deduce a narrower from a wider statement, which is believed or momentarily assumed to be true: as, from the general assertion, "*Every* bird was hatched from an egg," to deduce, "*This* or *that* bird was hatched from an egg." Conversely, if we can produce an instance in which the narrower statement is undeniably *false*, we infer *à fortiori*, that "much less" can the wider proposition be true. Thus: "Every bird has feathers" is refuted by the discovery of a bird which has *not* feathers, but hair. Our conviction of the justness of the deduction is seen in each case in and by itself, and does not depend on our knowledge of any higher generalization.

These two processes contain by far the most important part of what is called Syllogism. Only in Syllogism the *two* "Premisses," from which an inference is made, are both formally stated. The second premiss, in these simple cases, asserts the fact that we are dealing with an assertion narrower than the first adduced. Thus, after, "Every bird came from an egg," we add: "But the nightingale is a bird;" *therefore* the nightingale came from an egg. Here the second premiss, called the Minor, does but indicate that the conclusion is *a particular case* of the first premiss, or Major.—It is obvious to remark that in thus descending from the general to the particular we seem to assume that general truth is more easily known than particular; and I suppose that the perpetual use of syllogism among the medieval Schoolmen did accompany (whether as cause or effect) that delusive notion. And from this perhaps arises the scientific repugnance to syllogism so marked in Playfair and other eminent moderns. Yet to refute erroneous generalization is needful; and it is done by reasoning which is substantially Syllogism: as: "*If* every bird had feathers, the ornithorhynchus *would have* feathers:

but he has not: hence the hypothesis is untrue." Otherwise stated: "The ornithorhynchus has not feathers: the ornithorhynchus is a bird: therefore, Not every bird has feathers." This is called the syllogistic *form* of argument; in favour of which I have nothing whatever to say. But PLAYFAIR and others make objections which seem to me directed not against the form, but against the substance of Syllogism; (that is, against Deductive reasoning:) for they call it Petitio Principii,—"begging the question." If it be so in one form, so it is in every other form.

It is, no doubt, very vexatious to argue with men who by their confident generalizations extinguish what you regard as facts, and cannot be made to understand that you pay no allegiance to their broad doctrine, and on the contrary, rather adduce your fact to rebuke it as premature, as too wide, or as incautiously stated. But excess of confidence in a generalization is possible, and is common, in the school of Experimental philosophers, and is not at all confined to Aristotelian logicians.

Without any technical rules, it is always easy to test the validity of a syllogism, *when given in form*, by constructing it into a geometrical diagram. Thus for that just given, (which is in form, O is not F; O is B; therefore, Not every B is F;) we may put a circle (O) inside a larger circle (B), to denote: O is B. Place a circle (F) *outside* the circle (O), to denote: O is not F: and it immediately appears that the circle F *can not include* the circle B: that is, Not all B is F.

The uselessness of syllogism to test the justness of reasoning consists in the fact that we do not, and cannot conveniently, reason in syllogistic *form*. The great controversy is sure to be, how to reduce an argument into form. Some have made it an objection against Syllogism that it "adds nothing to the premisses," and *therefore is nugatory*. This is certainly a mistake; for the objection lies equally against all deductive reasoning; visibly and pre-eminently in Geometry and Algebra. But again, it is not always true, that when we

advance a narrower proposition inconsistent with one which is wider, that we *intend* to deny the wider. Very often we forget it, or are ignorant of it: and it is not superfluous to remind us of it. Credulity often shews itself (especially among Englishmen) in a greedy belief of alleged special facts, against which it is healthy to oppose generalization. Thus it is common with West Indians to assert that negroes will never labour except as slaves; and they imagine that they ought to be believed, because they have special experience of the negro. If against this I reason, that "*no race* of men prefers starvation to labour," and therefore I will not believe it of the negro, however much the disputant may say: "I've seen; and sure I ought to know:"—should I be chargeable with Petitio Principii?

One might think that a mathematician ought to understand that the *merit* of Syllogism does not consist in drawing a conclusion from *given* premisses, (which is extremely easy in all the forms that need be employed,) but in *inventing the combination* of the premisses. The most splendid feat of mathematical genius consists in putting together an argument, which, *when put together*, any intelligent youth can follow and discern to be demonstrative; though perhaps not three men in Europe could have constructed the argument. We may justly despise the *form* of Syllogism; but who now adopts it?

(18.) Syllogism not co-extensive with Deduction.

Archbishop Whately imagines that the force of all reasoning lies in its being reducible to Syllogism. The topic will recur, when we come to Induction. But I think he is wrong also as to Deduction. The argument: "Gold is heavier than Silver: Lead is heavier than Gold: *therefore* Lead is heavier than Silver," brings to the mind conviction as direct as the simplest of syllogisms. To say that its validity *depends on its being reducible* to syllogism, is wholly

unplausible; for to effect the reduction, you have to make changes of form at least as hard to accept as the direct argument; and when you have got your syllogisms, they are more complicated and cumbrous than the argument as it stands.

That WHATELY satisfies himself too easily as to the reduction of common argument to syllogistic form, may be inferred from his error concerning the sophism of ACHILLES and the tortoise, celebrated in antiquity. The sophist argued thus. "Achilles ran a race with the tortoise, and gave him a stadium in advance. His speed was tenfold of the tortoise, yet he was never able to catch him. FOR, while ACHILLES ran the stadium, the tortoise ran $\frac{1}{10}$ of a stadium; while ACHILLES ran the $\frac{1}{10}$th, the tortoise ran $\frac{1}{100}$; and so on for ever, the tortoise being always a little in advance, though less and less." That there is error here is easily proved by Anti-syllogizing; that is, by separate argument which deduces the contrary. For after ACHILLES has run *two* stadia, the tortoise has run but $\frac{2}{10}$ of a stadium; that is, has been outstripped by $\frac{8}{10}$ or $\frac{4}{5}$ of a stadium. But the problem is, how to show by syllogistic analysis the seat of the error. WHATELY contents himself by replying, that the confutation rests in the fact that no one has ever yet been able to reduce the argument to syllogisms. Surely, one might rejoin, it is for you to do that, if, as you say, syllogism is the universal touchstone. But that is not all. WHATELY does not discern that the fallacy is not logical at all, but what he would call *extralogical*, depending on the falsehood of a proposition which Arithmetic must confute, not Syllogism. The fallacy is, to assume that the sum of the series $1+\frac{1}{10}+\frac{1}{100}+$&c....is infinite *because* the number of terms is infinite; whereas its sum is $1\frac{1}{9}$; and when the tortoise has run $\frac{1}{9}$ of a stadium, ACHILLES has run $\frac{10}{9}$ or $1\frac{1}{9}$, and exactly catches him. The sophist arbitrarily portions out this finite distance into an infinite number of spaces, smaller and smaller, and makes this a reason for slipping in the words NEVER, ALWAYS, as if the time spent

in traversing $1\frac{1}{9}$ of a stadium were infinite. But if the velocity of the runners were so regulated as to produce the series $1+\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{3}+\frac{1}{4}+$&c., the conclusion is correct that he who is in advance would *never* be caught. Mere logic cannot discover this.

When Syllogism *descends* from the more general to the less, the process evidently cannot be reversed. But in mathematical reasonings it is quite common to be able to prove one premiss from the other premiss and the conclusion. This suffices to indicate that such argument is not mere syllogism. As a single illustration: "A is greater than B; B is equal to C; *therefore* A is greater than C," is not more valid than: "B is equal to C; A is greater than C; *therefore* A is greater than B." So many geometrical reasonings turn upon *equality*, that this phenomenon is to be expected; for it is the same to say, B=C, as C=B; whereas in syllogism the terms of a positive proposition are rarely commensurate.

It is not only unexceptionable reasoning,—it is also highly popular,—to descend in argument at once from two or more generals to particulars; and if we reduce these to syllogism, we run greater danger of fallacy by far; because the complexity and tediousness tire the mind. Thus: "Not all barbarians are defeated in their first conflict with the superior warlike force of more civilized men: *for*, the Araucanians, though wholly new to firearms, beat the Spaniards in their first battle." Here three descents from general to particular are made all at once.

[Professor De Morgan and others have further shown that Syllogism does not comprize all the forms of legitimate Deduction. It has long been complained that Syllogism merges in the vague word *Some*, whatever is less than All: hence "*Most* Englishmen are truthful" is pared down into "*Some* Englishmen are truthful;" and "Few Englishmen are cowards," becomes "Some are, and Some are not, cowards." This inability of the Aristotelian logic to take cognizance of the difference between Most (a great majority), and Very

few (a small minority) necessarily makes some good arguments turn out bad under its "reductions." DE MORGAN gives a very simple form of argument, such as the following: Most of the Eton pupils are sons of Englishmen: Most of them are well behaved: therefore, *some* sons of Englishmen are well behaved. Ludicrous as it may seem, this contemptibly small inference cannot be drawn at all by the Aristotelian logic, which vitiates the conclusion by substituting *Some* in each of the premisses for *Most*. In fact, if we change *Most* into *More than half*, the inference will still be soundly drawn. So, if we "quantify" the Subject, as by saying, $\frac{m}{p}$th of the pupils are so and so, and $\frac{n}{p}$th of them something else; we can draw an inference, whenever $(m+n)$ is greater than p. Common sense sees this at a glance: but syllogism is at fault.]

(19.) FIRST TRUTHS.

It would seem to have been among the points in which ARISTOTLE differed from PLATO, how the phrase "First Truths" should be accepted. PLATO (if I understand) meant by them the pregnant general truths out of which all minor truth must be deducible; which therefore in a deductive science come first, (as Axioms or Laws,) though they may come late in time to an individual or nation. ARISTOTLE wished rather to use the phrase for those truths which are *first to each of us;* since, of necessity, striving from the known towards the unknown, each of us must begin from what he knows. We shall probably all agree, that while we are dealing with deductive science, it is reasonable to interpret the phrase with PLATO: but beyond mathematics, the only sciences which can plausibly be called Deductive, are Ethics and Political Economy. The First Truths in chemistry and geology are matters of fact, attested by sense: nevertheless, the human senses being very uniform, those First Truths are the same for all men, and may stand at the head of a scientific

treatise: as indeed do the experiments on which the laws of Mechanics and Optics are founded. But what are First Truths in Politics? in Historical Criticism? in Theology? nay, and in Ethics? They vary not only with different men and with different ages, but with the same man at different times of his life; for what he once either dimly descried or proved elaborately, he may afterwards come to discern as a first principle: hence, such first truths do not yet belong to *science*, and have no fixedness at all. This is probably the reason why it is so hard to invest these branches of human thought with the form and authority of science. Many a man's first truths in religion are mere negations. CICERO, or CICERO's COTTA, might tell us, that his first truth consisted in a profound conviction that the popular mythology and augury were false. Their falsehood was more certain to COTTA than any thing positive concerning the gods.—It is from such private convictions, perhaps Negations, side by side with Presumptions, that each man who thinks fundamentally on such subjects works his way up; and no two minds can have the same history. Indeed to each person the great difficulty is to know *what are* his first principles, unless he start from some outward authority which is accepted without criticism. This is of course a crude and infantine condition of knowledge. Until many minds discern and adopt the *same* first truths, science has hardly begun. In Historical Criticism nevertheless sensible progress in this direction has certainly been made.

The celebrated lines of HESIOD, which may be summed up as asserting: "The voice of mankind is a voice of God," (so absurdly caricatured into, Vox populi vox Dei,) is, in the judgment of ARISTOTLE, the sound foundation of scientific truth. It cannot be claimed as dogmatically establishing more than the substantial veracity of the senses, and the main principles of Ethics: moreover to interpret and define both the one and the other with scientific accuracy, remains a difficult task.

In the great controversies which have agitated the world, the *true posture* of the argument has always been the main point contested; and this generally means, From *what* are we to proceed, as from first truths? To discern, not only what are with us first truths, but also what are such with our opponents, is the greatest of all necessities, if controversy is to be useful. We need to penetrate to our fundamental differences. It is easy to gain reputation as a controversialist, by developing the results of the first truths assumed by one's own party, and neglecting to observe that to an opposite school they are not admitted as truths at all.

The chief use (or excuse) for some approach to the very entangling and generally unfair method of *questioning*, which is called "Socratic," is, when it is honestly directed to ascertain what first truths an opposite party will grant.

(20.) Degrees of Certainty.

The basis of Certainty is found in the agreement of human minds, as Hesiod indicates. The agreement is most complete in regard to the testimony of the outward senses. Exceptional cases, such as of idiots and madmen, lose authority by their own incongruities. Occasional defects (as in colour-blindness) prove themselves to be defects in various ways: so that on the whole we speak of the human senses as our firmest ground of certainty. So at least the mass of mankind have always thought. Is this to be reproved in philosophers as "materialist?" I think not.

The propositions which we establish in Morals or in Religion rest on a less complete agreement of mankind, or on longer chains of reasoning, which thereby more easily allow lurking places for fallacy. We may admit that in degree of *certainty* they are inferior to the propositions of Sense, and yet we may believe them with a *conviction* equally absolute.

Our chief measure of a man's conviction is found in his

deliberate action. One who without necessity, without excitement, walks over a plank bridge, knowing that, if it were to break, he would fall into a frightful chasm, shows his absolute conviction that it will not break. If the bridge be very rickety, he may confess that he has less certainty of its not breaking than of the solid earth not subsiding; nevertheless, while he needlessly walks upon it, we see that his conviction is unimpaired. Just so, the conclusions of morals or religion may have less certainty than those of physics, yet they may have enough to produce in us a conviction practically unlimited.

Human life grows up from the animal into the intellectual and spiritual. The higher truths must be founded upon the lower, the nobler upon the meaner. Our very knowledge of Self depends upon muscular structure, our sympathies upon instincts, our sentiment on sympathy. As the foundation, however rude, is stronger than the superstructure, we need not wonder to find an analogy to this in the various orders of truth.

(21.) Close Reasoning.

There is some ambiguity involved in calling a man a close reasoner. Some rather vexatiously insert and parade propositions which every one will supply of himself. Hereby they perhaps make their argument approach the forms of syllogism: yet this is merely to argue Verbosely, not Closely.

Closeness of reasoning consists in care *neither to overdraw nor to underdraw* our conclusions. To overdraw is the fault of haste or greediness. To underdraw may be rhetorical policy, where we fear to awaken passion by telling the whole truth: but it may also be sophistical, where the reasoner knows that his argument will *prove too much* for him if he draw it legitimately. *Too much*, means, that it will prove something which is notoriously false, or something which he himself does not admit to be true.

Yet closeness of reasoning is not identical with *cautious* reasoning; which includes, as at least equally important, the choice of such assumptions or bases of argument as can least be objected to, or are the least which suffice for our conclusion. This is often called, *occupying low ground.* But what is logically effective, may be rhetorically very ineffective; if hereby we avoid to call out the nobler passions. Those who deal much in such reasoning are very dry.

One celebrated mode of economizing our assumptions is by the *Dilemma:* i. e. when we evade the necessity of establishing a proposition, as to which there might be doubt, by arguing out the case both ways, i.e. by assuming the proposition to be true, or next, to be false; and deducing our result alike on either hypothesis. Or again: if it be allowed that *one of two* propositions must be true, then we may argue upon them alternately towards the same result. Probably this also will be popularly called Close Reasoning.

(22.) Arguments *à priori.*

As opposed to *à posteriori,* the argument *à priori* neglects as much as possible the special facts of a case, and deals with its outlines only. Hence the conclusion is generally applicable more widely than to the case in hand; which tends to enlarge our wisdom. One who should aim to prove that the earth is flattened at its poles, might best convince the public of it by exhibiting in a table the results of measuring degrees of latitude on the earth's surface. But it is more *instructive* to reason that the fact *must* be thus, since the oceans are in permanent equilibrium, while the earth by its revolution tends to heap the water round the equator. This at once exhibits a broader truth, probably applicable to the other planets, and leads us to use the phrase Must Be instead of Is.

In passing it may be observed, that what Newton thus divined *à priori,* was afterwards established by measurement;

which, in contrast, is *à posteriori* reasoning. Such confirmation is always felt to be peculiarly valuable, as will be further set forth under VERIFICATION.

In reasoning *à priori* we assume fewer data than in *à posteriori*, which very thing makes the former method difficult; indeed it often inspires alarm by the ambitiousness and sweep of the inference. Yet, as assuming fewer data, it may be said to occupy "low ground."

Beyond the sphere of exact science such reasoning is only probable, or establishes a *provisional* opinion; nevertheless it is, as such, often of indispensable value, as indicating whether much or little positive and *à posteriori* proof is needed for a conclusion.

Argument from cause to effect is sometimes the same as to argue *à priori;* yet the two are not essentially the same thing. To argue from cause to effect is neither harder nor easier, more cogent or less cogent, than to argue from effect to cause. In Celestial Mechanics, they constitute merely inverse problems, *all* the causes being supposed known. But in human life this is quite impossible; that is why the argument from cause to effect is so difficult and slippery. Conversely, when we think that we argue from effects to causes, we do but argue towards some *few* or principal causes; and even then, it is hard to gain agreement of several competent reasoners,—as we see in the great problems of History.

(23.) INDUCTION, *first stage.*

The word Induction is ill suited to English; for its sense is not all suggested by the verb Induce. In Latin it has been used to translate the Greek word ἐπαγωγὴ, which etymologically=Inference. Inducere, to *lead on*, and Inferre to *bear on* or *carry on*, come to the same, when used metaphorically.

Yet Induction has received a definite and more limited meaning, which contrasts it with Deduction; for it is, the

ascending from one or more truths to another more general, as Deduction is ordinarily limited to *descending*, from a general to establish a particular. Yet Induction largely uses (what is virtually) Syllogism, in order to refute tentative general propositions.

Induction in embryo is nothing but vague presumption, with no well defined or fixed form of the proposition which it infers. When animals have been molested, they show shyness, sometimes more defined, sometimes less. If deer are alarmed at a man with a gun, but not at a man without a gun, we see that their inference from past molestations is virtually, "A man with a gun is dangerous;" but if their shyness is indiscriminate, it stands more vaguely, "Men are dangerous to us." Of couse no absolute and general truth can be established thus; it can only be *suggested*, and proposed for further examination,—for confirmation, modification or rejection.

That the animal has *consciously* in its mind a general truth, is not here asserted. But change the word "animal" into "human barbarian." If a tribe of savages in an island of the Pacific have been visited by two or three European ships, their experience of our good and evil will undoubtedly shape out to them many different propositions. If they have bought of Europeans on each occasion axes, hammers and nails, they may embody their experience in more than one proposition; as: "Men *with white faces* have plenty of iron," or, "Men *who come in great ships* have plenty of iron." Where experience is very narrow, a great number of such propositions may thus compete. Quickness to be satisfied with the first form given to the general proposition suggested by experience is a peculiarly barbaric error. Miscellaneous knowledge, (*information*, as we name it,) tends to explode this error, and is of preëminent service. Nothing is so blinding as the false light of prejudice, or premature judgment. The power of disproof needs to be greatly reinforced, before we can infer from given experience such general propositions, as deserve further examination for proof or disproof.

If, as in the *experiments* of Science, we can graduate successive experiences, and change one element at a time, great facility is offered for excluding false generalizations. When a reasoner definitely addresses himself to the problem of constructing a general proposition which shall comprize as particular cases a number of attained facts, he has first a problem comparable to that of shaping a cap which shall (as tightly as may be) go on to a number of given skulls. Next his general proposition must be such as has no known refutation from other experience. When experience is large, these conditions may be so severe, as to exclude all general propositions but one. In such case, that one evidently must stand as *provisional* truth,—to be held probable, *until refuted.*

(24.) Induction, *second stage.*

Most persons would use the word Induction only of the process which we employ *consciously and thoughtfully:* though Macaulay says, it is by induction that an infant learns to expect milk from its mother, not from its father. Evidently, this use of the word attributes Induction to brutes also; and few persons, I think, will choose so to speak. It is certain that all barbarians expect the sun to rise and the seasons to return; but *custom* suffices to inspire this expectation. Most of us will attribute Induction to the few alone who consciously and deliberately use the argument: "The sun will rise to-morrow, *since* it has risen regularly in the past."

A thoughtful man, as a Thales, might ask himself: "Why not equally argue that a spring will never dry up, because no tradition has come down to us that it ever has been dry? If, at a distant time, the sun actually did not rise, is it certain that ancient men were able to transmit the fact to us? Or again, grant that the island of Rhodes *never in the past* suffered the shock of an earthquake; can we thence infer that it *never will be* shaken in the future? Surely we have no

right to such confidence. How then can I be so sure that sunrise and the change of seasons will in the future follow the same routine as in the past?"—To such self-examination he might reply: "Vast masses have vast inertia. We know of no forces or obstacles likely or able to turn the sun out of his course suddenly and convulsively. In the lapse of many ages, small changes, invisible to us within our narrow limits of observation, may (for aught we know) revolutionize the heavenly bodies: we cannot, from our tradition of two or three thousand years, infer what will happen many million years hence. Therefore we cannot establish any absolute generality from our experience. If we watch a ball rolling on a green, we may foresee what will be its course for a few feet in front of it; but we cannot foresee its ultimate course. So, it is only the near future of the heavenly courses which we can foretel. Nevertheless, the rightful *presumption* is, that no sudden and spasmodic change can affect the mighty sun; but that, as he has moved from the earliest time to which records or tradition point, so will he move (we say not, for ever; but) in the near future of the human race. I pretend not that this is demonstratively proved; but it has enough support to bring reasonable conviction to the mind. If any one says No; it is *his* place to assign adequate reason for disbelief."

Such argument, it will be seen, goes far beyond the limits of *formal* logic. It does not confine its view to the dry fact that *certain things* have happened in the past, and infer that phenomena wholly similar will happen in the future; but it enters into the question, What *sort of things* they are. Here we step across from the logic of words to the logic of things. And from the beginning of human cultivation this higher logic was practised. Certainly it would surprize us to find a tribe of savages which had not a higher conviction in the stability of day and night, summer and winter, than in the future supply of water from a spring which had never been known to be dry. In formal logic, the two arguments stand

on a par: but in the practical logic of life they differ much in weight.

Again, it will be seen that the argument which I imagine for THALES moves towards the modern doctrine of the Stability of the Laws of Nature, which so largely imbues modern arguments of Physics. It claims, as a just presumption, that the vast masses of nature have "stability," in this sense,—that they are not subject to *sudden* change. Moreover, the absence of any "known sufficient reason" for sudden change, is made a ground for believing in stability *rather than* in the opposite. When this topic has been made available, Induction seems to have reached a second stage, of fuller maturity.

(25.) ON THE VALIDITY OF INDUCTION, IN GENERAL.

Induction in Exact Science does not attain its final completeness, until Verifications have been added, which will presently be spoken of. But some persons do not account Verification as *part* of the Induction; nor is Verification always attainable. Even before it has been attained, Induction may have great weight: nay, it will hardly be said that our conviction of the Sun's certain return is either more intense or more reasonable than that of THALES. The experience of more than 2000 years between him and us may be called a "Verification" of *his* inductive belief; but the induction seems to have been well able to dispense with this subsidiary aid. We may therefore ask: on what does the force of Induction to compel assent essentially depend?

If we reply, by the topic on which stress was just laid, we confine our confidence in it to the grand and vast phenomena of the universe. But it is evident that generalizations founded on experience are endless, and convince all mankind in the very beginnings of civilized life. Men learned the qualities of plants, their suitability for food or medicine, the best mode of selecting, of dressing, of culti-

vating them : the instincts and habits of animals, the difficulty or impossibility of domesticating them : the length of life of man and beast : the properties of wood, stone and metals. Since we cannot denounce their trust in such generalizations as unreasonable, it belongs to science to analyse and justify it.

WHATELY will have it, that Induction is nothing but Syllogism, with the general proposition suppressed. Thus, if one reason : "I have found *ten* shorthorned oxen taken at random to fatten easily ; therefore, I expect *other* shorthorned oxen to fatten easily," the validity of the reasoning depends (he says) on the suppressed premiss, "Whatever is true of *some* individuals of a class, is true of *all*."—But to say that this is what gives cogency to Induction, is to say that Induction is always worthless ; that its most sagacious and cautious application is logically as rotten as its most fatuous or sportive. Induction is made to depend upon a general proposition which is in all cases certainly false, while it proves the conclusion equally well whether the basis of the Induction be two instances or two million. But what if we can exhaust the entire possible number ? Some call it "Induction" in EUCLID, when he divides a proposition into four cases, (the only ones possible) and proves each separately. —Why, then, neither does the argument want WHATELY'S false "major."

It cannot be doubted that in mere observation the *number* of instances observed chiefly affects the mind and gives plausibility to a generalization. From this, MACAULAY in his brilliant article on LORD BACON, [Edinburgh Review, vol. 65] has laid down absolutely that a valid induction differs from a foolish induction solely in the number of examples on which it is founded. The example which he gives furnishes to us material not uninstructive.

An old gentleman, he says, used to entertain his friends after dinner by an induction, to prove that Jacobinism arose out of having three names. He quoted to the point, CHARLES

James Fox, John Horne Tooke, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, John Philpot Curran, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Theobald Wolfe Tone,—as Jacobins ; and in contrast, William Pitt, John Scott, William Windham, Samuel Horsley, Henry Dundas, Edmund Burke, as opposed to Jacobinism. Macaulay then lays down, that this sham induction differs from a true induction *solely in its having a deficient number of instances.*

That the number of instances is not the fatal defect, appears at once from the fact, that many inductions in physical science, accepted as valid, rest on fewer instances than twelve,—which is the number here quoted. The obvious and sufficient refutation lies in the counter instances which may easily be produced. It is more to our purpose to insist, that the twelve names *have been unfairly picked.* Evidently any thing can be proved, if this be allowed. But if a Biographical Dictionary were opened at random twelve or more times, and it had been agreed beforehand to select the first name on the lefthand page, and examine both the political sympathies of the person and the number of his names; (or, if his political sympathies were unknown, to open at a new page, until twelve persons were thus obtained with known political sympathies:) if then it always appeared, that those with two names were Tories and those with three were Jacobins; we should probably say: "There is something *more than chance* in this." We perhaps might suspect that Jacobinical parents had a fancy for giving three names to their children, and conversely; much as Puritan parents had a love of Hebrew names. Now this usefully directs the mind to the fact, that the validity of Induction, so long as it rests upon a mere collection of instances, depends on those instances being taken without selection, intentional or unintentional. To establish a general proposition concerning the quantity of salt in a gallon of sea water, evidently a hundred specimens from the same part of the same sea are scarcely worth more than one. To determine the quality of seed-corn, the purchaser selects

his samples *at random* and as it were blindfold from the sack. He will not adopt, as decisive of the whole, such specimens as the seller may present. This simple case suffices to show that the validity of Induction, when we rest on mere examples, turns on the doctrine of Chance, which here means impartial acceptance. The question is not, as MACAULAY imagines, *how many* instances we have got, but *how* we got them. When we say, that we took them by "chance," or "at random," we mean that we did not so take them as purposely to favour any one conclusion. But this is not enough: we must also beware, lest Nature herself may have sorted and packed the case, so as to present the specimens unfairly. Or, to put the matter otherwise, we must carefully look to it, whether our general proposition is not made *more* general than the specimens examined authorize;—whether it states all the qualities which they have in common. We may have generalized concerning *all* sea water, when we ought to have limited the proposition to the water of the *Oceans*, or even to the *water on their surface;* and so in other cases. But if we have thus severely limited the general proposition, and we know no counter reasons rejecting it or discrediting it, and believe the collection of instances to be quite impartial; then, even if their number be but few, they will give a high probability to the wider truth which we essay to found on them. Even one or two examples may satisfy us as to the medical potency of a plant.

(26.) VERIFICATION BY CHANCES.

It is professed that Mathematical science is demonstrative: hence it is at first a surprize to learn that Mathematicians often are glad to verify their conclusions by the test of chance-trials. This does happen sometimes simply because the validity of their processes is questionable: for they are not always perfect in demonstration. But in the commonest case, the thing to be verified is, the absence of error in the

application of the process. Thus, if it be numerical, a tired brain may have erred in a figure, or copied a wrong line, so as to vitiate the whole. Whoever constructs a numerical table, as of Logarithms, periodically checks his work by some method of duplicate computation. To make the thing clear to the unmathematical, suppose I were making a table of the multiples of any long number to aid me in dividing by it;—a table which will save fatigue of the head, and lessen the dangers of error. Let the number be 79,361. I form its double, its triple, its quadruple, &c., by successive *additions*, until I get nine times as much—viz., 714,249. Add to this once more the original number, and the result is 793,610. But by a glance of the eye we discern that this is actually ten times the original number; for we obtain it by merely adding a zero after 79,361. *This convinces us that the previous work has been correct.* It is possible, no doubt, that we have made somewhere two opposite errors, exactly neutralizing one another, so as, by sort of good luck, to bring out the right result. But such a Chance is highly improbable; and if it happen once, it cannot happen often. Thus if a mathematician examine a given table of figures by a formula constructed on purpose to test it, (a formula quite different from those by which the table was made,) and after random trials in every page find it correct, he regards its accuracy as reasonably trustworthy. Not but that even here there may be misprints, or final errors of writing out before going to press, on which his trials have failed to alight. To establish *absolute* accuracy in any work of art, is probably impossible: yet the example will explain how the doctrine of Chances operates to convince us.

To return to the shorthorned oxen. Let us suppose, that Mr. Bakewell had observed *two* such beasts, which by accident came under his notice, to fatten easily; and hereupon, it crossed his mind, that there was some connection between that fact and the shortness of their horns, so that he set up *tentatively* in his mind, as a proposition to be refuted

or confirmed: "*All* shorthorned oxen fatten easily." Further suppose, that, to put it to the test, he had written to eight graziers,—to all, in fact, personally known to him,—and asked them to look what sort of horns those beasts had, which fattened most easily; and that from one and all he had received the reply, "Of my stock, the beast which has fattened best has remarkably short horns":—every one would feel the immense confirmation hereby given to what before was little more than a suspicion,—resting on *two* instances. He has now *ten* instances: but the argument would not be: "This is true of *ten* cases; therefore it is true of *all*." It would stand thus: "The suspicion suggested by *two* cases, has stood the test in *eight* more; taking the graziers at random, and asking them the result of their experience. *This is something more than Chance.*"

Thus, whether we consider a mere ascent of many particulars towards a general proposition, which has no further verification; or on the other side suppose a testing of that proposition, after it has been put into definite shape;—*in either case*, the argument owes its validity to the doctrine of Chances.

(27.) Cogency of the Argument from the Chances.

If the doctrine of Chances give validity to Induction, what gives validity to the doctrine of Chances?

Consider a simple case. An urn is full of balls. I introduce my hand, and feel nothing else in the urn. I draw out one ball, and find it to be *black*. I return the ball, and draw a second time and a third time, groping at random. Every time, the ball drawn is black. I then conclude, that if the balls be not *all* black, yet the black ones are in majority. After six trials with the same result, I pronounce that they are in *great* majority.—What justifies the inference?

First, I "*know no reason*" but superiority of number in the black balls, which should lead to my drawing them, and them only. My general experience in life is, that when I want something, it does not come to my hand of itself. If objects are thick like trees in a forest, I may run on them unawares, and unwillingly; but if otherwise, I get them only by search and effort.—The assumption that the balls do not come to my hand by a will of their own, nor by the guidance of some mind, is essential to my drawing any inference concerning their comparative number.

If a juggler offer a pack of cards to draw from, and the person who draws draw always an ace of hearts, a child may infer that the pack consists wholly or chiefly of such aces: but adults are aware that the skill of the juggler passes off the same card. One who believes in meddling spirits, say fairies or genii, who shift and shuffle the objects around us, can have no reasonable ground to infer that black balls abound in an urn, because he always draws a black one. The fairy may each time guide to his hand the very same ball; and all the rest may be white. To give any weight to the doctrine of the Chances, we must believe our materials to be free from the special guidance of any superior mind. It would seem therefore that a belief of arbitrary intervention on the part of the most High, must incapacitate us, as perhaps it incapacitated the Arabs and the middleage Schoolmen for all but formal reasoning. In so far as such interference extends, human ignorance must extend; and even to suspect such interference, baffles our power of anticipation and paralyses our judgment.

Secondly then, assuming as a presumption and postulate alike scientific and religious, that He who is Highest will neither sport with our intellects nor allow us to be sported with by unseen jugglers, we have a right to infer that the frequent appearance of like inert objects is owing to their frequency; as, the frequent drawing of black balls to the frequency of the balls. This example typically exhibits the

cogency of an Induction, after (to the best of our power) we have limited the general conclusion as sharply as the examples, on which it is based, suggest. Nevertheless, rightly to frame the general proposition which the given examples *warrant*, is a delicate and difficult process. It needs (what we call) Judgment; a faculty cultivated by aid of extensive *Information*, which aids us to reject false lights, and imparts wholesome suspicions, and slowness of belief.

The Cogency of the argument from Chances cannot depend on mathematical calculation of fractions, such as one to a million, one to a billion, &c. All these estimates *presuppose*, and do but apply (or *quantify*) the principles. Nor can it depend upon Syllogism, except in so far as the doctrine of "No known Sufficient Reason" gives us ostensible and provisional Major premisses. Science has here (as with Intuition) to fall back upon Common Sense. It often happens that coincidences convince us all that a certain thing is true, because it is too much to attribute those coincidences *to mere chance*. Common Sense is generally the sole arbiter, irrespective of the question, whether mathematicians will, or will not, undertake to appreciate the chances numerically.

(28.) Experience and Experiment.

It has been stated by high authority, that the chief difference between the *spirit* of Bacon's philosophy and that of the Schoolmen was, that they looked to Proof, and he to Discovery; and that in regard to *procedure*, all before Galileo trusted chiefly to Observation and Experience; while the modern science, of which Galileo is the leader and Bacon the expounder, lays more stress on Experiment. The cardinal difference of the two last deserves attention.

Of course in many eminently important investigations we cannot make experiment. In Astronomy, the greatest of accurate sciences, only Observation is possible. Here, the

skill of the astronomer is exercised to ascertain at what crisis observation will be most valuable. It suggests what phenomena will solve, this way or that, certain doubtful questions; in what region they will be most fully seen, and at what hour or direction with least embarrassment. This is evidently a great improvement on mere routine-Observation; and, much more, on that casual and fitful knowledge called Experience.

The critical advantage of Experiment consists in sifting the complicated elements of a phenomenon. In many sciences, such as Chemistry and all its branches, and even in Physiology, it has been energetically applied; but Practical Medicine sadly lags behind. It is easy to see the cause. Even in so simple a matter as a man taking treacle-posset for a cold when going to bed, it is hard to discover, by any amount of "Experience," how much the treacle contributes to the result, how much the milk, and how much the heat. Of course, the paramount object is to cure the cold; and he who has experienced that this particular combination does good, seldom chooses to risk any thing for the sake of Science. If cat or dog were the patient, the physician (or rather the physiologist) would try the ingredients separately or with various changes: and the same applies to a hundred other cases. Men may think they are cured by hot brandy and water, when hot barley water would have done as well. A patient, who is cured by rest and medicine, would *perhaps* have got well equally by rest without the medicine. It is becoming notorious through the Homœopathists, who have dared to abstain from various remedies esteemed necessary, that many such things were no remedies at all, perhaps did but make bad worse. Physicians are most unhappily situated for experiment, since there is presented to them no *corpus vile* to tamper with; and, strange to say, they have to learn from the experiments of those whom they esteem quacks,—whose boldness they dare not imitate.

(29.) Highest Verifications of Science.

Hitherto it has appeared as though no Induction could attain *Universal* truth. We cannot by taking samples of seed wheat rightfully infer that *all* the grains are large, but only that a great majority are large; nor by any examination of samples of sovereigns from the Mint can we prove that there is not even a single light sovereign among them all. Nor in any case can Universal truth be reached by Induction, if Induction mean, either elaborate accumulation of instances, or samples taken, as fairly as we are able. The exceptions to some supposed law may be few enough to elude us, yet a single exception destroys the pretence of Universality. That Wood is lighter than Water, is a proposition of great practical value, and may long have been believed a universal truth, until at last it was found that Teakwood is heavier than water. Even the law of Gravity, as now estimated, may be, not absolute truth, but an approximation too near for our power of measurement to detect as defective. Speculators on molecular attraction have suggested laws, to which the received law approaches insensibly near, while tested by our organs only. But if we admit to the full such possibility, it is nevertheless a fact that our conviction of the Newtonian Theory is far too high to be called probability, and is comparable to our conviction of the truth of our senses. We know that they are fallible, and that we sometimes misinterpret them; yet we do not put their evidence on the same basis as a mere cautiously made Induction. What then is the additional confirmation which Physical Science, especially the Mathematical, has attained?

The great peculiarity is, that the laws there laid down, by more or less extensive Induction, are *quantitative*, and

admit of accurate *Deductions*, in the course of which any error in the supposed law would often be multiplied a thousand fold or a million fold. Under such circumstances, when results show no error, they give endless additional confirmation to the "law" from which they are deduced; and in fact would be accepted as an adequate "verification," even if the law had been arrived at by little more than conjecture founded on analogy. To this head belongs NEWTON's proof that the earth is flattened at the poles, which was at length verified by measurement. Even before Astronomy assumed its present form, as a theory of celestial mechanics; while it still was merely a problem of spherical geometry resting on close observation, the delicate computations needed to predict eclipses (which were generally successful enough for practical purposes) gave a complete popular demonstration of the science. Universally, successful predictions are the manifestation of an unmistakeable *power*, which convinces us that Truth lies at the bottom. Sir JOHN HERSCHEL indeed regards the prediction of such things as Eclipses as but a very small verification, in comparison with the far more complicated and difficult problem of finding the Longitude by measuring the distance of the moon from a fixed star.

The prediction of COPERNICUS, that Venus would at some time or other be found to have phases like the moon, is said to have impressed men's minds powerfully, when it proved true: yet it did not legitimately indicate any thing more than the acuteness of the reasoner; since it must be equally a fact, if the Ptolemaic theory were true. In recent days, the power of mental intercourse given by the electric telegraph, brings conviction to us all, that that electric theory must be true, which led to the invention of the method.

Again, it is observed that results which at first appear to be erroneous, but in fact reveal error somewhere else; equally with results novel and unexpected; yield, when confirmed, a very firm support to a theory. To have seemed wrong, and proved right, is an ordeal like passing through danger or

storm. The ship which for a moment seems to be overwhelmed, but comes through the waves unharmed, can be better trusted in the future.

We are also far more impressed, when two arguments totally *different in kind* bring out the same result, than by any multiplication of argument of the same kind. Error may, within certain limits, be self-consistent; and a common error may vitiate many processes, without exhibiting itself by diversity of results. But if the agreement subsists between two processes which rest on different principles, both processes seem to be verified; and if there still be error, it seems to lie higher. Thus learners in arithmetic, if they work out the same result by two processes which have not a figure in common except at the beginning and end, gain a conviction of their validity, which perhaps they cannot yet get from a scientific estimate of the reasoning employed. In all these cases of Verification, the doctrine of the Chances enters. In the *Predictions* of science, (on which so much stress is justly laid,) we see the matter instructively. The *order* in which facts are learned, and *how* you got at them, are of the utmost importance to the validity of the argument. It is not the same thing,—on the one hand, to learn two sets of facts and then construct a theory from them, which theory remains apparently idle and barren;—and on the other hand, to learn one set of facts first, construct a theory from them, infer new facts from the theory, and verify those facts by *after* observation. The latter process brings immensely more conviction than the former, even though the Induction which made the theory be feebler. Indeed it supposes (what was absent in the former process) a duplicate indication of the second set of facts.

(30.) On the Evidence of Particular Fact.

In all that has been here written concerning Induction, it has been assumed that various special truths are known, as so many facts, and that from these we proceed to elicit truths more general. This is the aspiration of what is specially called Philosophy,—to generalize. But conversely, it is often the main object to learn the truth concerning *definite matters*, of which primarily the five senses are the fit attestation, if only the thing inquired into be within their immediate reach. But it may be an event already passed, such as Judicial Courts and Historical Research investigate. It may be too far off to see, or it may lie in the depths of the earth or sea. Science then sometimes applies its own generalizations deductively, as the Celestial Mechanics and Chemistry may aid an inquiry concerning the undercrust of the Earth. But oftener, each science of fact develops for itself *rules of proceeding*, which do not take the form of general truth, but are rather warnings how to use certain instruments to best advantage,—what are their weak sides, and—when they are most trustworthy. And as the instruments concerned differ immensely, so the Logic (or *rules)* naturally differ, though something will be found in common.

The "instruments" here alluded to are such as, on the one hand, Human Testimony, (whether by the living voice or in writings;) on the other hand, instruments in the mathematical sense, such as the telescope and microscope, thermometer, mariner's compass, miner's magnet. All of these may be called *Specific Informants.* They are a kind of supplement to, or extension of, the bodily senses. What I cannot see with my naked eye, I see with a telescope: what I cannot

see myself, I see (so to say) by the eyes of another, when I accept the testimony of an eye-witness.

Every Specific Informant needs to have its veracity put to the test, and hereby may gain a solid reputation and authority. When, for the first time, a barbarian looks through a telescope at a well known object, a single glance may suffice to convince him of its value and trustworthiness; because he sees in it just what he makes sure he would see without it, were he near enough. Hence he will trust it in looking also at the moon. But the veracity of the mariner's compass is a much more complicated question, and after it was found to vary both with time and place, it seemed for a little while a dangerous guide, perhaps a misleader. This is not without analogy to Human Testimony. To understand its laws of error, is essential for its rightful use. Each instrument must be specially studied: without it, some of the most valuable may merely delude us. And as horizontal refraction will deceive us in the use of the telescope, so may early legends in our use of even noble writers.

GIBBON first taught that in History it was safe to believe the good which men tell of their opponents, and the evil which men tell of their own party. To get, in some such way, certain fixed bases of truth,—firm resting points,—is of the utmost importance. Each narrator has to be studied separately, as each witness in a court of law, to test his truth-telling qualities; just as a mathematical instrument must be studied. Some instruments, like the magnets by which miners measure the thickness of a wall of rock which separates them, are only trusted after trial of their prescience; exactly as with subterranean geometry.

(31.) The Lost Key.

King Nebuchadnezzar's problem of recovering and interpreting his lost dream was hard enough to puzzle even astrologers. It is a problem similar in kind to recover and interpret writing in an unknown language and unknown character. Even when the character is known, as in the case of the Etruscan fragments, we need some clue to their contents, a considerable mass of documents, or some knowledge of allied languages, to give us a chance of success. Again, if a *known* language be written in secret cipher, it may almost always be deciphered, if the cipher be everywhere of the same meaning. But if the sense attached to the signs vary by an unknown law, decipherment even of a familiar language is all but impossible. The problem in all these cases is different from any thing hitherto considered. We have not to work down from General to Particular Truth, nor upwards from Particular to General, nor by interpreting and balancing Specific Informants to elicit the truth: but we have to do, what is popularly called, find a Lost Key.

The peculiarity of the argument in all these cases, is, the high premium (so to say) which it gives to lucky guessing. The earlier analysis of the probabilities of the case goes for little or nothing: the inquirer may even forget what led him on, and his argument is not the worse, if his after-verification be satisfactory. Take the case of ample writings in a very difficult and complicated cipher. Suppose a person to find a paper explaining the secret, and through vanity to conceal that he has found it. If, professing to have discovered it by sheer cleverness, the steps of which he could not explain, he were to interpret paper after paper satisfactorily; if moreover, on close examination, it were undeniable, that the key,

as expounded by him, did actually give the words he assigned; everyone would accept the problem as solved. Language is so complicated, vast and delicate, that (to use an old comparison) the chance of a false cipher giving intelligent and sound results, would be as hard to believe, as that the pouring forth of alphabets from a bag should give us by chance the Iliad of HOMER. Again we may take the far milder task of deciphering a very illwritten letter, or MS. damaged by rot or fire, a classical text corrupted by frequent recopying: and we may inquire, what is the nature of the argument in these cases, and how far related to those which precede. In the first case, which is so very familiar, we are aware, that words illwritten, which we should have no chance of reading, if they were presented to us in isolation, are read with certainty, sometimes with ease, when we have them in connection; in so much that we transcribe them without apology, presenting our version as fact, not as conjecture. (Nay, the same thing happens in listening to speech imperfectly pronounced.) While this throws light on the rightful mode of seeking to correct a corrupt classical text, it suggests also that in all these cases we have before us rather a practical Art, than a Science. To read correctly the illwritten or the damaged, to interpret the illpronounced, is comparable to skill in using a microscope or a stethoscope. Each Art has its own rules. What these have in common, is, that by skilful conjecture they set up out of the obscure or fragmentary a result which by its harmony or lucidity commends itself to us as truth. —So, when an artist restores a mutilated piece of sculpture or of ruined architecture.

In the problem of deciphering a known language written in an unvarying cipher the method of proceeding is quite systematic: conjecture is superseded by what may fairly be called Science. The doctrine of Chances here lies at bottom, just as in making a Table of Life Annuities. The number of times that the words *and, the, this,...* occur out of every hundred words is not the same in one page of English as in

another; yet the variation is less in every thousand words; and in every ten thousand approaches so near to constancy, that in the previously known facts of the language the patient decipherer has a process of discovery almost certain.

Equally, in all the other problems, the logic which justifies the process, (if it be justifiable) turns on the doctrine of Chance, though with no numerical appreciation. Suppose that a Cuneoform text from Assyria is translated separately by even two students, and they produce translations substantially the same: then, though we may not know by what strangely lucky guesses the first discoveries of characters were made, by what process the alphabet was completed, or the language made out; we are competent to pronounce, that (unless there has been some unworthy collusion) the agreement of the two translators is *too much to attribute to mere Chance;* indeed if the piece be of any length, we may have from such an argument even an overwhelming conviction.—Put a smaller case in detail. One decipherer has interpreted two Persian words of unknown etymology, in a certain way which dissatisfies another; who pursuing his own clues, corrects the translation, and confirms it by help of Greek. The former, meanwhile, has found that his rendering, when its Assyrian equivalent is applied to various Assyrian inscriptions, is quite inadmissible. By help of his Assyrian, he corrects his original Persian rendering, and alights exactly on the same translation, which the other inquirer, ignorant of Assyrian, had convinced himself of otherwise. We pronounce: Such coincidences are "too much for mere chance." Such is the logic ever lying at the bottom.

The evidence which weighs with a decipherer or discoverer may be far greater than he can lay before the public; since the order of his guesses, and his many failures, would be too tedious and too egotistic a record: yet the more numerous his failures, if they were temporarily plausible, and solved many of the conditions, but not all,—the more desperate the difficulty appeared, after the most tantalizing hopes,—so much the

greater is his conviction that he has hit upon the truth, when at last a key is found to unlock the mystery. The public, which has not made the trial, cannot know whether (in details) other solutions might not succeed, and can only judge of the result in mass.

(32.) Judicial Processes against the Thugs.

English Law, for reasons of its own, severely prunes and represses testimony; even totally forbids its utterance, if a witness be supposed totally unconscientious. In the frightful murders which overspread India, under the fanaticism of the Thugs, a body secretly organized for plunder, the English rulers of India found it essential to set aside all our scrupulosity and all our precedents, considering solely sound logic and moral right. A single illustration here suffices.

A high officer was established in Calcutta, in close relation to officers in many other principal towns, for suppressing the organization of the Thugs. If a man fell into the hands of law as a criminal, who was suspected as a Thug, promises were held out to him if he would reveal something. The man was presumed to be a liar, perhaps a murderer? Why trust his testimony? It was *not* trusted: yet it was heard.—The matter nevertheless of first importance was, that he prove himself to *know* something about the Thugs and their murders. Suppose him to say to the magistrate: "You remember A. B. of this city, who vanished two years ago: I saw him strangled, and will show you his grave." The culprit takes officers with him through obscure paths, and in a jungle where the earth is covered by vegetation points out an area not large, and says: "Under our feet lie the bodies of two men and a boy. One of the men was A. B. They were all strangled together." The weeds are scraped away. The earth is opened. The bones of two men and one boy are found. No one can think this to be "mere chance." It is clear that the man *knows*

something, liar and scoundrel as he may be. Well: he is asked, "Who committed that murder?" He gives the names of K. A. J., and M. E. F., with their residences, perhaps in distant provinces. Next he is asked, "Whom he knows to be Thugs?" His replies, and all that he attests as facts about them, though known to him as rumour only, are carefully set down, and sent to the central office in Calcutta. Details are thence sent to the provincial officers concerning this murder; with orders that if any one supposed to be a Thug be in the hands of justice, he shall be closely interrogated concerning it, as likewise be asked to give the names and residences of those known to him as Thugs. If, without leading questions or suggestion from the magistrate, a second and even a third culprit denounced K. A. J., his guilt could not be doubtful, considering the distances and the vastness of population. So, if one culprit in the south of India and another in the West thus accused a man in the North East, picking out an individual from many millions, at distances of 500 to 1000 miles, it is too much for accident. They might indeed have believed an erroneous *Thug rumour* that he was the very man who threw the cord on a particular occasion; yet the fact that he was a Thug, and almost that he took part in that murder, would be established by even two such testimonies, of men however mendacious. It is easy to see how collateral testimony might be multiplied. But to identify the man remained, which was especially important in populous places, where many might bear the same name. The man (M. E. F.) under suspicion was, on fit occasion, summoned into court, (for which he knew not the real reason) and was carefully mixed in a crowd. His accusers were brought from their distant abodes into the court separately, without his being aware that he had any accusers. Each separately and secretly pointed out to an officer the man whom he had called M. E. F., and had accused of the murder. If each separately picked out the same man, and the magistrate knew his name to be really M. E. F., there could no

longer be doubt of his identity. Thus the Government held his guilt to be established.

The broad fact here prominent is, that the doctrine of the Chances lay at the bottom of this logic also. The problem is brought to the point, at which we can say, *Either* such or such is the Truth, *or* there is a most astonishing combination of Chance Coincidencies. And when the latter becomes too monstrous to believe, we fall back on the former as proved.

(33.) Historical Evidence.

Certain great outlines of History have their attestation in present indubitable fact. Thus, concerning the European conquests of Rome. On the one side: ancient buildings, great roads, aqueducts, Roman baths, and mosaics discovered in excavations, and other local remains; on the other, the very languages of France, Spain, Portugal and Wallachia,—give us a solid sense that the conquest was a reality. But beyond these outlines, our sole evidence is in books, and a little consideration shows under how great disadvantages is the inquiry after truth. Our *Specific Informants* are witnesses, who, having told their tale, and vanished, can no longer be interrogated. On what grounds they believed what they tell, whether by rumour, by public documents, or by eyesight, what is the date of the book from which they transcribe, or even what is their own date; we may have to make out as we can. We may study these writers carefully, to ascertain their powers, qualities, and tendencies; yet, so complicated is the human mind, the study is often insufficient for the occasion. When we find a writer express himself with grave concern or contempt for the credulity of his countrymen, and evidently himself to be bent on truth, cautious and painstaking; we think perhaps that we have before us a guide

whom we can thoroughly trust. But after long experience and the criticism of him by many keen intellects, it is discovered that he had by no means thrown off *all* the credulity of his countrymen. Because he did not, like them, believe the fables and miracles of antiquity, he fancied himself on cautious and safe ground, while he turned poetry into history by rejecting its evident improbabilities. We, who are experienced in so many literatures, at length understand, that to get history whether out of Homer, or out of the Persian poetical historian FIRDOUSI; out of the tragedies of King John or King Lear, or out of an Indian Epic poem; is an operation almost equally hopeless. Certain probabilities may recommend themselves: to invent so vast a world, and so much of it quite needlessly, may seem a task beyond the poet; yet this applies nearly as well to FIRDOUSI as to HOMER. In short, when no basis whatever is given us but a poem, which for its noble beauty sank into a nation's heart, we can never argue from it in the manner of THUCYDIDES. And if even in him we find an unconscious credulity concerning early events, how much less can we trust shallow uncritical compilers of events distant from them in time or even in place? Even alleged national migrations and conquests are often quite uncertain. Did the Ostrogoths of the Crimea and the Western Goths of the Danube really migrate thither from Sweden? Did the Gaulish tribes north of Greece, and the Boii in ancient Bohemia, migrate thither out of Gaul? Was Campania ever a permanent Tuscan possession? Did King RAMESES the Great conquer the Medes and Persians, Bactria and Scythia? On such questions we are (as it were) in *penumbra*. It may not be wholly darkness, but we must despair of ever getting trustworthy light. It is a region in which modest opinion may rove; but no truth stands firm enough to build upon.

But the great interest of History is in its moral colouring, and here, alas, our deficiency is greater still. See how differently our own statesmen are estimated by different observers

not unintelligent; how we are biassed by our school, our party, our sect, our personal peculiarities. And especially when a man moves out of routine, walking on an edge which separates high virtue from crime, he often appears to be a hero to one class, a scoundrel to another. Nor are the noblest historians unsusceptible of extravagant error in their moral colouring of men not distant from them. It is startling, after reading the account of ANTONIUS PRIMUS in TACITUS's Histories as a clever, unscrupulous rascal,* to find the same man held up by MARTIAL as a model of virtue, a man who in declining years had no one day of life to regret. Closer inquiry may suggest, that the aristocratic TACITUS received his account of ANTONIUS PRIMUS from the disappointed aristocrat VIPSTANUS MESSALLA, whose portrait of ANTONIUS may have been about as just, as a portrait of GARIBALDI by an adherent of the Pope. Be this as it may, modern inquirers are forced to revolt against TACITUS's portrait of TIBERIUS CÆSAR; nor is THUCYDIDES any longer held unbiassed by aristocratic feeling. When the two greatest historians of antiquity need to be read with such caution, what shall be said of those who have been believed either for their style, or because they were the only informants extant?

Modern History is becoming ever more and more trustworthy, by the publication of records, documents, letters of statesmen; and we are ever learning greater severity in forming beliefs and judgments. No such new aids are possible concerning distant times. Only at a few crises are letters and speeches extant of the actors themselves. Even with these, the problem of unveiling men's motives and characters is difficult; without them, it is all but impossible, except as to the few whose actions stand out on the sky. In the future it is to be hoped that the experience drawn from recent days will enforce more and

* Not but that every public *act* ascribed to ANTONIUS by TACITUS, in the midst of his vituperation, is highly honourable.

more distrust of what have been called historical "authorities" concerning the remote past. If rigid re-examination of anemometers and telescopes be needful, lest they deceive us, how irrational is it to give easy belief to what a dead man has written concerning times earlier than himself, resting on we know not what information? The more severe our scepticism the better, if it be but cold and suspensive; but if it hotly precipitate us into an opposite dogmatism, truth cannot be thus advanced. Those things which really deserve belief will only ground themselves more deeply, when we yield less confidence to rumour, come from whose pen it may.

(34.) Analogy.

Analogy, or proportion, is a very vague word. Analogical reasoning may be wild absurdity. "There are seven notes in the musical gamut: *therefore*, to sustain the harmony of heaven, seven bodies must move round the earth; viz., Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon."—Such reasoning was not wholly indigestible to the stomach of antiquity. It is difficult to say, what may not be called an Analogy; or under what limitations an Analogy exerts on the mind any cogent force. Nevertheless, Analogy is very potent in *suggestion*, and as such, of supreme value to one who is too sagaciously incredulous to be deluded by it. In Greek metaphor one might call Analogy *the Huntress*. Her untiring activity is the true inspiration of Genius. Says Aristotle, It belongs to the educated mind to see likenesses amid things unlike. Such is the function of Analogy.

If her suggestions be severely tested, coldly verified, knowledge will steadily advance. Without her suggestions, Induction degenerates into a tedious accumulation of facts under which memory faints and clear thought is buried. But Analogy must not be paraded as an argument. Like vital power, it is hidden away deeply. Its results appear, in the

divinations of Genius. But until the guess is proved good, to talk of it is vain; and after it is proved good, it is but a historical curiosity.

Analogy plays a part even in rigid Science. The first student of Spherical Geometry,—in observing a likeness, in the midst of difference, of *one* property in Spherical Triangles to *one* property in Plane Triangles,—was, no doubt, led on to ask what *other* properties in the unknown system might bear analogy to those of the known: and thus was guided to fresh discoveries. The delight of knowledge is also greatly increased by the establishment of analogies. They are a reward for many an hour of labour.

How interesting it is to find in a bat and a bird the rudiments of our forearm and lower arm, of our hand and fingers! How keen the curiosity to know whether trees breathe, digest, sleep; whether planets have inhabitants; and other questions as to which we must despair of certain knowledge. But we may observe, though mere analogy can prove nothing, it may (where we are necessarily in *penumbra*) throw the burden of proof on one side, leaving a presumption or provisional superiority on the other. Thus, although we know nothing about superior spirits, one may urge, that, *as a presumption from analogy*, every finite being must have limits of space, and that to attribute to them power to range at will over the universe is gratuitous and unplausible. Similarly, we hold the *presumption*, that stars, where they are in circumstances ostensibly similar to our sun, have planets revolving round them, which planets, sooner or later, sustain animal and rational life. Analogy is the sole and sufficient reason for the presumption; but (as far as can at present be seen) no test, no verification is possible. Since we have nothing to stake on the belief, the belief founded on presumption has no strain to withstand; and, if feeble, is yet strong enough to live unshaken.

Out of the very vague use of the word Analogy unprofitable controversies arise. Thus, many will say, that we believe

from Analogy that a newly discovered *mollusc* or *zoophyte* has a term of life, and will die. Evidently, this is a deduction from a universal proposition to which Induction has previously led us; viz., that "*All* life (on this globe) is mortal": hence we believe with an intensity of conviction such as mere Analogy could not justify. It may be therefore better to avoid such use of the word Analogy. When the mind moves from one known fact to the *suspicion* that something *like* it in another case will be true, we do not pass up by an Induction and down again by a Deduction. This is obvious in mathematical analogies, and in the (supposed) Analogy of the seven heavenly bodies to the seven notes of the gamut. To frame a general proposition in Induction is often difficult and admits much ambiguity: without any such labour we pass from one particular to another similar: but this does not affect to be proof; it gives suggestion only.

END OF LOGICAL FRAGMENTS.

FOUR LECTURES ON POETRY;

DELIVERED FIRST IN WALES TO A SELECT COMPANY.

FIRST LECTURE.

Topics and Essence of Poetry.

Men who have scientific knowledge may teach what is new. I can but explain what is old. Moreover, I must illustrate my subject from that which I know best; hence, next to English poetry, I go to Greek, or sometimes to Latin, for my illustrations. Others may adduce what is equally to the purpose from German or Italian or other modern poetry; but each must speak from that which he has attained.

It would be affected to begin by any panegyric on Poetry. I assume that all my hearers, even if they have no extensive acquaintance with Poets, yet have in themselves a response to the internal worth of Poetry. Why else should they now come and hear me? If I were to say something severe of "the man who hath not music in his soul," I might seem to be gratuitously speaking ill of the absent. But in truth this music, this poetry has many forms. It is not solely in sound, nor solely in colour, nor solely in words and arrangements of thought: it is the animating spirit of Art. If you ask, What is the essence of poetry, perhaps we must reply,—It is the same essence as distinguishes Mind from Animal Perception. A very stupid animal sees the outside of things, and learns *phenomena* only. If man could strictly limit himself to what

some call "observed facts," he too would learn nothing but phenomena. Happily it cannot be so: for the soul of man is essentially poetic, and sees beneath phenomena something deeper than phenomena. It looks on Nature with the eye of one who has a heart as well as a head, and reflects the light of its own sympathies on every object. Poetry cultivates the heart, even where it is scientifically very inaccurate; and it is in the order of natural growth, that no great advance of national intellect takes place without an earlier moral development, generally by some form of poetry. The time at length arrives, when we have to cry out for freedom to Science,—when we have to demand, that Science shall not be crippled by imaginary moral necessities. But it is not the less true that Science never would have sprung up, had not Poetry and Morality and Religion previously enriched the soil.

It is well known in history that the earliest poets claim and receive a semi-religious character, and exercise a religious influence. We call them distinctively Bards. The name has always been well known in Wales, and unless romance deceives us, the power of the Welsh bard to excite the patriotism of his countrymen was such, that the barbarous King EDWARD I. of England put to death every bard as his implacable foe. If we are to believe our poet GRAY, the last bard prophesied the calamities of EDWARD PLANTAGENET and his house, but saw in glorious future a time when a Welsh monarch of Tudor blood should sit on the throne of England; when also under great ELIZABETH Wales should feel that she had conquered England, as well as England her. The bard had aroused the spirit of the Welsh, as did the Greek TYRTÆUS the spirit of the Spartans, and in some respect as ISAIAH excited the people of Hezekiah. The religious character of the bard properly belongs to the *first* period of poetry, when its art is scarcely self-conscious. It nevertheless continues, after poetry becomes an elaborated profession, as it certainly was in HOMER'S day. HOMER freely invokes

the muses as goddesses to teach and inspire him; to tell him things which the eye of living man has not seen nor ear heard, and enable him to expound his great theme worthily. Much later, we find PINDAR aspire eminently to the religious character of a bard. He not only enunciates as divine truth, in tones often very lofty and imposing, the theological fables of his day, but sometimes even injures his poetry by acting the moralist extravagantly. Later poets by mere vicious imitation affect the faith of the bard. Not but that our own MILTON in deep earnest betook himself to poetry as a religious exercise and as a religious influence: which was quite in harmony with his strong Puritanism, and (I suppose) was heightened by his blindness. It was a specious thought, that when the outer eye was shut, the inner eyes of the seer were opened more keenly on the spirit world: although we well know, that the poet needs preëminently the painter's eye, as well as the hero's heart and the soul of the sage.

When we proceed to ask what is the essence of Poetry? we encounter a difficulty not to be dissembled. Poetry has taken so many forms (of which I may speak more particularly in my second Lecture,) that it is hard to limit it. I must indeed begin by cutting away various metrical performances, such as Satires and Comic pieces, as not included by me in Poetry. I understand by the word, only that which aims at *elevation*. The style must be in a higher pitch than that of common life, and the poet must intend to raise the mind accordingly. The *diction* of poetry must necessarily have something distinctive, and in most languages *metre* is requisite for its perfection; certainly in ours. These two peculiarities are apt to vanish in translation; and though of high importance, are less vital than the qualities which remain in spite of translation. The latter fall generally under three heads, Grandeur, Beauty, and Feeling.

EDMUND BURKE maintains that Terror is the chief source of whatever is Sublime, Pleasure of the Beautiful. In the sight of terrible objects there is an excitement of mind, which,

if not carried too far, elevates and gratifies. To look down a chasm of frightful depth, with a strong rail to protect us: to see a prodigious smash with the blow of a steam hammer, or a great conflagration;—though the sight may have no imaginable beauty,—has a wonderful fascination; nay, and even when undeniably painful, attracts us, as a shipwreck, where men's lives are at stake, and we are unable to help. The Roman poet LUCRETIUS gave distinct expression to the fact, and tried to explain it; but as an Epicurean, failed, in my belief. He says (as I venture to translate):

'Tis sweet, when by the brawl of winds | the mighty sea is worried,
Safely from off the neighbour strand | to watch a labouring vessel.
Not that thy brother's sad turmoil | to thee is food delightsome,
But that it pleasant is, to see | what ills thyself escapest.

But selfishness does not constitute the interest; self-congratulation does not necessarily enter. The shudder of pity draws us out of self, above self,—hereby elevates, ennobles; moreover, the grandeur of the sight in some sense enlarges the heart. I ask leave to change the poet's moralizing, thus:

Not that thy brother's sad turmoil | to thee is food delightsome,
But that with shudder of amaze | thy pitying heart expandeth.

Sublime objects and beautiful objects are naturally in outward contrast. The sublime is ordinarily vast, as a mountain or the sea; the beautiful, of moderate compass. Strength predominates in the one, delicacy in the other. A bear is grander than a gazelle, but less beautiful. The sublime is oftenest rough or rugged, else sharp, precipitous; or huge, uncouth: the beautiful is smooth or soft or rounded. The sublime is often dim-coloured, dingy, rusty, with uncertain outline; the beautiful rather bright-coloured, clear and pure, distinct in its lines or gradually shaded. Yet a sublime object may also be eminently beautiful, the tranquil sea, the mountain under clear sky, the sunset. Here magnitude gives sublimity, pure colours give beauty. The art of the landscape painter is to get a background of the sublime and a foreground of beauty. But however the two elements be

blended, they are really different, and ought not to be confounded in thought.

Mere terror without grandeur is not suitable for poetry. A tarantula or a poisonous bug (says BURKE, if I remember) may be as dangerous as a lion ; yet if it disgust, it cannot be poetical. The wild dogs devouring the slain in BYRON'S Siege of Corinth, the more vivid their picture the more are they horrible, rather than terrible. Many great poets err gravely, as I believe, on this side. MILTON'S portrait of Sin was probably meant to be disgusting : I cannot think it poetically praiseworthy. Over painful subjects Art should step lightly, not dwell and gloat upon them. VIRGIL is terrible and piteous, not revolting, when he tells of the serpents strangling LAOCOON and his sons. But who of us would like to have the scene presented to the eye in his drawing-room in solid marble ? The details of horrible wounds in HOMER'S battles are now repudiated by all. Allowance must be made for national associations. Those accustomed to the butcheries of sacrifice, and the sacred exhibition of reeking vitals, probably felt less incongruity with Art in these things. So a description of Purgatory may once have seemed grand and sublime : while to an English audience, it is either ridiculous or disgusting, in proportion as it is vivid. We can only bear so much as may pass as metaphor; as when VIRGIL says, that old crime is burnt out by flames or washed out by flood.

If a piece of poetry is very short,—supposing it to meet the demands of criticism as to diction and metre,—a single substantial excellence may suffice ; for it asks no great sacrifice of our time and attention. A Sonnet may aim only at sublimity, or only at beauty : it may be a religious utterance, or a tribute to a friend's worth, or a panegyric on some local scene, or the glorification of some moral principle :—and it may satisfy us. Yet in all cases we demand in the artist a certain *glow* which arises out of love of his subject. By loving it he must impart to us something of his love. The poetical form which he assumes, must seem to be the setting

and frame of a gem, the casket which he has wrought to enshrine and adorn his jewel. This glow of love, I suppose, is the "authentic fire" of which some talk; at least I know no other. In meditative hymns, though the person addressed is the sublimest of beings, that sublimity is not pourtrayed,—it is inexpressible,—it can only be taken for granted. The hymn derives its excellence and power chiefly from the intensity of affection developed. What is the following from Dr. WATTS, but an astonishing lovesong?

> My God! the spring of all my joys,
> The life of my delights,
> The glory of my brightest hours
> And comfort of my nights:
> In darkest shades if thou appear,
> My dawning is begun;
> Thou art my soul's sweet Morning star,
> And thou my rising Sun.

Many passages in the Old Testament which declare the greatness of the Creator and his works are celebrated for their sublimity: yet, if we examine them in detail, they generally fall far short of the known facts, as estimated in modern science. They are made lofty by the *sense* of sublimity which animated the writer, rather than by the statements in themselves. And a gush of feeling generally aids a gush of words. Under emotion many are fluent and eloquent, who are ordinarily embarrassed in expression. Hence, where the poet's fire underlies, we generally get an unusual freedom and flow of expression, and the verses seem to have been rather struck off at a burst, than patched together and perfected by a series of corrections. This depends especially on the *structure* being natural to the language and vigorous. In general we may say, that the poet needs, *first*, enough mechanical command of the language to fulfil the conditions of metre and diction; *next*, a certain enthusiasm (perhaps temporary) for his subject, which he must so love, as to desire to adorn and recommend it. Man so sympathizes with man, that while only short

pieces of poetry are presented, we willingly go along with another's enthusiasm, and are pleased with the novelty, even if the sentiments be not our own. Hence there is an assured perpetuity of poetry, in unlimited mass, so far as short poems are concerned. But the longer a poem, the harder it becomes to answer the question, Why should I read it? in short, to impart sufficient *interest*.

When literature is a novelty, either a nation or an individual may be omnivorous. Young people often gormandize books indiscriminately. Any wild fiction will attract them; and I rather think that the fictions which we read in early life assume to us a permanent solidity and exceptional interest. But when a nation has accumulated a certain mass of acceptable poetry, a more critical spirit comes in, and new poems are less eagerly devoured: so in elder life we are often somewhat sated with fiction, and harder to interest in it. There are very few persons, old or young, who would not think it an infliction to be asked to read a new Epic poem in twenty-four books, as long as the Iliad: if it be a quarter of that length, the undertaking would be formidable. Especially now that we demand in each line a certain poetical excellence, the effort of appreciating each line increases to the reader. To read very rapidly is generally to lose a large part of the poetry. The heart is not so active as the intellect. Love is a terrible consumer of time. We must dwell on every beauty in detail, if we are to take it in. Hence in the present stage of our national development and highly critical taste, circumstances weigh heavily against a poem of any length.

It is remarkable how many great excellencies may be combined by a poet, while yet he fails of attracting any general interest. The poetical faculties in SHELLEY appear to have coëxisted in much purity and strength. In his Prometheus he chose a grand subject, and treated it with much beauty. His pictures from nature are fascinating and diversified, the diction is sparkling, the metre varied and melodious;

yet after a while we are tired, and indisposed to recur to the book. It is found to want *human interest*, being supramundane, and as it were magical. On an opposite side, when the same poet wrote the tragedy of the Cenci, he rather repelled than allured readers, the crimes involved in the tales being too awful and too ugly. "It suffices not" says HORACE "that poems be elegant: let them also be sweet (attractive)."

But here we alight on an untoward fact. As different subjects attract different minds, and differently affect the same man in a different stage of life, it may seem that the excellence of poetry is relative, not absolute; that poetry once esteemed, must at length sink in value; that every age must have its new growth of poets, and that there can be no standard of better or worse. There is some truth in this; yet the portion of truth in it is easily exaggerated. An English and a French audience may be differently affected by the same tragedy. Athenians were delighted with legends, which to us are thoroughly insipid. Nevertheless, poetry which turns on broad human interest—an interest in which one nation and another, rich and poor, young and old, sympathize alike,—is not easily superseded when its poetical merits have once attained national recognition. The older poetry may have much to throw away as lumber, partly when it is puerile or morally inferior, partly because too tedious: yet on the whole the advantage rests with the old poets, and the new have difficulty in competing, especially if they exceed very moderate limits of length.

A long poem, which gains permanent admiration and really lives in the hearts of a nation in successive ages, has in the very fact a testimony of merit, an award hard to contend against. Sublimity and beauty both together will not suffice. There must be feeling,—pathos in the largest sense,—and a subject adapted to the heart of the nation. By reason of the great difficulty of fulfilling all the conditions, there does appear to me to be a natural limit to the number of poems of any magnitude.

In all Art, the choice of a subject is of prime importance, if the work has magnitude and involves effort; if it is neither a mere study and exercise, nor executed for a transitory purpose. To spend serious effort, which may be wasted from want of sympathy in the public, is surely unwise. Execution, however powerful, will never atone for the bad choice of a subject; nay, if the subject be repulsive, the more perfect and vivid the execution, the more odious is the result; as when ugly and monstrous fictions, or the horrible lacerations of the soul, are paraded before us. A poet who spends whole years and much intellect over a long work, must hope for wide attention. It is well to ask, what have been in the past the conditions of his gaining such attention.

The *Homeric tales*, whether of gods or of heroes, were devoutly believed by the Greeks, in outline and substantially. Certain miracles alone were stript off by the hearer or reader, as a kind of imagery admitted by compact, just as soliloquies or talking in metre. It was matter of convention that the exploits of a king with his body guard were all ascribed to the king himself; and successes attributed to divine favour were at pleasure described as effected by a god's direct intervention. With such modification the poet's tale passed as history; and it was a history in which all Greece was interested; first, as it attested the superiority of Grecian to Asiatic arms and prowess; secondly, as giving an account of the state of Greece in that age; thirdly, as the germ of after revolutions, which led to transition from the Achaian to the Hellenic era. Again, the *Greek tragedians* uniformly took subjects, which easily passed as true, and had to do with persons supposed to be historical. ÆSCHYLUS ventured on one tale of recent contemporaneous history in the noble play of the Persians, which is from end to end a song of Athenian triumph over XERXES. PHRYNICHUS before him dramatized the capture of MILETUS by the Persians: and it is reported that the Athenian arbiters, though they awarded him the prize of poetry, fined him for harrowing the feelings of his

audience. This anecdote, true or false, well points out, that the reason against a very recent historical subject may be, that its interest is *too intense* for Art. WALTER SCOTT'S piece on the massacre of Glencoe, though harmless now, might have been insurrectionary 150 years ago. Its fierceness might seem savage, its pathos too wounding. For this reason, as well as to avoid the too tight fetters of history, it is well if the tale be somewhat softened in the haze of distance. Such was the case with nearly all the topics of Greek tragedy. The *first plays in England*, called Mysteries, were also founded on religious tales or legends. *Milton* took for the subject of his two Epics the greatest of historical facts, as he viewed them. Of *Shakspeare* no plays have been so popular with every class of mind as the historical. On the whole I cannot doubt that a belief in the reality of events immensely increases the interest, and that a poet who deliberately invents a fiction and tries to force it into interest, exposes himself to an enormous disadvantage,—at least unless his poem is contained in very narrow limits, being such as we may call a Ditty, like GOLDSMITH'S Edwin and Angelina. On this topic I shall have to speak farther in analysing Epic poetry. But I must add something concerning *Walter Scott's* four great poems. He did not indeed limit himself to historical persons, but he set forth real local scenes, with national characters and costume, which at once cast an illusion of reality over his tale, and imparted agreeable information. Moreover he has real characters of eminence, especially BRUCE, DOUGLAS, and King JAMES V. The great battles of Bannockburn and Flodden are more vital to Scotland and live more in the people's heart, than did the siege of Troy with the Greeks.—Passing to the Latins, we find their greatest poem, the *Æneid*, to have dealt with two national topics of the deepest interest, —the infancy or rather origin of Rome, and her mortal rivalry with Carthage. The two greatest poems of Italy both deal with believed realities: *Dante* with Purgatory, *Tasso* with a Crusade. The Crusades appear to be nearly the grandest of

topics for European interest, which could have been assumed; but the qualities needed in the poet were perhaps too great. There is still no want of splendid topics, if there coëxisted the power, and the will so to apply the power. What can surpass JOAN OF ARC, for a French poem?—seeing that she is not only the enthusiastic military maiden, the religious heroine and the victim of intolerance, but also the champion of nationality, whose action commenced the vast and new career of united France. What a subject is the Thirty Years' War, with GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS and WALLENSTEIN and FERDINAND II! What a subject is the Dutch war of freedom!

I do not see how to doubt, that the superior facility of prose is the true cause why these and other very grand topics are not treated in poetry. WALTER SCOTT himself, after four national Scottish poems, betook himself to prose novels *constructed on the same principles*, and was still more splendidly successful. His novels are read with interest, not only in Germany and Scandinavia, but in Hungary and in India, and as the public press has stated, by the Imaum of Muscât and the King of Siam.

A great discouragement to long poems is found in the extravagant demand of a uniformly high poetical tone all through. Perhaps VIRGIL initiated this change for the worse. It tends to wear out both composer and reader. To throw away choice diction on common topics, is to affect a love which the poet does not feel or ought not to feel. HOMER allows his poetical style to sink with the subject, and not only lessens his own trouble, but relieves the reader from too great strain, and makes his grander style, which soon recurs, more acceptable and more salient. Nor does he entirely abstain from scenes which have a tinge of comedy, as in that of VULCAN acting as a limping and jocose cupbearer, to the great amusement of the gods. Bishop BLOMFIELD, in his edition of Æschylus's Persians, claims the close of that play for comedy. It has no attempt at superior poetry, but it parades the ragged regiment with which XERXES returned

home from Greece: and the dirges for the slain must have been meant to excite pleasure, not compassion, in the audience. XERXES himself in one speech apparently holds out his inverted quiver to display that not one arrow is left. He bids the chorus pluck their beards; and they reply, Tightly, tightly. All converges to the belief that the poet was exciting contemptuous hilarity.—Again in the Orestes of EURIPIDES one scene may be called comic, being intended to amuse the audience by a display of Asiatic cowardice. A Phrygian who escapes the sword of Orestes rushes on to the stage and with great volubility narrates his adventure in excited metres. He opens:

> Death from the Argive sword I shunn'd,
> In barbarian buskins
> Vanishing, vanishing, O Earth, Earth!
> By barbarian scuddings.

Such relaxations of poetic tension are surely good in a longer poem, when we habitually allow them in a tragedy of five acts. The prose writer, whether novelist or actual historian, of course adapts his style to his materials, and becomes high-strung or pictorial only where the subject deserves it. But the fear of criticism seems to overpower modern poets, so that they dare not imitate the freedom of HOMER to sink or rise.

Although I believe that a plot judiciously taken from history is superior to a fictitious plot,—inasmuch as real life not only has deeper interest, but is prodigiously richer and more varied than is possible to fiction,—yet to make the judicious choice grows ever harder, as history multiplies. For we are distracted by multitudinous interest, and do not throw our hearts readily into one subject merely because a poet invites us. Moreover the poet has to consider to what his own talents are suited: and if he expect that a tale will be interesting *barely because* it is historical, he will make an entire mistake.

How TASSO could permit himself to invent a fabulous hero Rinaldo, may seem hard to understand. But it is worse

to invent slanders against a real person, (as SCHILLER against the conjugal faithfulness of Count Egmont) for fancied advantage to the poem. Fiction of unimportant events is one thing; substantial distortion of moral character is far different. So to outrage truth, excites indignation in the reader.

WALTER SCOTT did not venture to trust entirely to his epic materials for interest, but introduced the ordinary resource of the novelist,—a private lovestory. In the Lay of the Last Minstrel, we have Lord Cranstoun and Margaret: in the Lady of the Lake, Malcolm Graeme and Ellen: in Marmion, De Wilton and the lady Clara: in the Lord of the Isles, Ronald and Edith. In all, the completion of the lovers' wishes gives as it were a natural termination to the tale. The Iliad is like an unfinished cathedral: for why should it end with the burial of Hector? We should not have missed the last book; and some treat it as spurious. But the Odyssey ends with a real novelists' conclusion,—the hero recovers his palace and wife.

There is another topic on which perhaps I ought to touch as discriminating older from the newest poetry,—viz., the introduction of supernatural machinery, whether gods and miracles, or magic and demons. Greek poets, dealing with things divine as a legitimate circle of free romance, have no scruples about religious truth, and a bare minimum of reverence. PINDAR indeed and ÆSCHYLUS intend to be reverential, and between their idea of JUPITER and that of HOMER a great chasm had arisen. Nevertheless they felt no repugnance to making deity a mere ornament and aggrandizement of some secondary matter. In every case, descriptions of gods or angels are for us preöccupied and exhausted: they are no longer open material for poetry. But beyond this, our vaster knowledge of the Universe, our more solemn ideas of Him who pervades it, and of the two eternities stretching backwards and forwards weigh far more heavily on us now, than of old on Greeks and Hebrews. Perhaps I am going beyond the truth. I remember the transgressions, as they seem to

me, of both German and English poets; but I dread to say too much, if I touch on them in detail. At least English taste forbids us to make the most glorious of Beings a mere handle for the scoffing of another. Nor only so, but I believe we have a thorough distaste for such introduction of magic into poetry, as makes it affect the issues of the action. I suppose we all regret that TASSO introduced so much of magic into his great poem.

SOUTHEY, when assuming Arabian or Hindoo fantasies as the basis of his tale, thinks he has a right to adopt their superstitions in mass: and from the impossibility of drawing the line to limit him, we make large concessions. So long as his supernaturalism seems demanded by the plot itself, it is easier to pardon it; as in his Kehama. But in Thalaba I suppose he wearies out all readers: for the magic appears to be at once unlimited and optional with the poet. Whole masses of it might be cut out without being missed in the poem. Yet SOUTHEY studied his plots very carefully.

In the French school, I believe, first rose the formal claim of what is called *Poetical Justice*, a doctrine which was for a time decidedly prevalent. According to this, the judgment of Heaven against evil and for the right was to be manifest in the issue of events.—A complete reversal of judgment may oftener now be heard. Tragedy especially, it is said, inspires pity and terror by the painful and calamitous facts which real life furnishes, as when virtue perishes on the scaffold or at the stake. It must be also confessed that the Greek Tragedians had no idea of such Poetical Justice; for they had a theory of their own of a blind Fate controling even JUPITER, and, much more, men; and they revelled in the narration of horrors concerning the families of ATREUS and ŒDIPUS, which were certainly unknown to HOMER and invented later than his age. Such a notion of Fate seems to us, if not actually immoral, yet painful, odious and extremely superfluous: and short of admitting the idea of Poetical Justice, as a principle to be insisted on, I think it may be

urged that Art ought not to send us away gloomy and pained. It ought to relieve us, and on the whole rather make us happier. It is undeniable, that we have a stern pleasure in retribution upon *selfish* and *cruel* guilt, which makes us blink at the question whether a tale of such retribution is throughout historically probable. We know that guilt is sometimes in appearance thoroughly triumphant and without retribution on the individual himself: for this very reason History is often a bitter instruction, hard to digest, too stern for amusement, and needing too high a faith. Yet, inasmuch as in the general tendency of things wickedness brings its own punishment, it is not a puerile morality so to represent it in a fiction. Indeed the poet may argue thus. History is too vast for my art. You say, its moralities are grander than those of my work. Well: so is nature grander than the painter's work. You in vain tell him to place on his canvas a scene that spreads over two-thirds of the horizon, or to express the vastness, the depth, the infinitudes which he sees, or their diversified aspects. He complains that even if his power of work and leisure were immeasurable, yet Nature paints with both lights and colours, he with colours alone. Hence *rules* of Art arise, which are but an economizing of our little power. So too (the poet may say) while History occupies ages on its work, mine is to be comprized within a few hours. Diamonds which have taken millions of years to crystallize may well be harder than artificial gems. It is not fair to measure the moral penalties of my poem by divine justice. Retributions perhaps hidden and unseen are by me exchanged for what is visible and plain; just as in place of thought, and of motive scarcely perceived by the mind itself, I substitute continuous soliloquy.

In every case, as regards the morality,—that is, the influence of poetry for good,—nothing depends on this Poetical Justice. In poetry, as in all other writings, the moral influence depends on its throwing our sympathies

aright and leaving on the mind fit images and contemplations. Many darker passions may be pourtrayed: for the Pathos which we seek has a two-fold character like the sublime and beautiful, viz., the terrible and the lovely. While we shudder at evil passion, it cannot make us worse. Demoralization begins, when we learn to sympathize with it, or to dwell on things over which it is healthful to step lightly. Evidently there may be, either a stage of national life, or certain persons, to whom even the Iliad is a corrupting book. Such perhaps it really was to ALEXANDER THE GREAT, teaching him to sympathize with and devoutly admire a proud, revengeful, bloodthirsty, imperious, self-glorifying, but beautiful and brave ACHILLES; whose passions were to be propitiated and pampered by any amount of other people's misery. The dread of such demoralization of his bands of well-educated warriors actually led PLATO to forbid the reading of this great and simple-hearted poet in his imaginary Republic.

We cannot deny the power of a poet for evil as well as good: the two are coördinate. He can stir up our prepossessions, national or religious. He can lay hold of our infantine recollections or our historical studies, and make them minister to his purpose. He can infuse tenderness, beauty or grandeur into that in which they do not legitimately dwell. He may attract us by rich imagery or noble diction, and, if we resign our hearts to his magic influence, give them back to us either better or worse. There is a danger, no doubt. But we encounter the same danger with a preacher or with a novelist in proportion to his powers; and we every way need to be aware of seducing spirits and false prophets. A poet may be mischievous, just in proportion as he is interesting: and the moderns find the chief danger to lie in his becoming voluptuous. Poets and novelists alike are aware, that there is no cheaper way of attracting interest, than by dwelling largely on the passion of Love; and there is none that they have more abused.

It is very remarkable, that while the ancient theory concerning the relation of the sexes was at best deficient and at worst very base; while the abundance of slavewomen and freedwomen, and the unchallenged rightfulness of slavery, depressed the best men's notions of the rights of women; yet in their highest poets there is less than in our own that can minister to voluptuousness; even in HOMER and VIRGIL than in MILTON and SPENSER. But here also WALTER SCOTT is admirable. He has an unfailing sweetness of heart, full-charged with the morality of the future. What can be more delicious than his doctrine of Love?

> True Love's the gift which God has given
> To man alone beneath the heaven.
> It is not fantasy's hot fire,
> Whose wishes, soon as granted, fly:
> It liveth not in fierce desire;
> With dead desire it doth not die.
> It is the secret sympathy,
> The silver link, the silken tie,
> Which heart to heart and mind to mind
> In body and in soul can bind.

I should feel ashamed to quote from the ancients their notions in contrast.

END OF FIRST LECTURE.

SECOND LECTURE (ON POETRY).

Forms of Poetry.

That Poetry should arise earlier than Prose, may seem paradoxical, when a poem demands much labour; while every letter-writer can scribble prose. But Prose is the language of philosophy, Poetry of feeling. In fact, Prose implies the art of writing: whereas Poetry comes earlier than written characters. The poetry of such ages is widely different from the polished verses of Pope or Campbell; yet it is easily recognized to be a deliberate composition, quite other than unrestricted speech, *(soluta oratio,)* as the Latins call prose.

With us and with most nations Metre is held essential to the form of poetry. It would be scarcely proper here to dwell on any scholastic details. But I may remark, that *our* metre differs essentially from that of the old Greeks, in being *oratorical,* and depending on the prose Accent; but theirs was *musical,* and depended on equable Times, which are to us an offence, as decidedly monotonous. The oldest Roman verse seems to have been oratorical, like ours. When they learnt the Greek method, they but half submitted to it, and finally made a compromise between the two principles, which has generated the laws of metre for Virgil and Ovid, probably also for Horace. The vulgar perhaps were never reconciled to Greek metre, which needed either the lyre, or at least some simple tune. With the decay of classical taste, accentual metre established itself in Latin; and the very same thing has happened in Greek. Metrical feet have received certain names, as Iamb, Trochee, Spondee, Pyrrhic; and it deserves attention, that these words are ambiguous,

according as the metre depends on Accent or on Time. Thus in English, *míghty, píty, fémale* are all accentually Trochees, because all have the accent on the first syllable; and in English metre they are equivalent. But in estimate of musical time (which is called Quantity) *mighty* is a Trochee, (say, a crotchet and quaver,) *pity* is a Pyrrhic, (say, two quavers) and *female* is a Spondee, (say, two crotchets). These would not at all be equivalent in Greek verse.

Our metres are of two classes, duplicate and triplicate. In the duplicate, the accents ordinarily fall on alternate syllables. Then the metre is Iambic, if the accents are on even syllables; but Trochaic, if they are on the odd syllables. A Trochaic verse is not good, unless the first accent is powerful; which very much limits the use of this metre in our language. But I have gone into this detail, chiefly to remark that we are displeased by accents all of equal strength or all at equal musical distance,—either of which is monotonous and tame: also we dislike to have the words and the metrical feet commensurate. At least, this ought not to recur often enough to catch attention: as in

Glássy | wáter, | glássy | wáter,—

or

The stág | at éve | had drúnk | his fill.

Attention to such details is technically called, observing the law of Cæsura (division): and there is a general law of much value, alike in English, Latin and Greek, that especially in the middle of the line an unequal division should be made. Thus,

The stág at évening | dránk his fill

is more melodious than as SCOTT wrote it: and

Loud the noise | of war's alarms

is better metre than that about Glassy water.

Our Triplicate verse has between two accents two unaccented syllables. We call it Anapæstic and Dactylic; but it is essentially different from the Greek verse so named. It

is Minuet or dancing time, and quite unsuited to long pieces. In fact great care is needed in adapting it to any but light or joyful subjects. It is also with us very apt to be prosaic. Many of our commonest formulas run into this metre of themselves. A mathematician, writing a treatise of Optics, is said to have printed unawares the following as the opening of one of the propositions: "If parallel rays come contrary ways, and fall upon opposite sides——"

Metre, I said, properly belongs to the form of poetry. The Hebrew language is an exception: a certain parallelism of phrase is said there to compensate for the want. In some languages Rhyme or Assonance may serve instead, or arrangement of versicles of nearly equal length, each having either three or four oratorical accents. All these turn upon the *sound* of words to the ear.

But under the Form of Poetry, we may also reckon, (what does not depend on sound,) a certain peculiarity of *diction*, which distinguishes poetry from prose, at least in these days, since prose has arisen. No one will dignify mere versified prose with the title of poetry. But language here differs largely from language. French has scarcely any diction distinctive of poetry. Latin is nearly in like case; for it has at most certain poetical forms of adjectives,—among others compound adjectives which are sparingly used. But it makes up by its wonderful power of transposition, to us unattainable and unimaginable, which at once imparts a poetical tinge. The poets evade certain forms of prose syntax as clumsy, and make greater use both of the infinitive mood and of the participles than CICERO: so in fact do the historians. Latin poets also studiously vary the common syntax even when simplest; thus: for, The oxen draw the plough, we have as a first step, The oxen struggle at the plough, which adds energy; next, The necks of the oxen struggle at the plough; which is more graphic; finally, The plough struggles with (or at) the oxen's necks; which is purely a poetical syntax, and almost personifies the plough. VIRGIL and HORACE exhaust art in such

subtle inversion. We too use grammatical transpositions in poetry to elevate the style. These, with us, are often *archaic*, that is, reminiscences of antiquity. Especially in our clumsy compound tenses, if we admit them at all, slight transposition relieves the tameness. Perhaps in all cultivated poetry *terseness* of diction is aimed at: even in prose this is an excellence. But beyond the French and the Latins, we have a considerable resource of poetry in a large mass of older words, which rarely, if ever, are now heard in daily life, yet are understood by every one, perhaps are familiar to us in sacred books, which preserve the older diction. We cannot compete with German, much less with Greek, in richness of such poetical resources; yet our supply is large and highly valuable, though satirical writers, and persons who love to degrade the lofty and elevate the base, are ever at work to mar languages by burlesque and by misusing noble forms of speech.—But beside the use of words which are in themselves antique and thereby poetical, poetry will wisely avoid that tendency to use abstract expressions, to which (it may seem) a misguided effort after accuracy has given prodigious development in modern Europe. The best classical writers of Greece and Rome have a strong tendency to the *concrete*, instead of the *abstract*, even in prose: and so have our own older writers. Thus: "He spake these things in the *ears* of the people," for, "in the hearing of the people." So, *mouth* or *lips* may be used for words, *path* or even *foot* for behaviour or course, the *sword*, the *bayonet* for military violence; and generally, the instrument or outward symbol for the abstract thing. We likewise in prose most needlessly run to Latin for words, when we have excellent words already in Saxon and Norman. So much the more may our poet with advantage cling to the older vocabulary. Such small cares are largely mechanical, and so is metre: that is why I place them under *Form*. Metre and Diction do not make Poetry, yet they are essential to its perfection, and never can be wisely disparaged.

But I have to deal with Form in another sense; that in

which we may speak of the Forms of Poems, under the names Epic, Dramatic, Pastoral. Permit me to make a new beginning.

While poetry is wholly illiterate, it appears universally to associate itself with Music; which is its original outward mark. Whether the music shall be only a tune to which the voice conforms, or the sound of an instrument, seems to depend on mechanical advance: but earlier than the invention of the lyre or harp, there were cymbals, timbrels or drums; and the rudest barbarians can make clatterings in musical time with shells, stones, or pieces of metal, which give a sensible rhythm, even where no strict metre is aimed at. The voice at the same time executes some kind of recitative, which (even when we judge it wholly devoid of musical beauty) tends to give to sentences a measured form, marking them as verse. That most unpoetical nation, the Romans, used the same word for the clauses of an ancient law, and for the lines of a poem. Undoubtedly, the desire of aiding memory leads to a certain measurement of every early composition, even if it be a genealogy or a proverb. Thus Verse may be called the universal form of early *composition.* I have already mentioned that the Greek word *poetry* (or rather *poesy)* means *composition,* neither more nor less; as far as the derivation is concerned, it might equally have meant prose. But to illiterate poetry, beside the Verse or rhythm, some kind of chant seems to be essential; and we may observe the tendency in children, who cannot easily be made to read verse without it. Their mind is so caught by the form that unless they are taught a tune with it, they invent a sing-song of their own, generally very unpleasing to a cultivated taste, as is the music of most rude peoples. There is no human tendency which we can find fully developed in any one nation: yet by putting together the early experience of several nations, even if our knowledge of each separately is rather fragmentary, we can gain a pretty good natural history of the peculiarity which we are studying. I propose in this

lecture to discuss something of the Natural history of poetry in its various forms.

Though Prose Composition comes later in time, after writing materials are abundant, possibly we ought to reckon, as naturally coeval with poetry,—not indeed in all nations, but in many,—the professional Story Teller, who is the representative of oral prose. The story teller of modern Persia, and the improvisatore of Italy who talks off-hand rhyme, might seem quite a later phenomenon; but we read that the early Arabs had much the same practice, and among the African negroes we hear of the "singing-men" who are often attached to the chieftains, and, like the court jester of the Middle Ages of Europe, narrate stories of their own. It is possible that the minstrel and the story teller are two naturally contemporaneous growths, representatives of poetry and prose in the earliest times, the latter of whom especially attached himself to the train of some chieftain. Minstrels also were glad of such patronage; but while the minstrel by his half religious character stood more upright before the holder of power, and leant on priestly influences, where such existed; the story teller, who (though often a man of much talent) inclined to play the buffoon, became more entirely dependent on one chief or prince, and was less disposed to the wandering life than the romantic minstrel. Indeed it has been thought, that Fables (an extremely early form of composition) had their origin in despotic courts, because they supply the least dangerous method by which a courtier can give advice or admonition to a sovereign prince. I will not undertake to assert this in its generality; yet it has plausible support. We all remember NATHAN's parable to DAVID of the ewe lamb.

At any rate, whatever the exact era; sooner or later, in every country where mind is active and letters rare, the minstrel and the story teller coexist; whether the Song and the Story take the forms of Ballad and Legend, both half

sacred; or of Hymn and Priestly Narrative, both avowedly sacred; or of courtly Sonnet and Jester's tale or Fable. In nations which have any high poetical talent the character of song is probably quite as various in the earliest time as that of written poetry in the latest. But, over and above, in many nations there is a peculiar development of poetry called EPIC, on which you must allow me to dwell more pointedly.

Epic Poetry is in my belief a compromise between History and Poetry. Before a people has any idea how difficult it is to learn and keep historical truth, before speaker or hearers have at all cultivated the historical faculty, a poet undertakes to gratify the embryo historical appetite, and absorbs into his work the interest of national sympathies without sacrificing the ornaments and charms which are peculiarly his own. The great Latin epic of ENNIUS was avowedly a history of Rome, and must have owed its chief attraction to the fact that Rome had then no history in the Latin tongue. The great Persian Epic of FIRDUSÎ was just in like case. By the animosity of Mussulman rulers against the older worship of Persia, war was made against all intelligible records of the past, so that the written history of the old dynasties perished. Popular memory retained and repeated, then confused and marred it. We are able to compare the outlines of FIRDUSÎ with what we know certainly to be fact. He has preserved no memory of the long continued Persian wars against Greece, nor of the final conquest of Persia by Greek arms. With him, ALEXANDER THE GREAT was a Persian prince, who took the throne from his elder brother. He is not even acquainted with the wars and successes of the Parthians and of the Sassanidæ against the Romans, which we might have expected national pride to remember. It is instructive to us thus to learn how untrustworthy as history is an Epic poem, however historical its pretensions. The very same lesson is taught by the Epic, or poetical romance, called TURPIN'S Chronicle of CHARLEMAGNE.—I am tempted to moot the question, whether

the historical plays of SHAKSPEARE, though dramatic in their form, ought not to be regarded as substantially Epic in their spirit and in their relations. They rest on tales which either are or are believed to be true, and draw their interest from the national history. Moreover they have none of the meagre unity which the drama generally assumes. Like HOMER's poetry they have an infinite background as of distant things dimly seen. The illusion, as if of truth, hereby produced in HOMER, is to me one of his most remarkable phenomena. The poet speaks like a man who draws his tale from the infinitude of real life. Just as in reading TASSO, we are referred to every part of Europe from which the Crusaders came, and pick up short pieces of information concerning their family and fortunes which have nothing to do with the main subject of the poem; so in the Iliad we are often informed in parenthesis of little facts, which have no bearing on the argument, but seem to come out quite undesignedly, from the exuberance of the poet's knowledge, barely because they are true. VIRGIL tries to imitate it, but unsuccessfully. In HOMER it is by no means wholly attributable to art, but rather to the fact that his memory was well charged with legends in which he himself believed. We see the same thing again in WALTER SCOTT. By drawing on a real world and not on his own invention he gains a variety, a weight and often a pathos, which to a tale of entire fiction is impossible. Rather than quote HOMER, whom I should have to translate, I will illustrate the remark from SCOTT. I open him at random:

> Why do these steeds stand ready dight?
> Why watch these warriors arm'd by night?
> They watch to hear the bloodhound baying,
> They watch to hear the war horn braying,
> To see *St. George's* red cross streaming,
> To see the midnight beacon gleaming:
> They watch against southern force and guile;
> Lest *Scroop* or *Howard* or *Percy's* powers
> Threaten Branksome's lordly towers
> From *Warkworth* or *Naworth* or merry *Carlisle.*

Here the enumeration of names aids greatly to the vividness, and gives an illusion of truth. Again: when WILLIAM OF DELORAINE enters Melrose Abbey,

> Full many a scutcheon and banner riven
> Shook to the cold night wind of heaven
> Around the screenèd altar's pale:
> And there the dying lamps did burn
> Before thy low and lonely urn,
> O gallant chief of *Otterburne!*
> And thine, dark knight of *Liddesdale!*
> O fading honours of the dead!
> O high ambition, lowly laid!

Of course this allusion to the tombs of Earl DOUGLAS who was killed at Otterburne and of his kinsman WILLIAM DOUGLAS, is mere digression; but for that very reason is life-like. It may seem needless to insist, only that it is so often forgotten, that a company of rude warriors, or any people that has national spirit, may take much delight in poetry which professes to tell real truth concerning their ancient princes or religious founders, when they would be quite apathetic to the most beautiful poetry concerning persons unknown to them, or concerning that which they knew to be entirely fictitious. Had not such a phenomenon as WALTER SCOTT appeared, I should have been tempted to lay down that by the rise of prose History, true Epic poetry is necessarily annihilated. But he has shown, that we may adopt the infinitude of real history and construct on it a fiction which has the plausibility without the rigidity of truth. Many have remarked that HERODOTUS's grand tale of the repulse from Greece of the two great Persian invasions is not without reason to be called a prose Epic.

While all readers are delighted with the apparent infinitude of truth underlying HOMER's poetry, and with the touches of History which SCOTT so often interposes, it is deserving of special remark, that in poems wholly fictitious we with one accord dislike such complicated plots as approach to real life: indeed critics demand of the poet under the name of *unity* a

bareness of logical simplicity which is the very reverse of the Epic. Nothing (it seems) is to be stated, presupposed, or alluded to, which does not conduce to the action.—Why is this? I can only infer, that we resent an effort to put on us the burden of understanding and remembering fiction needlessly. It is quite enough to submit to what the logic of the tale essentially demands: more we will not endure. That is: it confesses what hard work every writer of Fiction has, to make us care at all for his tale. It is an uphill task; for we love Truth better. We may endure the Fiction for the sake of its dress, but we do not like it for itself.

Next in magnitude and importance to the Epic every one will reckon the Drama, which first assumed importance in Athens. I do not wish to disparage it, when I say, that Attic Tragedy is to the Homeric Epics as a group of statues is to a painting with multitudinous figures on a great landscape: or again, we may compare Tragedy to a Greek temple, and Epic to an irregular vast cathedral. The compactness of the Greek tragedy makes it very different from SHAKSPEARE's historical plays. On the other hand, some may say we ought not to judge of it by single plays. Many of the noblest dramas were composed as a trilogy; that is, three plays made a single whole, and were acted in succession on the same day to the same audiences. It is possible to go farther in the argument, and say, that we ought to compare the *entire mass* of these Tragic dramas with the Epics. Of ÆSCHYLUS we have seven plays complete, and fragments of seventy-one; of SOPHOCLES we have seven complete and fragments of eighty-four; of EURIPIDES nineteen complete and fragments of fifty-five. A few of the whole are Satyrical, not Tragic; but the total is vast, and was greater than this enumeration. Their Tragedy had in some respect a form more similar to our Opera,—a fact which rose out of its history.

Rude songs of the vintage, which celebrated Dionysus or Bacchus, god of the wine vat, were sung by a chorus (that is, by a dancing band) fantastically dressed, who, as treaders of

the wine vat, were regarded as the retinue of Bacchus, and probably carried some of his symbols, especially vine leaves, yew leaves, wild ivy and myrtle wreathed around wands. A poet first introduced a conversation in verse between himself and the chorus. Gradually two, and at length three, speakers were brought in, the choral songs were shortened and the dialogue lengthened: a plot was further made as a foundation for the dialogue, and the Drama was the result. But the chorus remained as an essential and prominent element. It is a curious mark of the historical connexion between the modern and the ancient theatre, that the place in which our musicians sit is still called the *orchestra*, that is, the dancing place, the place appropriated to the chorus. The music between the Acts is the historical substitute for the choral hymns.

Among the contrasts between the old and the new must be mentioned besides, that their actors wore *masks*, which to us seems an unintelligible barbarism. What is of far deeper importance, their actors were not professional men, but what we should call *amateurs*. It was not hard to get actors, for only four were ordinarily needed; moreover, the tragedies were played only three times or at most four times in the year, on feast days when all business was suspended. The whole city gave up the prime of the day to them, as to a religious solemnity. It is difficult to know how so many Tragedies as SOPHOCLES and EURIPIDES wrote contemporaneously could ever find time for exhibition.

Again, the choral hymns are not a mere unessential accident, like the songs of Ariel in SHAKSPEARE, but necessary to the drama and elaborate. In virtue of them the poet seemed to himself to be a bard, and poured out his own reflections in them as in a meditative hymn. They gave a great additional scope to his genius, and by the variety of metre, as also by music, relieved the great monotony of quantitative Iambics, pronounced (I suppose) in recitative. There is no real limitation on the subject of these choral odes, though in the two

earlier tragedians they are always associated with the action of the drama. EURIPIDES pretty well broke the bond. Thus Tragedy took up into itself nearly every variety of smaller serious poetry.

But I have to explain more definitively the great transition of poetry from the earlier to the later state, which is not only externally from that of the minstrel and improvisatore to that of the writer and book, but intellectually from rudeness to refinement. In strictness the question is not whether a poem be or be not written, but whether it is composed to be heard or to be read. While a knowledge of letters is rare, or writing materials scarce and clumsy, all poetry, though written, is addressed to the ear. In all early civilization, there being no printing press, much even of prose literature was meant to be read aloud, which was apt to give it a character less scientific and more rhetorical. Poetry being still more emphatically a composition than even elaborate prose, first showed the new style. What is meant to be read in private, may well be concise and even condensed. It will bear (as we say) to be read again, and may improve on second reading. But what is to be heard must produce its full effect all at once. It requires some time to impress a new thought on some hearers. A public speaker is seldom effective, if he is too condensed and never repeats himself. A chief art is, so to repeat his thought, as not to seem to repeat it; putting it in different words, so that the hearer may gain familiarity with it from different sides. This is what we call Amplification. It is proper to oratory and to early poetry; but it is gradually driven out of written poetry as cultivation advances.

Striking illustrations how oratorical early poetry may be, are found in the Hebrew Scriptures. In the books of JOB and EZEKIEL Amplification seems pushed to its extreme. I need only read to you a few verses from JOB xl. xli. on the monsters of the deep, and from EZEKIEL xxxi. on the Assyrian in his glory..... ARISTOTLE well says, that what big sketching is to small pictures, such is the popular and

practical oration to the polished harangue (pamphlet) which is directed only to please, and intended for perusal. The former, if read in private, seems coarse and inaccurate; the latter, if recited, is feeble and unpopular. Early Epic is of the popular class. Thus HOMER is broad and strong. He lays on his colours like a scene-painter; sometimes delicate, but always more anxious for force than for minute elegance. The perfection of art is supposed to be reached, when delicacy is attained and force is not yet lost.

The Attic Tragedians decidedly belong to the second or later stage of poetry. The tide in Greece is said to have turned with the satirical poetry of ARCHILOCHUS, who first wrote in terse style, while Epic poets were full of amplification, fond of superfluous epithets, addicted to repeat whole lines or half lines or whole sentences from themselves, and equally to borrow from those who went before them. In the new poetry both originality and terseness were exacted. It was in some sense a change from the childhood to the manhood of the nation: and it cannot be doubted that the three great Tragedians of Athens were quite at the head of all Athenian culture.

Now as Epic poetry took up out of *History* a foreign charm, so did Tragic poetry out of *Morals*. Athens had as yet no prose writer whatever, when ÆSCHYLUS wrote. The philosophy, so called, of THALES and others concerned itself either with physical science or with argument against the mythologies. Nowhere was any such mass of moral thought penned, as overflowed in these great poets. ÆSCHYLUS was less popular, chiefly because his diction was often tinged with Sicilian Greek or otherwise too foreign for simple Athenians. EURIPIDES delighted them by his very skilful composition of purely Attic words into an easy and poetical syntax; also by the great amount of rhetorical skill with which he furnished his disputants. This was only a symptom of the insidious disease which Science was infusing into the drama. Moral philosophy and argumentation was the ivy which clambered

up the oak, adorned it with a splendid foliage not its own, and at last strangled it. We see likewise in the Roman HORACE a history not dissimilar. His later odes have little savour of poetical life; they are moral constructions. Will English poetry die of philosophy? I have often thought it has caught the disease.

As by the birth of History a natural death (or say, with the Greeks, a *euthanasia*, an auspicious decease) comes upon Epic poetry; so, it may seem, the birth of Moral Philosophy in prose was a knell of death to Tragedy. When SOCRATES had accustomed Athens to treat such topics in talk and as science, Tragedy lost its function, or at least its power of interest. With the death of EURIPIDES it seemed to perish, and that, for ever.

You may be interested by an example of EURIPIDES's tendency to philosophize. A large number indeed of fragments from his speeches have been preserved for their moral interest. So we familiarly quote lines of SHAKSPEARE as if they were national proverbs. But I speak rather of whole speeches or pieces, and will quote a choral hymn from the Iphigenia in Aulis, translating it as well as I can. The strophe or first stanza is on Love, and uses the current phrases of mythology with a certain grace. The antistrophe or second stanza is in very elegant diction, difficult to reproduce in English, yet the poetical spirit is overpowered by accurate moral thought, in itself highly remarkable. The speaker is a woman,—a young matron, it seems. But I must add, he seldom runs into moralizing in his choral odes: this is certainly no fair specimen.

IPH. IN AULIS 544.

1. Blest they, who find Love's goddess gentle,
And live by frantic stings unharass'd,
The beds of Aphrodita sharing
With sage discretion;
Where Love, the golden-hairèd, aimeth
A twofold arrow of the Graces;
The one for happy fate, the other
For life's confusion.

I from our chambers ban the latter,
O fairest Kypris! Charms in measure
To me allotted be, and passion
Unblam'd in fondness.
Portion I court in Aphrodita;
From too much, save me!

2. But various are the hearts of mortals,
Cross-fashioned in the bent; yet alway
Right good beyond dispute the upright.
Well cultur'd rearings
Greatly to virtue aid: for, wisdom
Is to revere, and grace surpassing
Hath one, who duty scans by insight,
Where from Opinion
Is shed on life repute un-aging.
A great emprize the chase of virtue,—
To *women*, veil'd in Love's retirement;
But *manly* effort*
Wellordered, myriadteeming, grander
The city raiseth.

In Attic tragedy little or nothing depended on the scene-painter, as the acting ordinarily went on under the open sky. Much depended on the dancing and music; but these were cultivated universally. Even MENELAUS in HOMER presumes this, when he says:

Of all things is satiety; | —of slumber, and of fondness,
And *of soft tones melodious*, | and *noble skill of dancing*,—

These cannot have been of much trouble to the performers. The poet himself taught and directed the rehearsals. The dresses of the chorus were expensive, but were of a form fixed by custom or religion, and probably fitted every body nearly alike. Nor was there any effort wasted about historical costume, as of late with us. The English theatre will perhaps die out. When the professional system is finally dead, a far more reasonable and beneficial amateur system

* The old text *ἔνδον* is against metre and sense. I conjecturally change *αὖ κόσμος ἔνδον* to *εὔκοσμος ἀγών*. The glory of Woman (she says) is wise and faithful love; of Man labour for the city.

may arise, if Elocution be cultivated (as I hope it will be and am sure it ought to be) as an ordinary and necessary part of education.

But besides the two great forms, Epic and Dramatic, I ought to mention in detail other kinds of poetry. ARISTOTLE comprehends all that remains under the word Lyric, the lyre having been disused in these two, after certain recitatives had become universally familiar. We indeed may modify his words, and retain a triple division, by saying that poetry was composed either to be *read*, to be *acted*, or to be *sung*. In earliest Greece perhaps, nearly as now in Africa, nothing could go off well without song, or even song and dance. There was wedding song, and funeral song, war song, song for a victor at the games, drinking song, songs at the harvest and at the vintage, a song about (or to) every god; besides epitaphs, inscriptions on offerings or monuments, and moral verses such as SOLON'S. Great art was once expended on Funeral poetry. In ancient Asia mourning was emphatically made a profession, and Dramatic Dirges were constructed, which were called Arian and acted peculiarly by Mariandynians. PINDAR among the Greeks wrote many dirges for the dead, which have perished. SIMONIDES composed a great multitude of elegant epitaphs and other mourning pieces. In the Choêphori of ÆSCHYLUS there is probably more than one choral ode, modelled after the Arian scheme.

To exhaust the kinds of poetry by enumeration seems impossible. Such epithets as Narrative, Descriptive, Didactic, Meditative,...rather suggest elements than classes of poetry; for they may enter any kind. The most stupid of all are the strictly Didactic Poems, which, we may boldly say, ought not to exist, although VIRGIL wrote four Georgics, that is, poems to give advice in Husbandry, on crops, planting, cattle and bees. He has so skilfully run away from his subject, as to produce much very fine poetry; but the example was mischievous. A host of imitators followed. Whether the Art of Brewing was the last didactic poem, I do not know; but

such things seem to have died out. The poem of the Roman LUCRETIUS is not here comprized, for his object sincerely was his own Science, and he put it into verse to lessen its repulsiveness. Poetry was not his *end*, but his *means;* which wholly alters the case.

In modern days English poems have been written in the *form* of Dramas, which were not intended to be acted. Of these MILMAN'S were perhaps the earliest:—I think his first were before BYRON'S. It was strongly felt that BYRON crippled himself by Unity of time and place; nor did he succeed in interesting the public by his choice of subjects. It has been pronounced an unwisdom in any one to write in a dramatic form, unless he really intend the piece for exhibition. For he makes an enormous sacrifice, and immensely increases his difficulties. A narrative poet is always free to introduce speeches, but the dramatist cannot narrate in his own name. Our modern narrative poems also admit songs at pleasure, and thus embrace greater variety of form than the ancient Epic. Nevertheless, it is possible that MILMAN rightly judged what suited his own talents. He probably has not dash enough for a less regular and constrained form. BYRON on the contrary cut away his own forces by it.

Ditties arise impromptu in some poetical nations, as they did among the Arabs and Hebrews, and as they do among African negroes. MUNGO PARK tells a pretty story, how, after he had been robbed, he sate down under a tree weary and famished; and there he was kindly fed and soothed by black women. While he was resting, as if half asleep, he was touched to hear the little ditty which they sang among themselves in the midst of their work. I can now quote his words only from memory, but they ran nearly thus: "The poor white man came and sate under our tree. He has no mother to bring him milk: he has no daughter to grind his corn: let us pity the poor white man, who came to sit under our tree." This instance of extemporaneous ditty does not stand alone. When Captain DENHAM returned from a ma-

rauding expedition: in which Boo KHALLOOM, a certain chief of Fezzan, (who united in himself the grazier, the merchant, the prince and the robber,) was slain by the Fellatahs, DENHAM immediately after heard the following ditty sung in the streets:

1. Oh trust not to the gun and the sword:
The spear of the unbeliever prevails.
Boo Khalloom, the good and the brave, has fallen:
Who shall now be safe?

2. As the moon among the little stars, so was Boo Khalloom among men:
Whither shall Fezzan now look for a protector?
Men hang their heads in sorrow,
While women wring their hands,
Rending the air with their cries.

3. As a shepherd to his flock, so was Boo Khalloom to Fezzan.
Give him songs: give him music:
What words can equal his praise?
His heart was as large as the Desart:
His coffers were as the exuberance of the camel's udder,
Comforting and nourishing those around him.

4. As the flowers without rain perish in the field,
So will the Fezzaneers droop;
For Boo Khalloom returns no more.
His body lies in the land of the heathen:
The poisoned arrow of the unbeliever prevails.

5. Oh trust not to the gun and the sword:
The spear of the heathen conquers.
Boo Khalloom, the good and the brave, has fallen:
Who shall now be safe?

The poetry which rose latest among the Greeks was called Pastoral; on which I may bestow a few words.

What are called Pastorals are sometimes dramatic in their form, yet in their substance are partly descriptive, partly consist of songs and elegies. The original writer of Pastorals was THEOCRITUS, who drew from nature, and represented the shepherds of Sicily nearly as they were, that is, as a set of rude and gross men, yet fond of playing the pipe, and possessing some poetical skill. VIRGIL copied these, but polished

off most of the grossness, thereby idealizing the shepherd life. Into it he introduced moreover at least one political man by name, viz. GALLUS, afterwards governor of Egypt. Other great personages seem to be hidden under feigned names, as JULIUS CÆSAR under Daphnis. VIRGIL hereby set the taste for a long time to come. The most beautiful imitation of him in English is perhaps MILTON'S Lycidas, which nevertheless is so little intelligible as a whole, that it reminds one rather of a piece of music, or of a magical dissolving picture. SPENSER'S Fairy Queen is of the same sort. It has select and ardent admirers. Some critics set it above every thing, yet the English people in general will not read it; chiefly because no one can understand it. In more recent days THOMSON'S Poetry had much of the merits and of the form of Pastorals, with names such as Damon and Thyrsis, which testify whom he is imitating: but WHARTON'S mock Pastorals, I believe, were a virtual proclamation that we are tired of this school, and are to have no more of it. Better known than WHARTON are the verses written for LAURA MATILDA in the Rejected Addresses; which have aided to expel that system which put forward as poetry soft and polished versification all about nothing.

Pan beheld Patroclus dying:
Nox to Niobe was turn'd.
Bacchus, from Osiris flying,
Saw his Sémelè inurn'd.
&c.

Since then, a new form of rustic poetry has been attempted by CRABBE,—rustic, but by no means always pastoral. He draws from low life with disagreeable exactness, like a Dutch painter; and although he has some true and splendid descriptions of the elements, his subject is too unpleasing and his tone too ungenial to have many admirers.

It is remarkable to me how free from ferocity are War Songs of Greece, as far as I can remember to have read: there is nothing like that which I have heard of in the Saxon

and Danish and (under correction I say it) of the Welsh. The celebrated song of TYRTÆUS (translated as I find convenient) may here deserve to be read.

Valour to all mankind the highest prize is counted,
The noblest for a youth to bear away.
A common good is he to the city and all the people,
Who firmly striding in the front rank waits,
But of ignoble flight no memory admitteth,
Putting to risk his hardy life and soul,
And to the standers-by gives heart to perish boldly:
This man in war hath sure utility.
Suddenly doth he rout the bristling mass of foemen
Thick wedg'd, and sharply checks the battle tide;
Then foremost falls himself, and precious life abandons,
But glorifies his town and land and sire,
When many a wound in front his bosom deeply pierces,
Through bossy shield, and the good breastplate through.
For him the young lament, for him lament the aged,
And all the city is touch'd with sad regrets;
And signal among men are shown his grave and children,
And sons of sons, and all their after race.
Never doth this man's name and noble glory perish:
Immortal, e'en beneath the earth, is he,
Whom, bravest of the brave, in stubborn battle standing
For country and children dear, fierce Mars shall slay.
But if he well escape the fate of death long racking
And conquering win the lance's brilliant boast,
Then all, both young and old, together pay him honour,
And he to Pluto goes thick crown'd with joys.
He, e'en in age, is bright among his comrade-freedmen,
By Reverence and by Justice screen'd from harm.

It is sometimes said that poetical genius perished in Athens as soon as prose literature arose. I rather believe that the highest minds, as now among ourselves, found other occupations more urgent and more fruitful. Yet it must be admitted that genius of all sorts perished with liberty, 70 or 80 years later. Even then, poetical *taste* continued. Exquisite short poems, which we vaguely call Epigrams, abounded to very late times. In general, I believe that when a nation has already got in literature a notable mass of good poetry,

and criticism is fastidious, and high perfection is demanded in every line, it seems madness to increase the bulk of the same article. So said HORACE concerning Greek poetry. The impulse to write is with some a mania so inexplicable, that no law can safely be laid down. But in a cultivated age, with a taste for poetry widely diffused, in which also great master poets are studied and familiar, there certainly may be hundreds of possible poets and yet not one willing to devote his time to a long and elaborate effort. In our youth we saw COLERIDGE, SOUTHEY and SCOTT, who had begun as poets, become writers of prose. Possibly we shall not be far wrong in saying that in the early and central period poetry is composed by the highest minds to instruct the nation, but in the later stage the best is composed solely to please the writer himself, without any idea of publishing. Such pieces will naturally be short. Thus ARISTOTLE wrote his beautiful hymn to Virtue to console himself for the cruel death which a patriotic friend endured from the Persians. We do wrong to complain that Nature becomes stingy of poetical genius as a nation advances, if the great thing which we lack, is, willingness to devote life to the task.

END OF SECOND LECTURE.

THIRD LECTURE.

On Poetical Description.

Writer differs exceedingly from writer, speaker from speaker, in liveliness. To be dull, is in all a very undesirable fault. It springs from no single cause. But there is nothing in which the lively and the dull more ordinarily show their contrast than in Description. This is no way peculiar to Poetry. The historian, the novelist, the orator, the letter writer, nay, the witness before a jury, all deal in descriptions.

Some scenes are so vivid, that an eye-witness who describes them can hardly help being lively. That flattest of writers, Xenophon, becomes in a few passages very vivid, as in telling of a hard-fought battle. Polybius, of all valuable ancient historians the most tedious, becomes lively when narrating a frightful mutiny in the Carthaginian army. The Latin historians cultivated this virtue to a pernicious extreme. Livy prefers to tell what he knows to be a romance,—what is probably his own pure invention,—rather than lack vivid touches. Those of us who have read Carlyle's French Revolution will understand better than necessary all that I mean.—The novelist in some respects goes into greater detail than is approved in a historian. To describe costume minutely is not thought wrong in a novelist; but this is very rare in history, as when Herodotus tells the various armour of Xerxes' motley army. Now it is remarkable,—it is a weakness in Homer, if we regard him as only a poet,—that he has a love of minute description for its own sake, even when it adds neither to effect nor to beauty. I am apt to call it in him an *Egyptian* peculiarity. The Egyptian pictures go

beyond the Dutch in homeliness, and enter into the whole routine of common life. The Egyptians would seem to have laboured at a vast series of paintings for no other reason but to transmit to us a knowledge of their antiquities. All the processes of baking and grinding, every domestic and useful art, are accurately depicted, though with figures almost wooden. Nearly as wooden, I fear, are some of the Homeric descriptions, which, however curious, certainly are not beautiful, as the details of killing an ox and roasting the small collops. The poet loves details in things artificial, equally as in sea pictures, in which he is wonderfully various. On the contrary he is monotonous and self-repeating as to the armour and dressing of his heroes. No novelist could be more minute, than is HOMER as to the breast-plate and shield of AGAMEMNON; and as the poet there is not careless, as often, but exerts himself, it may be worth while to quote the whole passage.

ILIAD II., 17-44.

First on his shins the dapper greaves | with silver anklets fitted
Arrang'd he: next, to guard his breast, | enwrapt him in a corslet,
Which erst from Kinyras he gat | as hospitable token,
What time to Kyprus spread abroad | high tiding, that the Argives
Would shortly on their galleys sail | against the land of Troas.
Therefore on him bestow'd he it, | to gratify the monarch.
Ten stripes of blue and dusky steel | ran o'er its polish'd surface:
Its stripes of gold were six and six, | but those of tin were twenty.
Toward the neck, three on each side, | the forms of dark blue serpents
Did arch them, like to heav'nly bows | the which upon the welkin
May Saturn's child set forth, a sign | to voice-dividing mortals.
Next slung he round his shoulders' breadth | the cutlas brightly studded
With gold, within a silver sheath | which hung on golden braces.
Above, he took his furious (?) shield, | much crafty, man-encircling,
Round which ten brazen circles ran. | On the fair front in centre,
Mid twenty bosses of white tin, | one of blue steel protruded.
Upon it Gorgon horrid-ey'd, | the outmost border filling,
Cast dreadful glances, and around | sat Flight and Consternation.
The strap with silver was encased: | o'er it an azure serpent
Was twin'd with three outgazing heads, | forth from one neck proceeding.

But on his head a casque he set | with double ridge four-crested (?),
Bushy with horse-tail: dreadfully | the plume above it nodded.
A pair of valiant spears he grasp'd | with tips of copper sharpen'd,
And from them shone the yellow gleam | afar into the heaven.

WALTER SCOTT shows his affinity to HOMER, even in so small a thing as this,—his love of telling how a prince was dressed, and how the Celtic clans were armed. Hear his account of King JAMES in Marmion.

An easy task it was, I trow,
King James's manly form to know,
Although, his courtesy to show,
He doff'd, to Marmion bending low,
His broider'd cap and plume.
For royal were his garb and mien,
His cloak of crimson velvet pil'd,
Trimm'd with the fur of marten wild:
His vest of changeful satin sheen
The dazzled eye beguil'd.
His gorgeous collar hung adown,
Wrought with the badge of Scotland's crown,
The thistle brave, of old renown.
His trusty blade, Toledo right,
Descended from a baldric bright.
White were his buskins; on the heel
His spurs inlaid with gold and steel.
His bonnet, all of crimson fair,
Was button'd with a ruby rare;
And Marmion deem'd he ne'er had seen
A prince of such a noble mien.

I might also quote largely from a recent poem in sadly monotonous metre,—LONGFELLOW's Hiawatha,—for description most minute, very Homeric, and as I call it, very Egyptian, yet often noble, and always interesting. But the interest of such descriptions is properly historical, not poetical. Beyond Epic poetry we ill bear them; and after all, the novelist will beat the poet in this work. Indeed in all direct description the novelist competes sharply. SCOTT himself shows it as to elaborate descriptions of scenery, in which he indulges greatly, alike in his poems and in his novels. In

general this is a topic on which the moderns extravagate. Our passion for landscape must, I believe, exceed that of the ancients. Our numerous landscape-painters kindle it, and the safety of our travelling permits much indulgence in the reality. We can quote from VIRGIL and HORACE plenty to show that they had an eye and a heart for such beauty, but there is nothing in magnitude and in enthusiasm to compare with our poets. SCOTT has indeed made Scotland wild with it. I need not quote any thing about Loch Katrine and the Trosachs. But in HOMER descriptions of the sea, which are his *forte*, generally come out in similes, not in a formal account of a particular place; and the Tragedians appear upon principle to have made human action and passion so prominent, as always to keep allusions to scenery subordinate. They generally, even in choral odes where impulse may take its fling, rather intersperse touches of scenery which kindle the hearers' own imagination, than draw any elaborate picture themselves. EURIPIDES abounds with this. I give an example, though translation is difficult.

EURIP. ALCESTIS 569.

Oh ever liberal house,
Dear haunt of guests! in thee
Apollo, Pythian harper, deign'd to tarry;
Who, upon thy domain
A hireling to become
Endur'd, and many a shepherd-ditty whistled
Adown the slanting glades
Unto thy grazing herds.
Thereat, delight of song to common pasture
The spotted lynxes drew:
Anon, from forest crown
Of Othrys hied the murderous troop of lions.
Then danc'd around thy harp,
O Shining One! the fawn
Of dappled vest; who, with light ankle skipping,
Flitted across the bound
Of lofty-hairèd pine,
Charm'd by the kindly melody.

Observe how the touches of scenery are interfused,—the slanting glades—the forest crown—the region of lofty pines: then with the grazing cattle, the lynxes, the lions, and the skipping fawn, he fills out a picture.

From the same poet I take a shorter extract,

EURIP. BACCH. 868.

When o'er her netted prison
The timid game has vanish'd,
The huntsman's whoop his hounds' career attuneth.
But she, with stormy straining,
Along the river's level
Boundeth,—by emptiness of man delighted,—
Beneath the blossoms of the dark-hair'd copse.

In personal descriptions novelists do not shrink to tell the form of a hero or heroine's features, but no wise poet ventures on any thing of the kind: the moral aspect, impression and effect of the countenance or person, is that on which alone he dwells. When HOMER would describe the beauty of HELEN, he does so by stating its effect *on the old men*, the counsellors of PRIAM. They say:

ILIAD III., 156.

None may be wroth, that Trôians—and trimly greav'd Achaians
For such a woman many a year | choose bitter woe to suffer.
Unto the deathless goddesses | her face hath awful likeness.

The description of VENUS is equally short and scarcely less vague; and the same may be said of VIRGIL's description. Sparkling eyes, rosy cheek, lovely or alluring bosom, bright hair or golden hair, pretty well exhaust what is to be directly said: but grace of movement and divine odour are also ascribed. Here again the moderns dare to amplify, but it is on the spiritual side of beauty, and by describing its effect. BYRON writes thus concerning Zuleika, (Bride of Abydos, Canto I. vi.)

Who hath not prov'd how feebly words essay
To fix one spark of beauty's heav'nly ray?

> Who doth not feel,—until his fainting sight
> Faints into dimness with its own delight,—
> His changing cheek, his fainting heart confess
> The might, the majesty of loveliness?

He adds six more lines, of which the three last are open to criticism, and might better have been condensed into one. MILTON concerning EVE is as short as the ancients:

> Grace was in all her steps, heav'n in her eye,
> In all her gestures dignity and love.

We are forbidden to call this "Virgilian" by the phrase *Heav'n in her eye;* for, the ancients found no moral idea at all in the word Heaven, and there is no translating this. In the Lady of the Lake, after SCOTT has described Ellen and even her dress, and one thinks he has done, he begins again thus:

> And never brooch the fold combin'd
> Above a heart more good and kind.
> Her kindness and her worth to spy,
> You need but gaze on Ellen's eye.
> Not Katrine in her mirror blue
> Gave back the shaggy banks more true,
> Than every free-born glance confess'd
> The guileless movements of her breast:
> Whether joy danc'd in her dark eye,
> Or woe or pity claim'd a sigh,
> Or filial love was glowing there,
> Or meek devotion pour'd a pray'r,
> Or tale of injury call'd forth
> The indignant spirit of the North.

One may doubt whether the Greek and Latin poets knew how large a part of beauty depends on moral expression. They did not draw a fierce MEDEA or a dogged ANTIGONE to be beautiful: *abandon* in a woman came forth with them as a Bacchanal, beautiful but mad.

Descriptions of strong passion are not at all difficult. Novelists easily succeed in it, and so do poets, the symptoms being very visible. In general, description ought to be, first Vivid, next, where the subject allows, it should have touches

of the Ethical or Pathetic. Moreover, much more is gained by stating effects than causes. In rapid action indeed this is essential. Causes pass too quickly to be seen, effects abide. Causes are often matters of deep art or science, effects are on the surface. To revert to personal beauty, what it is in a particular countenance which impresses us with awe, love, or sympathy, it may need a physiognomist or an artist to tell. The poet, if wise, will be satisfied to announce the effect. Even in so obvious a subject for poetical description as the rapid movement of horses, though VIRGIL has in several places admirable and untranslateable words, we hardly get any thing so effective as the simple statement how the horse himself was changed by his toil. As HOMER says of AGAMEMNON's steeds,

> Their breasts with streaks of foam were white,
> the dust their bellies spatter'd——

Here too SCOTT and BYRON are fuller, and both good:

LADY OF THE LAKE, V., 15.

> They bathe their courser's' sweltering sides,
> Dark Forth, amid thy sluggish tides,
> And on the opposing shore take ground,
> With plash, with scramble, and with bound.

I do not know any thing in the classics at all of the same kind with that ride of King JAMES, much less with MAZEPPA's, from which I just adduce what comes nearest to the last quoted.

> With glossy skin and dripping mane
> And reeling limbs and reeking flank
> The wild steed's sinewy * nerves still strain
> Up the repelling bank.

Again, the effects tell most. The wild horses described in Mazeppa bear well to be paralleled with HOMER's celebrated comparison, first of ALEXANDER, afterwards of HECTOR, to the stalled horse which has broken his halter. But when the thing to be described is in itself thus obviously noble, many

* (NOTE.) *Sinewy nerves* mean *sinewy sinews*: this is a weakness.

poets not first-rate are equal to it. The creative power of the poet is chiefly tried, when the tale does not of itself suggest any thing beautiful or noble, but his imagination has to invent the nobleness or beauty or pathos. And here permit me to digress concerning the word Imagination.

If the question were put to several persons at random, What quality of mind is most needed in a poet? they would perhaps all answer, Imagination: yet, if asked, What is Imagination? they might give very different replies. Sometimes the word is used for that discursiveness which flits from subject to subject, and groups together ideas borrowed from different places or different regions of thought. This admits of being distinctively called *Fancy*. It is highly pleasing in the lighter sorts of poetry and properly belongs to Ornament: but in the midst of any deep feeling, sallies of Fancy are offensive. They spoil our sympathy, and suggest that the poet is shallow-hearted. More intentness of mind would give greater sobriety and forbid sportiveness.—A second quality sometimes called Imagination is better named *Fantasy*: I mean, inventiveness of things unreal, such as the caves of the sea-nymphs or a battle between a fairy and a griffin; of which there is no end in the Arabian Nights and in SOUTHEY's poems. Magic and miracles exert their chief force on children and childish men. Nothing is easier than such invention. SOUTHEY was probably too learned to condescend to invent: he borrowed conscientiously from orientals. MILTON loves to adopt from the Greeks ornament of this fantastic kind, as SOUTHEY from the Asiatics: but with MILTON it is mere imagery and allusion, not incorporated into any events of his poetry. Perhaps modern taste rather endures than approves such things. No one could now, without encountering a severe outburst of hostile criticism, write the Tempest, in which the spirits and magic are so effective.

A third kind of Imagination is the faculty which makes judicious combinations and contrasts and brings-in details

"natural, but not obvious," than which nothing more tends to the liveliness of poetry or prose. A fourth definition limits the last-named (perhaps unduly) to the discernment of Analogies, especially between the moral and material world; so that Imagination becomes the faculty which suggests metaphorical language.

To explain what I mean here by Combination, and how it bears upon Description, I will read a few lines from SCOTT's Marmion, Canto II. 1.

> The breeze, which swept away the smoke,
> Round Norham castle roll'd,
> When all the loud artillery spoke,
> With lightning flash, and thunder stroke,
> As Marmion left the Hold.
> It curl'd not Tweed alone, that breeze,
> For, far upon Northumbrian seas,
> It freshly blew, and strong,
> Where, from high Whitby's cloister'd pile,
> Bound to St. Cuthbert's Holy Isle,
> It bore a bark along.

In prose, all that had to be told, was, that a salute of cannon was fired for MARMION's departure, and that a vessel from Whitby was sailing for St. Cuthbert's isle. The poet combines the two by the intervention of the breeze. The *same* breeze which swept away the smoke, brought the bark swiftly on its voyage. This is a pleasing combination, invented by the imagination of the poet. Read further, and you will find how vividly he imagined the movement of the ship, the merriment of the sailors, and the various feelings of the nuns on board.

> One eyed the shrouds and swelling sail
> With many a benedicite:
> One at the rippling surge grew pale
> And would for terror pray;
> Then shriek'd because the seadog nigh
> His round black head and sparkling eye
> Rear'd o'er the foaming spray.

Here the poet has out of his own fulness invented these details, and they bring out the scene as real. Let me pass to another form of lively description. BYRON has to tell us that the Hellespont was stormy. He might have added, "as stormy as when it drown'd the unfortunate LEANDER;" but not content with this poetical addition, he personifies Love, and brings out the thought in this wonderful richness:

BRIDE OF ABYDOS, CANTO II. 1.

The winds are high on Hellè's wave,
As on that night of stormy water,
When LOVE, who sent, forgot to save
The young, the beautiful the brave,
The lonely hope of SESTOS' daughter.

But it is remarkable with how few touches a powerful effect is sometimes produced by a great poet, where an inferior writer would be elaborate. For instance, Athéna (Minerva) in the Iliad comes down from heaven to calm the anger of ACHILLES. It is told in few lines as follows:

ILIAD I., 197.

Behind him, by his auburn hair | she seiz'd the son of Peleus,
And stood, to him alone revealed; | but none beside him saw her.
First marvell'd he; then was abashed, | when quickly he distinguish'd
Maiden Athéna: dreadfully | her two eyes beam'd upon him.

We here learn what she did, and how he felt; but as to what she was like,—it is only said that her two eyes beamed dreadfully. Yet it suffices to suggest a grand image, and the abashment of the proud ACHILLES assures us how august a being he saw. Again the poet tells us the effect, and leaves it to speak for itself. The great fault of second-rate poets, who excel chiefly in versification, is, that they want to tell every thing themselves, and do not set the reader's own imagination at work. This is indeed the error of HOMER himself, and perhaps of all the ancients, in regard to the single combats of heroes: but one of POPE's great sins, is, his corrupting HOMER's simplicity. An instructive example is in the cele-

brated simile of the Moon, where POPE's version has been greatly admired. HOMER says barely:

ILIAD VIII., 555.

And as around the shining Moon | the many stars of heaven
Glister with radiance distinct, | when all the sky is breathless,
And every lofty peak is shown, | and headland edge, and forest,
And from behind the cloven sky | unfathom'd heaven gleameth,
Nor hidden any star may be, | and joyful is the shepherd:—
So many fires, &c.....

Here the earth is dark as far as appears; the outline of the hills being strongly marked on the sky. The brilliancy of the little stars rather implies that the Moon was *not* very full and powerful, though of that the poet says nothing. He might have written at least as well: "And as *in absence of the Moon* | the many stars, &c." But what does POPE make him say?

As when the Moon, refulgent lamp of Night,
O'er heav'n's pure azure spreads her sacred light;
When not a breath disturbs the deep serene,
And not a cloud o'ercasts the solemn scene;
Around her throne the vivid planets roll,
And stars unnumber'd gild the glowing pole,
O'er the dark trees a *yellower verdure* shed,
And *tip with silver* every mountain's head;
Then shine the vales, the rocks in prospect rise,
A flood of glory bursts from all the skies:
The conscious swains rejoicing in the sight,
Eye the *blue* vault, and bless the *useful* light.

Whether HOMER's shepherd rejoiced because the moon was *useful*, HOMER does not say; and it is unfair to say it for him: but far worse is it to paint his moonlight into sunlight, and make his stars cast a yellow tint on the trees and tip the hills with silver. "*Then* shine the vales:" really as if they did not shine in the day, but only under the moon: and all this, forsooth, is to illustrate the brightness of the enemy's watch fires!—This it is, to improve upon a master. In

general, minute description is bad where the mind supplies the details of itself; also, where the Sublime is aimed at. Breadth of touch seems here essential.

The ancient poets constantly labour at single combats of heroes, but seldom with good result. Every modern poet seems to surpass them. They fail, the moment the action becomes rapid, because they insist on telling accurately far more than could possibly be seen or known; which gives a tame and leisurely effect. There is an elaborate single combat between two princely brethren in the Phœnissæ of EURIPIDES, and it has one excellent touch. "The sweat," says the poet, "streamed from the spectators in anxiety." But he knows too accurately every posture and stroke of the heroes, quite in Homeric fashion. HOMER himself is almost stereotype in his own weakness. I will read a few lines from the single combat in the third book of the Iliad, v. 344.

There, at short distance, stood they both | upon the ground appointed,
Their adverse lances brandishing, | indignant each at other,
First Alexander forward threw | the spear with lengthy shadow
And hit the shield of Atreus' son | which equal was on all sides;
Nor might the metal force its way, | but first the point was broken,
Caught in the sturdy buckler. Next, | Atrídes Menelâos
With pray'r to father Jupiter | uprose to hurl his weapon.
. . . . . .
He spake, and poising forward threw | the spear with lengthy shadow,
And hit the shield of Priam's son | which equal was on all sides.
Right through the shield's resplendency | hurtled the massy weapon,
And thro' the corslet's crafty work | with force uncheck'd was planted:
Close to his side from front to back | it thro' the tunic glided
Harmless: for quick the hero flinch'd | and gloomy fate avoided.

I do not think that any one can read the combat of Roderick Dhu with James Fitz James, of William of Deloraine with Lord Cranstoun, or Cranstoun with Richard Musgrave, and not think SCOTT immeasurably superior. HOMER always succeeds better, when he tells of the movement of hosts on a greater scale, or deals more broadly with war, and veils it in simile. Thus

ILIAD XI., 492.

As when an overflowing brook | down from the mountains cometh
On to the plain with tossing gush, | by storms from Jove escorted,
And many a dry and rotten oak, | and many a pine it beareth,
And slime and rubbish plentiful | into the salt wave casteth;
So then did gallant Ajax deal, | filling the plain with turmoil,
Horses and heroes slaughtering. | Nor yet did Hector hear it;
For by Scamander's bank afar | he on the left was fighting,
Where chiefly heads of heroes fell | and clamour rose incessant,
Round warriour Idómeneus | and round the mighty Nestor.
With these did Hector company, | and ruthless deeds achiev'd he,
By spear and charioteering skill, | the bands of young men wasting.

I might occupy the day in quoting like noble passages. Nevertheless I doubt whether in all HOMER there is any thing to compare with SCOTT's battle of Flodden Field. JEFFREY indeed has judged it to surpass any thing ever written of the kind. The poet takes the reader with him to stand on one spot, and see whatever can be seen from thence. This gives to the scene, not only a unity, but an impression of reality. Then, as to the fate of Lord MARMION himself. The details of the struggle are left to be conjectured by the reader. Lord MARMION's banner for a while is seen flying aloft, and only occasionally wavering. Then it begins to toss about and roll like a mast in a tempest. At last,—down it goes. And what then? In another moment,

— Fast as shaft can fly,
Bloodshot his eyes, his nostrils spread,
The loose rein dangling from his head,
Housing and saddle bloody red,
Lord Marmion's steed rush'd by.

For a short interval we are as it were left alone with the Lady CLARE, to conjecture possibilities. But presently

— up the hill there rode
Two horsemen drench'd in gore,
And in their arms, a helpless load,
A wounded knight they bore.
His hand still strain'd the broken brand:
His arms were smear'd with blood and sand.

Dragg'd from among the horses' feet,
With dinted shield and helmet beat,
The falcon crest and plumage gone,—
Can that be haughty Marmion?

Finally, the dismay spread through Scotland by the defeat, and the permanent memory of it, tell more than could any accurate narrative.

Tradition, legend, tune and song
Shall many an age that wail prolong.
Still from the sire the son shall hear
Of the stern strife and carnage drear
Of Flodden's fatal field,
Where shiver'd was fair Scotland's spear,
And broken was her shield.

It would be insulting to good old HOMER to quote from his battles of the gods, which are notoriously utter failures. Their best apology might be to quote beside them MILTON'S heavenly cannonadings. SOUTHEY, a poet in general esteem far inferior to MILTON, more than once undertook this unpromising task,—to describe a combat of supernatural beings, and in one instance has come out very grandly, I think: it is, in the combat of Kehama with Yamen, the Hindoo Pluto.

He came in all his might and majesty,
With all his terrors clad and all his pride,
And by the attribute of Deity,
Which he had won from heav'n, self-multiplied,
The dreadful One appear'd on every side.
. . . . . .
The brazen portals crumbling fall to dust.
Prone fall the giant guards,
Beneath the Aullays crush'd.
On, on thro' Yamen-pur their thundering feet
Speed from all points to Yamen's judgment-seat:
And lo! where, multiplied,
Behind, before him, and on every side,
Wielding all weapons in his countless hands,
Around the Lord of hell Kehama stands.
Then too the Lord of hell put forth his might.

Thick darkness, blacker than the blackest night,
Rose from their wrath and veil'd
The unutterable fight. . . . . .
. . . . . As the gloom
Open'd, fall'n Yamen on the ground was seen,
His neck beneath the conquering Rajah's feet,
Who on the marble tomb
Had his triumphant seat.

So also, HOMER's account of the gods' descent for battle, before he gets into details, is magnificent, and I will quote it for a special reason.

ILIAD XX., 56-66.

Terrific thunder'd from on high | the Sire of gods and mortals;
Neptune shook boundless Earth beneath | and the steep heads of mountains.
Then all a-quaking were the feet | of rill-bestreamèd Ida,
And the hill-tops and Priam's walls | and galleys of Achaia.
Yea, in his underworld-recess | lord Aïdes was frighted,
And leapt in terror from his throne, | and shriek'd aloud, lest haply
Neptune landshâking burst for him | the upper earth asunder,
And to the eyes of gods and men | lay open all his mansions
Horrific, pestilent; at which | even the blessed shudder.
So dire the hurly of the shock, | when gods are match'd in quarrel.

The splendour of this passage depends greatly on its stating effects. Earth was shaken, Pluto was frightened, and could not tell what was coming next. He was afraid of having his secret and horrid abodes thrown open to the light. How awful an idea of the concussion this gave to a Greek!

So again, instead of direct descriptions of Passion, it often avails more to tell some token of a disturbed mind. To utter some *paradoxical* sentiment, or something *unreasonably hyperbolical*, is so employed by Grecian art; but in fact, there is no end of the modes in which, with moderate skill, poets and novelists bring out the inward passion by few words put into a speaker's mouth. To add pathos when there is *no* passion suggesting it, seems to me a far harder task. I illustrated it above, in SCOTT's gratuitous mention of the tombs of Earl

DOUGLAS and WILLIAM DOUGLAS. I might allude to WILLIAM of DELORAINE shaking his head at HALIDON. What shall I say of the most unexpected apostrophe when MARMION is dying? It has gained the admiration of all readers, and will live as long as the English language.

> O Woman! in our hours of ease
> Inconstant, coy, and hard to please,
> And variable as the shade
> By the light quivering aspen made;
> When pain and anguish wring the brow,
> A ministering angel thou.

BYRON has not SCOTT's true tenderness, but he has great mystical power. The well known passage in the Siege of Corinth is no bad illustration. (xi.)

> Tis midnight: on the mountains brown
> The cold round moon, &c.....

We might well bring BYRON and SCOTT into comparison, by observing how each describes the effects of an awful sound,—the sound of the Convent Knell in Marmion, the sound of the blowing up of the Church in the Siege of Corinth. In each the fancy of the poet has full swing, but BYRON, dealing with a far more frightful subject, makes it hideous and offensive. MURRAY has published GIFFORD's note, which suggests to strike out entirely twenty-seven lines, which he entitles "despicable stuff." But the fault in them is simply moral. They gloat upon the details of men torn in pieces by gunpowder, and call on their mothers to examine the fragments. The poet may have meant to hold up the horrors of war, as he does elsewhere most emphatically; but the effect here is rather misanthropic, and suggests hard heartedness. In short they are far too painful.

BYRON and SCOTT might in some sense be called rival poets, and for a while it seemed as if the fascinations of the younger had eclipsed the elder. But SCOTT's four great poems have an undying interest. He is truly the Homer of

Scotland; while his rival, unless I mistake, is less and less read. BYRON's consciousness of power made him both careless and scornful. He thought he might make his tale as little edifying, his personages as repulsive or uninteresting as he chose, and yet by secondary charms he was sure to hold fast his reader's admiration. The method of evading his hero is carried to its extreme in his Childe Harold. Out of the last Canto the Childe totally vanishes, and nobody cares to ask why. The poet simply tells us, that "his theme has died into an echo,"—and expects us to be satisfied. Thus the plot with him was nothing, when he chose.

On the contrary, ARISTOTLE, the father of all criticism, made so much of the plot, that he has been thought to regard a poem too much as a piece of mechanism. Poetry, being a sort of electric power, strikes less by accumulated weight than by instantaneous impulse; nor can any skill in the planning of a poem redress and atone for faults in detail; while even with a bad plot, a poem may please through beauty in detail, as VIRGIL's Georgics. For this reason the moderns are carried into the error of thinking that the parts will take care of the whole,—nay of adopting a bad or painful plot, if they believe it will give scope to their descriptive powers. I call this a *grave* error. The poet's first business is to *please*, to *attract*, in order that he may *elevate*. As he cannot force us to read what is painful, it is at least good policy in him to avoid revolting us. I touched on the topic in the first lecture, yet I wish to press farther on it. Vital questions here lie hid, on which professional English critics are (I fear) in violent collision with the great bulk of the best people in the land.

Are we, or are we not, revolted by the coarse vulgarities of Shakspeare? Of course we are. Much is printed, which the most unscrupulous actors dare not pronounce to an audience: pass this by. There still remains much that is vulgar, pert, silly, ugly, stupid, yet treated as an essential part of a play. This is justified, by *some* because (they say) the

stage ought to be "a mirror of life," by *others* because the contrast of the light to the serious gives saliency to the tragic element. I shall speak of the latter argument first.

The contrast of joy and gaiety to gloom and terror may be truly artistic. Thus in MILMAN's fine tragedy, the Fall of Jerusalem (a very noble subject, executed with rare ability) the bridal songs are contrasted with the terrors of war, tender hopes with fanatical violences and deadly presages. Such *Piano* and *Forte* we all understand, we all approve. But each in turn is suited to Tragedy, each wins separate admiration. This will never justify the intrusion into Tragedy of what is in itself offensive. The smart talk of grooms and footmen, even when not gross, but only pert, is very disagreeable to have to listen to in real life: can it be less repulsive in a theatre? Mean silly jokes, made into smarter enigmas by a poet's cleverness, so that the hearer is called to solve petty riddles, are not to be justified as a contrast to seriousness: they are as much out of place as brutality. I cannot but think that they were from the first intended to pander to the lower part of an audience. (In passing, permit me to observe, that we do not know how much has been interlarded into SHAKSPEARE's own writing by the professional craft of actors.) The defence of vulgarity by the plea of "beneficial contrast" seems to me an afterthought.

I go back to the other plea, that the stage ought to be a "Mirror of Life." I might ask whether Caliban is a character drawn from life, and whether any play-writer in his senses is willing to set on the stage the awful and disgusting horrors which alas! really exist in Christendom. But I emphatically deny that the stage *ought* to be a mirror of life. While the idea is allowed to reign, the Theatre, instead of instructing, will for ever be a centre of impurity. It cannot be denied that this is its historical character, and that on this account it has been shunned by moral and religious persons. While the plays notoriously reeked with foulness, it was pretended by

critics, actors and stage-goers that to object to the system was *a sour Puritanism.* The word *prude* is flung in one's face still by the same classes, if one is displeased with things as they are, under which the neighbourhood of the great theatres is a focus of profligacy; unmarried actresses, if they remain of decent character, are thought wonders; and no prudent head of a family can take wife and children to a playhouse without anxious selection, and care not to be entrapped into some evil farce in the close. Mr. MACREADY, in my youth, encouraged by noble Whig families and some men of letters, planned and attempted a great reform; but it was a mere flash in the pan. The theatre did not become the School of Virtue which was talked of. How can it, if it is to be a mirror of life, displaying evil and good? Are young people made virtuous by the dwelling of the mind on evil? Why not as well paint things ugly and beautiful indiscriminately, as represent all life on the stage? ART should select the deserving, not take things at random, much less select the bad. But unless this fundamental idea (the Mirror of Life) is extirpated,—and perhaps I may add, until the actors are either unpaid or otherwise paid,—the theatres will for ever, as in the past, gravitate towards the tastes of the vicious.

Nor is that all; but the plot ought not to rack the heart too much. A simple murder, as of King AGAMEMNON,—a simple adultery, as of Queen CLYTEMNESTRA,—does not rack the heart. As old poets tell such things, we step lightly even "o'er carcases and dusky gore." The king in superstition slays his daughter at a seer's command; the queen's heart is hereby alienated: she resolves on revenge, associates a paramour to aid her, and kills her husband. Well: it is horrid: so is many a newspaper paragraph: but it does not sink deep into us. But if a tale of insanity is acted with life-like exactness, if a tale of seduction is artfully elaborated, it may inflict far too much pain to endure. I am but one of a million, who will not listen or read for the sake of being

lacerated and tormented. Pathos, like mustard and pepper, must be in moderation. Let even tragedy touch my heart gently, or I shall soon be only hardened by it. No heart among us can bear gratuitous excoriation: the terrible realities of life suffice,—when they come. We cannot, like the Athenians fine a poet for harrowing our feelings too much; but we have our private remedy in not listening to him. The topic holds alike for the drama, for written poetry and for prose fiction.

END OF THIRD LECTURE.

FOURTH LECTURE.

Poetical Ornament.

In my third lecture I spoke of the virtues of Description, and of the poet's Imagination as active in it. To-day I shall call your attention peculiarly to the poet's method of *adorning* his subject.

Ornament belongs more to majesty than to sublimity. The truly sublime can afford to dispense with ornament, as can the intrinsically beautiful. But poetry has to treat many subjects which are grand without being sublime, or which admit of being made beautiful, though not intrinsically such. Many second-rate poets can be eminent artists of the ornamental, yet even the highest poets cannot afford to neglect a careful and even elaborate adornment of many passages. Not only were Milton and Virgil great artists, but Homer, careless improvisatore as he may seem, is a diligent workman at ornament in his own way.

Of Milton perhaps some of you wonder that I have produced so little. His poetical powers to adorn and describe scenes of tranquil beauty are unquestioned. His smaller poems are very perfect in their kind, and some of them very popular. His diction is embroidered like a field of wild flowers, and his exuberance unsurpassed. *Majesty* seems to me the word that describes his ordinary and easy attainment; but I doubt whether he is often successful, when he aims at being Sublime. He has undertaken what is beyond human attainment,—to describe things which eye hath not seen; and he tells them with a confidence which borders on irreverence, and on which it is very hard to comment. Homer, in the infancy of pagan rambling, did not more familiarly

reveal what Jupiter talked to Juno in secret, than MILTON tells the conferences of the Almighty with his coëqual Son. But beyond any defects of particular passages, there are pervading elements which lower interest in his two great poems: his stiffness, his display of learning, his mixture of Pagan mythology with Christianity, his scholastic physics, and the general coldness of his plot. His hero ADAM has no character, nothing to sympathize with. He is almost an inanimate statue; and it has been said not unjustly that Satan is the hero of Paradise Lost. Whether Satan is more properly called Gigantic or Sublime, I cannot discuss, and will not venture to assert. But I think it to be a fact, that the Paradise Lost is more praised than read, especially beyond the four first books, and the Paradise Regained is scarcely even praised. I am afraid to say what I think of it. Nevertheless MILTON was a consummate master of poetry as an *art*, and peculiarly understood skilful adornment. His noble rhythm is not more vigorous than he received it from SHAKSPEARE'S hands, but it is far more perfect in melody. I have now thus introduced him, because it is in Ornament that he peculiarly excels, and it is of Ornament that I proceed to speak.

Ornament sometimes is in mere *diction*, and the range of its possibility is limited by the nature of the language. On *Poetical Diction*, as preferring the *antique*, the *concrete* and the *terse*, remarks were made in the second lecture, which need not be here repeated. Besides; some words, particularly adjectives, admit of more than one inflexion, or allow of composition. The poet adopts the rarer form, in order to avoid the associations of homely life. I do not mean that he necessarily does so, but that in many cases it aids him, and conduces to ornament. Some languages far surpass the English, both in the abundance of outlying words little used in prose, and in the ease of inventing new forms of words, whether composite or inflected, for the occasion. To explain my meaning, I will give familiar instances. For *beautiful, joyful, glad*, a poet may say *beauteous, joyous, gladsome;* for *verdant*

verdurous, for *lucid lucent*; these are, changes by inflection; or again, for a *billowy* sea he may say a *billow-lifting* sea; this is a change by composition. Now if such changes are made as it were by rule, it seems to be a mechanical trick, and soon displeases. Really to adorn, the diction ought to seem to flow out of the poet's elevation of feeling, and, if possible, to bear some mark of his own individuality. If the language will allow of it, he ought rather to coin words than to borrow them; for if he borrow words too remarkable, he may even be taxed with stealing them. No modern English poet would easily venture to speak of a *heaven-kissing* hill; for this epithet is felt by us to be SHAKSPEARE'S own property. MILTON had the great advantage of writing at a time when it was uncertain how much of Latin might justly come into English. He has therefore interfused into his style masses of Latinized words, which are now known to us nowhere else, and appear to us as MILTON'S peculiar coinage, though, I suppose, in SPENSER and in the Elizabethan dialect which Sir WALTER SCOTT tells us was called Euphuism, as partly also in Heraldry, these and much more must have been found. I mean such words as *argent, orient, couchant, lucent, emergent, concoctive*, (for digestive), *infurcate, irriguous, intelligential, unlibidinous*, and great numbers of others which he uses not in the common English sense but in an older meaning, as *illustrious* for *bright, elate* for *lifted up* (physically), *implicit* for *entangled, succinct* for *girded, spirited* for *inspired*. MILTON is very skilful in applying the vast material which was thus at his command, and by means of which he can make our language smooth or harsh at his will. He was followed by an immoral debased generation, and after it by a long prosaic era, during which, I believe, our language became more stereotyped than in his day, and less plastic to the poet's hand. It is hard now for a versifier to coin words. In composition, one want is *a vowel of union*. In the words Handicraft, Mountebank, we have it. If we could say Steamoboat, Townowall, it would add much to euphony.

But a still graver deficiency is in adjectival and participial terminations; for both *-ing* and *-ed* are overworked. We are accustomed to Bright-hair'd, Dark-ey'd; but we can hardly understand such words as Well-harp'd, Well-sheep'd, to mean, Having a fine harp, Having fine sheep; so that the limits of invention are very narrow.

Ornament is added to poetical style, not only by those peculiarities of words and grammar which vanish in translation, but in substance by four other methods especially: viz. by Comparison, (or more widely still by Allusion,) by Metaphor, by Personification, and by occasional Hyperbole. All these points are common to Poetry with Oratory. Only, in such oratory as has a proper practical end, whether of the Bar, of the Senate, or of Public Assemblies, ornament is far more severely repressed by the serious sense of business. But in oratory which has no immediate, sharply defined, visible end, as in a Funeral Panegyric, greater freedom and range of discursiveness into the field of the beautiful is permissible; yet even this falls short of the liberties allowed to the poet in quest of decoration.

I.—Of poetical ornaments, none is more natural and primitive than that of *Comparison*. An unbounded field of *allusion* is hereby opened, since it is at the poet's own discretion when to stop. Hereby whatever objects are naturally beautiful or striking may be brought in. The oldest poets have had immense advantage in preöccupying the most obvious and interesting topics. Homer is peculiarly ample, frequent and various in it. A single example will show his manner. He thus compares the stones flung in battle to a snow-storm.

Iliad XII., 278.

Thickly as fall the flakes of snow | upon a day of winter,
When Jove the Counsellor is bent | his weapons to exhibit,
Snowing on mortals: mid the lull | of winds, he sheds it constant,
Until the lofty mountain-peaks | and outmost knolls it cover,
And eke the lotus-bearing plains | and the fat tilth of peasants;

Yea, and along the hoary deep | the shores and creeks it lineth,
Save where the billows washing up | repel it; but beyond them
Are all things overwrapt, whene'er | the storm from Jove is heavy:
So they on either side did fling | —on Troians—on Achaians—
The stones thick showering; and noise | along the rampart hooted.

This poet is often so wrapt up in his comparison, that he seems to forget what he is illustrating. It belongs to the volatile infancy of literature, and it relieves the too monotonous tale of war.—Accurate observation of outward nature gives the main supply of comparisons.

It may be of interest to contrast BYRON with HOMER, where they alight on the same natural event to illustrate the same subject; viz. the rushing together of two hosts is compared to the meeting of river and sea, or of two rivers. In general the later poets are less diffuse in their comparisons than the old; but in the case before us BYRON is more diffuse than HOMER. *Giaour:*

As rolls the river into Ocean,
In sable torrent wildly streaming:
As the seatide's opposing motion,
In azure column proudly gleaming,
Beats back the current many a rood,
In curling foam and mingling flood,
While eddying whirl and breaking wave,
Rous'd by the blast of winter, rave;
Through sparkling spray, in thuudering clash,
The lightnings of the waters flash
In awful whiteness o'er the shore,
That shines and shakes beneath the roar;—
Thus as the stream and ocean greet
With waves that madden as they meet:—
Thus join the bands whom mutual wrong
And fate and fury drive along.

HOMER in Iliad XVII., 263, says more concisely:

As at the mouth, where shoals hem-in | a river dropt from heav'n,
Against the current rage and roar | huge billows, and beside them
The ridges of the circling beach | with splashing surf rebellow;
With such alarum rush'd (I wot) | the Troians——

Also, of two streams meeting: Iliad IV., 452:

Like as when torrents fed by storms, | down from the mountains streaming,
Mix in the bottom of a dell | the riot of their water,
Spouted from mighty fountain-heads, | within a hollow dingle;
And far along the cliffs aloft | their brawl the goatherd heareth:—
So, when in conflict these were mix'd, | did scream arise and turmoil.

Of course in general those comparisons are selected which are intrinsically noble; but early poets are not susceptible to the ridiculous as we are, and HOMER in particular goes beyond what any modern would dare. He compares the Myrmidons to wasps, and his hero the huge AJAX to an ass over whose back boys in vain break many a stick. More marvellous still, the drying up of the river Scamander by the fire of the god VULCAN, he compares to the frying of bacon!

ILIAD XXI., 361.

So spake he, parching in the flame, | and his gay currents bubbled.
And as by fire abundant urg'd, | a cauldron inly boileth,
When under it dry faggots lie, | but in it fat of bacon
From tender-nurtured pig doth seethe, | with bubbles swift uprising;
So then his dainty streams with fire | were parch'd.

Some comparisons are well borne, when very concise, on which it would be unwise to dwell. When BYRON says:

Many a bosom, sheath'd in brass,
Strew'd the ground *like broken glass;*

it is striking and frightful. But if it were expanded in Homeric fashion, I fear it would seem to us ludicrous. I may also quote HOMER again on the same subject as before, a snow-storm, to show how he can shorten it:

ILIAD XII., 156.

Thickly as flakes of snow are shed | on Earth the many-feeder,
When by the whirl of gusty winds | the cold dark clouds are winnow'd;
So darted weapons from their hands | in constant stream,——

Before, he made a lull of the winds; here, the wind is active.

In general, it is natural to illustrate things moral or metaphysical by the comparison of things physical: to reverse the order is apt to seem like a conceit. HOMER twice refers to the *speed of thought* and of *dreams*, to illustrate material swiftness. THEOCRITUS has the phrase, *softer than sleep*. But the ancients are very sparing in this. We may accept from BYRON the comparison of the sound of Lake Leman to his sister's voice upbraiding him; but he does not give us a more vivid idea of the force of Night and Storm, by comparing them to the "dark eye of woman, lovely in its strength,"—that strength being moral. He does but divert the mind from the subject. Comparisons of this class are very dangerous. Whether his phrase, "Leaves, young as joy," (Childe Harold, iii.) deserve praise, I leave others to judge.

MOORE, among our contemporaries, is considered most open to conceits; but he is probably very sober in comparison to the poets of the Elizabethan and following age. The conceits in CHAPMAN, obtruded by him on HOMER, are very reprehensible. He makes HECTOR say, that the time will come, when Troy shall *shed her towers for tears*. MOORE is certainly over-ingenious. We feel it even in what is (I suppose) his most beautiful hymn:

> Ah, who could bear life's stormy doom,
> Did not thy wing of love
> Come brightly wafting through the gloom
> Some peace-branch from above!
> Then sorrow, touch'd by thee, grows bright
> With more than rapture's ray,
> As darkness shows us worlds of light
> We never saw by day.

The two last lines take us by surprize, as too clever, and rather amuse the intellect, than harmonize with devotion. Yet BLANCO WHITE has a fine sonnet on this very thought; and if it were developed more leisurely, instead of intercepting us of a sudden, it is both a serious and an instructive

analogy. But what is to be said of the following in BYRON? (Bride of Abydos, xii.)

> As the stream late conceal'd By the fringe of its willows,
> When it rushes reveal'd By the light of its billows;
> As the bolt bursts on high From the black cloud that bound it,
> Flash'd the soul of that eye Through the long lashes round it.

The soul flashes out of an eye, as lightning out of a cloud: so far, no one will object. But, over and above, the soul comes through the *lashes* of the eye, as a stream is seen through the *fringe* of its willows. This is too much, surely.

Further, Comparisons not only ought not to be conceits, not only ought to be intrinsically pleasing and noble, or at least graphic and striking,—many of HOMER's similes are *only* graphic and striking, not noble in our estimate,—but when it is possible, should have something moral or pathetic, in them. The ancients often attempt this by aid of their mythology. Thus, if he compare arrows to a snow-storm, it is, when "Jove the Counsellor is pleased to snow upon mankind, displaying his weapons," or, if something is compared to a torrent, he may add as a comment on its ravages, that JUPITER is punishing men for crooked verdicts. We now rather pardon this, than find any thing to imitate. Quite different it is, to add touches of human interest and make them excite pleasing associations.

There is nothing indeed on which HOMER labours so much as *simile*, which is his highest effort, his choicest gem. It is remarkable, that in his first book he has not one simile. When the real action begins in the second book, similes begin; and on coming to a great effort for which he solemnly invokes the Muses' aid, he has six long similes in succession. This is remote from our taste, and must be judged of on separate grounds. We do not admit accumulation of similes, except in strong emotion, when the mind is as it were labouring for expression; and then *each must be very short.*

Crafty CLYTEMNESTRA, pretending love for her husband, thus concentrates on him a heap of similes:

ÆSCH. AG. 896.

The watch dog of the fold this man I call,
A vessel's saviour-cable; pillar chief
Of some high roof; a father's only child;
Land shown to mariners beyond their hope;
Weather serene, which after storm appears,
Or gushing spring to thirsty traveller.

There is something laboured in this, as there ought to be. Epic poets are perhaps never quite so short. The nearest analogue in HOMER that I can alight on is the following:

ILIAD XIV., 394.

Neither against the pebbly beach | so much the billow roareth,
When Boreas from breadth of sea | with bitter puff doth drive it;
Nor hooteth fiery-blazing flame | within a mountain's hollows
So loudly, when it riseth fierce | the forest to enkindle;
Nor wind, which in its hour of wrath | is mightiest of bluster,
Unto the lofty leaf-hair'd oaks | such altercation screameth;
Such as was then the voice abroad | from Troians and Achaians,
When each upon the other rush'd | with terrible alarum.

As one more example,—BYRON (Childe Harold, Canto III. 32, 33) thus describes a broken heart, in comparisons wonderfully elaborate, painfully beautiful.

They mourn, but smile at length, and smiling mourn.
The tree will wither long before it fall:
The hull drives on, though mast and sail be torn:
The roof tree sinks, but moulders on the hall
In massy hoariness: the ruin'd wall
Stands when its wind-worn battlements are gone.
The bars survive the captive they enthral:
The day drags on, though storms keep out the sun:
And thus the heart will break, yet brokenly live on.

Even as a broken mirror, which the glass
In every fragment multiplies, and makes
A thousand images of one that was;
The same, and still the more, the more it breaks:
&c.....

II.—It is thus that Comparison tends to abridge itself, into what we call Metaphor. Indeed, by merely dropping the particle As, we pass from the one to the other. Conversely a metaphor may be expanded into a comparison; but by reason of the expansion it is generally unpleasing, for it seems too much ado for the result. Thus, the waves *kissed* the shore is a metaphor for *touched* the shore *lightly;* but it would be far better to use the latter prosaic phrase, than make a comparison thus: "As a mother may kiss her child, so then did the waves touch the shore." Conciseness is practically needful, to be pleasing. A thoroughly hackneyed metaphor becomes mere prose, as the *foot* of a mountain, the *neck* of a mountain, the *head* of a bay; indeed, we forget that it is metaphor. Hence such a metaphor, as, to call a camel a *ship of the desert,* is to us any thing but poetical; and all the conventional metaphors of those versifiers (whether in Arabic or other tongues) who imagine that excellence consists in reproducing the metaphors of "*standard*" poets, are unendurably tame. ARISTOTLE well lays down, that the poet or orator must invent his own metaphors; and this is the chief difficulty to the later poet, who has to glean in a field where others have reaped before him.

Metaphor is somewhat rare in those early poets (as HOMER) who deal largely in simile. Yet now and then HOMER comes out unexpectedly with strong metaphor:

> Still went the stubborn tustle on: its *iron-hearted* riot
> Thro' æther's vasty emptiness | to *brassy* heaven sounded.

Among the North American Indians strong metaphor enters daily talk, and tends to become stereotype. But the barbarian metaphors are generally of an external and obvious kind. With higher cultivation they take a more intellectual form. Metaphors are divided into two classes, metaphors from direct similarity, and metaphors from analogy. If I say, "The velvet grass," I mean that the grass is like to velvet, soft as velvet; but when ÆSCHYLUS calls the rock of Salmy-

dessus, "stepmother of ships," it is analogy, viz. what a stepmother is to a stepchild, such is the rock to ships; it is a likeness of relation, not a direct likeness, nor perceptible to sense. "A flinty heart" is metaphor from analogy, moral not physical hardness being intended. But to call nature in the Arctic regions *stepdame*, as I think CAMPBELL does, is better than the use of it I have just adduced from ÆSCHYLUS. For Nature elsewhere plays the part of *mother*; but in the Arctic regions destroys our hope and turns out stepmother. But no one expects a rock any where to foster ships.

Let me now try to turn into Homeric simile a metaphorical passage of SHAKSPEARE. RICHARD III. says of his brother EDWARD:

> Now is the winter of our discontent
> Made glorious summer by this sun of York;
> And all the clouds, that lour'd upon our house,
> In the deep bosom of the Ocean buried.

Homerically it may stand thus:

> As when the winter's angry blast | to glorious summer yieldeth,
> And by the lofty-riding sun | the works of men are gladden'd,
> Nor fear they tempest: every cloud | is deep in ocean buried:
> So vanish'd are our discontents, | nor war our house affrighteth,
> Since on his high-thron'd eminence | this lord of York is seated.

But hereby we lose both the terseness of expression, and the closeness of comparison.

The Greek Tragedians are even overrun with metaphor, especially the boldest of them, ÆSCHYLUS, who has often been compared to SHAKSPEARE. Do not suppose that I undervalue him, (for I think him the greatest of the three) if I quote his queer metaphor, "Dust, near cousin of Mud." I believe it was an unhappy endeavour to elevate a homely word, which ought to have been left in its homeliness. PINDAR sins far worse in this way. He has a wretched want of sympathy with his subject, and labours in many ways to give it artificial grandeur. He has to write on a man (suppose) who has attained preëminent glory by winning a boxing match or a

horse race: what is the poet to say? He does not once condescend to give us a picture even of horses running, as HOMER, VIRGIL, SOPHOCLES, BYRON, or SCOTT; much less of pugilists, as THEOCRITUS, VIRGIL, and HOMER: but he goes off to legends and to the honours won in other games: between them he moralizes and chats; and when the topic is mean, makes some desperate attempt to elevate it. Wishing to let us know that his hero won *a cloak* as a prize in a certain game, he says, that he carried off *a drug* (or *remedy*) *for cold breezes;* a phrase certainly as frigid, as it is obscure. He opens one ode, with this grandiloquent metaphor.

> Under a chamber's well wall'd porch
> Golden pillars will we set;
> And as a splendid palace,
> Will we the edifice compact.

[*That is:* I am now going to write a very fine ode.]

> For in the work's commencement it befits
> To plant the front far-beaming.

[*That is:* I must begin with something grand.]

> Now, if a man Olympia's prize hath won,
> And at prophetic Pisa's altar
> Steward is to Jupiter;
> And eke in famous Syracuse
> Second founder is esteem'd;—
> To him what song can be denied?
> What lovely melody may townsmen grudge him?
>
> For, let the son of Sóstratus
> Know, that he his foot *divine*
> In such a sandal holdeth.

[*That is:* let him know that he is in this case.]

"I should like to be *in your shoes,*" is probably a homely metaphor every where. To bring the metaphor into high poetry is hazardous; but to think one can mend it by adding the epithet *divine* to the man's foot, is a wonderful infatuation. Probably no poet of great power ever made so many grave failures of this kind, as PINDAR. "Forge thy

tongue upon a truthful anvil," says he. Again: "I have the fancy of a shrill-(griding) hone on my tongue, which draws me willing into fair flowing breezes." He only means to say, that he is *whetted* for poetical recitation. But I must not dwell on any one poet.

In the Hebrew hymns of every age, and in the book of JOB, we find a free use of strong metaphors: ye did eat "the kidney fat of wheat, and drank the pure blood of the grape." "I put on righteousness as a garment." "Feet was I to the lame." "The rock poured forth rivers of oil;" i. e. the rock produced oil bushes, or olive trees, which supplied oil in abundance. Hebrew poetry is too condensed and electric to adopt the leisurely Homeric simile.

To continue a metaphor too long is generally an error: Archbishop WHATELY, I believe, invented the phrase, "Hunting a metaphor to death." Yet there may be special reasons which allow or enforce continuity of a metaphor, as, when it is a nationally accepted token. A successful example is in the continued metaphor of the Pine tree, symbol of the Highlands and banner of Roderick Dhu; which SCOTT finely pursues in the Boatman's Song:

> Hail to the chief who in triumph advances!
> Honour'd and bless'd be the evergreen *Pine!*
> . . . . . &c. . . .
> Moor'd in the rifted rock, Proof to the tempest's shock,
> Firmer he roots him, the ruder it blow, &c.

The ability to appreciate metaphors must constantly depend on previous knowledge and mental associations. Metaphor is condensed comparison; and unless we compare what is to be illustrated with something known already, not with the unknown, the comparison neither interests nor instructs. A Jew,—or a Christian intimately familiar with the ceremonial law of the Jews, may readily accept metaphors drawn from that law, which are unintelligible to persons unacquainted with it. To make a *scape-goat* of any one, is to us expressive: for we know that the scape-goat was to carry off into the wilderness the sins of all the congregation. To a

Greek or Roman the phrase would bring darkness, not light. So to a Hindoo certain scriptural metaphors, such as "Lamb of God," are extremely embarrassing. Of course, every thing can be explained by erudition; but a metaphor which needs explanation loses much; for its power to strike depends largely on the instantaneous perception of likeness. Again, Hymns which are written for a mixed congregation may have metaphors drawn from Old Testament law or history, or from other topics familiar to a simple audience; but metaphors from sources unknown to them could only perplex. Greek and Latin poets similarly have metaphors drawn from their own mythology, as well as allusions of other kinds. A reader needs familiarity with these, before the poetry can come with its due effect to him. The same may be said of many splendid metaphors of our own writers,—in poetry or prose: as, when BYRON calls Rome *the Niobe of nations* (Childe H., IV. 79) or when BURKE calls the well-meaning revolutionists of France children too dutiful, who toss their aged parent into the kettle of magicians, &c. We must be first familiar with the fable of PELIAS and MEDEA, to appreciate the beauty of the phrase.

It cannot be doubted, that of all ornaments the metaphor is the most spiritual; by far the most valuable both in poetry and oratory. It helps to powerful conceptions, and it is capable of speaking strongly to the heart. But, in order to this, it must be perfect on all sides;—intrinsically well suited,—well adapted to the hearer or reader,—and regulated by delicate judgment. In strong emotion, a string of metaphors is admissible, as cumulus. Thus JOHN OF GAUNT in SHAKSPEARE, mourning over England: (Richard II.)

> This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle,
> This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
> This other Eden, demi-paradise,
> This fortress, built by Nature for herself
> Against infection and the hand of war,
> This happy breed of men, this little world,
> This precious stone, set in the silver sea,
> &c. . . . .

III.—*Personification* is not only obvious to early poets, but enters into the structure of the chief literary languages of the old world. In Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, Sanscrit, inanimate objects are made masculine or feminine, and that even when the language possessed a neuter form. This is evil: for it anticipates in prose a personification which ought to be reserved for poetry. In English, we can personify the Sun and Moon by simply saying He or She instead of It: so indeed we personify Heaven and Earth by merely dropping the article: as, Earth trembled, for, The earth trembled. In Greek also the style is slightly elevated by dropping the article: if then it suggest personification, it is through a special mythology, which makes earth a goddess. The Greeks in this way *stereotyped* personification and destroyed (in so far) the individualism of the poet. Greek and Latin poets are overrun with nymphs, dryads, and other little deities. Where a modern might have given Echo a transitory personality, the ancient gives her sculptural shape as a nymph, with whom we may next be told that Apollo fell in love or something else equally incoherent, which is in truth a caricature of ornament. The ancient descriptions of Tartarus abound in shadowy personages; and MILTON follows suit. Since polytheism has been exploded, our taste is averse to elaborate personifications such as that of Fame or the goddess of Strife in VIRGIL. We admit of "Odes" to Contentment, to Joy, to Adversity, to Superstition, to Music, to Winter, to Duty; nay, we have poems to Hope and to Memory; but none of these are ornaments of poetry, they are a special class of poems. LUCRETIUS has a short personification of Superstition, thoroughly proof against the severity of modern taste.

> When foully human life lay crush'd | 'neath direful Superstition,
> Who stretch'd her horrid neck from heav'n | outgazing over mortals;—

nor can our noblest poets refuse occasionally to amplify in this line. In Childe Harold, Canto I., 39, we have:

> Red *Battle* stamps his foot, and nations feel the shock.

Lo! where the Giant on the mountain stands,
His blood-red tresses deepening in the sun,
With death-shot glowing in his fiery hands,
And eye that scorcheth all it glares upon.
Restless it rolls, now fixt, and now anon
Flashing afar,—and at his iron feet
Destruction cow'rs, to mark what deeds are done.
For on this morn three potent nations meet,
To shed before his shrine the blood he deems most sweet.

But the general tendency of the moderns is not to dwell at all on any personification, but to strike it off in one word. Thus SOTHEBY in a little piece concerning his wife's illness, meaning to say that neither husband nor daughters could get hope of her recovery, expresses it thus:

When *Love* and *Duty* watching round
No solace in each other found,—

The ease with which this ornament is used, may lead to an excess of it. In the following from BYRON I feel a monotony.

Alike must *Wealth* and *Poverty*
Pass heedless and unheeded by:
For *Courtesy* and *Pity* died
With Hassan on the mountain side.

Greeks and Latins effected personification in quite another manner, viz. by attributing sense or passion to things inanimate. Homeric epithets of this nature are often cited: as, "the javelins, | for glut of carnage *greedy*." But he likewise gives vividness to simile, by thus insinuating personification. Thus in a difficult passage he compares the mind of NESTOR, when irresolute, to the sea which heaves terribly during a calm from storms at a distance (or after a storm):

ILIAD XIV., 16.

As curdles under helpless surge | the mighty deep, *foreboding*
Fleet scud of breezes whistling shrill, | all vainly: for it rolleth
No way, till some decisive wind | from Jupiter descendeth:
So heav'd the aged hero's soul, | ——

Here the sea is said to *forebode*, perhaps, eye in the distance with desire and expectation. There is some uncertainty as to the exact meaning he intended, but he clearly personifies the Deep by it. Our poets familiarly use this delicate ornament. Thus SCOTT in the sequel of a passage which I quoted last time, has, concerning the bark which came from Whitby :

> Upon the gale she stoop'd her side,
> And bounded o'er the swelling tide,
> *As she were dancing home.*

Thus, more sweetly still, he tells us of

> —— the copsewood gray
> Which wav'd *and wept* o'er Loch Achray.

As an extreme contrast to this conciseness we have in the earliest literature personification which takes the form of Fable. Thus in the Hebrew book of Judges the Trees choose a king. In the embassy to ACHILLES, old PHŒNIX narrates a mythus concerning Frenzy and Penitencies, which are treated as persons : this is thoroughly in the style of antiquity. In the Proverbs of SOLOMON Wisdom is personified also as solidly as are gods in Greek mythology, and the things ascribed to her (or him) are in the tone of Fable. But enough has been now said of Personification.

IV.—I mentioned Hyperbole as a poetical ornament ; but the very word must suggest, that its use can be only exceptional. There must be on each occasion some special reason to justify it. One use of it, is, as a token of strongly disturbing passion ; as when HIPPOLYTUS is so indignant at the wickedness of one woman, as to wonder that the gods ever created woman at all. JOB, in his miseries, and their contrast to his former prosperity, cannot measure his words, and speaks in hyperbole. The Hebrew prophets in general, if they have to announce the dreadful overthrow of a great empire, seem in like manner to lose themselves in immensity. ISAIAH, portending the destruction of Babylon, says that the

sun, moon and stars shall be darkened, the heavens shall be shaken, the earth shall be removed out of its place, and become as the chased roe. In comparison to this HOMER is modest, nay, is scarcely hyperbolical, concerning the darkness which covered the field of battle round the body of PATROCLUS.

ILIAD XVII., 366.

Nor sure it was to any,
That Sun or Moon was safe: for mist | of welkin all enshrouded,
Where round Actorides' dead son | the bravest stood in combat.

In general, antiquity was a bad arithmetician. Number beyond a high limit seemed to be infinite. There are barbarous tongues, which can only count up to a thousand, and call everything beyond that "innumerable." It did not seem to an old Hebrew extravagant as to us, to call ABRAHAM's posterity "as the sand of the sea in number." How many times the grains of sand on the sea exceed a million, he probably had not thought of inquiring, and a thousand thousand seemed to him fitly compared to the sand of the sea. So HOMER describes the number of AGAMEMNON's troops as equal to the leaves and blossoms in Spring. The pardon which we give to antiquity, we extend to our poets, and treat such a hyperbole as the following in BYRON, concerning the rock of Corinth, as an amiable extravagance.

SIEGE OF CORINTH, 1.

But could the blood before her shed
Since first Timoleon's brother bled
Or baffled Persia's despot fled,
Arise from out the earth, which drank
The stream of slaughter as it sank,
That sanguine stream would overflow
Her isthmus idly spread below.
Or could the bones of all the slain
Who perish'd there be pil'd again
That rival pyramid would rise
More mountain-like, through those clear skies,
Than yon tow'r-capp'd Acropolis,
Which seems the very clouds to kiss.

Perhaps our tolerance to such extravagances is to be interpreted as a protest against all numerical accuracy in a poet. If BYRON knew exactly how high a tetrahedron could be made from the bones of ten million men, he would be very unwise to betray his knowledge. It is a thing for a poet to dissemble.—All intensity of narrative makes some hyperbole excusable, and in the old epic such intensity was normal. But it is certainly unwise in a modern poet to presume on like excuse for himself.

In fact, Hyperbole naturally belongs to the older form of poetry, which has, for one characteristic, Amplification,—a quality at least as much Rhetorical as Poetical; but Rhetoric in poetry is now offensive to us. We condemn it even in the Juno of VIRGIL. There is another element of rhetoric, common in the Hebrew poetry,—I mean, *antithesis*. The school of POPE has wearied us with it. Such lines as the following would certainly meet no praise now.

> Strong without rage, without o'erflowing full.
> Peace to the slave, and vengeance on the free.
> An artless savage, but a fearless man.

BYRON went great lengths in exalting POPE, and though intensely different in temperament, now and then has a disagreeable savour of him. Thus:

LARA, II., 1.

> The sun is in the heav'ns and life on earth,
> Flow'rs in the valley, splendour in the beam,
> Health on the gale, and freshness in the stream.

This is certainly too epigrammatic: instead of breadth and force, it has something artificial and petty. I dare to say that in an Arab poet this would seem supremely beautiful, especially if the words rhymed in the middle of the line, as well as in the end. Perhaps our greatest objection to such antithesis is, that the art is too manifest. It does not obey the law,—"It belongs to art to conceal art."

I am unwilling to close these lectures, without some words on Poetry, as an instrument of Education. All judicious parents and teachers are aware, that moral and religious truth cannot be usefully imparted by inculcation of systematic treatises. The thing needed is not so much to understand the right and the wrong, as to sympathize with the good and hate the evil. To imbibe noble sentiment, is, to become a noble being. To feel resentment against oppression of the weak, horror at cruelty, compassion for the unfortunate, tenderness for the penitent, stern satisfaction in the just punishment of guilt, admiration of heroism, love of the good and generous, contempt of meanness and all low selfishness,— is not indeed to become a moralist, but is to become such a person as a wise moralist wishes. Such right feelings are best imbibed in domestic life, from association with persons in whom they are already vigorous; but they ill admit of scholastic inculcation by any formal method. Nevertheless by right poetry they are advantageously communicated. While its charms are admirably adapted both to call out and to direct the enthusiasm of youth, the ease of remembering it is another great advantage.

In the opening of these lectures I spoke of the old poets as in their own conception *Bards* and teachers of Religious Truth. Those who know only the puerile national mythology of Greece and Rome, do not easily imagine what just and noble religious conceptions are to be found, here and there, among their highest poets, testifying that every where Man is made for the Truth and has some power of discerning it. How much more in our own national poetry, if we carefully cull it, is it easy to find moral enthusiasm in abundance.

There has been much zeal in recent times for National Education; but, I apprehend, an error has been committed in aiming at it in the direction of Science, instead of Poetry and general Literature. Science is a higher growth out of Industrial Art, and is the goal to which all schools of *Industrial* accomplishment ought to drive. I highly esteem such schools,

where they exist, and believe that we greatly need them; but they seem to me to have a different object, viz. to make individuals better in their work, better in their trade or profession, but not more refined, more sympathetic men, of nobler and higher sentiment. The latter end cannot be served by Science, but is the direct province of Fine Art and of Poetry. Long before Science existed or could exist, human nature was cultivated, as among the Hebrews and Greeks, by Music, Poetry, Sculpture, Painting and kindred methods: but here I can only press the topic of Poetry.

Hitherto our young people, I mean our boys, have been trained to read largely of foreign, and little of our native poetry. The custom began before any of our now esteemed poets existed, and is continued without any real propriety. Dr. ARNOLD, an active and sincere promoter of educational improvement, endeavoured to defend this anomaly by saying, that English poetry slips away from the tongue too quickly, so that the mind cannot adequately dwell on it; but that in reading a Greek or Latin poet the very difficulty of the language forces the student to ponder every word, and dive into every sentiment. This appears to me on both sides unsound. First, it is not possible for a student who has not already attained the many feelings connected with special words, by any effort of mind to conjure up the shade of thought which they express. He must first attain the homely dialect, before he can possibly appreciate the poetry aright. But next, (what I would desire at present to recommend to your thought,) Dr. ARNOLD totally overlooked a most important aid and agency for making the youthful mind dwell upon our native poetry; namely *Elocution*. The old Athenians regarded it as the chief point in accomplished education, to learn to recite aloud or sing to the lyre the verses of SOLON, of SIMONIDES, of PINDAR, of EURIPIDES: and in my belief to recite with proper intonation and elocution our own poetry ought to be made an essential part of instruction even in our primary schools. The teacher by reading communicates much hidden sentiment

which the pupil would seldom have discovered of himself from the dead page; and in turn by repeating aright the pupil shows that he has understood and appreciated. Moreover the rhythm and melody are thus taught, a refined pronunciation is acquired, the substance of the poetry is more deeply impressed on the memory, and (if it have been well selected) becomes an efficient vehicle of right sentiment.

Besides, I regard the unacquaintance of the many with pure and well pronounced English to be a political evil of firstrate magnitude. The speaking of many languages in one country is often dreaded by statesmen as hostile to a united patriotism; not always justly: but to have two dialects, one patrician and one plebeian, is an incurable mischief, the causes of permanent heart-burning and certain mutual misunderstandings. I once lived many months in Turkey, and I know that the poorest Turk, however coarse his garb, can sit at the table of the rich, and partake of a friendly meal without the humiliating sense of inequality occasioned by a vulgar dialect. A menial may become a Pasha, and pass as a gentleman. But here the poor man is unable for five minutes to forget his essential degradation. If he try to speak on the commonest topics, "his speech bewrayeth him:" he is reminded that he is a plebeian, whatever his worth and whatever his force of character; and that he cannot coalesce with the speaker of patrician English. This is a gratuitous, not a necessary evil: it might be subdued by proper schooling.

But if Poetry be especially adapted to school the sentiments of youth, how preëminently must it avoid every thing voluptuous! Even that coarsest of satirists, JUVENAL, inculcates, that "the utmost reverence is due to young people." Critics who in love of the voluptuous declaim against prudery, generally imagine or pretend that the great question is concerning delicacy of *expression;* but that is not at all the case. The great evil is voluptuous suggestion, which is perhaps only more insidious by delicacy. And let such critics talk, and poets write, as they may, the tide of an improving nation is

too strong for them. If we are sinking into weakness and baseness as the peoples trampled down by Roman empire sank, voluptuous poets may be in permanent demand; but not else. And now a days, women happily read literature, and not men only as of old. The poetry which men cannot read to sisters, mothers and daughters at once loses two thirds of its audience.—Look to Lord BYRON. How great a genius! so high above the crowd of poets in felicity of poetical expression and richness of thought, that it is hard to say who is his equal. Yet he is already bedimmed and vanishing, solely from deficiency in moral qualities, and largely for that form of immorality to which I allude. No poems will be immortal, whatever their genius, unless fitted to purify youth. Therefore GOLDSMITH and even COWPER will outlive many poets of far higher powers.

END OF FOURTH LECTURE.

SEVEN LECTURES

ON THE CHIEF FORMS OF ANCIENT NATIONS.

FIRST LECTURE.

On the Prehistorical State of the Tribes of Mankind.

At no distant period, at a time to which we easily look back in history, the nations of Europe were nearly all barbarian or savage. It is quite an undisputed fact. Two thousand years ago, the inhabitants of Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland and Russia, were as thoroughly in the savage state as are now the native tribes of North America. The Britons of that day had risen sensibly above the Germans; so had the Gauls, or inhabitants of France. In the south of France their advance in civilization was still higher; yet other well known branches of the same people were in great barbarism. Surveying in like manner ancient Spain, Italy and Greece, we come to the certain conclusion that three thousand years ago all Europe was savage, with the exception of a few small centres into which something of civilized art and principle had been imported from Asia.

It is conceded that the great mass of European population belongs to a single race, whose ancestors once talked a common language, imperfect as it may have been. It has been called the Indo-European race, ever since it was discovered that the Brahmins of India, and the inhabitants of the Persian empire, spoke languages of the same class as Greeks and

Germans, and must necessarily have sprung from the same stock. (For it is impossible to impute the similarities of their language to any other cause, although many very confident reasoners choose persistently to shut their eyes to the fact.) The inhabitants of ancient Media and ancient Persia are described as having been very rude peoples before they rose by conquest: and though history fails us, it is reasonable to believe that the Asiatic, as well as the European portion of this great human family was in a semi-savage state when their separation began. Whether we are to look back five thousand or ten thousand years for that era, is a question of secondary importance. The main point is, that the progenitors of those who are now the most accomplished nations of mankind, were, a few thousand years ago, savages so rude, that, to an observer from without, they might seem unimprovable. Such might the ancient Germans seem, only 1800 years ago, to the eye of the Roman historian TACITUS.

Another stock of population, which was perhaps earlier civilized, is that to which the Hebrews, Phœnicians, Syrians and Assyrians belong, with the Arabs and the people of ancient Ethiopia, the modern Abyssinia. The Arabs to this day, whether in Arabia or in Algiers, are to us an exhibition of what their common progenitors once were, in their prehistorical state.

A more mysterious people was that of ancient Egypt, for it seems to stand in isolation, having a civilization of extreme antiquity, hardly to be computed as dating less than six thousand years back, while we are not able very certainly to identify the race with that of any other. Nevertheless, researches in language show a limited yet positive relation of the Egyptian to some other tongues of North Africa on the one side, as to Hebrew and Arabic on the other. Also the physical peculiarities of the ancient Egyptian reappear in African tribes who do not stand higher than the modern Arabs. It must be inferred that a considerable mass of the North African population must be distantly related to that of

Egypt. If we call this the *Lybian* stock, it would seem that the Egyptians are the highest type of the Lybians. It is only by inference that we can look back to a prehistorical state of the Egyptians; yet it is reasonable to assume that they also rose out of savagery, though at a very early era.

A fourth great race, of which a numerous portion has always consisted of very rude pastoral or even hunter tribes, has for its most advanced branch the Chinese. Tartars, Turkomans, Ouigurs, Mongols, show us the prehistoric state of the agricultural Chinese; although the civilization of China, as that of India, of Mesopotamia and of Egypt reaches back to an antiquity which we cannot measure. On the whole it is probably inferred that *all* mankind was once barbarous; hence we call barbarism the prehistoric state. Since at any rate it is the prehistoric condition of those races which have since become the foremost nations in the world, to study that condition is instructive, and belongs to a noble curiosity. What every adult owes to children, such tenderness do civilized races owe to savages.

I now propose to treat under separate heads: 1. The characteristics of barbarians. 2. The incipient coalescing into nations. 3. The effects of physical geography. 4. The formation of national character.

I.—The element of human society is the Family, in which the infant is born, and reared, and learns language, intelligence, necessary art and morality. Among *fishing* and *hunting* people, even single families may live in isolation; but this is quite exceptional. For the most part, a score or more of families congregate, whether for mutual security or through marriage relationship, and the rudiments of a tribe or village is formed. Strength of body, being of chief avail, is the principal qualification for headship over a tribe; and women, from want of fighting powers, are less honoured, even when not unkindly treated. Through the loss of male life in battles or other dangers, women become more numerous than men and polygamy naturally follows. How

else can a man protect a woman in the wilderness, but by marrying her or giving her in marriage? The treatment of women is widely different among different barbarians; but among wandering tribes, polygamy, as a principle, is sure to be admitted, and it remains as a privilege of chieftains, when it dies out with the people at large.

It is characteristic of the savage in his lowest state, that, like the brutes, he does not cause his food to exist, but takes what he finds existing. He gathers wild fruits and digs up roots, like the ape; he catches fish or wild animals, as does a beast of prey. Such a one is apt to perish by the disappearance of his food, which in no case increases in proportion as the human tribe increases. The wild American is starved out by the mere noises which the civilized workman makes. The sounds of the axe, the hammer and the saw, to say nothing of the high-pressure steam-engine, frighten away the game on which the wild man lives. All hunter tribes are liable to severe famines, owing to the difficulty of storing their food, and the sudden migration of game in an unusually severe season. The pastoral tribes, which live largely on the milk and partly on the flesh of tame cattle, are a step sensibly higher than the hunters. By protecting their herds from wild beasts, they increase the number of the animals, and thus in some sense produce their own food. Yet as the quantity of wild grass is limited, there is an impossibility of multiplying the herds beyond a certain point, and this in turn limits the human population on the soil. It is not until men exert themselves to create a supply of food for the cattle, that they pass out of the barbarian position. The grazier who sows artificial grass or cabbages, floods meadows, gathers hay, takes care that the dung of his beasts shall fertilize his fields, and much more, one who plants oats, beans, barley and roots for their food; becomes an agriculturist, though he is also pastoral. Even so, his toil sustains a far smaller human population, than when men feed almost solely on the direct products of the soil. But hardly in the luxuriance of the tropics can a truly

savage people have a dense population. Its density begins with agriculture, when the great majority become practically vegetarians.

Deficiency of metals and of tools is to be expected among all rude people. Fish bones, shells and stone hatchets were once used, to pierce, to scrape and to hew, before tin and copper were known. Copper was found earlier or more plentifully than iron, which in the state of ore may long be unrecognized. From copper and tin a very hard, but very brittle mixture is made, when art begins to advance; and as soon as the power of fire to subdue metals and elicit them out of ores is known, a great and perhaps a sudden advance is made in the tools of many arts. But a tool to make tools, is a thing long unthought of. Wandering people cannot have workshops, and grudge to amass stores of timber or metal. Their tools must be of the simplest kind, and are generally very light. With these, by great practice and diligence, they often do wonders, and make it very unjust in us to call them lazy; but they work with immense disadvantage; and their industry, even when most ingeniously applied, is far less fruitful than ours. Deficiency of tools remains to the last as *effect* and *cause* of a savage state. Even in the older civilization of the world—that which we encounter in the towns of Algiers or Syria, or in those parts of India which owe nothing to Europe, essential inferiority of tools is laboriously compensated by great perseverance of the workman; but until they unlearn that conservatism which adheres to established modes,—until they submit to new principles with new methods, and struggle for a perpetual improvement of tools,—they must fall below our level.

Among savages very little division of labour is established; each family is for the most part self-supporting by its own products. Goods are not made for sale to any great extent; no systematic traffic, no market exists; no coin is needed. All this conduces preëminently to independence, and independence is the charm of the savage life. Among hunter tribes it

may go so far, that a single family or single man is independent at pleasure. The proud North American, with bow and arrow, plunges into the depth of the forest, and is at home everywhere in his hunting ground. New possibilities arise, when they live within reach of the towns of more civilized men, from whom they can purchase by barter the tools, weapons or stores which they chiefly need. Then it becomes worth while to prepare goods which will be valued in the town market; but whether the savage will adopt new habits, depends largely on several critical questions. His state ought to be one of transition and progress; but if for many ages it has been fixed, and, by long cultivation of the habits and sentiments best adapted to it, has received all the perfection of which it seems capable; the people have an intense preference for it, with all its hardships, and will not modify it, when they might.

Savages readily submit to be guided by a chief, whether in warlike movements, or in necessary migrations; but he is to them a political or military leader, not a master of work. Each is used to work for himself, at his own will, often most laboriously; but ill submits to be set to work by another. Impatience of continuous labour is generally imputed to them. In many cases, such labour seems to them to be women's work; in others, the impatience really is directed against a task-master, or against work totally different in kind from that to which they are accustomed. We expect far too much of them, and often blame them most unjustly for not having, and not liking, our habits. Our German ancestors would never work themselves, if they could in some raid overmaster a man of foreign blood, and make him their slave; and alas! there are plenty of us now, who would gladly do the same, if the law would wink at it. We have therefore little right to carp at the laziness of savages, if they feed themselves honestly, and neither steal men nor plunder their goods.

Concerning the moral development of savages it is difficult to say anything generally, except that from want of menta

culture it cannot be progressive, it is in many ways childish, and from the limitation of their circumstances it is sure to be arbitrary and onesided in its development. Yet, it is to be feared that we have less advantage morally over them than we fondly imagine. Compare the most cruel or sensual savages known with the baser population of Europe, and the European rascals will, I think, be judged by far the worse. Many is the appalling tale, recorded by Europeans, in which men called civilized and Christian, have rewarded the kind hospitality of savages by ferocious ingratitude or retaliated their offences with tenfold revenge. Our vices are worse than theirs, and their simple virtues are sterling and thoroughly trustworthy.

A rigid judge is forced to pronounce, that wherever Spaniards, Dutch or Anglo–Saxons have had dealings with aborigines, in every region of Barbaria, the more civilized man has carried off the palm of mean fraud and perfidious violence; whether because he is less used to be free from the pressure of the Law, or because his Avarice has an intensity unknown to the savage. It is a terrible history, utterly disgraceful to our moral pretensions; nor is it in the past only, but in the present also.* I must not dwell on it: but I will say, that without overlooking the widespread philanthropy which pervades Europe as never before, we (in England at least) have much of the worst Pharisaism to unlearn, in our judgments of inferior tribes. Nevertheless, perhaps our greatest practical error is that of forcing ourselves into close relations with them. The thing desirable, where possible, is to have as a *buffer* between savages and ourselves some ruder population. To grudge independence to those who may save us from direct collision with tribes more barbarous, is surely a mistake. The highly civilized and the thoroughly savage are sure to quarrel, and their war brings acuter sufferings on both than any other conflict.

With the Kroomen of Africa, a strong and spirited people,

* See Note at the end of Lecture.

we get on very well by dealing with them through their own chiefs or leaders. They are serviceable to us especially by cutting firewood for our steamers which navigate great African rivers, as the Niger and its affluents. They endure to be not only scolded, but struck, by their leader, for any lack of duty; but they will not endure direct command from us. The leader bargains with us, and performs bargains in good faith. This is no bad hint, as to the wisest course with those who have stagnated in an older civilization and seem to us semi-barbarous. In this way alone, probably, will the French in Algiers be able to govern the Arabs; namely, through the mediation of Arab chieftains of the tribes. In this way the British have become paramount in India, through the instrumentality of native princes.

II. There was a time, at which men of one race, spreading over vast and empty spaces of land, took courses so diverse as never to rejoin. The language which they had in common, not being fixed in literature, underwent changes far more rapid than is possible with us; changes, at first perhaps of single words, such as we call nouns and verbs; but also in those elements which make up grammar: so that in time not only diversity of dialect arose, but even total diversity of language. Thus, those who came forth from (let us say) Northern Persia as Persians or (as it is becoming usual to call the primitive Indo-European race) Arians, and wandered—some into Tartary, others into Armenia and Anatolia,—making their way westward and northwestward in the course of many centuries, gradually became Greeks, Goths, Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, Latins, Oscans, Welsh and Irish, wholly incapable of understanding one another, although to the eye of learned analysis their languages evidently sprang out of one original. This was the era of separation. It went on into the subdivision of languages and the production of dialects extremely different. Thus the Gothic is split into numerous branches of German and Danish: these two have become actually diverse languages, possibly for 3000 years: and the Dutch, which is a low German, broke up into many strongly marked dialects. Just so

the natives of North America, spreading over the continent in smaller numbers, produced a great variety of languages, each tribe speaking differently from every other tribe. Yet the common principles which pervade all the languages are held to prove that they have not originated independently, but, like those of Europe, have arisen by the successive modifications of a single original. In this way the *variety* of mankind has been immensely increased in all the earlier history.

But a time comes, when the opposite movement begins, and separation is succeeded by consolidation. Physical Geography (of which I have presently to speak) chiefly decides how soon this shall be, and under what circumstances. When abundance of grass over open country, and abundance of cattle easily tamed, have led men to betake themselves to a pastoral life, their necessary migrations teach them military movements: a tribe is an army, and some powerful tribe conquers weaker ones. A royal or imperial tribe is formed: and the royal language, becoming the most honourable, displaces the rest, or reduces them to inferior rank. Many such dialects coalesce with and greatly enrich the royal language, and then die out themselves, losing independent existence. Whether languages, as well as dialects, have in Europe so died out as to leave no trace, is open to discussion. Certain it is, that in the later stage languages become fewer, as in the earlier stage they become more numerous. The era of consolidation may also set in, not by proper conquest, but by the voluntary cohesion which commerce, intermarriage, or fear of a powerful enemy dictates. Greater freedom is then retained; yet one language soon assumes supremacy, with the result already described. Narrow space, cooping up the people, as in an island, may also consolidate many tribes into a single community, and make a beginning of national life.

III. This is an obvious possibility that rises out of Physical Geography, but it is only one out of many important results. If an island of even moderate size be intersected by mountain ridges, they become a barrier against union practically insuperable. The separation here exercised by the

character of the ground is direct and cannot escape notice. But the most important influence of the form of a country, its soil and its climate, is on the *habits* and *occupation* of a people. Most critical of all, are the causes which conduce to agriculture,—agriculture, at once the most fruitful and the most dangerous of expedients for life. He who tills the soil exposes his valuable stores to the malice or enmity of the whole world. Any marauder can make him pay tribute by threatening to burn his crop; so that the husbandman finds his best chance to lie in paying a yearly sum to some fighting man, who for this consideration will protect him from other robbers. In this way a strong man who loves fight and hates work, putting himself at the head of like spirits, becomes a baron. Rent is paid to him, at first for defence by his direct force, afterwards for defence by the law and by the officers of law. But in a wide country with no natural divisions and barriers, and amid the shiftings of large masses of the people, those who settle down to agriculture are exposed to a succession of marauders worse than locusts. Hence in the vast plains of Eastern Europe, comprehending North Germany, Poland and Russia, also in similar regions of Asia, which we vaguely name Tartary, it was long before tillage could be safe. Individuals are not likely to have undertaken it on their own account: husbandry must begin as the act of the tribe. The land itself is not conceived of as property. All that the tribe collectively claims, is a right of pasture and movement over the surface. But when many tribes, like so many centres of repulsion revolving about themselves, are mutually kept within definite limits, and the ground is not unfertile, they at last cultivate it by common effort for common benefit, and defend the crops by common force as a public property. We know this as a fact concerning ancient Germany, and it perhaps exhibits the early progress in the whole North East of Europe. Among the North American tribes the women were the cultivators; perhaps also among the Arabs, when the tribe collectively undertakes to raise a crop.

But in those regions of the Old World in which the motives to agriculture were strongest, the process of settlement took place very early, and (for aught we know) under very different circumstances. The regions to which I refer, are preëminently the valleys and deltas of great rivers. Of these the most celebrated are, the Nile of Egypt, the Euphrates and Tigris of Mesopotamia, the Oxus and Iaxartes in the Bactrian region, the Indus and its great tributaries, the Ganges, the Brahmapootra and other rivers of India. Not to dwell further on Asia beyond, let me name as last and greatest the double river-system of China. How small the human race may have been at one time on the banks of some of these magnificent rivers, we cannot know. If in the infancy of mankind one or two families found themselves *alone* in such a region, they may have betaken themselves to husbandry without the shadow of fear from a human enemy, and there, have multiplied so much faster than seems possible to the roaming life, as to have become more than competent to defend themselves from intrusion. River navigation would be coëval with agricultural settlement, if not earlier, and in every tidal river had double advantage. The raft, the canoe, the coracle and the boat, follow in steady succession. How soon copper and iron are attainable varies greatly in different regions. Yet the tent or hut changes into the house. The barn and the dock become necessary. Iron, though very desirable, is not every where essential to the plough. Even with the Homeric Greeks, iron was still rare. To provide materials and produce articles so various, division of labour arises as soon as it is possible. It always becomes possible quickly from the use of the plough, by which the toil of one family can feed two or three. Stores are laid in; foresight increases. Naturally therefore, on the banks of these great rivers began the first civilization of the world; and upon all at so very early an era, that no one can decide which is oldest;—whether China, or India, or Mesopotamia or Egypt first developed a settled nation, in its full variety of occupations, cohering for mutual supply and support, in conscious unity.

In contrast to this position let me enumerate the sites of other portions of our race. 1. Some, carried in boats, perhaps unawares, down the rivers into the sea, reached small islands. 2. Some, on the seacoast, became chiefly fishers, if the land was rocky or ill watered, and deficient in natural fruit. 3. Others, in thickly wooded country abounding in game, lived by hunting. Such a people must scatter widely and can never be numerous. 4. Others were on dry steppes, well able to bear grasses, but ill able to reward the ploughman. 5. Others on Arctic plains, as Kamchatka and Siberia. (What force or what wild folly first drove men to such inhospitable regions, it is hard to conjecture. The languages of those peoples show them to be of the same stock as the Mongols and Turks; from whom therefore they must have migrated.) Many branches of them on the Arctic ocean can live only on fish, seals and wild birds, or on the milk of the reindeer. Nevertheless, the Finns, a Mongolian race, who of all Arctic people are highest, manage to raise crops of corn side by side, it is said, with the Lapps, in places where it had seemed impossible, and show in their nobler forms their better sustenance.

Even without great rivers, which, beside their other advantages, make the carriage of heavy produce so easy, many a secluded vale and many a table land richly rewards agriculturists, who, by the barrier which rocks and ditches oppose to marauding horsemen, have been enabled to defend themselves and thrive in numerous centres. Every great system of mountains shelters tillage on all its lower slopes, so that civilization has sprung up in a thousand places, although on a small scale compared to that of the great river-side communities. Where first the plough was invented, we do not know. The name of ploughing is fundamentally the same in Wales and in Bengal.

The early husbandry of Russia had a peculiar history, which we trace but dimly; yet I cannot myself doubt how to interpret the notices transmitted to us, and I think them instructive. Four and five centuries before the Christian era,

the whole northern coast of the Black Sea was called Scythia. Pastoral tribes wandered over most of it: they called themselves *Scolot*, and among themselves regarded one tribe as royal. They had horses in great numbers and of fine breed, and were very formidable as cavalry. To this day Podolia and the Ukraine are highly celebrated for their fertility as corn countries, and already then they were under civilization, as was a part of the Crimea. The cultivators are called by HERODOTUS "agricultural Scythians," but they were evidently treated as foreigners by the Scythians, to whom they paid a certain tribute. A little later, the corn of the Crimea and of the Black Sea was actively imported into Greece: after that, we totally lose sight of Scythia for some centuries. When the curtain rises, we find Southern Russia occupied by Goths; called Ostrogoths and Visigoths, that is, Eastern and Western Goths; the Eastern Goths holding the Crimea, and the Western Bessarabia. The *primâ facie* inference, and I believe, the true one, is, that these Goths are the agricultural Scythians of HERODOTUS, who, having multiplied on the fertile soil, had grown powerful enough to compete with the wandering tribes. Those Scythians were perhaps expelled by the Sarmatians somewhat earlier; but the Sarmatians themselves moved farther north or west, and left the Goths paramount sovereigns in that fertile region. Just so, the European colonists of North America have multiplied, until the native savages are in comparison to them feeble.

The civilized man, who has once learned higher arts of life, struggles to maintain and pursue them even in circumstances less favourable. But the savage, like an infant, is acted upon by surrounding nature, and adopts that mode of living which the climate and land suggests as easiest. Physical Geography therefore may be said to have *dictated* to early man his livelihood and his habits: yet this does not mean that savages have always understood and used the capabilities of the soil. The hunters of America might have been agriculturists nor do they wholly neglect to raise crops; but beside other discourage-

ments of the savage, they had neither horse nor ox. They perhaps might have been pastoral; though it is not clear that their native bison can be domesticated. That they have managed to hunt without the dog, is to me a marvel; and I always suspect that the diversion of their nervous energy to the eye and nose has lessened the force of their minds.

Insular Communities are very peculiar and interesting. Where Nature is most liberal, as in tropical islands, the inhabitants appear to remain unenterprising and stagnant. Elsewhere such communities become active seafarers, perhaps pirates; and at home, both agriculturists and manufacturers; but what they have to export, must depend on various circumstances.

Side by side with Physical Geography, and almost as a part of it, we must reckon the presence or absence of cattle easily domesticated. Their fewness in America, and their total absence in Australia, remarkably tally with the lower state of man in those regions. Nevertheless, everywhere, agriculture is at length attained. When it has taken firm root, so that wandering ceases, human civilization has begun.

JONADAB the son of RECHAB laid an injunction on all his posterity, neither to build house, nor sow seed, nor plant vineyards; but dwell in tents. The purpose of this, was, no doubt, to maintain wild *independence*; yet to us it may seem that no one has less personal *freedom* than a pastoral tribesman. All coöperation demands sacrifice of self-will; zeal for a community makes the sacrifice voluntary. In so far, the virtue of a citizen (which is the primary meaning of civilization) may belong to the members of roaming tribes. The main importance of agriculture turns on other points. It makes subsistence increase with numbers; it lessens the pressure of the law, which enforces a scattering or emigration. With denser population language becomes more fixed: for, the greater the masses who speak it, the less power has individual caprice to change it. Those whom agriculture relieves from the task of raising food, are free for other occupations, and unless War is

allowed to swallow up all superfluous energy, new arts of peace are followed specially by different men. From diversity of work follows a great complexity of relations in society; whence, first, markets, barter, money; next, development of mind, and literature; after which, the experience of the past is an inheritance of the present, and knowledge becomes cumulative. Moreover, from the time that a nation really settles down, a private home is possible, and families can be reared apart. In the pastoral life, still more than in that of hunters, people seem to be always in public. An Arab obtains privacy, only by riding into the desart. It is difficult to appreciate the moral effect of this difference, but it is certainly great. Thus on the whole, economically, mentally and morally, seeds of improvement are sown, on the day that a roaming people is fixed to the soil. Even to be forced to this by being conquered, may be an advantage, especially if the conqueror be himself not too civilized, that is, not too distant in habits and temperament from the conquered.

IV. It remains for me to dwell on the formation of national character. Even in the native tribes of North America, whom we regard as typical savages, a sharply marked national character is found, and likewise among the tented Arabs. This it is, which makes their adoption of other habits tenfold in difficulty, and gives the worst omen of ultimate extinction for the American race. But a doctrine concerning *races* is abroad, so dogmatic and so groundless, that I am driven to dwell upon it in detail. The German, the Dutch and the Dane, have each a national character, sharply marked and diverse; yet no one ever yet doubted that they are near kinsmen, who by direct propagation sprang from a common stock. The separation of Dutch from German is not 18 centuries old; that of Dane from German may perhaps be 2 to 3000 years. Varieties of the human race thus formed, are, no doubt, persistent, as are various breeds of animals; but they are not eternal and unchangeable. They have risen out of circumstances and habits, and will be modified by new circumstances

and new habits. For some years back, ever since Dr. PRICHARD wrote a small book on the Celtic Languages, the learned have been forced to admit that the Welsh and Irish belong to the Indo-European group, and that Irishmen, Germans, Persians and Bengalees are born and bred out of a common source. Yet how vast is the difference here of national character! How great is that of the Englishman and the Neapolitan! Yet they are certainly children of common ancestors. The Englishman is mixed in unknown proportions of Danish, Dutch and Welsh. The national differences in English, Danish and Dutch, it will be conceded by all, rise out of their history;—their abodes, their modes of life, and their political vicissitudes. It therefore cannot be reasonably doubted, that the same is true of the Welsh, and also of the Irish, though the common source of Welsh and Dutch is far more distant than of English and Dutch. Again, the ancient Gauls (or inhabitants of France and once of Lombardy) are always described as *tall* by Roman writers: so are the ancient Germans. Now the modern French nation is not tall, but rather short of stature; yet it is descended, partly from those known as Gauls by the Romans, partly from the Germans. No large admixture of blood has come into France, except from Germany: yet the progeny of two taller peoples is a shorter people. Hence we have it as a fact, that a race does not necessarily preserve all the characteristics which it once had. The shortness of the modern French peasantry is in part ascribed to the conscription of all the taller men for the armies, in a long series of centuries. And what shall we say of the stunted forms in our English cities? Evidently they rise in general out of unhealthy circumstances. In ancient Greece, the variety of character was immense between Athenians, Boeotians, Spartans, Acarnanians, Thessalians, Rhodians; yet no one doubts that they were strictly of the same race. How different again in character are the Irish from the Welsh; yet they are nearer kinsmen to one another than to any other great nation. The French, although called

Celtic, have much German blood everywhere mixed, and were once thoroughly Iberian in the south-west: but they are utterly opposed in character to Germans and to Spaniards, and not very like the Welsh or Irish. Those who preach to us "blood" as everything in national type and national character, seem to be forgetful of facts, of which they can hardly be ignorant.

National character may change in many ways, from causes easy to understand. A chieftain in Norway projects an expedition: he is joined by *picked* men,—men of high spirit, of warlike reputation, and therefore probably (in those days) of stature above the average. When such a band settles in France, its progeny is likely to be taller than the average of Norwegians. It has many enterprizes and successes: it becomes celebrated: warlike youths flock to its banner: it wins, first a French province, next the crown of England. In a single century it has developed a new national character: and evidently this might happen, independently of admixture of blood.

Again: Englishmen discontented with the tyranny of Charles I., colonize America and found New England. The colonists are chiefly of the middle classes, industrious, prudent, loving law and liberty, generally Puritans in religion. Having owed nothing to English Aristocracy, and having suffered injustice from royalty, their political leaning is generally to republicanism and democracy. In America they become prevalently small freeholders, cultivating the ground themselves; and in the towns are artizans, traders, or professional men who need the good will of all. There is no aristocracy, nor any sense of a court. Surely it is to be expected, that out of those elements a national character different from that of England would be generated in New England, though very much also remains in common with that of our middle classes. Again: Slavery in the Southern States has produced in white men a vastly different character.

The Spanish character has been most powerfully affected

by the long struggle of Spain against the Mohammedan Moors. The difference of the Dutch and the Austrians has increased greatly since the wars of the Reformation. When we thus see active causes in operation, we ought not to doubt that like causes operated in antiquity.

The life of herdsmen on the great plains of Tartary or Eastern Europe is so similar to itself, that the character of one people upon it becomes like that of another. The historian NIEBUHR is confident that the Scythians of HERODOTUS the *(Scolot)* were Mongols, because their character is like that of Mongols. But the argument is worthless. The Sarmatians, on the same plains, were of the same character, as far as can be judged. The Hungarians are of the Hun race, fundamentally Mongol, and the Hungarian features still show Tartar or Chinese eyebrows. Yet the Hungarians, having been long agriculturists, especially on a very fertile plain, are not only tall and well grown, in reverse to the squat Huns, but are politically constitutional, like the English. It must be added, that, with points of contrast, the Tartars have also strong similarities to the Arabs.

It is pretended by many German reasoners, whom Englishmen greedily follow, that no races in the world except our own *Teutonic* race (as it is called) have understood constitutional liberty. This is mere national vanity. The Bohemians, a Sclavonic people, three or four centuries ago, better understood and better practised constitutional liberty than the contemporary English; so did the people of Arragon, and those of Castile. In France indeed and in Ireland there never was popular liberty, as far as we know, nor on vast open countries, where cavalry domineers: but amid hills and mountains freedom is the rule and despotism the exception, whatever the human stock. By the ordinary progress of man, unless foreign conquest breaks continuity of action, or force from without in some other way intervenes, precedent, custom and law bridle even a despotic dynasty. But in law, religion played a large part from early times, and complexity

so increases with civilization that general statements are dangerous. Negatively we may safely say, that national character never depends upon blood *alone*; it is always modified and may be immeasurably diversified by history in each family of the same stock. Occupations and national institutions are the two causes by far the most influential on national character; and though to a certain extent the institutions are themselves a result of that character, yet the character itself is but of small avail to determine institutions in comparison with other causes, especially physical geography, and the proximity of men either powerful enough to become lords, or weak enough to be made slaves.

END OF FIRST LECTURE.

NOTE TO PAGE 152.

The character of the North American aboriginals has been variously panegyrized and reviled. I read with deep interest the following from the pen of that wise and good man, WENDELL PHILLIPS. (*Anti-slavery Standard*, New York, September 19th, 1868.)

"At last we have taken lessons from experience. Our excellent Indian Peace Commission, and all other National machinery brought into contact with the Indian, recommend recognizing his citizenship, acknowledging his rights, insuring him ample protection in them, and then claiming of him the duties of citizenship. The popular indifference to this whole question, combined with the selfish greed and bloodthirstyness of the frontier, is obstacle enough to the adoption of this policy. Meanwhile political intrigue adds its weight. Against these, truth makes slow way. In vain do all those whose lives give them experience testify

in its favour, and bear witness to the virtue and capacity of the Indian. General Harney, after 50 years spent among them, asserts that he never knew an Indian violate the duties of hospitality or break his word. Carson said the same. General Sherman took the headship of the Indian Peace Commission, an Indian hater; just as he entered the war a negro hater. A few month's experience has converted him to a full faith in the Indian's honourable dealing, his capacity for civilization and citizenship. When the Indian Commission with Sherman at its head first met an Indian Council, the 'savages' produced six white men as prisoners, whom they wished to exchange for Indian prisoners. The Christian Commission blushed, as they were forced to confess to the savages, that our civilized troops had never taken a prisoner, but always shot every man down were he stood. We Christians could not produce six spared lives to exchange; but the generous savage only answered: 'Well: at any rate take these white men to their homes: we have no claim on them.' What a scene for Christianity! God bless such barbarians, and make us like them."

He proceeds to tell of other generous conduct of a chief whose two brothers had (by mistake!) been killed at his side by the American troops, while serving the Federal Government; and declares that nothing in Sidney, Bayard or Du Guesclin was more nobly chivalrous than the chief's conduct. The English Home Government has long sincerely desired to maintain just and humane conduct toward aborigines: but it is too notorious how different is the behaviour of our colonists, and even of the Colonial Governments.

SECOND LECTURE.

On the Priestly Kingdoms: Especially Egypt.

Law is everywhere built upon custom. Custom consolidates itself chiefly in nations which have long existed without breach of continuity. Either to conquer, or to be conquered, or again, to emigrate into a land different in soil or climate, is liable to break the continuity of custom: but if it be not broken, then out of Custom Law will arise; and this, whether the nation be hunters, shepherds, or settled and agricultural.

Yet in the two ruder states law will be simple, traditional and generally notorious. Law in fact will be unwritten, from want of the materials and the art of writing. In such a state, the chief or the king may easily exercise the functions both of general and of judge over a small community. If his dominion be extended by conquest, he will probably make his lieutenants and captains judges in his place: thus out of mere military supremacy no order of civilian-judges develops itself. To reconcile *Constitutional* government with military royalty, is everywhere difficult. One element ordinarily killed the other. The King either overthrew the Law or was himself expelled. Reconciliation seems to have been first established by means of Priesthood.

Priesthood, as Europe saw it in the middle and dark ages, had this peculiarity, that it came from foreign sources, bringing with it literature and higher mental exercise, as well as a new religion. Naturally, in proportion as reverence for the religion spread, every priest rose in importance before the heart of barbarous chieftains. The same thing is seen, when our mis-

sionaries convert the savage tribes of Polynesia. But for the interference of European powers, they might easily establish a strong priestly rule,—a real hierarchy. Some have believed that the ancient British system called Druidical was equally imported from the foreigner; but this is far too uncertain to dwell on at present; and I must turn my attention to the peculiarites of *home-sprung* priesthood.

In the rudest tribes known to us, Religion and its Priests have a very humble beginning. The Priest first appears as the Conjurer, the Doctor, the Sorcerer, the Seer,—and in general, the Wise Man. Wisdom is for a long while undistinguishable and inseparable from cunning and fraud. The love of truth for its own sake is a very late and slowly attained virtue. Ages elapse, during which a falsehood that tends to an immediately good result is looked on as not merely allowable, but even praiseworthy. It is then natural and inevitable that the original Wise Man should seek to exalt his character by investing himself with a fictitious sanctity, which strengthens him against violence and gives weight to his replies. He therefore searches after powerful herbs, uses curious ceremonies, practises arts of divination, seeks communication with invisible powers, and perhaps offers to them some kind of present, as food and sacrifice. Nor must it be forgotten, that the diviner himself is to a great extent a partaker of the general delusion; and if he end in being a deceiver, yet he was at first himself deceived; moreover, if applied to a good cause, his very deceit seems to him virtue, and he calls it Wisdom. Shall we blame ancient men for this? When we clear away our own insincerities, we may better afford to be severe upon the old diviners and priests.

How great material in the mind of rude man exists for the arts of the diviner, we may learn even from the wonderful vitality of a belief in ghosts and fetches among ourselves. Surrounded by the superstitious as in modern Egypt or Persia, even Europeans trained in science are apt to be infected by them. We have recently heard Mr. CATLIN'S account of the

North American Indians, who believe it necessary to propitiate the spirits of the very beasts, whom they are about to kill, as bears and eagles. We may then probably expect, that the original priest will, as a thing of course, be a seer or diviner, who not only tells, to those who consult him, secrets of an unseen or future world, but also reveals things forgotten, things lost, explains the reasons of private or public disasters, and interprets curious dreams. But by none of these things, whatever the amount of superstition, can priests grow up into a priestly order. In ancient Greece both seers and priests were common; nay, they were spread over all Asia Minor, apparently. (Here, in contrast to the Seer, by the *Priest* I mean one who has a special *temple* in charge, and there honours a god by set offerings.) Certain temples had peculiar celebrity. Above all that of Apollo in Delphi was frequented, not by Greeks only, but by foreigners from distant parts. One may almost say, the more celebrated a temple, the less national it became. In ancient Greece, and ancient Italy alike, *orders* of priests were extremely rare,—indeed but few were hereditary—and never rose into high political importance. The highest functions of a Roman priest were substantially *formal.* He taught formulas for ratifying promises, oaths, treaties; and hence, marriages, adoptions and wills. He might give an official opinion whether the formalities of a treaty had sufficed, or had incurred some flaw; but no one would consult him whether it was wise or unwise, just or unjust, or whether it had been morally violated.

It is only by aid of a moral position as *expositors* of law and *judges* of controversy, that a priestly order can coalesce into political authority. One of the earliest wants of men, in avoiding noxious quarrels, is the intervention of an impartial and intelligent judge. Dervishes or Marabouts are accepted as mediators in Kabyle villiages. Arab chieftains in the present day have been known more than once to send a deputation on long journeys to a British officer, refer their disputes to him, and abide by his decision. According to HERODOTUS,

the rude Scythians used to carry their causes before the Argippaei, a distant tribe held to be sacred. It was not subject to their king; but it consisted of non-belligerent men, and was respected by all around. HOMER had a similar belief of a tribe of harmless Scythians, "most just of men," who had no *bows* (if that be the true translation). Accident might in such circumstances easily lead to the acceptance of a whole tribe as a Priestly Order, when its decisions proved permanently acceptable. In Greece itself the people of Elis, who presided over the sacred truce of Olympia, if their moral qualities had seconded their opportunity, might perhaps have become arbiters in Greek war. It is not then difficult to understand under what conditions a priestly order, tribe or caste, may assume fixed position and relations. In ancient Persia the Magians, and in Babylon the Chaldeans, become priestly tribes in a secondary stage; but this, apparently, was by a fall from secular ascendency, not by elevation.

We have among the Jewish people something like a successive history of the steps of a priesthood, which was carried into a very rare isolation by the fall of monarchy. From the prophet MOSES downward (it is to be presumed) priests existed among the Hebrews, but their functions were local and confined to special duties in no sense political; nor is there any trace of their corporate action after the early establishment of the people in the promised land. In fact, they had no landed possessions for a very long while, nor any organic cohesion and combination, that we can discover; nor is their political greatness established until after a long series of events. The priest ELI, by acting as *judge*, for a moment gave a hint of possible rise to the priestly order; but the misconduct of his sons, whose judgment was corrupt and their course immoral brought his ascendency to an end. Upon this the prophet or seer (not priest) SAMUEL gained celebrity as judge, and held the office until declining years. Disasters in war forced him to appoint SAUL as king; who falling into a feud with the priests, massacred 85 of them. They adopted DAVID

as their champion. He, with their zealous aid, displaced the house of Saul, and first invested *two* chief priests with something of splendour. SOLOMON, son of DAVID, built a rich temple, and made *one* priest supreme: yet the priests were all evidently subject to the kings, who appointed or deposed them at will. Only after a frightful massacre of royalty had reduced the house of DAVID to a single infant, did the priesthood assume independent action and political importance. The priest JEHOIADA, who restored the dynasty and was guardian of the royal child, became actual regent; and thenceforward the whole order steadily rose, though not unchecked. As centuries advanced, it became a constitutional check on monarchy, a promulgator, upholder and expositor of law. It gradually developed literary men; transcribed, produced or cherished sacred hymns, proverbs, books of law or other books; and when the sacred volumes were acknowledged as the national code, the priests could not but be the lawyers and judges, especially when the monarchy had vanished. After foreign conquerors had destroyed the dynasties in both branches of Israel, the priesthood stepped into the royal place, first under captivity, next on the restoration to their own land. Christians in Turkey—being unable to fraternize with the State, or throw their patriotism into loyalty towards it,—of necessity yield their real allegiance, and devote their whole patriotism, to the Church and its rulers. Just so, after the Babylonian captivity, the Jews clung to the priestly supremacy, and exhibited a real hierarchical State in the interval which preceded the destruction of Jerusalem by TITUS. This sacerdotal rule was strictly the supremacy of an *Order*; and it will be observed, it took up the whole function of judging and expounding, and the general administration of law. In so far, it is fairly comparable to the elaborate and very peculiar priesthood of Egypt, concerning which I shall have much more to say.

When we contrast the *judicial* with the *executive* powers, and lay stress on the necessity of putting them into different

hands, as a mutual check and to prevent despotism, we lay ourselves open to the objection, that it is illogical to contrast the two classes of functions. In fact, every judge is an executive officer. A Judge acts *executively* when he enforces a decree, by means of serjeants and bailiffs; and when he imprisons or releases. The ancients conceived with much accuracy of the royal as the military power, and with it they contrasted the judicial power, as executive but not military. The position of the priests, in Egypt, and probably in India, appears to have been exactly what we call civilian. Not to allow the Crown to encroach upon Parliament, was the great problem of our ancestors: with the old Egyptian priests the same was probably viewed under the form of not allowing the *military* to encroach on the *civilians*. The origin of their very remarkable polity is lost in the depths of ages; as indeed is that of India, which has much in common with it. We can only *infer*, with more or less probability, how the institutions arose. Our information concerning their later state is chiefly on second-hand; yet the confirmation is so complete on cardinal points, that we believe without hesitation even many things grotesque and highly peculiar.

It must be carefully understood that in the priestly order, certainly of Egypt, probably* of India, every literary profession and all mental cultivation was embraced, only under a religious exterior. England once had archbishops, bishops and cardinals, as ministers of state; we still have clergymen as schoolmasters, mathematicians, historians, professors, and active literary men. It would be very incorrect to conceive of the Egyptian priesthood as having anything in common with a *parochial* clergy. They agree more nearly to the clergy of the middle ages, when the Church contained almost exclusively

NOTE.—A remarkable difference of modern India, is, that the highest, the *holy* caste, may practise very mean trades: thus we hear of Brahmin cooks or coachmen, who retain veneration as Brahmins from men above them in station. Herein we see the *religious* idea of Brahminism surviving the *secular*.

the men of letters, of knowledge, of study; when lawyers, or legists, had not arisen; at which time it was a possibility of the future, that all lawyers, secretaries of state, judges, learned men and men of science, as astronomers and physicians, with copyists of learned MSS. and all writers, down to the humblest clerk,—should for ages be included in ecclesiastics. A vague dislike, mounting towards hatred, comes over many of us, at the mention of an ancient hierarchy, as an instance of *successful priestcraft:* but in fact it is more comparable to modern constitutional government, which pursues very indirect methods, often tinctured with hypocrisy, to restrain misgovernment by kings; when direct processes would incur the risk of fresh commotion, either by driving them to despair, or by opening the throne to new ambition.

One point, both in the Egyptian and in the Indian system, very offensive to us, is, the institution of *Castes,* of which the priestly caste was but one. It is not at all credible to me, that such an arrangement was made by the contrivance and will of priests. All that they can have done, is, to give religious sanction and thereby perpetuity to it, after it had come into existence. Such an institution must have arisen of itself out of the division of labour, when a sense of its importance had become general, and arts were improving in successive generations. Especially when books are scarce, when the processes of art are unwritten, and knowledge is imparted by direct teaching, every workshop is a school, every workman is a teacher of apprentices. No wonder then, that each father teaches his son his own work. To a certain extent this leads to improved skill; and while done without compulsion, it is unquestionably good. If prohibition really went so far, that (for instance) the son of a shoemaker *could* not be a tailor, nor the son of a tailor a shoemaker, this must have arisen out of mutual jealousy in trade-unions. Each, unwilling to allow his own market to be glutted by the admission of apprentices from without, might make outcry to confine his own trade to the children of those who practised it. But such restriction

could not be universal, and whatever there may have been, would be exaggerated to us by foreigners. How, further, it may be asked, could an exclusive warrior caste exist? would it be possible to decline the advantage of recruiting a national army from strong men everywhere? or would the public finance be able to feed permanently in peace an armed force superfluously competent for every war? The difficulty cannot be wholly cleared, yet may be relieved, on the one hand by putting in parallel the Roman armies during two full centuries of the republic; and from another quarter, by adducing the Austrian organization of the Croatian frontier. The Romans, before MARIUS, did not admit into their army wholly poor citizens. They picked out from the fields vigorous men who were small proprietors, or their sons, and pressed them at pleasure into the army. Thus the petty freeholds might be said to be held on the *condition* of military service; though but a part of all the freeholders were called out in any one year. The artizans and townspeople were not regarded as good soldiers, and, like freedmen and slaves, actually escaped conscription. Thus in some sense we might call the Roman and Latin small proprietors "a warrior caste." To say that no one could enter it, was, to say that no one could get freehold land at pleasure. Yet several children of a freehold could not succeed to their father's place. But for the continuous, inordinate and ever extending wars of Rome, the system might have remained for many more centuries without exhausting the military population. As for Austria, the land system of her Croatian frontier is described as a sort of socialism. The land is held by several families in common, and all are liable to a conscription of extreme severity. Without attempting to state details, it may suffice to assert that this portion of the Croatians is really a military caste, incapable of escaping from the bondage. One thing is to me dark, how the Egyptian caste of Husbandmen was distinguished from the Warriors, if the warriors were husbandmen. To say that the warriors were only receivers of *rent*, like our land-

lords, and were supported by rent, would make their numbers too few for the ranks of an army. Shall we suppose that husbandmen meant peasants who were not freeholders, but only under-labourers and hirelings? That is possible; but I must add, that when large masses of the warrior caste seceded in disgust into Ethiopia, the Egyptian king betook himself to form an army of other materials, not without success.

That the warrior caste had ranks higher and lower, is certain from the fact that the king was its proper chief. In the Turkish empire we see something of the kind, where only Mohammedans bear arms and serve the sultan in war; so that in some sense the Mussulmans collectively, excepting their religious functionaries, are a military caste. But they have not, as such, special lands allotted to them, as we learn was the case with the ancient Egyptian warriors.

That the two chief castes,—that of the priests and that of the warriors,—should seek to keep themselves exclusive, is only in agreement with the selfishness and pride which always find excuse in law, custom or alleged necessity. But we might reasonably believe that in other respects the statements were exaggerated as to the inflexibility of Egyptian caste in general, did not the known facts of modern India prove how obstructive and obstinate such institutions may become. Not that but even concerning India exaggeration has been current in regard to all the lower grades, which multiplied in complexity with the progress of time. Originally the number of castes was but few, though never less than four; which we may render Priests, Warriors, Peasants and Menials (or Mechanics). From the Priests, as I have said, rose all literary professions; the lawyer, the judge, the secretary of state, the clerk, the templewarden or sacristan, the physician, the geometrician, the schoolteacher, and of course, the performers of ceremonies, diviners, interpreters of dreams, sacrificers, and perhaps astrologers. Not all of these professions seem to us valuable: but it surely was a great thing to have the general government depend on these industrious

civilians, who possessed all the knowledge of the day; and not upon the military caste, which could furnish nothing but that monotonous article "*the warrior*," great or small, whether as royalty, as baronial families, military courts, knights, or men-at-arms; whose profession eminently tends to accustom men to quick and rough action, in which more is thought of immediate than of future results. Under Peasants, when four castes alone were counted, with Husbandmen must have been included various half-roving classes; as shepherds, fowlers, fishers, hunters, camel-drivers, muleteers, boatmen; though shepherds and camel-drivers may from the beginning have been regarded as wholly foreign to Egypt, perhaps men of Arab blood, who, if at all counted, were a fifth or Pariah caste. The fourth division probably included all townsmen of lower rank than the priests; whether mechanics or shopmen, domestic menials or jobbers. The shopmen at first must have sold their own work. Finally by war and conquest, or by purchase from foreigners, Slaves were introduced into every civilized and many barbarous communities, and a slave caste might be expected to result. Domestic slaves, I believe, did not exist in Egypt, yet the State held slaves, who were employed in public works. Especially for mining, antiquity seems to have regarded slaves as indispensable.

Although I have expressed incredulity that the Priestly order created the principle of caste, and enforced it according to its ultimate rules; yet I can well believe that it afforded an efficient means for governing a populous community, and, as such, was fostered by the priests. In our own great cities how terrible is the chaos from want of organization of our units! How easily are good people in extreme distress overlooked! and how easily do rogues lurk unseen! Foreign conquerors, as Persians or Romans, often found the convenience of communicating with chief bakers and chief cutlers, with chief smiths and chief tailors, and through them making their edicts known in the needful quarters. If we are to believe, that in Egypt when anything was stolen, the magistrate

applied to the *head-thief* for it, and by his aid recovered it, on paying a forfeit at the owner's cost, this was to carry the system rather too far for us: but I must confess such organizing of *thieves* as a profession, and diplomatic overtures with the head-thief, seem to me more like to a caricature made by an ingenious foreigner to astonish the credulous, than to a principle historically approved and established. Compromises with thieves, especially when a lost article is of greater value to the owner than to any one else, are made among us also; and an Asiatic observer might easily pervert into English law such things when done even against our law. In comparison to Greeks or Romans, the system of Egyptian law-proceedings seems to have been very accurate and even punctilious, every deposition being elaborately registered. There may have been pedantry, but there was probably anxious legality.

Now what was the success of all this complex system and its careful guidance? Accepting ancient Egypt as a principal type or specimen of Priestly Government (so called) let me try to express in summary what it wrought out. From it must not be expected "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," nor the greatest breadth of culture; nor that equal chance for all, held out by the highest of modern republics, in which there is a really free course to merit for all white men, from the bottom to the top of society. In Egypt, as in all the modern European monarchies, the lower classes remained of necessity in the parish and rank of their fathers; but, owing to the warm climate, to the steady overflow of the Nile, and to the vigilant skill by which its waters were husbanded, the wants of the poorest were always easily provided. Food abounded, scanty dress sufficed, small houses or huts with slender apparatus satisfied the unambitious peasant. The number of things eatable and nutritious which grew of themselves, made the effort to feed a family very small. Whether modern cultivation has changed this, I do not know; but DIODORUS sets 20 drachmas as all that a child need cost a parent, until able to earn its own food. It is something like saying 20 shillings

at present. He computes the population at seven million in his day. The land belonged, first to the king, secondly to the priests, thirdly to the warrior caste; which suggests to me that those called Husbandmen tilled for *hire* the lands of the king and of the priests; while the "Warriors" cultivated their own land as freehold. But, I repeat, this is mere conjecture. The king's wealth would support not only his court and servants, but all warlike expenses, except those of soldiers' pay. Their lands were their pay. Kings appear to have built from their own resources the great temples and pyramids; but the secular or civil government, called priestly, must have been supported by the priestly estates. It is possible that the king's rent was partly paid by *corvée*, or defined labour from the peasants on his estates.

As a result of these singular institutions, art (such as was then known) was carried to a very high pitch. Its vastness will for ever astonish. The prodigious remains at Thebes attest what Egypt could do before Abraham was born. *Gunpowder* being unknown, the task of excavating rock was so much harder. Their labours in canals and basins for artificial irrigation were prodigious. No one in antiquity seems to have known the *Hydraulic Press;* so much the weaker was man to lift enormous weights. Yet the highest edifices of the moderns seem insignificant by the side of the hall of Karnac in Egyptian Thebes. Their sculpture and architecture are still the wonder of the world. They not only had the art of tempering steel, but with it cut and beautifully polished the hardest porphyry, and transported through long distances stones far huger than we ever attempt to stir. To tell of their industrial and beautiful arts, one must almost rehearse every thing now known to us. The forms of their sculpture and painting, being dictated by religion (that is, by antique custom), are generally stiff and ungraceful; yet the great elegance of their metal, woollen and earthenware shows that only freedom was wanting, genius was *not* wanting. The shapes were copied by the Greeks, and we now know them as

classical. Not only had the Egyptians the loom, and wove delicately in linen, cotton and woollen, but made *paper* for literary use. They framed gold and silver into rings, to serve as money. Their gilding, their glass making and porcelain were as good as ours. Their weapons of war and armour were also very perfect; so that it is hard to say that the restrictions of Caste were practically damaging to Art; nay, we *must* ascribe their successes to *something* in their institutions. Shall we say, simply to long peace, long security, and long industry?

The land of Egypt is remarkably defended by nature. A ribbon of land, as the ancients call it,—a thin line of sea-banks,—masks the mouths of the Nile, which are the northern or sea-front of Egypt. On the West it was screened by the African desart, on the East by the desart of Syria and by the Red Sea. From Ethiopia the "Cataracts," which we should call the *rapids*, of the Nile were a considerable defence; so that, in general, invasion was difficult, and an invader who failed to be the superior from the first was in danger of total destruction. These advantages, it is probable, kept Egypt for many ages in perfect security at home, and allowed her institutions to grow up slowly and continuously. The country in general consists of four portions. Northern-most is the Delta of the Nile, a large part of which was called the *Marshes.* The Valley of the Nile is the back bone of the country. On each side of this run the Eastern and Western desarts, whose mountains abound in useful common stone, (limestone and sandstone), also in valuable granite and porphyry; those on the eastern side in gold, copper, iron or lead. In the Western mountains they built the tombs, or rather cities of the dead, which in many ages became of a magnitude oppressive to the spirit of living. But no fertile land was devoted to this. All the inhabited district was divided into organic *parishes,* Nomes, as the Greeks termed them, that is, *portions,*—which had special differences of religion,—for instance, different sacred animals. This, like difference of local dialect, must have

flowed out of a very ancient source, and strikingly marks that the religion was strictly home-grown. In effect it must have acted like a law of settlement, confining the people of each parish to its own soil. The whole religion may be described as the embodying of noble and mystical ideas in grotesque and degrading emblems, borrowed almost entirely from the forms of brute animals; and inasmuch as the vulgar learnt the outward symbols well, but their inward meaning ill, it became in fact a regulated beast worship, scarcely higher than African Fetichism. Its very fixed character and elaborate completeness assures us that it had taken long ages to crystallize into that wonderful state. Whole troops of beasts had priests to watch over them. Animals and insects innumerable were enbalmed and entombed with scrupulous care. The life of a cat might in some parishes be esteemed more highly than that of many men. The Persian king CAMBYSES, the first invader of Egypt known to us, is said to have put cats and other sacred animals in front of his ranks to deter the Egyptians from casting their missiles. Whether to accept this as true, or as an ingenious fiction of a Greek storyteller, I do not know.

We cannot doubt that the industry of the whole nation went on by routine, like that of bees and ants. No thought of anything beyond his immediate sphere was likely to enter the mind of artizan or peasant; nor can we in England boast of much variety or activity of intellect in our own peasants. But all the professions were elaborately cultivated. Physicians were broken up into special classes, who are said to have devoted themselves to separate members of the body. Perhaps this only meant that they had, as we, besides Surgeons who treat Wounds, Oculists, Aurists, Dentists, and Corn Cutters. But all are said to have been hereditary. This would tend to manual dexterity, but not to truth of theory or wisdom of treatment.

As to foreign traffic, the lightest articles, as fine linen, best bore land carriage. But beside this, they manufactured for

the foreigner furniture and weapons in wood, copper and iron; musical instruments, paper, and probably an abundance of tools. They hunted in Africa for horses and slaves, and exported both articles. Their horse is judged to have been substantially of the same breed as that which we call Arab. From want of the *coach spring*, no ancient vehicles could compare with ours; but among the ancients, the Egyptian car and the great Egyptian bow, (six feet long, like that of old England,) were unsurpassed. On the Nile, they used boats of bulrush, and other light materials; but, apparently from a religious scruple, they long kept aloof from the sea. Egypt also was deficient in ship timber; and until a late period, they used Phœnicians as their shipmasters. The slaves were perhaps coveted and hunted only for exportation or for service in the mines. The wicked trade is said to have been very active: yet the children of a slave woman by a free father were free, which is better than can be said of English or American law.

The king, on ascending the throne, was adopted into the priestly order. When he died, the priests decided whether he had been faithful to his duties and deserved burial in the royal sepulchres.* In general, we must believe, a *constitutional* superintendence of the kingly power was not forgotten, in life or death. The Priesthood, like that of the Middle Ages, had earned (as we may infer) the reverence of the common people by being the champion of the weak against the armed, of the cultivator against the baron. Such a priesthood is, in its own day, the embodiment of intellect, right and law against brute force. Since only after a long struggle do such checks on tyranny become consolidated, we have here a new indication (beside that of the local religions) of the long infancy, and, so to say, apprenticeship which the Egyptian constitution must have undergone, earlier than its earliest existing monuments. It must be added, while the splendid, highly artificial, and well-preserved temples of Egyptian Thebes carry

* These (at least with many dynasties) were at Thebes, not in the mountains. Also certain kings had Pyramids for their tombs.

the mind back two millenniums earlier than Pericles, the pyramids of Memphis point to a still more remote era, since which the soil of the whole country has risen immensely by the deposits of the Nile, the huge Sphinx is well nigh buried, the granite has mouldered. Art was then far inferior, taste was undeveloped; no hieroglyphics were inscribed: yet a peculiar astronomy and geometry dictated and aided the builder's work, testifying that Science was already born in that remote age, among men of thick lips, negro eyes, dark skin and often curly hair. Thus the great priestly kingdom, ever wonderful, ever venerable,—however trite its theories and despicable its emblems at last seem,—still looms on us through the haze of ages, suggesting how many other strange and floundering steps mankind in its slippery ascent may once have had to make in India and in China.

END OF SECOND LECTURE.

THIRD LECTURE.

On the Commercial States of Antiquity; Especially Phœnician.

No nation becomes highly commercial, until it is highly industrious. Such industry pre-supposes much security of property as well as of life, and generally decays if this security be impaired. All commerce either is, or at least is believed to be, a benefit on each side; for no one is compelled to buy or sell. The commerce in things essentially noxious is not largely carried on between nations. On the African continent, commerce in slaves has from the earliest time been a desolating curse. Yet, to speak in general, commercial States are universal benefactors and the great multipliers of peaceful relations among mankind. Nevertheless, the idle and violent, who misunderstand and envy the prosperity which industry brings, naturally dislike and generally slander them, supposing that the essence of commerce is fraud. Thus an old Persian king described a Greek market-place, as a square plot in which people met to tell lies and cheat one another.

The most energetic cities of the Greeks became in their prime eminently commercial; yet the Greeks are known to us in their origin as military and piratical, in their higher development as literary and critical, the great originators of science to Europe. Their literature, art and science to us are of more importance than their commercial character. Accordingly, I decline in this lecture to dwell upon Greece. The race of mankind of which I have now chiefly to speak, has *Syria* for its centre and head-quarters, and may con-

veniently be entitled Aramæan as an inclusive name. It will embrace the Syrians, the Phœnicians, the Philistines, the Canaanites and Hebrews, the Mesopotamians down to the Persian gulf and the islands in that gulf. Their history is hardly ever known continuously in any detail; yet we know a multitude of facts. I ought to add, that with very insufficient reason, the word *Shemitic* has been used to express the Aramæan and the Arab families.

The Arabs stand in close relation to the Syrian race, as do the Danes and Scandinavians to the Germans; yet there is a measurable interval. The people of ancient Ethiopia,—the modern Tigré in Abyssinia,—were much nearer than the Arabs to the Hebrew and Syrian; but which way the migration moved when they separated, is not known. There was a fashion not very long back of tracing all the Arian (or Indo-European) peoples to the Caucasus; just as if this family had originated on that great mountain ridge, while the main continent was submerged. To carry out this theory, notion or fancy,—we might add, that the Aramæan race originated in Hollow Syria, between the two great ridges of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, which run north and south, parallel to the sea-coast, between a sea of water on the west and a sea of sand on the east. The western side of Libanus is very precipitous, and between its base and the sea is a strip of lowland, called Phœnicia on the northern end, and principally Philistia, that is Palestine, on the southern end. East of Anti-Libanus is open country, which becomes desart as soon as water fails. The rivers from the mountain, which make Damascus fertile, are at length spread out into marshes and swallowed in sand. Northward the tableland is much broader, and stretches towards the Euphrates. This great river starts with its companion the Tigris, from nearly the same part of Kourdistân, the Switzerland of Western Asia; but at first widely diverges, running to the south-west, as though about to empty itself into the Levant, did not Mount Taurus forbid. Forced to turn, first to the south, next to the south-east, Euphrates comes back with

a mighty sweep, and at last joins the Tigris: afterwards both rivers flow together into the Persian gulf. Between them is contained the celebrated Mesopotamia, which is broad in the north, but gradually grows narrow. Limestone mountains abut on it, and behind them rises northward the vast mountain land of Kourdistân. The Kourds are not Aramæans: they are rude and fierce kinsmen of the Persians. The character of these mountaineers, even when they cultivate the plain, is strongly distinguished from that of Syrians and Arabs.

The upper Euphrates, like the Nile, runs in a peculiar valley of its own, the breadth of which is always very moderate. At one, two or three miles distant from the river bank are high cliffs, (now called specifically *bergs* by geographers,) which are as walls to table land. The valley, between the bergs, is always fertile; the table land on each side is often naturally a wilderness, the rain running through the limestone or other porous rock, and leaving it dry. This is perfectly similar to the state of things in Egypt. Lower down the stream, the high land on each side is more and more depressed or recedes, until the two rivers are united by a plain of mud, which is sometimes converted into a wide marsh by their inundations. In ancient times, by various works of irrigation the superfluous waters were saved and directed, giving to the country an immense and almost fabulous fertility. But the centres of this judicious industry were the towns, placed at intervals along the banks of one or other river. Many of these, in early times, were independent States; but of all, none are so celebrated as Nineveh on the Tigris and Babylon on the Euphrates. The entire population of the river valleys is likely to have been homogeneous and agricultural; in habits and character, perhaps also in race, different from those who lived and probably roved on the table land or sandy plains.

Syria is a very self-sufficient region. In its hills and plains it has timber and pastures, fruit trees and corn crops, stone and iron; with good supply of perennial water from the rain on its mountains. Babylon, like modern Bagdad on the Tigris,

was, no doubt, deficient in timber, stone and all minerals; but then as now, heavy goods were carried down the rivers upon rafts supported by inflated goat-skins; and upon them the largest blocks of stone may be transported. Timber, if well squared and packed at the water's edge, might of course come down in the form of a raft; but it is probable that suitable forests do not grow near enough for this. The use of large timber in building is much economized. Date-stems which are tough and wiry, but more like a bit of huge cable than a log of wood, are made to do as much service as they can; and brick or tile supersedes to the utmost both stone and timber. Long before the towns either on the Mesopotamian rivers or on the table land of Syria could be characterized as commercial, they must have been highly developed by native industry. Baalbec stood on the highest part of the lofty plain between Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and may be esteemed coëval with Babylon and Thebes. Its ambition of vastness in architecture and in dealing with huge blocks of stone, is similar to that of Egypt.

The lowland or sea-coast of Syria, with much narrower territory, had some additional advantages. Phœnicia, its northern part, enjoyed excellent harbours, by which it had direct access to the sea, with power of shelter; and from the numerous spurs of Libanus and their great steepness there is much variety of climate, and timber for ship-building. Phœnicia in short, though by the navigable river Orontes it penetrates to the upper country, is in many respects like a Greek island. Hence in ages too early to sound, its ancient city Sidon was accustomed to navigate the Greek seas. It is remarkable that in the Persian Gulf two islands (thought to have been colonies from Babylon) were called Tyrus and Aradus, the very names held by two principal cities of Phœnicia. That the same Aramæan race had diffused itself along this area, will not be doubted, whatever theory we adopt concerning migrations.

The southern part of the sea-coast was, during the early

Hebrew period, occupied by the Philistines. The description of their manners reminds one of Dorian Greeks, and their deficiency in good harbours hindered their competing with the Phœnicians on the sea. The Hebrews stigmatize them as "uncircumcised;" while we happen to know that the ancient Syrians, as the ancient Arabs and the Egyptian priests, were all circumcised. If I rightly believe that the Phœnicians, like the Philistines, were in historical times uncircumcised, it may appear that the dwellers on the sea-coast by contact with foreigners *unlearned* the practice, which in the earliest age was common to the whole race. The evidence that the Philistines were of Aramæan stock is not very strong; yet their religion and their names agree with the belief, and the Hebrews seem to have understood their language. Hence we must abide by the doctrine, until it is disproved. They do not further concern us here.

Primitive Babylon and primitive Nineveh were great centres of industry, and self-contained political communities. They must have thus existed long before either was a centre of empire; nor could both at once have been imperial. We know that Nineveh was an imperial city eight centuries before Christ, and carried Israel captive: we know also that it had no such widespread sway westward in the reigns of DAVID and SOLOMON. So again, we know that Babylon became imperial under NEBUCHADNEZZAR and NABOPOLASSAR before him; and evidently the rise of Babylon meant the decline of Nineveh. Each dynasty was purely military and enlarged its chief city into a vast fortified camp, by including in it what had been outlying fortresses, and large cultivated districts. A much earlier empire of Assyria, with Nineveh for its capital, is reported; but all that is presented to us of it is a long list of names of kings, names suspiciously Greek and perhaps fabricated. [Sir HENRY RAWLINSON has now much to say on the subject, which can have no place here.] Analogy suggests to us as a high probability, that in very early times the great cities of Mesopotamia entered into close relations, first of

amity and commerce, next of federation; as did the cities of Phœnicia, of the Punic territory, and of Etruria. When endangered by foreign force, federation would become warlike alliance, and would need a Head or Leading State. The strongest state was the natural leader, and especially if nearest to the danger, would earn confidence by activity. The enemy to be most feared lay to the north-east in and beyond the mountains, and would be likely to descend into Mesopotamia by the pass of Zagros. Elam, or Elymais, was in early days thus formidable. The mountain population had at all times abundant supply of iron, and much experience in working it. According to the old saying, those who have iron can always seize gold. Thus the ruder and poorer mountaineers often preferred to strike for plunder and the chance of empire, rather than vie with their wealthy neighbours in industry. As in Greece and in Etruria, so of Mesopotamia one or other city may in different centuries have taken the lead. Suffice it here to say, that the collective cities were ordinarily but one power,—that war between them had the character of civil war, and was exceptional;—and that their general relations with Syria also were those of amity. I must slightly recur to the topic in the next lecture.

Phœnicia, and her colony Carthage, are of necessity now my principal subject. So limited a territory as Phœnicia soon became thickly peopled. On Cyprus and Crete she planted colonies very early. They were her most natural customers and centres of supply; but with Egypt also her commerce was very steady, whence she drew certain raw produce, especially food, precious metals, and perhaps wool, papyrus, reeds and other plants. Both countries were skilful in manufacture. So are England and Germany. Since commerce in manufactured goods is very active between England and Germany, so may it have been between Phœnicia and Egypt. The Phœnicians had iron and copper mines in Sarepta: they also sent wine to Egypt, the Egyptian wine not being esteemed. Ship timber and other valuable wood,—possibly barges ready built,—were

a far more important supply from Phœnicia, whether the two countries were related as equals, or whether Egypt held her maritime neighbour in dependent alliance. But in general the Phœnician cities, before CYRUS the Great, were able to sustain themselves in face of the foreigner by close mutual league. Sidon was the leading city in the earliest times known to us; but much later, Tyre was founded on an island, and eclipsed the older city. HOMER appears to have been unacquainted with the name of Tyre, though familiar with that of Sidonians.

The Phœnicians at an early period explored the Greek seas. Becoming bold navigators, they ventured farther and farther in the Mediterranean and planted distant colonies, in Sicily, in Africa and in Spain. Tartessus and Gades are well known names: Gades still survives as Cadiz. By far the most celebrated of their colonies were those in Africa, called by the Romans *Punic*,—the very same word as *Phœnician*, which represents the Greek pronunciation. Of these settlements Carthage was not the earliest, but was by far the greatest. No one of the rest could compete with her; hence the whole league, though consisting of independent states, is called by us Carthaginian. The modern Tunis represents the site of Carthage. The harbour, useless to our great ships, was regarded by the ancients as of unrivalled excellence. Tyre lived as it were anew in her African colony. Phœnician enterprize sailed through the straits of Gibraltar, and reached the island of Britain. The tin of Cornwall is said to have attracted them: hence the Greeks called us, the Tin-islands (*Cassitéridès*).

Commerce between two nations is profitable, first, in proportion as their productions differ; next, in proportion as they are near at hand; thirdly, in proportion as both nations are rich. Hence in general, the greater the civilization and industry of both, other things being equal, the greater the gain to both. But, then as now, without diplomatic relations commerce between the civilized was impossible. Frauds and

violences, piracy real or imputed, embarrassed every attempt at trade, unless it was politically organized. The Egyptians, we know, for the convenience of business, allowed to the Tyrians a "camp" on their soil. It must have been like a Dutch fortified factory in Japan, or such as the English East India Company had in Calcutta a century ago. This was perhaps universal in antiquity. In Hebrew history we read of "streets" in Jerusalem or Samaria to be allotted for Damascene traffic, and conversely in Damascus: that is, there was to be *a Jews' quarter* in Damascus; no doubt, shut in by gates. Also under DAVID and SOLOMON there were commercial treaties between the Hebrews and the Tyrians. In historical Greece we find nothing of the sort. A deplorable feud, springing perhaps from a fatal economical ignorance, raged between Greeks and Phœnicians. The two most intelligent nations of the ancient world, the two which mentally might best have supplied each the other's lack, never facilitated mutual trade, but repelled one another with suspicion and enmity. Their contest for the island of Sicily (which indeed was preöccupied by other less intelligent nations), may have been in part cause of their rivalry; yet it probably lay still deeper.

Commerce, I just now said, is peculiarly valuable between nations who have products extremely unlike. Such are, on the one side, ingenious manufacturers who produce tools and trinkets, stuffs and utensils; on the other side, rude barbarians who have hides and wool, horn, hoofs and ivory, dyewood, nuts, cotton or other rude material, or perhaps grain, if they are more advanced. Such trade was often carried on by barter, and, in very primitive fashion, by gesticulation instead of language. The civilized trader has the advantage of knowing what the goods will fetch *in other markets;* of which the barbarian is wholly ignorant. Hence, though the latter gains by the exchange (for he yields up what he values less for what he covets more), yet he does not gain as much as he might gain. He parts with valuable substance for mere

trinkets, as glass beads, or simple tools which to him are invaluable. He is not wronged; yet a disproportionate gain falls to the navigator, and the trade is esteemed by him highly lucrative, even if the voyage be distant. To his nation it is the less lucrative through the comparative poverty of barbarians. A few shipmasters may make a high per centage on their capital, but the total gain to a nation is generally small in comparison to that which accrues from commerce with a rich and civilized people. When England and France were fighting which should have the distant traffic of India, they forfeited mutual traffic close at hand, which would have been much more valuable to both, though India is a vast and wealthy continent, not an island of barbarians. But unhappily the large gains of one or two traders are visible and strike the imagination; they hurry away men's understanding. Monopoly of such a market is coveted; secrecy is cherished to uphold its gains. A foreigner who discovers it, is violently driven away as an intruder, and commercial wars arise, which quickly swallow up mercantile profit. Thus Phœnicians and Greeks contended for the commerce and carrying trade of the Mediterranean, and seemed to one another natural enemies. Of course they were not likely to have mutual commerce, while it was so obscurely understood that commerce is a mutual benefit. That clever nations should be thus carried into hostility, is as wonderful as it is deplorable; but none can throw the stone at another. England should remember her own eagerness to ruin the Dutch marine. Even Cromwell, champion of European Protestantism, was hostile to Holland, its most heroic representative; indeed, I believe, founded our Navigation Laws with the special object of damaging Dutch commerce. Also towards our American colonies we were equally illiberal.

Before Grecian communities had risen into high vigour, Phœnicia had a great start; so to some extent had Etruria and Carthage. In early Greece the Phœnician merchant had been welcome; afterwards the two nations, as it were, divided

the world between them, and sought different markets. The system of Barter, by which trade went on with barbarians, continued later than we might at first believe. In the Homeric poems we find the people acquainted with all the arts of working metal, although the more exquisite armour is obtained from the foreigner, and the arms of ACHILLES (as the helmet of HECTOR) are accounted to be the workmanship of a god. We further find them familiar with gold, silver, copper, iron, tin, though iron is rare and disproportionately valuable: but there is no allusion to coined money, nor even to gold or silver rings, to serve for coin, as in Egypt. All marketing seems to have been carried on by direct barter, of which we have a striking instance, when a certain EUNEOS, son of JASON, brings to the Greek camp wine for sale. The poet tells us that some purchased the wine

> With oxen-hides, or living kine, | or brass, or shining iron,
> And some with slaves. Iliad vii., 474.

So too he tells us how many cattle prince HECTOR gave for his bride ANDROMACHA to her father; also that a Thracian prince paid to king PRIAM for a daughter, 100 kine and 1000 goats and sheep. Nor can we evade the statement by saying that coin stamped with an ox or sheep is meant; for the poet is explicit, saying "sheep, | *which countless cropped his pastures.*" He has often occasion to speak of the ransom paid by captives, but it is invariably in goods or solid metal, without any medium of exchange. We do not know the date of the Iliad: nay, whether it is a gradual growth, added to at successive eras, is still contested. Bishop THIRLWALL believes that the poet described strictly the manners of his own age; and with trifling exceptions (such as that of the trumpet) it is reasonable so to believe. That no allusion to money has ever slipt out of him, is certainly remarkable. This may seem to bring down the time of barter somewhat late. But it must be remembered, that though retail purchases cannot be made with uncoined lumps of gold and silver with much greater advantage than with sandals or tippets, yet in the commercial

towns the merchants would settle their large accounts then, as now, with bullion. And in fact, at a period preceding the general use of coined money (which is ascribed to the Lydian monarchs about six centuries before Christ) there was a very active demand for gold as a medium of exchange.

Between nations mutually fenced off, and ill provided with the means of recovering debts, one from the other, Credit had very narrow limits. Nearly all transactions must have been conducted by immediate payment, and that, in articles of universal demand. There was no nation like Jews or Armenians, dispersed every where, rich and weak, whose bills would be accepted, because they could be enforced. Silver, and especially gold, were universally in high esteem; and as the holder of them had a power of prompt payment, he had prodigious advantage in seizing advantageous purchases. Hence the premium was great in bringing gold from distant countries. In early times the Phœnicians worked for gold and silver in the island of Thasos in the north of the Ægean sea or Greek Archipelago, and in the opposite continent, then called Thrace. They also brought these precious metals from Spain. Gold dust was discovered in the sands of the Tagus, and in Africa, after the surface-supply in Western Asia had been exhausted. Gold was also brought from Sheba in southern Arabia, and is likely to have found its way direct to Egypt. By a long and dangerous journey it came from the Ural Mountains; but perhaps only under the stimulus of Greek enterprize, after MILETUS had planted her vigorous colony Olbia at the mouth of the Bug, the ancient Hypanis. Certain it is, that the quest of gold for commerce drove men to remote places, and aided greatly to open the world.

Another article, light and valuable, able to bear the expense of transport on the backs of animals, spurred men to distant traffic; I mean, spices and incense for use in ancient religion. Their smell when burnt, and the mystical cloud of smoke, were universally esteemed; and if the arts of the magician were added to religion, the smoke was essential for

his performances. Regular caravans were sent towards Arabia and towards India for these coveted commodities, which passed first to Egypt or to Babylon, were taken up by the Phœnicians, and diffused over all the countries of the Mediterranean. The Greeks were able to get them at Egypt, from the era of PSAMMETICHUS (say B.C. 670), who allowed them a "camp," or fortified factory, for commerce.

As Egypt was celebrated for her manufacture of fine linen, so was Phœnicia for her brilliantly dyed woollen stuffs. The prevalent tint may have been purple or crimson, but the word *purple* is used with deceptive vagueness. Indeed its Latin form, *purpur*, in Greek *porphur*, appears to be a "frequentative" which in Shemitic or Greek indifferently may mean mixed colour. It is universally agreed that the dye came from a shell-fish. The Latins often call the dye *ostrum*, connected with *ostrea*, oyster: the Greeks name the fish *porphura*. But the tint from different seas was different,—purple, violet, crimson, scarlet, even vermilion, they say. The Greeks were so accustomed to this Phœnician dye, that they use the word *phœnix* to mean fiery red, and bestow the same name *phœnix* on the fabulous bird (probably the flamingo) which they supposed to consume itself in flames. No article of commerce in all antiquity was more celebrated than the Tyrian purple cloth, which is mentioned side by side with ivory and tortoiseshell, curious marbles and woods, in describing the luxuries of wealth. If CICERO, VIRGIL or HORACE has to speak of costly furniture, Tyrian cloth is sure to be foremost: but the manufacture can hardly then have been confined to Phœnicia.

Commerce was also organized by the Phœnicians through Arabia, the actual carriers being roving tribes, whose mutual competition secured the great merchants from extortion. Several lines of commerce are made out. *One* went due south, skirting the Red Sea, to Medina, Mecca and Yemen, perhaps nearly as the pilgrims now go to Mecca. A *second* made for places called Deraya and Gerrhæ on the Persian gulf. A

third route was Syrian, rather than Phœnician, from Baalbec and Emesa, to Tadmor and Thapsacus, and so down the Euphrates; if indeed I ought to account this Arabian at all.

The distant settlements of the Phœnicians on the coast of Africa and Spain are supposed to have given rise to the Greek fable concerning the wandering of HERCULES, from which the straits of Gibraltar, or rather the opposite mountains, were called the Pillars of HERCULES. Religion in those days travelled with commerce, especially among rude nations. Commercial Temples, it seems, were built as secure warehouses for goods, and were surrounded with all the sanctities of ancient religion. In this way the traffic might actually carry a religion with it. A chief deity of the Carthaginians whom they called Moloch or Molech (that is, *king*) seems to have been entitled by the Greeks "HERCULES," in their arbitrary fashion. Hence the migration of the Tyrian HERCULES was nothing but the carrying forward of Phœnician religion. It is probable that these temples were fortified by strong walls and gates, as well as by religious fear. CICERO tells us a fact concerning the island of Cyprus in his own day, which is suggestive of much, as to the ancient use of temples. The townsmen of Salamis had been forced to borrow money temporarily at the extortionate charge of 40 per cent. As quickly as possible they proceeded to repay the principal of the money; but the Roman usurer would not accept it, and insisted on their continuing to incur this ruinous interest. Upon this they deposited the money *in a temple* under protest, and then proceeded by law to require him to sign their discharge.

The religion of the Phœnicians was not essentially different from that of the Syrians and Babylonians. In all, as in India, ancient mystical ideas had run riot into impure fables and evil practices: we cannot help passing on them all, as on Grecian religion, a general condemnation. In general, the older a religion,—that is, the longer it had been held sacred,—the longer a free criticism of it had been forbidden or for-

borne,—the more puerile and impure it was sure to be. On the other hand, time, which encrusted it with foulness lessened its original cruelties, such as ignorance and fear generate. There certainly was an era at which the Phœnicians practised human sacrifice, and in a crisis of disaster, held the offering of children by parents to be of all sacrifices most meritorious. In the time of the Jewish kings AHAZ, HEZEKIAH, MANASSEH, say seven centuries before Christ, such a doctrine was still active; but in Tyre it had died out, and was matter of tradition only, at the time of ALEXANDER the Great.

Phœnicia had three chief cities, Sidon, Tyre and Aradus. In early times we hear of their *kings*; so do we of the kings of Carthage. It is certain that the latter were at every time constitutionally limited, and at last stood on democratic support as a POMPEY or CÆSAR in Rome. The Phœnician kings also are not likely to have been ever despotic, and at length the commonalty so grew up, that the kings appear to vanish peaceably. This is a great sign of stable and overruling law. The three chief cities at length combined;—as far as we can conjecture, like the United States of America, or like the three cities in the island of Rhodes. For they built a city in common for their Congress, which inevitably reminds one of Washington. It was called Tripolis (or the Triple City), but this, apparently is the Greek translation of the Phœnician (*i.e.* the Hebrew) name. Its modern corruption is Tarâbolos. Thenceforward it may be inferred that their defence against the foreigner was carried on by a single executive, whatever measure of power over their domestic concerns was retained by each city.

The Assyrian empire of the eighth century before Christ, in the height of its energy, overwhelmed Phœnicia; yet was resolutely resisted by the Tyrians on their little island. After enormous exertions, king SHALMANASSAR was finally repelled, about B.C. 716. Probably when his successor SENNACHERIB fell into his great distress a few years later, Phœnicia recovered its

independence. A second terrible siege was endured by Tyre a full century later, from the Babylonian king NEBUCHADNEZZAR, who was also unable to subdue the heroic islanders. Nevertheless the Persian empire, far greater than either, subdued and kept all Phœnicia, with Egypt, Cyprus, Syria and Asia Minor. In its decline, two centuries after CYRUS the Great, new struggles arose, and Sidon (about B.C. 346) suffered dreadful extremities in a siege from DARIUS OCHUS. If they could have foreseen what was impending from Greece, much better might all Phœnicia have reserved its force to resist ALEXANDER the Great. Once more, when the continent was conquered, insular Tyre refused to submit, B.C. 332. The energetic and pertinacious Macedonian by enormous labour carried a mole into the sea, joined the island to the shore, forced surrender of the city, and for ever destroyed the advantage of the site. Thenceforward Tyre was no more distinguished than other cities on the same coast.

Hitherto I have alluded to Carthage, only as a colony from Phœnicia; but the colonies were greater than the mother, and deserve separate description. The Phœnicians were contracted, oppressed, and at last greatly ruined by the powerful monarchies of Asia: but the Punic colonies in Africa had to deal only with barbarians, rather troublesome and damaging than formidable. At first these were quieted by tribute, which for a little while gives content, as a peace-offering. But the greater the industry and prosperity of the cultivator, the higher do the demands of the idle barbarian rise, if he feel himself the stronger. When the colonists received no protection and needed none, they at last refused tribute. JUSTIN records one war concerning the tribute, in which the Libyans were successful. But time fights for the Agriculturist, whose numbers and resources gradually become superior. Again, at sea, the Punes found both Etruscans and Greeks formidable rivals. These were partly resisted and partly conciliated. Carthage was an actual ally of Etruria in a war with the Phocæans (Ionic Greeks of Asia) before CYRUS the Great: they were

also allied (according to PINDAR) against his contemporary prince HIERO of Syracuse. This suggests that the Punic league had commercial treaties with the Etruscans, as indeed we know they had with early Rome, when it was virtually an Etruscan city. Greeks were generally weakened by intestine sedition, and those of Sicily were sorely oppressed by domestic tyrants. Yet the wars of Carthage against the Greeks of Sicily were very pernicious to her, and a chief cause why she did not outgrow the force of Rome.

While Carthage was not strong enough for continental conquest, she spread her colonies along the coast. The Phœnicians were unable to defend their valuable settlements in Spain, which in consequence naturally fell to the Punic confederacy. It is said that there were in all 200 towns. We hear especially of Tartessus, Carteia, Gades, Calpe, Hispalis. The name Arbocala, which we meet in LIVY, startles us by the thoroughly Arabic aspect of the word, as meaning Four Castles. The silver mines of Spain, worked by Carthaginian skill, are said to have been still more profitable than the gold mines. Until after their first Roman war they made no attempt to conquer in Spain. They preferred to conciliate good will by commerce, and employ the country as a recruiting ground for their armies.

In their second stage, when they had overmastered the Libyans, landed estates became the favourite investment of their wealthy traders: agriculture received high honour. MAGO, one of their chief magistrates, wrote a celebrated treatise upon it. How complete was the reconciliation of the conquered natives, appears from the total absence of fortifications over the Carthaginian territory, over which the beautiful villas, gardens and cultivated estates of the rich lay exposed, as in England, to any pirate who could evade the fleets. Systematic colonies of poor citizens were sent out to people the interior. The Libyans were incorporated with them in towns called Liby-phœnicians, and proved highly valuable subjects and faithful troops. Carthage was gradually carried

into an imperial position, as England in India, but it was not the end sought; it was a means. Industry and commerce were her chosen pursuits.

Her settlements in Corsica, Ivica and the Baleares were important, as well as in the greater islands Sicily and Sardinia. But I must state her African limits. The original colonies were Utica, Adrumetum, Clypeus or Aspis, Leptis, Hippo and Carthage. On the west, the limit was Hippo Regius, capital of a Numidian king, their dependent ally. On the east, they spread until the barrenness of the soil stopped agriculture near the lesser Syrtis: on the west the natives whether Numidians, Massylians or Maurusians, were more powerful. To the south, the lake Triton was their limit. The highlands of Atlas give plenty of water and fertility. Besides, isolated colonies on the coast westward facilitated distant navigation. A curious fragment is extant;—a Greek translation of a Carthaginian naval expedition to found colonies on the Atlantic coast. It is called HANNO'S *Periplus* (coasting voyage); and testifies to their distant enterprize.

The old Punic states were all on good soil and produced all our crops, fruits and cattle. Mount Atlas gave them besides,—lions, panthers, elephants and apes. Their public revenue was from Customs, Mines and Tribute. Their nautical skill excelled even the Greeks. The beautiful form of the modern Algerine vessels descends from the Carthaginians. Instead of *triremes*, such as Athens used, they employed the *quinquereme*. Yet the *land* was with them higher than fleet or army: their nobility was a landed aristocracy.

Both Phœnicians and Carthaginians showed again and again, like the Dutch, that they could fight with the most desperate courage when occasion required. Moreover, their mechanical skill enabled them to carry to the highest perfection all that military art of antiquity which was concerned in the attack and defence of fortified places. These arts were cultivated very early; for we find them painted in Egyptian tombs. The Phœnicians conveyed a knowledge of them to

Carthage; Carthage employed them in Sicily: from them they were learned by the Syracusans and employed by DIONYSIUS the tyrant. PHILIP the Macedonian learned the arts from DIONYSIUS, and the Macedonians by a strange circuit carried them into Asia.

But neither Phœnicians nor Carthaginians were military nations. They did not make war upon system: they preferred mercenary barbarians as troops, and they seldom had good generals. In war they were generally inferior to the Greeks; and, except under three or four generals of high genius, were always beaten by the Romans. Hence these peaceful, industrious and highly useful people were at length trampled down by military hordes from Italy, which, like locusts, devoured all other peoples' prosperity, and added nothing to those whose freedom and manliness they totally ruined.

One gift Phœnicia bestowed on the West, which to this day we all enjoy,—the priceless boon of the Alphabet. Babylonia has cuneoform characters of her own, which assimilate her native literature to that of ancient Media and Persia. These are a peculiar type, apparently coëval with Egyptian hieroglyphics. The Phœnician simplification, once suggested, once known, is held as an eternal possession. Greeks learned it, Etruscans learned it, Syrians and Samaritans, Chaldees and Hebrews learned it. In due time it became Umbrian, Roman, Oscan, Cyrenaic, Coptic, Lycian, Pontic, Parthian, Bactrian. By another line it passed to Arabs, Persians and modern Turks, to Ethiopians and Abyssinians. It has now overspread the Old World from the Atlantic Ocean to the great river Indus. It will cover all Africa, and hold undisputed possession of both Americas and of the isles of the Pacific.

END OF THIRD LECTURE.

FOURTH LECTURE.

On the Equestrian Empires of Antiquity.*

Morality and Reasoning may at length decide all the abstract controversies of Politics, but they cannot decide the fit limits of territory for independent powers. Seas, Desarts or great Mountain ranges have always been the chief arbiters in this undebateable question. Little powers arose where islands and mountains abound; but where wide plains extend, unbroken by formidable desart, there sooner or later great empires arise. On such plains, eminently in ancient times before gunpowder was invented, the chief aid of warfare was the horse. Whether the main wealth of men be in herds of sheep, asses, goats, oxen, camels, or else in crops of precious food, in either case they are liable to fatal depredation from the captain of a powerful cavalry. Nay, and even well-trained heavy-armed infantry on such plains ill-resist the attacks of agile horsemen. The stubborn Lacedæmonians at Platæa, unequipped themselves with bows, showed too plainly their sincere dread of the Persian arrow-shots. Crassus and his Roman legions fell thus before the Parthians. The luckier Xenophon, with his celebrated Ten Thousand, saw that all was lost, unless he could put together against the Persians some cavalry force: for, says he, "when we encounter them; if we be superior, how many of them shall we slay? and if we be worsted, how many of us will escape?" It is not until infantry is brought to the last perfection, as to missile weapons, and armour neither too light nor too heavy, that it becomes

* I. Scythian. II. Mesopotamian. III. Persian.

superior to cavalry in mere fighting: and even then, it can neither catch its enemy nor secure its communications, its provisions or its march, if unaided by friendly fortresses.

Asia is remarkably divided by a long mountain chain stretching almost east and west: which bounds modern Persia on the north. We regard Northern Asia as bounded westward by the Ural Mountains. These with Caucasus and the Black Sea, mark off a wide region of almost continuous plain, which embraces, with modern Russia in Europe, the north of Germany as far as Berlin. All this European region was vaguely called Scythia by the Greeks. East of the Ural mountains was an Asiatic Scythia of unknown extent northward: its southern base pressed against modern Persia. I shall call this second Scythia simply Tartary. A third "Scythia beyond the Imaus" was also talked of by the Romans; this is the modern Mongolia and Thibet, with which I must not here concern myself.

Scythia and Tartary has each its characteristic breed of horse. That of Scythia we know as the horse of the *Cossack*, which is small, active, untiring and hardy. In winter the horses are left wild; they feed themselves even in spite of snow, and in fighting against wolves earn something of the fierceness of the wild horse, whose toughness they retain. This we learn from the moderns only, but it is likely to have been equally true of the ancient horses and ancient manner of treating them.—The horse of the Tartars is the still more celebrated *Turcomân*, tall and long-backed, larger and stronger than the Arab or the Cossack horse, with long swinging trot like a camel, whose patient toil he emulates, and performs wonderful marches. Each Scythia abounds in grass. To keep horses costs nothing. The African barb, the Arabian steed, have often to be fed on camel's milk from deficiency of suitable provender. No such costly nourishment is ascribed to the northern horses. Moreover Scythia in very early times employed the waggon as the ordinary home of the people. This constituted a high superiority over ancient and modern

Arabs. There must be something in Arabia which resists wheel carriages. The soil perhaps is alternately too rugged with rock and too soft in sand: else, when Arabs had learned every luxury in imperial cities, why did the waggon never come to aid the tent in the desart? Scythia on the contrary had vast arable plains, and long steppes, often of limestone clothed with scanty grass, which, (I presume) like our sheep-downs, were prevalently round and smooth, allowing rude wheels to turn upon them. HORACE, intending to describe the Scythian fashion, says of the Getans, "Whose homesteads flit, drawn by well-order'd teams." Such a pastoral people has taken a wide step higher than the mere tented Arabs. To construct waggons for a whole nation, to turn wheels, and keep such fabrics in repair, implies stores of timber, variety of tools, and art to make tools, nay, to procure iron. On the other hand, so much greater weight can be drawn on waggons than the backs of beasts can carry, that a nation which employs them may be wealthy in a measure quite impossible to Arab rovers. In short, the Scythians may be said to be like an army with all its stores and baggage which must every night be arranged in orderly encampment; the Arabs like an expedition of light cavalry which is cut off from its supports. The ancient Scythians were, no doubt, very barbarous: yet, without aid from the towns and resources of civilized industry, they could sustain, not battles only, but campaigns against great powers. But the Arabs, though terrible to an enemy who ventures into their desarts, neither now nor ever could fight beyond them without borrowing the materials and arts of the civilized.

Ancient Scythia did not practically extend very far northward: apparently, forests and swamps so blocked up access, that no news of a Ural mountain-chain running north and south reached the Greeks at all. HERODOTUS knew only of the branch which runs east and west, evidently the mere southern base of the Ural, at Orenburg. European Scythia had access to Tartary along the north and along the south of the Caspian.

Northward the mouths of the Volga interposed, southward the road led through difficult country, broken up by the lower ribs and spurs of the Caucasus. Thus practically, though to pass was possible, yet the two countries did not easily fall under one dominion. The Tartar power was by far the greater, and in the time of CYRUS the Great appears to have been in possession of the banks of the Oxus. HERODOTUS calls the people Massagetæ. Though according to his description they were in the grossest barbarism, they were formidable to Persia when in its full military vigour. From the earliest times Turân and Irân have been used to denote the Tartar and the Persian empires, two eternal antagonists. Turân represents collectively all the rovers of Tartary. In modern days learned men employ the word to express all the nations of the Ottoman, Turcomân, Tartar and Mongolian stock.

The historian GIBBON has laid just stress on the fact, that the daily life of the Tartar was a practice in the most difficult problems of war. To direct the movements of a thousand men is not easy: to keep in hand ten thousand is a high art. To control the marches, the rests, the encampment, the provisioning and the watering of fifty thousand with beasts and baggage, demands a rare ability. A few among us acquire the skill laboriously: the Tartars of that day followed it as ordinary routine, and it is probable that the men knew the right movements by a sort of instinct, with slight hints from the captain in chief. With us soldiers have to be inured to the field before they can safely begin a campaign: the Tartars were always in the field; and when they might have rested, pursued hunting on a great scale. Hence they were in antiquity by far the most formidable of all nations, and became the greatest conquerors in the world. China has again and again been conquered by the Mongol Tartars: the same nation conquered India. The reigning dynasty of Persia is Tartar, but not by actual Tartar conquest. The Seljuk and Ottoman Turks were both Tartars, and conquered Western Asia; the Ottomans over-mastered Egypt and the whole north coast of

Africa. From Constantinople to the frontiers of China the sovereigns sit, not on chairs, but on carpets. This is the token of their primitive camp-life. But in China the peaceful nation has always subdued its conqueror into the adopting of its own habits.

The most celebrated of the passes by which the Tartar armies could get through the great mountain wall into the Persian empire, was called by the ancients, the Caspian Gate. It is immediately south of the Caspian Sea, near the modern capital Teherân. Any great civilized power, duly vigilant, could defend this pass with ease and certainty against any amount of barbarian force, and most easily of all against horsemen. But Bactria to the north of the Hindoo Koosh, a civilized country, whose inhabitants were of Persian race, was an essential part of the Persian empire. It was peculiarly exposed to Tartar attack, and it is probable that the perpetual enmity of the two powers turned much upon this circumstance.

DARIUS the Great, king of Persia, also entered a great and (it may seem) a useless war against the Scythians. We know that he conquered Thrace and Macedonia in Europe, and crossed the Danube to attack the Scythians. It is therefore possible that his war (of which the details in HERODOTUS are by general confession an incredible romance) was directed to secure his European conquest by chastising the Scythians for their incursions. It would seem that they chose rather to weary him out by retreating, than to fight with him; that he could never catch them to any effect; that he was at last thoroughly tired of the chase, and happy to come back safe. Nevertheless, he lost no honour, and rather, as an invader, seemed to have displayed superiority. We may plausibly compare with it our own invasion of Affghanistân.

But though the Scythians and Tartars in antiquity are always named with highest respect for their military prowess; though one Scythian army or nation (B.C. 633) is said to have oppressed the Median empire for 28 years, and to have sent

bands into Palestine from whom a city there was named Scythopolis, and to have attempted to move on into Egypt: although, further, we hear of a Scythian (Tartar) king a little before the Christian era putting a prince of his own choosing on the throne of Persia (then called Parthia) :—yet we know very little in detail at that era concerning any Tartar monarchy. From general analogy, we may infer, that the empire was a system of tribe ruling over tribe, each subject tribe being internally self-governed. I therefore now pass from the north,—from Russia and Tartary—to speak of the Mesopotamian and Persian monarchies.

II.—In the preceding lecture I described the two great rivers of Mesopotamia and the opulent towns on their banks, of which the greatest were Nineveh on the Tigris, and Babylon on the Euphrates. Nineveh is the more northern city and is believed to have been near the site of the modern Moosul. It was the chief city of Athur or Ashur,—both probably the same word,—from which the Greeks made Assyria. The people were of the Aramæan stock. Temples and religious ceremonies were highly developed as part of the State : priests were, no doubt, in high honour ; but no priestly caste was, as in Egypt, at the head in Nineveh; and as far as may be conjectured, the military force in the king's hand made him always a real despot. But the royalty was well organized ; the people was homogeneous, not a chaos of conquered foreigners. Precedent was assuredly powerful, industry had its deep channels and secure course; all which things immensely modify despotism, as in modern Austria, and make a native royalty widely different from a foreign empire. So much applies, while their rule was confined to their own Aramæan nation.

There are still those who believe in a very ancient Assyrian empire which was spread over Persia and Armenia. It seems to me to rest on nothing but mere fabulous and self-confuting tales in inferior Greek and modern writers. There is talk of a great queen SEMIRAMIS, who conquered India according to

DIODORUS. She marries NINUS, founder of Nineveh; who is supposed to be NIMROD, I believe, and to have lived long before ABRAHAM. But HERODOTUS, referring to this celebrated SEMIRAMIS, says that she lived four generations above NITOCRIS, a Babylonian queen to whom he ascribes the works which we regard as NEBUCHADNEZZAR'S. In short his SEMIRAMIS is about contemporary with king MANASSEH of Judah. Knowing nothing and believing nothing of an early Assyrian monarchy which extended its sway beyond Mesopotamia, I can say nothing about it. But we may well believe that the king of Nineveh and the king of Babylon were highly respectable potentates on their own area in very remote times; and we may so far humour the doctrine of proto-Assyrian empire, as to believe that a king in Nineveh was king of kings to all the towns of the two rivers, and counted even the king of Babylon among his subordinates. While of his eastern and northern supremacy nothing is known, we can boldly assert that between the time of MOSES and SOLOMON, nay, during the rule of the powerful Benhadads in Damascus, no Assyrian rule stretched, as is pretended, to the shores of the Levant. Certainly every word that we read in the Jewish Scriptures concerning the kings of Israel, the Canaanites, the Tyrians, the Syrians, until the decline of the Benhadads, distinctly assumes the contrary.

The Assyrians and Babylonians, whenever they took the field, were sure to have an excellent cavalry; because they had a superior breed of horses, and noble plains; and, though the verdure of these lasted but for a third part of the year, yet there was every facility for storing barley and straw without limit. The use of the war-chariot, and even the chariot with scythes, is ascribed to the Assyrians. The latter was dangerous to its own friends. Among the Syrians, Egyptians, and Assyrians, chariots as well as horsemen are again and again mentioned. In the forces of XERXES which invaded Greece were numerous war-chariots, but they served for the luxury of princes, not for actual war. Somewhat earlier, the chariot was

undoubtedly used in battle; and it must have had some positive advantage, which led to its adoption over all Western Asia and in Egypt. In the case of our British predecessors, we may suppose that their chariot-horse was a pony, too small to carry an armed warrior. Will any one say that very heavy armour for a time discouraged cavalry? The Babylonian or Assyrian horse, like the Arab, was probably small. The Persian horse of sculpture is a very short and strong cob. At any rate it must be believed that horses were ridden by barbarians in the Old world, as notoriously in the New, long before art had advanced to the constructing of war-chariots.

But Assyria had always had to withstand the forces of Elam, a power occupying the mountain-province of Louristân, due east of Bagdad, but reaching down by its rivers to the Persian gulf. The command of the mouth of the Tigris was essential to Mesopotamia: and at a time unknown to us, it may have seemed easier to Nineveh to conquer and hold the upper country, than have the perpetual trouble of repressing incursions. Elam, by the book of Genesis, was a powerful kingdom in the days of ABRAHAM. When it pleased TIGLATHPILESER, king of Assyria, to accept the petition of king AHAZ of Judah, and attack REZIN king of Syria,—a considerable potentate; he strikes REZIN down with a single blow, and conquers all Syria at once. It is evident that either his resources must have been drawn from a far larger area than those of REZIN, or his armies had been practised in war on a great scale. We know the name of his predecessor PUL, who sent troops as far as the land of Israel,—by what route, we do not know. Elam is named by ISAIAH, as led by the Assyrians against Jerusalem; and great as is our ignorance of this Assyrian empire, it seems reasonable to believe that before its power touched Israel, it had conquered Elymais, Media and the mountainous region westward, so as to reach the Mediterranean at the gulf of Scanderoon. Just as England in India uses native troops,—nay, easily induces those whom she conquered ten or fifteen years before, to fight under her banner,—so did Assyria put

Elamites, Medes and Kourds into her ranks. Mistress of the two great rivers, she would easily command the services of any number of Arabs, if she wanted them. Thus every kind of force was at her disposal, and by the way of the Persian gulf she had direct commerce with India. Through how many reigns this great power was growing, is very obscure; but if it had been long established and secure to the north and east, I think its ambition would have been much earlier felt to the west. Provisionally we may assume, that her first known expedition west of Mesopotamia, (that of PUL, about 760 B.C.) is an era marking that her struggle to the north-east was victoriously closed.

Syria, Israel, Philistia, Phœnicia, were conquered. Through the celebrated pass of Issus the forces of Assyria got round mount Taurus, and commanded access to Asia Minor. The city of Tarsus, (a word which probably meant Fortress) was built to command the pass, by an Assyrian king whom the Greeks termed SARDANAPALUS, perhaps PUL himself. But it was humiliating to the great monarchy, that it could not succeed against the insular city Tyre; and next, it lost a mighty army in the desart, while attempting to invade Egypt. This disaster proved really fatal; for the Median nation revolted, and never could be reconquered: and almost simultaneously the king of Babylon sent an embassy to HEZEKIAH of Judah,—a certain mark that he had seceded from the Assyrian alliance. Henceforth, until the destruction of Nineveh, Assyria, though still a great power, is evidently acting on the defensive.

I must now take some notice of a much disputed name; the Greeks wrote it Chaldae, the Hebrews Chasdi. The truer name was perhaps intermediate, viz., Chardi. The Greeks at a later time regard them as the Priests or perhaps *priestly tribe* of Babylon. In Hebrew history they are the *royal dynasty* of Babylon. Earlier still, they were the inhabitants of northern Mesopotamia, as well as can be judged; nay, some say they were the Carduchians or Kourds of the

mountains; which would refer them to a different stock of population from the Babylonians. We have a very mysterious notice of them in the prophet ISAIAH (ch. 23), who says: "Behold, the land of the Chaldeans. This people was not, until the Assyrian founded it for them that dwelt in the wilderness." The passage is so abrupt, as to excite suspicion of error: but if there be no corruption, there is but one meaning: namely, "The Chaldeans were a people who roved without settled abodes" in the north of Mesopotamia, "until the Assyrians planted them in towns and villages." By what chain of events they became princes of Babylon, we do not know; but *accepting the above as fact*, we may conjecture that they were at first a choice guard of the city, prætorian troops or Janizaries; the industrious Babylonians having no taste for becoming mercenary soldiers. If their captain,—prefect of the prætorians, as the Latins would call him,—became, first a very powerful man, next generalissimo of the republic, and finally king; it would be neither a very rare nor a very wonderful development.

We find the Babylonians to have computed from a date which they call the era of NABONASSAR, B.C. 747. Apparently it is the era at which the Chaldee royalty was established in Babylon. MERODACH BALADAN (about B.C. 710) was the king who seceded from Nineveh, as just now said. Naturally the Babylonians may have been disgusted to learn that thousands of their brave men had perished mysteriously on the Nabathaean sands or in the Serbonian bog, to pamper the ambition of an Assyrian king. Secession in order to extort some better security against illimitable wars by which they had nothing to gain, was reasonable. ESARHADDON son of SENNACHERIB is supposed to have reconquered Babylon. Nevertheless, this did but lead to a fatal resolve to break away, by aid of an alliance with the warlike Median king, whom the Greeks called CYAXARES, and regarded as the third king of that dynasty. NABOPOLASSAR was then king of Babylon. To the Babylonian multitude it was not of great concern

whether the ruling dynasty had its centre in Babylon or in Nineveh: it concerned them very much, that the two cities and the whole Mesopotamian people should cohere, and the rule of strangers be excluded. But by alliance with the Medes they broke in pieces their native strength. The ill-omened league succeeded in capturing and destroying Nineveh. The ruin was great, total and sudden, beyond all precedent; and implies a policy of premeditated unappeasable enmity. Of the details we know nothing; but, that a terrible and irreparable blow was inflicted on northern Mesopotamia, cannot be doubted.

Babylon for a brief space had in consequence freer course for ambition. The Medes were for two generations its good friends, and were fully engaged in other conquests. Meanwhile young NEBUCHADNEZZAR began his own splendid but delusive career. A new dynasty (from about 670 B.C.) had reigned in Egypt with a totally new spirit, by aid of Greek mercenaries. It had entered into the Greek world and Greek commerce, placed its capital at Sais, in the marshes, aspired to have a fleet on the Mediterranean, conquered Philistia, besieged the town of Ashdod with an obstinacy previously unheard of; (HERODOTUS says, for 28 years!) and appears practically to have had control of Phœnicia or intimate alliance with it. The conquest of Syria was, as I suppose, the aim of PHARAOH NECHO, who was already supreme in Palestine. But such schemes could not meet approval in Babylon, and war between the two countries took place. The Egyptians were severely defeated at Carchemish on the Euphrates, and had to abandon their conquests. NEBUCHADNEZZAR in turn became master of Syria, Palestine and Phœnicia. He fought in vain to capture Tyre, and there is no evidence that he ever set foot in Egypt: yet he seemed to be a great and powerful conqueror. He might carry off spoil; but we know how little that pays towards the expenses of a war: nor could the newly conquered Syria give to Mesopotamia half the strength lost by the fall of Nineveh. A vastly greater power was rising against it from the Medes

and Persians. In the second generation after NEBUCHADNEZZAR, CYRUS the Great encompassed Babylon, which, apparently with no severe resistance, surrendered to him. Its fortifications were not demolished, nor do we hear of any violent treatment;—a marked contrast to the fate of Nineveh. But the Chaldee royalty was overthrown, and the Chaldees thenceforth seem to be mere priests.* It may here be fitly added, that in antiquity the Chaldees have peculiar credit for the early cultivation af astronomy.

III.—I must now proceed to speak of the great Persian monarchy, which might well have claimed a whole lecture for itself. In antiquity we hear of the dynasties of Medes, Persians and Parthians, and are apt to think of them as different powers; but they were the same power, differing only by its centre of government. Its natural area is called by the Persians *Irân*, the region of those who speak the Persian tongue. It is a great table land, without valleys or rivers that reach the sea. Its eastern boundary was Mesopotamia and Armenia. On the north the Hindoo Koosh and mount Elburz,—on the north-east the desarts of Tartary, limited it; for it legitimately included Bactria—the modern Balkh. Indeed the north-east is believed to have been the earliest seat of civilization; nor is it doubted that the Bactrian language was akin to the Hyrcanian, Median and Persian, which differed only as dialects. On the south one might think that the Persian gulf is the limit; but in fact as soon as the table land ends, the strip of coast below it is rather Arabia than Persia, and the ascent from the sea by the pass of Abushehr to Shiraz is arduous in the extreme.

This great country is otherwise broken up by mountains and desarts. The Hindoo Koosh divides Bactria from it. The Gate of Susis, or Uxian defile, led from Elam to Persis

* Will any one think this to indicate, that in fact, the two highest orders, the royalty and the priests, had all along *both* been "Chaldees;" so that, after the vanishing of royalty, the priests alone have the title?—This is but one possibility out of several.

proper, which we call *Fars*. Another difficult pass leads into Caramania or Kirmân. In short, Elam, Media, Persis, Caramania, Hyrcania, Parthia, Ariana, Bactria, Sogdiana, might quite as well be independent powers, as in Greece were Thessaly, Bœotia and Attica. But after the experience of union, the tendency is, to re-unite. It must be added, that Irân in the popular conception did not reach to the Indus, but the people even on the *West* bank of that river were named Indians: nevertheless, DARIUS son of HYSTASPES conquered down to the Indus itself. Eastward, until the celebrated passes of which we have recent experience,—the Bolan pass, and the Khyber pass,—the country *physically* is still Persian. It abounds with salt desarts, it is dry and lofty, cold by night, hot by day. The men are tall, handsome, lively and clever. The language was Indo-European,—akin to Sanscrit, Greek and German,—quite unlike the Babylonian on one side and the Tartar on another. Yet the Persian empire has always included many subjects of Babylonian, and many of Tartar extraction. Irân at all times claimed the great province of Azerbaijan in the north-west, which joins it to Armenia; but in that province the people now talk Turkomân, a Tartar-Turkish. How much of that very mountainous region, Kourdistân, really belonged to the Persian empire, it is impossible to say. In fact we know that every Persian king was used to pay toll to the mountaineers at certain passes of Irân itself, as less troublesome than fighting with them about it. ALEXANDER the Great first broke down this humiliating custom.

Excepting some such mountains, the Median empire contained all modern Persia with Bactria (*Balkh*) and at least Persian Kourdistân, with Armenia. CYRUS the Persian conquered all Asia down to the Greek seas. The LYDIAN empire, which he thus swallowed, had seemed to the Greeks unparalleled in opulence and formidable in magnitude; but to CYRUS it was hardly more than one province out of twenty. It was bounded on the east by the river Halys,—the modern

Kizil Irmak, or Red River. These kings of Lydia had a painful interest for Greece; since their power hindered the independence of the Greek colonies in Asia. They were wealthy and spirited, harmonized well with Greeks; and were believed by the ancients to have sent forth the celebrated Etruscans as a colony to Italy. This belief is fiercely assailed by the moderns; but with hardly the shadow of a reason, as far as I can judge. We cannot pretend *proof* that the Etruscans were Lydians; but we can say, that all the ancients believed it, except one man, the historian DIONYSIUS; and that the reasons which he gives for disbelief are bad ones. Tuscan genius has shone out anew among the moderns. If the Etruscans were originally from Lydia, they give us the better to understand what sort of court and people and government king CRŒSUS held. But even his mountains and his deep-channelled river proved unable to save his little empire from the arms of the mighty CYRUS.

Nor might Babylon long escape. As I have already said, CYRUS lived to conquer Babylonia. But it must not be supposed that Babylon was thereby desolated, ruined or any way damaged. It could not indeed any longer add the factitious and undesirable splendour of an imperial capital to its own native prosperity; moreover DARIUS lowered its walls, through jealousy, after a revolt. But it was still a rich and noble city under ALEXANDER the Great and his successors, and sank gradually when later monarchs preferred other sites.

CAMBYSES, son of CYRUS, conquered Egypt; but lost a large army in the desart, when he attempted to conquer "Ethiopia:" what district is meant by Ethiopia, is not quite clear.

DARIUS, son of HYSTASPES, regained the empire for the Persian dynasty, from a conspiracy of Magians or Medians. Crossing the straits at Byzantium, he fortified that critical post, conquered the northern shore of the sea of Marmora, all Thrace, Macedonia and Pæonia, or the modern Roumelia; and temporarily at least, became master of Bulgaria, the southern

coast of the Danube. At the opposite end of the empire he conquered to the very banks of the Indus, and on the north included all the modern Bokhara in his limits. So vast a power might well intoxicate a man; and it assuredly intoxicated his son. Athens had rudely insulted DARIUS, by burning the city of Sardis, the capital of Lydia. Vengeance was thought necessary. DARIUS'S first expedition miscarried at Marathon. A revolt of Egypt followed, and retarded a new attack on Athens. But it was resolved to conquer the whole Grecian peninsula. On the death of DARIUS, his son XERXES regained Egypt, and ought to have learned caution in his dealings with Greece. His advantages were overwhelming, as to men, ships, horses and wealth: a greater advantage still was, that he had unity of counsel, unity of action and absolute obedience; while the enemy had divided counsels, and plenty of statesmen willing to sell their country. He might have attacked it in several places at once. The Thessalians and Bœotians declared for him; a Lacedæmonian king was in his camp and in his councils. But he disdained to act prudently, and so mismanaged, that his vast forces did but embarrass and disgrace him. The defeat of his mighty armament is an event which has affected the history of all Europe thenceforward.

Conquest after this era (B.C. 480, 479) moved eastward. Greece steadily won on Persia. That empire declined. The Persians lost spirit; Persian viceroys often revolted. Finally, the Macedonians and Greeks conquered Irân under ALEXANDER the Great; but with no benefit to Greece, who merely found herself conquered by the resources of Asia. What XERXES could not do, ALEXANDER did. But in the interval, Greece had acted, spoken and written. Genius had had its course under her republics, but perished instantly when Asiatic monarchy overwhelmed her.

What was the essential vice of such monarchy? It was this, I believe. The central executive power was able to direct the entire military force at its pleasure: hence nothing could

check it. The king could depute a viceroy, but had to make him despotic like himself, only on a smaller scale. The nominees of the viceroy were despotic in their turn. So is it in the modern Turkish empire. Its whole system is described as a perpetual delegation of despotism. A mere military despot may promulgate excellent rules, but no judges or lawyers can force satraps, pashas or other governors to observe them. The military power is everywhere too strong for civilians, and even in the Priestly kingdoms is hardly restrained. The same was the essential vice of the Roman government, for a long while even at home, and always in the provinces. If a civilian opposed anything, the prætor or governor might cut off his head first, and leave him to appeal afterwards. Every one of these empires was a mere exaltation of brute force and personal will. Meanwhile the princes practised polygamy, and their children were reared in the seraglio.

The rule of ALEXANDER was to the Persian nobility a severe downfall; for he put the Macedonians into their place. But to the common Persians and to the rest of the empire it was no revolution at all. They felt no other change, than when an energetic and warlike succeeds to a languid king: and truly, when he died, the whole empire had a dreadful experience of twenty years from the quarrels of his successors. SELEUCUS, who at last possessed the principal Asiatic portion, having fixed his capital on the Syrian coast, where he built the city of Antioch, lost all vigorous control of the far East, and not long after his death the whole of Irân was lost to the Macedonians. The *Parthians* occupied it; and continued in power not much short of 500 years. From Persians they differed perhaps only as Scotchmen may from men of Middlesex. We learn that the plays of EURIPIDES were acted in Greek at the Parthian court; which testifies that they were curious of foreign literature, and no mere barbarians. The Romans learnt to respect the Parthian prowess. It was far greater than that of the Syrian successors of ALEXANDER.

When the Persians of CYRUS are first heard of in history, they are described as rude mountaineers, who fought as infantry. Their later weapons were reed arrows, shot from *large* bows (says HERODOTUS), also small javelins, and a dagger hanging at the thigh. They had wicker shields of some size, perhaps a shirt of iron scales: but it is clear in the history that this armour could not withstand the Grecian pike. Brave as the Persian infantry was, the characteristic force of the armies under this monarchy, as of Scythians, Parthians and Babylonians, was cavalry, armed with the bow. The bow of the horseman can never be so long as that of the footman, nor did the Greek bow compare with that of Egypt and of mediæval England. The horse of modern Persia is highly esteemed, though fiercer than the Arab, as well as stronger. Perhaps it is the same as that celebrated in antiquity as the Nisæan breed. Be that as it may, the cavalry of Media became naturally that of Persia, when the Persian dynasty seized the empire. Among the Parthians, it would seem that the infantry played little part. In the Greek war of XERXES, the contest as conceived of by the Greeks was between the bow and the spear.

Under the dynasty of the Sassanidæ recommenced the rule of Persis proper, and the *religion* of CYRUS and DARIUS was established. Similar as were Medes and Persians, there was a fierce religious schism, reminding us of Sonnees and Shiites among Mohammedans. But we do not know details. The Persians disapproved of images in worship, and though believing in angels, were strictly monotheistic. The Parthians, seemed to them guilty of impious error, whether about the Evil Spirit or something else: and it is certain that the accession of the Sassanidæ introduced a great religious persecution. No one, reading merely the Greek accounts of DARIUS and XERXES, would imagine that religion had any deep place in the Persian heart.

Yet it is not possible to doubt that the Persian religion was remarkably pure and simple. We see it in the account

of HERODOTUS. No temple, no altar, no sacrifice, no images. They see GOD moving in the elements, and hold these to be his natural type, especially wind and fire. They regard him as dwelling in heaven, not in houses built for him by men.—That the Mussulmans should see in this nothing but a senseless Fire-Worship, is mere narrowness of understanding.

The best point in the government of the old Persians has in part been reproduced by the Turks; viz., that they in general not only left to a conquered people their own law, but largely administered it through their own chiefs. The Persians, as soon as they understood the Greek character, allowed the Greek cities in Asia to conduct their domestic affairs by means of their own magistracies, elected by themselves in their own way. The Great King demanded an ordinary tribute, extraordinary contributions in time of war, whether of money, men, horses or ships, and of course certain payments to his satrap. The mischief was, that the satrap could never be kept in order by the subject people.

On the whole, I think it appears that monarchy which unites a homogeneous but divided people, is generally a great benefit; but conquest (whether by monarchy or a republic) of a people very unlike the conquerors, is generally a grave evil. When a nation addicted to fighting and averse to continuous industry conquers the industrious and wealthy, it does but use up their wealth, ruin their manliness, fall into voluptuousness or endless quarrels from within, and perish by decay. This is the general history of conquering monarchies.

None of these powers, as far as we know,—neither Persia, Macedonia, Rome, nor the Assyrian, Chaldean or Ottoman dynasty, contributed anything to the advance of mankind in skill, in wisdom, in learning, in taste, in culture of any kind. At best, they did but give to artists opportunity of exercising skill on some great scale. But the art had been gained, either under the constitutional monarchy of Egypt, or in the free cities of Phœnicia, Greece, Etruria, Syria and Mesopotamia, or in the remote culture of Bactria and Ariana, before they were seats of empire.

The Parthians are often called Scythians, but the countenances on their coins are thoroughly Persian or Afghan; in fact, are very Jewish. They have absolutely nothing of the Mongol in eyebrows, nose or beard. The contests of aspirants to the throne, in the absence of a fixed law of succession, gradually weakened them: yet the Indus and the Euphrates were long their limits. Armenia was generally in dependent alliance to them. From about B.C. 256 to A.C. 226 (481 years) is the duration of their rule. The dynasty is called the *Arsacidæ*.

The monarchy of the *Sassanidæ* which followed was splendid and chivalrous, and controlled the Roman empire more effectually than the Parthians had done. But Rome was no longer what she had been. Decay, decrepitude, internal wars wasted her; and first Goths, then other Germans aided to pull her down. The Sassanidæ remained as a majestic and specious power, until the new-born Mohammedan enthusiasm overwhelmed the entire realm:—an event which terminates Ancient History in the East.

END OF FOURTH LECTURE.

FIFTH LECTURE.

On the Republican Form in General; Especially Athens.

It was regarded as an axiom by Aristotle, that a Constitution, (or *Polity*, as he named it,) could only exist while the citizens were in moderate number. To have so many as a hundred thousand, would make legal freedom impossible, and doom the state to fall under the power of royalty or of tyrants. Absolute royalty seemed the natural condition of Persia or India. On the contrary, when states were small, royalty was but an accident, constitutionalism was the normal state; and royalty was likely to be, or gradually to become, constitutional, by just such steps and processes as in Europe we well understand.

But in all the small states of Greece and Italy the movement tended to the total overthrow of royalty; for this reason, that constitutional royalty, as it exists in England, is far too expensive for a little state. To keep a king for show, and get ministers and generals to do his work, was too great a burden. In Greece, only Sparta endured it; but there splendour was forbidden and impossible. Moreover the Spartan kings, though shorn of civil power, were actual generals of the army, and did real work; certainly more than an English royal duke who happens to be commander-in-chief. Although Homer talks grandly of that king of kings, Agamemnon, yet when he would display to us a true home-scene, he curiously represents "the king" as standing in the harvest field to superintend his reapers and rejoice in their industry. An English baronet

might have been to HOMER's notion a king, and a duke a king of the chief rank. A superior king, like ACHILLES, had subordinate judges, who heard and decided causes in his stead. An ordinary king was not only *warrior* and *captain*, as in the Iliad, but *carpenter* and *pilot* as in the Odyssey, and *judge* as in Hesiod. When a king grew old, as PELEUS father of ACHILLES, or LAERTES father of ULYSSES, he was displaced, as of course, and his son succeeded him. The rule was strictly personal: a minor could not be king, nor could any one reign without bearing the entire responsibility of the government. As all states sooner or later have misfortune and discontent, and either are or seem to be misgoverned, every dynasty accumulated ill-will, and in a small state could be overthrown by slight effort, whenever odium was general. Republicanism did not necessarily follow at once. A king might be elected from a new family; and if the state were warlike, needing always a general, elective royalty might become systematic; but this did not happen in Greece. It was not uncommon in Italy, and perhaps was derived from the Tuscans. In Sparta the fall of royalty was broken and delayed by having two kings, both hereditary. But a civil government was put right over their heads; they were in truth only hereditary generals, though called kings. We also hear of Protectors and Dictators; but these, as in modern times, could only be temporary and transitional. It is probable that in such matters the same causes worked, with the same general result, in Phœnicia, Carthage and Etruria, as in Greek and Latin states. Some of them may have been always republics, and never have had kings at all: but at any rate, they became republics at last.

What then was the general character and description of this republicanism, so widely diffused among small states? This is the topic which at present I am about to discuss. With numerous points of difference, they had also much in common; much also which it would not occur to a mere Englishman to expect.

First of all, it needs to be strongly impressed that Repub-

licanism with none of them meant *human equality.* Even citizens might have great diversity of political rank and right, as in modern Europe peers and commoners differ. Likewise, as with us some noblemen are legislative peers, others have a title but not a seat in parliament, so in Rome a few nobles were in the Senate, a large number were not. Again, it was possible to be a half citizen. Aliens, when fixedly resident, received peculiar rights, short of the full franchise: and certain friendly states might by treaty be admitted to such half rights without continuous residence. So too, freedmen had an imperfect franchise. Thus far they differed from us less in substance than in words. They might have called our nobles Patricians, or Wellborn; our enfranchised commoners, the Plebs or Demos; our non-franchised citizens were like their Freedmen or their Resident aliens. Nevertheless, in two points of principle we are greatly opposed to them. *First,* we insist on equality before the law: *next,* we hold that local birth entitles every one to the ordinary benefits of citizenship.

A peer of Parliament has in England a few exceptional privileges in regard to the processes of a criminal suit; but they do not deserve to have stress here laid on them. To speak broadly, the law both criminal and civil is the same for every one in the community. Except in the very critical case of slaves, a double code was no more imagined by ancient states than by ourselves. Nevertheless, full citizens were in most republics favoured in regard to degrading punishments, and sheltered from summary tribunals; and in the practical result citizens had often a harsh and unjust advantage at law over foreigners or half citizens, and their crimes were difficult to punish. Crimes of Roman nobles against provincials were more unpunishable under the republic than in any known historical empire. Even a Persian satrap or Turkish pasha has always to fear retribution from the great monarch. We must confess; every where, in a newly conquered empire, office-bearers get a frightful license against foreign subjects,

especially if their cruelties, however illegal, have some public and imperial design. But it is the reproach of all the ancient aristocracies, and of Rome preëminently, that a noble had an almost entire impunity of selfish crime against persons of inferior grade. No events oftener induced insurrection and revolution in petty states than outrages of the aristocracy against women; which were seldom punishable by the ordinary course of law. The root of the evil was, that the idea of *human equality* was never for a moment admitted as the basis of law. The State was understood to rest, not on morality, but on conquest. Even when the times of rudeness and coarse barbarism were past, law was never allowed to shift and underprop itself on morality; for every where Slavery stood at the side of the citizens, as a perpetual memento that brute force, not right, was sovereign. This was the poisonous element in every ancient republic, however plausible, which doomed it to early decay, after very transient brilliancy. From the battle of Marathon to the thirty tyrants of Athens (B.C. 490-404) is less than 90 years: such is the chief period of Athenian glory. But if we count from the expulsion of the sons of PEISISTRATUS to the death of DEMOSTHENES we have in all barely 180 years of democracy, after which Athens is an inglorious shadow of herself. Rome began her career of internal vigour only from the year in which she admitted the Latin cities into full and final equality with herself. But let us go back one generation, and count from the plebeian consulate, B.C. 365. The inward forces of life increase until the war of HANNIBAL, B.C. 218; only 147 years. Thenceforward she wastes frightfully from within. The numbers of her citizens are recruited only by the adoption of foreigners. Italian cultivation declines; large estates, thinly peopled by slaves and cattle, increase: the armies are filled, first by foreign Italians, only half citizens, next by Illyrians, Spaniards and Gauls; and then the republic vanishes, conquered by its own foreign troops. As early as the time of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, who was killed B.C. 133, the state of the Roman

plebeians and of the Italy which they had conquered, was truly deplorable. Thus we can in no way make out two full centuries for the thriving period of the Roman republic. Yet Athens and Rome are the two most celebrated free states of antiquity.

The one great mischief was, that, in their day of power, they were not just: truly a common case! To barbarians they did not behave worse than do Christians. But we do it against our principles, and only under some evil stimulus, as Avarice. Therefore in cool blood and when dealing in civil life, we admit abstract human rights. They did not. Men had no rights as men, but only by treaty, by enactment. Hence slavery remained unquestioned by moralists. A slave trade was the natural result of every war; and the greater the successes of war the more numerous the slaves. Every one will see, that an abundance of cheap slaves made the labour of freemen less valuable in the market: but that was the least part of the evil. The rudest slaves were often applied to work which disgusted freemen, such as mining; the delicate ones to household and menial service, which few free persons coveted. In the country the Roman slaves were little used for cultivation, much for tending cattle. Their chief economical mischief was there in the discouragement of agriculture. But the moral mischiefs were innumerable. Many of the captives of war were of the middle classes, and far from uneducated, according to the standard of that age. Such persons, when once their spirit is broken to submit to a thoroughly bad master, become the most efficient tools of crime. The terrible power which enforces their abject obedience, added to their own intelligence, equips a rich man with ruffians, perjurers and reckless ministers of profligacy. At the same time, by the familiar knowledge of such contingencies the resistance of towns to capture was made fanatical, and the obstinacy of the defence inflamed the ferocity of the victor. It was not at all rare for an ancient free city to prefer to slay wives and children, burn their precious goods in a

heap, and then either leap into the fire or throw themselves on the weapons of an enemy vastly superior, rather than accept a summons of surrender. The very historians who report such horrors, moralize on them as if quite unaware that the slavery in prospect for captives of war was their cause. Both men of spirit and men of virtue preferred death to slavery, for those dearest to them as well as for themselves.

But what I now peculiarly press, is, the general and permanent political influence of slavery on the law and the constitution. The slavery might be mild and stagnant, as at Athens, not encroaching: yet in every case it proclaimed that violence was the foundation of the State. It forbade appeal to morality as the basis of law. The keener the intellect, the more shameless became the political reasoner. A young ALCIBIADES could silence a PERICLES; a PERICLES might despise an ARISTIDES as a superficial politician. If men were to be kept in slavery, merely because others were physically stronger, why might not poorer citizens be depressed, be burdened with unfair imposts, and forbidden honourable and lucrative offices, merely because an aristocracy was legally stronger? And if between rank and rank an appeal to abstract equity and divine law was closed, much less between State and State could there be any appeal but to force. In Greece, where the majority of slaves was Greek, the case was in so far the worse, if the system was to stand. It would hardly have stood if the doctrine of ARISTIDES had triumphed, and the allies of Athens had been honourably treated as equals. A uniform franchise through the whole federation would have followed. Democracy was understood to mean "the equality of freemen"; and, when there was no separation of blood between the free and the slave, humanity and truth *might* have triumphed as in modern Europe. But when the foremost State in Greece crushed her own allies by violence, the young aristocracy of Athens frankly argued, "What the State may do, we may do, when we can": and the *rule of brute force* became their avowed philosophy, in the very crisis at which

the law might have moved on towards higher justice. PERICLES, the statesman of the democracy, gave broad exhibition of the false principle in his foreign policy; his aristocratical opponents improved it into domestic assassination and terrorism.

Until Slavery is put upon the same basis as Cannibalism, the lower orders of society have no respite from oppression. In battle, when fight we must, men will be killed; but that is no reason for eating them, although human flesh is probably as delicate as that of swine. To say: "I have a right to eat a man, because I have a right to kill him," is barbarian logic; and is quite as good as to say, "I have a right to make a slave of him, because I may kill him." I repeat: the noblest States of antiquity never took the first step towards permanence, which consists in basing law upon *human morality*. To do this, it must be proclaimed a "guilty fantasy, that man can ever be the chattel of man."

All the great foundations of law were supposed to be arbitrary. No one laid down that privileges (where they existed) were given for the public good, whether to individuals, to families or to orders; that duties were commensurate with rights; or even that a State, when it claimed allegiance, owed protection. Every State claimed allegiance of slaves: no State imagined that it owed protection to slaves, although a few humane laws were passed in their favour. Of course those States which had slaves most numerous and worst treated, were in the most dangerous position. By far the worst was Sparta, a State in nearly every respect peculiarly execrable, although it attracted the warm admiration, not only of the soldier XENOPHON, but, also, as is generally admitted, of the philosopher PLATO. I must dwell a moment on Sparta.

Sparta cultivated military virtues only,—drilling, fighting, hunting, and prompt obedience according to law. The free inhabitants of her country-towns were disfranchised and treated as foreigners, the mass of the peasants as public slaves. Literature, music and all mental culture were forbidden; no Spartan earned his livelihood: citizens fed at a common mess.

The daily and almost hourly occupation of citizens, and the management of their children, were prescribed by law, so that the noblest Spartan had every day about as little freedom as a soldier during a campaign. The system extirpated genius, depressed men of talent, fostered mediocrity and even stimulated avarice. As often as the slave population appeared to be growing strong and it was thought expedient to weaken and terrify them, murderous raids were made against them to keep down their number and their spirit. THUCYDIDES, an author of reputation unsurpassed for grave veracity and caution, tells a tale of what happened in his own day, soon after the death of PERICLES. The Spartans proclaimed to the Helots or slaves, that whoever of them believed that his bravery against the public enemy had deserved freedom should come forward and claim it. Of the claimants they selected 2,000, and pretended to give them the inauguration and insignia of freedom. They were led through the temples with chaplets on their heads, and soon after disappeared, no one perceiving how they were destroyed. THUCYDIDES says that the Spartans used this process to get rid of those who might prove ambitious and daring spirits.

The Spartans always knew that they were living as with a volcano under their feet; hence they were generally timid and sluggish in foreign action, although certainly ambitious. THUCYDIDES makes an Athenian orator say, (what undoubtedly was his own judgment,) that at home among themselves the Spartans exercise much virtue, but towards foreigners show signally that they identify convenience with honour and their own advantage with justice. Sparta in a single battle against the celebrated EPAMINONDAS of Thebes lost 400 pure citizens. The blow was irreparable: she never recovered from it. On so narrow a basis did the State rest. This was the famous battle of Leuctra, B.C. 371.

It is evident on a moment's thought how unstable is a constitution which is surrounded by a mass of slaves or of wretched freemen greatly outnumbering the favoured citizens.

The hope of the miserable is in revolution, and the logic of their lords justifies their insurgency. If force has depressed them, force may lift them on high. They are a natural army, ripe and ready for a CATILINE, a CLODIUS, or a CÆSAR. The Gracchi well understood, that to give lands to Roman citizens, and people Italy with multitudes of freemen,—thus to broaden the basis of the State, and increase the military population,—was the only course of safety. This is in fact, what the great French revolution did for France, and what the measures of Prussian statesmen did for Prussia early in this century,—namely, gave to the State new masses of independent freehold citizens. For this the Roman poet HORACE longed in vain,—"the masculine offspring of rustic warriors,"—whom the broad estates of the aristocracy had superseded by wretched slaves, by cattle, and by beautiful parks.

Of peculiar mischief to Greece was the prejudice against *intermarriage* of State with State. Where a people speaking a single language is spread over a country, the rich men of one district are apt to look out for wives among the rich men of other districts. Others less rich do the same, and only the poor ordinarily intermarry with immediate neighbours. By intermarriage, interests and affections are entangled: the leading men of each city learn to desire the prosperity of other cities, and above all, are anxious to avoid war with them. The great KIMON, whose mother was a Thracian princess, was accepted as a true citizen; and he himself took an Arcadian woman for his second wife: yet bigotry prevailed. Nearly all the cities had a perverse repugnance to legalizing the practice, and ordinarily ejected from citizenship the offspring of mixed marriages. Such children were in law general outcasts. States were hindered from coalescing, and were constantly reminded that they were to one another foreigners, whom nothing but a treaty, perhaps a truce, sheltered from hostility. As the nobility in each State was forced to find wives from within a very narrow community, it may be suspected that a far pettier family-feeling hence grew up among them.

The jealousy of aristocracy certainly assumed a very mean tone. The animosity between nobles and commoners in a majority of cities became so fierce, and mutual atrocities so extreme, that one may conjecture intermarriage between the orders to have been very rare. Thus the separation in Greece was made sharp between State and State, between Nobles and Commons, between Free citizens and Aliens or Slaves. These were serious evils. In Italy things took another shape.

I have said enough to warn you against the idea that Republicanism meant justice, freedom or equality. In fact the lowest part of the community had every where more to hope from a military usurper or an active resolute king, than from a *military aristocracy;* which is probably the very worst of all forms of government. When it was displaced by a usurper, whom the Greeks called a tyrant, this man often proved a transition towards a *democratic republic;* which, though it had the great vice of instability, yet, while it was able to stand, was the best form known to antiquity. Nevertheless even the Greek democracies did not regard birth upon their soil to confer citizenship; and no sooner were conscious of strength, than they became deplorably stingy of their own peculiar honour. Early Athens, or rather Attica, while undistinguished in Greece, willingly received fugitives from all parts and incorporated them into her own polity. Early Rome, in her regal period, did the same thing, though under the later kings an inferior citizenship (the Latin *plebs*) was established. Each of the two States, on growing strong, whatever the policy towards distinguished foreigners living *abroad*, seemed to think that *at home* all existing citizens were losers by admitting resident aliens into equality.

One State of Greece, generally esteemed barbarous, viz., the Ætolians, acted on the opposite principle, which has been so gloriously successful with the United States of America. The Ætolians are scarcely heard of in civilized relations, until the invasion of Greece by Gauls, a century after the burning of Rome by other Gauls. No Greeks resisted them so bravely

and effectively as the Ætolians, who thereby first gained a name in Greece. Fired with a new ambition, they commenced a career of encroachment, which, like that of Rome in Italy, was in fact robbery and violent conquest. But their confederacy seems to have been internally liberal. Like the Arab followers of MOHAMMED, they were more covetous of comrades than of subjects. Such a power, when it once has started with impetus, amid weak, enslaved or distracted populations, increases like a snowball as it moves. The Ætolians soon proved superior to the Achæan league and stood up bravely against a far greater power, PHILIP III. of Macedon. But the Romans used them as a tool against PHILIP, and then crushed them in turn. What course affairs would have taken without the Romans, no one can tell; yet the facts suggest, how great, safe and easy a career of prosperity Athens might have run, if in her day of power and brilliant credit she had understood that to double the number of her citizens was to double her force and her moral weight; that all her resident aliens and their children ought (as of old) to be admitted into full citizenship, and all the common business of her allies to be transacted in common Congress; as among the Ætolians; who every year so elected their Captain-General. On the contrary, PLUTARCH tells us—what is difficult to believe—that PERICLES induced the Athenians (immediately, it seems, on the death of KIMON) to eject from citizenship all children born from foreign mothers, though their fathers might be citizens. This could only have been from the base expediency of bribing citizens by gifts from the treasury and by various jobs. Of course the fewer the citizens, the cheaper it became thus to win their votes.

In spite of these deplorable errors and shortcomings, the tendency of Greek democracy was humanizing and beneficial, and Athens was its principal type. Perhaps we may almost say, that Attica was civilized first in Greece. There first, the carrying of weapons in daily life was laid aside even in the country, which implies how little the rustic slaves were feared.

No improvement could take place in early Greece, any more than in mediæval Europe, until each tribe was fixed in its own territory. For several centuries the population shifted about, one people expelling another from the more fertile soil. THUCYDIDES believes that the barrenness of Attica, which saved it from being coveted, conduced to its early strength. No one invaded it, but it received and adopted those who were cast out. The whole district united itself into a single State, so that the townsmen of every parish were citizens of the chief city Athens. It thus became strong enough to resist more warlike and predatory tribes, vaguely called Dorians.

Every Grecian State was liable to encroachments on its border, and had to resist them sternly and fight for every foot of ground, if it would not be swallowed up. Out of this arose Patriotism. A limited soil, with well marked hills, known intimately to all, attracts devoted affection. The Country affords to the imagination the idea of the State, as separate from that of the king or royal dynasty. Every citizen is bound to keep himself in training and with good arms, in order to fight for the boundaries; and the king also, as leader of the national army, had to risk his life for the State. From this was born that cardinal republican notion, that *the Law and the State are higher than even the king*, and much more than any nobles; and when royalty fell, the nobles had to pay homage to law. In the early times of uncertain possession or violence, Attica, like most other lands, had got entangled in a net of claims and customs, which caused poverty, debt and misery: but the people had enough of political force to empower the celebrated SOLON to enact a new system. He swept away old debts by judicious despotism, and by his new fundamental laws placed the welfare of Attica permanently on a safe basis. But I must here name a second fundamental republican principle,—that *the power of enacting Laws rests ultimately with the assembly of the citizens*,—the Folk-Mote, as our ancestors called it. It was not a Parliament, an elective body, but consisted of the actual citizens.

themselves, the householders of the whole country. They might employ a committee to report on a question: such really was the Council at Athens: but the ultimate decision lay with the Assembly.

Nor was this all; but the *election of the real Executive government also lay with the Assembly.* Nothing may seem to an English mind more outrageous. We think that even Parliament is incompetent to choose ministers; how much less should we believe the constituencies themselves to be capable of it! But the fact is, that our ministers have in this very point brought our constitution to a dead lock. They will not have *any one* choose the minister. Not the Queen, according to the newest doctrine; the sovereign, it is now ruled, is to have no opinion and no action. Not the Parliament: and not the people. When Parliament casts out a minister,—suppose because untrustworthy or incompetent,—the sovereign (forsooth) is to consult that very minister, whom to put in his place. The Greeks might tell us, that this rule is made for the special benefit of an aristocracy, not of the nation.

The magistrates nominally chief (I must say) were appointed *by lot;* but their functions were rather judicial than what we call executive. The real administration gradually devolved on the annual board of ten generals. While the Athenians could get men of aristocratic birth, who were loyal to the constitution, they preferred to elect them as leaders. Probably nineteen high posts out of twenty were filled by those who passed as gentlemen, and any one who was called Well-born was sure of an eminent career, if he had talent and good will to the people.

A Greek aristocrat outwardly was much the same in every State. They were generally beautiful and vigorous in frame, because of the constant training on the wrestling-ground. The Athenian noble loved, not only to listen to minstrels and see dancers, but to sing and dance himself: these were the accomplishments of a gentleman. Few were rich enough to

live in what *we* should call state or pomp. MILTIADES and his son KIMON had estates in Thrace, but such cases were exceptional. Every one was rich enough to be an aristocrat, who was able to live without personal labour; who could devote his time to martial exercise, elegant accomplishments or public business; who could also afford handsome armour and the best weapons. All had poor and mean houses in the estimate of later days, Riches at Athens were denoted by the number and beauty of horses, whose keep was expensive on so dry a soil. A high display of wealth and public spirit, was, to build and keep a trireme (the ship of war in that day) for the service of the State. Many nobles were of course haughty, some were violent and dangerous; but in order to obtain election, a majority were courteous and conciliating: hence Athenian commanders were in general popular and affable to allies as well as to citizens. They lived much in Athens, almost in public and before the eyes of poorer citizens: quite unlike the German and Norman barons, who immured themselves in rustic castles, surrounded only by retainers who paid abject obedience. The Greek noble, on the wrestling ground or in the market place or in the Council, met his equals, and was saluted by his inferiors. His daughters walked in the sacred processions or danced publicly to the honour of ARTEMIS. He loved to see his sons go through their martial exercises or wrestlings with the youths of their own age. Beauty of limbs and form was very visible through their dress, and had even political importance. ARISTOTLE utters the sentiment of every Greek, when he says, that if a man could be as beautiful as the statues of the gods, all men would bow to him in willing homage. Over the magistrates appointed by lot election had no control; but in fact the elective board of chief captains were what we should call the *Ministry*. They were professedly military and naval, and were expected to be able to play the warrior. Such were the men whom the Athenians loved to set at their head.

SOCRATES was very severe upon the system of appointing

magistrates by lot. They were more sacred and more inefficient than the elected, as a constitutional king than his prime minister. They were allowed *assessors* to give them advice. Whether they really restrained the elected ministers from the thought of usurpation, (as no prime minister dreams of aspiring to the throne, where there is a constitutional king,) I am not able to say; for they move in a general obscurity. It is a singular part of the constitution.

Besides the Assembly, the Archons chosen by lot, and the Military Board, there were two Councils,—the Areopagus or Athenian Sanhedrim,—and the common Council. The latter was not unlike a Roman Senate. It was what in our voluntary Societies, we should call the Executive Committee, which has to get the sanction of the General Committee for all its acts, yet often practically does all the work and has all the power. The Athenian Assembly nevertheless had far more power than a Roman popular Assembly, which could only say Yes or No. Any private citizen in Athens might speak, when the crier made general invitation, and in his speech might not only propose to amend a measure laid before the Assembly by the Council or by the Chief General, but might even suggest a totally different measure, and call for the votes concerning it. This made it *possible* for the Assembly to take the Executive Government entirely out of the hands of its own officers; but there was no practical likelihood whatever of such a thing being done, except when the Executive was suspected of treason, (in which case it is a terrible calamity that it should hold the reins of State a single day longer) or if sudden public danger made an immediate reverse of measures expedient.

When NICIAS, the Chief general, was very ineffective in his attack on the island Sphacteria, and military disaster was more and more feared, the Assembly sent CLEON the tanner, somewhat against his will, to execute what he said NICIAS ought to have done. Complete success followed. THUCYDIDES, who tells it, does his utmost to throw contempt on CLEON his political opponent: but his own account shows that the ener-

getic move of the Assembly was decidedly wise, that CLEON'S success was earned by good sense, and that NICIAS was always too dilatory and unenterprizing. It is evident that he was elected again and again for his wealth, affability, and many social virtues, in spite of wanting military judgment and zeal.

In all military questions, the Generals had necessarily immense influence over the Assembly: yet (paradoxical as it may seem to say so) perhaps an Athenian sculptor or sword-maker, living in private life, could often compete with a general in public debate on a military question of detail, more wisely than a civilian with a military minister in Parliament now, and much more effectively. The general who spoke in the Assembly had received no *written* dispatches from the army: he had no maps of the scene of war: his information came from the *lips* of one or more messengers, who went over the city publishing their tales to everybody. The whole public was presently possessed of as much information as the chief general. No technical questions, on which professional men alone can judge well, could possibly be involved. He who was ablest to put together in imagination the bits of information furnished by the actual spectators of events, was best furnished with the materials for a sound judgment. NICIAS, in the fatal expedition against Syracuse, was the first Athenian general who sent home a *written* dispatch.

It may be worth while to mention the military dispatches of the Spartans. The general carried with him a stick peculiarly turned. A perfectly similar one was kept by a magistrate at home. The general had also a number of strips of leather of the same size and shape. When he wished to send a dispatch, he wound a strip of leather round the stick, and then wrote on it. When it was unwound, no one could read it. In this state the messenger carried it home. There the magistrate wound it anew on his stick, and was able to read it. XENOPHON has copied for us one of these dispatches. The entire of it consists of four versicles. "Good fortune is wasting. MINDARUS has

perished. The men are hungry. We are at a loss what to do." One might think it was a telegram.

As to legislation, many precautions were taken by the Assembly, to prevent the subversion of the State itself by haste, fraud or mistake. No fundamental law could be altered without several formal processes, due notice and time; and to propose an enactment against a fundamental law lay the proposer open to severe punishment if he obtained the votes for the Assembly in his favour. It was his duty first fully to ascertain that his proposal was *not* against law; he was therefore treated as having deceived the people. There was also a board of lawyers, (Thesmothetæ,) who had as an ordinary duty to keep the whole code of law harmonious with itself,—to report as soon as they discovered any internal contradiction,—to exhibit on tables, side by side, the contrariety,—and after a certain lapse of time, to ask the people which of the two statements they would repeal. Grave and earnest effort, such as may shame us, was used to make the law clear to every one.

The *jury*-system was also characteristic of Athenian democracy, and seems to have worked well, until PERICLES perverted it into an agency for giving a petty fee to every needy citizen. There was no officer answering to our *judge*, who can authoritatively lay down the law, and even order a new trial, if the jury (in his opinion) go against law or evidence. The president or chairman of the Athenian jury did but command, according to a certain routine, all the prescribed legal processes. In important criminal cases the number of a jury might be very great, to prevent intimidation or perhaps bribery. Such juries nevertheless were easily biassed by pity, and seem to have claimed a royal right to pardon, especially in offences against the State: and if several persons were accused of the same offence, (each having a legal right of separate trial) after condemning one or two, the jury became lenient to the rest, as though sufficient penalty had been exacted. This is like a general punishing a mutiny. But if an Athenian commander misconducted himself against

the allies, he was likely to meet severe punishment from an Athenian jury, if we may believe words which THUCYDIDES puts into the mouth of an Athenian commander.

The citizens of Athens were supposed able to attend the Assembly on its ordinary and preappointed days, since the territory of Attica is so small as to be soon walked over. But when a special assembly was convened by a general on an urgent question, we may be sure that only those who lived in or very near Athens could attend it. If a general, like PERICLES, could win the good will of this moderate number of citizens, he was almost omnipotent in foreign affairs.—The feast-days nevertheless gave to all of them some time for public business; and from keen interest and continual attention, with the knowledge that they would have to vote, (which makes men listen thoughtfully) they seem to have voted as wisely as most European Parliaments. In Dorian States the public law enforced martial exercises. This was not the case in Athens: but as the thin soil and habitual spare eating, with much mental activity, kept them lean, they easily became alert soldiers, and fought against walls far better than the Spartans.

It must be added, that the pike, which was the Greek weapon, needs far less practice and skill than the sword, the arrow or the javelin. The great weight of the Greek shield was the chief distress to a warrior. In fact it remained doubtful to the last whether this was not a mistake. The public education of Athenians was earned in the Assembly and in the Juries, where they listened, for a practical end, to accomplished speakers. Even in the theatres they picked up something, especially from the plays of EURIPIDES. Those who went to school learned the verses of SOLON, HESIOD and other moral poets, and also the poems of HOMER.

Between the two extremes of Athens and Sparta there were many respectable Greek constitutions: none perhaps better than the Dorian Rhodes and the Ionian Massilia, on which two States I may add a few words.

The island of Rhodes in HOMER'S time was divided among

three independent cities. The poet calls the Rhodians *haughty*, and so the Greeks esteemed them in the time of DEMOSTHENES. It is possible that they had something of the English temperament, which offends foreigners. They had the good sense to merge their three cities into a single State, and establish a just and satisfactory constitution in common. Their prosperity was damaged by the contiguity of the mighty Persian empire; nevertheless, they went safely and very honourably through those storms, regained independence under the successors of ALEXANDER, and exhibited a vigorous political life and growing power, when nearly all Greece was decaying. As they had an excellent fleet, the Romans sought their alliance, used it to great advantage; and when that alliance was no longer needed, grudged them free speech and independent bearing. You will guess the consequence. Their outlying territory was stript from them, and their fleet destroyed. The Romans were punished by the frightful growth of piracy, which before long terribly distressed them. We do not know much of the Rhodians from within. Their public conduct, so far as known to us, is always honourable and spirited. Internally they seem to have been remarkably free from seditions, when all Greece was suffering from them. If through well tempered institutions and political wisdom, they were contented and prosperous, how could they but be proud of their name and of their beautiful island? The epithet *haughty* Rhodians, side by side with their simple but honourable history, sounds to me like a panegyric. For they had no windy ambition. They did not trample down other men's freedom and call it Empire, but they temperately maintained their own even against greater force.

Massilia, the modern Marseilles, was a colony from Phocæa, an Asiatic city, itself a colony from Athens. Greek colonies were ordinarily independent States, which kept up only good will and honour towards the mother city. At all times, every colony inherits an old experience with new facilities, the ties of precedent and routine being severed. Phocæa had eminent

enterprize in long voyages : hence this distant colony Massilia. Fresh accessions of colonists were afterwards added ; possibly not all of Ionian blood. At any rate, such was the temperament of the constitution and the citizens, that one would not know, by any thing told of them, that they were Ionians rather than Æolians. Perhaps the same may be said of other Asiatic Greek colonies, who may have gained wisdom with skill from proximity to the Lydian towns. Massilia diffused Greek letters and something of Greek culture into Gaul, conciliated her Alpine neighbours, and used them as troops ; by industry and commerce became prosperous and honoured ; was an independent ally of the Roman Republic, and remained on good terms with the Senate to the last : was long acknowledged as a free city, whose soil was foreign to Rome, and only seems to be lost in the Roman empire, when all Gauls became Roman citizens.

Many of the peculiarities of those Mediterranean Republics arose out of their smallness. When the institutions were moderately good, each man felt his importance in the State : every cultivated man was a Statesman, a Jurist, a public Councillor, an Advocate, each in turn. Law was brought home to each man's door, and the local principle of government, on which civil freedom chiefly rests, was firmly established. For stability, federation on just terms was essential : for federation, liberal laws of *intermarriage*. Athens here contemptibly went wrong. Her colony *Olynthus* in Thrace as remarkably went right, and commenced by it a most flourishing federation, which might have changed the history of Macedonia and of Rome. But Sparta in jealousy overthrew it, and the last chance of Grecian permanent independence was lost.

END OF FIFTH LECTURE.

SIXTH LECTURE.

On the Form of the Roman Republic.

The book of History is vast. None of us can read it all: few of us can read it much. Yet for us all a certain amount, variously selected in various nations, is profitable: and in Europe, which has been permanently affected by Roman power, all who can afford the time will do well to learn at least *what* was the Roman State, and *what* its Empire. In this lecture I select for my subject the Roman Republic just in its prime, say B.C. 218, before it was attacked by Hannibal. Its area of empire was then small, barely including Italy up to the river Po, with Sicily, the coasts of Sardinia, and a leadership in northern Spain. Half of Italy was still disaffected, and nothing beyond Italy at all secure. Yet the peculiar institutions had attained their full completeness. Among Romans and the Latin colonies there was vigorous loyalty, and all the organs then worked at their highest perfection. The Romans were those who possessed the full franchise. Thirty Latin colonies, spread over Italy and strongly fortified, were the complement of the State, and talked the imperial language. The common Latins had not the right of voting in the Roman assemblies, nor the right of being elected to dignities in Rome; but they had freedom in their own municipality (that is, each in his own colony) and by election into high colonial office any Latin became a full Roman citizen, eligible to dignity in Rome. These colonies saved Rome from Hannibal.

The historian Polybius, who wrote but a little later than

the era of which I treat, complains of the difficulty of giving a name to the Roman constitution. He enumerates the great powers of the Consul which seem to be royal, as indeed his costume and his throne. Moreover, his absolute power over the lives of soldiers and officers the moment he took the field, appeared like Asiatic despotism. But next, the high authority of the Senate, both executively over the treasury and the public works, and judicially as a high court for impeachment of Italians, and in foreign affairs as the decider of all policy and all replies to ambassadors,—appeared to be that of an Aristocracy. What function then, he asks, is left for the body of the people? Why, the people alone awards honour or punishment to citizens, alone can sentence a Roman to death, alone can enact laws, and those absolutely, even when they damage the property of senators. After all then, he says, it seems to be a Democracy.

Of the Roman institutions the most complicated and abstruse are the *legislative assemblies.* These must not be compared to our Parliaments, but to our ancient Folk-motes, meetings of all the local citizens, all the enrolled and privileged body. What is most paradoxical, there were two different modes of organization, both constitutional. When the Consul summoned the assembly, it met and voted according to a special method, originally military, and with military emblems; this was called the Assembly of Centuries. But when the Tribune summoned it, no patricians came, but only those called plebeians, and the mode of voting was simpler, and nearly democratical.

Century or Hundred, was a military word, a *Centurion* meaning its captain: but in fact it was used for the voting unit, however few or many it contained. The Centuries were ranged under *Classes* (or orders of wealth) and the richer the class, the fewer the number of men in a century. Every Century had an equal vote: hence the richer men had advantage in voting. This the Greeks called a Timocracy: we of late use the word Plutocracy for it: but the details had been

greatly changed (as is inferred, by the Censors, not long before) so as to lessen the advantage gained by the rich. Moreover, as, in the national militia, the men above the age of 46 were held in reserve, and only those from the age of 18 to 46 were liable to conscription; so in this military assembly the men above 46 voted apart, as *elders*, with the same number of centuries as the *younger*. We compute that this gives to one elder man the voting power of three younger men. CICERO believes that this also was *designed* to prevent mere numbers from prevailing.

But, what was of far greater importance than the advantage given to wealth or age, was, that in this Assembly the Senate claimed and won the exclusive right of laying before it, by the mouth of the consul, the bill on which it was to vote. The Tribunes of the plebs long strove, but strove in vain, to initiate legislation in it. The consul SPURIUS CASSIUS, a most eminent patrician, tried to present a bill in it himself, against the will of the Senate. But his colleague and his whole order turned against him, and treated his attempt as equivalent to making himself King. He was put to death for the crime. Thus the Senate became not only coördinate as a legislative power to the assembly, as are our two houses of Parliament, but even kept to itself the right of originating laws; while the assembly, might not even suggest amendment of a bill offered to it, but could only say Yes or No. This is similar to our University Legislation at Oxford and Cambridge.

But the Tribunes of the plebs, foiled in their attempt, suddenly betook themselves to a bolder policy, and claimed absolute legislative power for the Assembly of the Tribes, which elected them. Of this Assembly I must now speak. *Tribus* in Latin, as *Trefo* in Umbrian and *Tref* in Welsh, means District, Shire, Parish. King SERVIUS divided Rome into four tribes, *i.e.* parishes, It was a smaller division than Shire, else we might render Tribunus *Sheriff*. Originally it would seem that each tribe elected its own tribune for purposes of taxation and of war; and this continued to the last. But in a crisis of

distress, when the plebs threatened to emigrate in mass, the Senate conceded that it should have Tribunes as *public patrons* of its own, of plebeian rank, sacred and inviolate. They were at first five in number, to represent the five classes; afterwards ten. Twenty years after their first appointment, they extorted a new concession;—that they should be elected, not in the military Assembly held by the consuls, but by the plebeians alone, under presidency of Tribunes. Thus rose the assembly of the Tribes, voting by the head. Yet as each tribe had an equal vote, the more populous tribes were at a disadvantage; and the vote was not finally decided by a strict majority of individuals.

The tribunes, by being thus elected, gained a right of haranguing their own constituents without interference of the consuls; a right as important then, as is the free newspaper now. The people became attached to the new assembly and fond of passing Resolutions in it; though these had no more force of law, than have the resolutions of an English public meeting. Nevertheless their moral effect must have been great. Moreover, the Tribunes of the Plebs stood on a high pinnacle. By solemn treaty between the Orders they were legally sacrosanct, as defenders of the plebeians, that is, of the great majority of the citizens. Hence they took courage to claim that the Resolutions of the Tribes should have the force of law, and *be binding on the whole people.* On three different occasions this was solemnly enacted, and after the third time the Senate ceased to struggle. It had been accustomed to falsify its own edicts in order to retract concessions; but such practices could not win in the long run. Legislation in the assembly of the Tribes thus became wholly independent of the Senate, and was carried over the head of the patricians. But meanwhile many plebeians had gradually become senators; the patrician order had dwindled. Noble plebeians occupied the tribunate, and had no desire to offend the Senate; only a tribune could originate legislation in his assembly. No private citizen could even speak except by his favour or invitation;

much less could any one move an amendment. This assembly therefore, though apparently democratic, was in the hands of its own officer. Moreover, since of the ten tribunes (in the later republic, and at the time of which I treat) *any one* could forbid the voting, the Senate was able to stop a bill, whenever it could win over one out of the ten tribunes. Thus the power of the Roman assembly was far less than that of Athens, and may seem even wrongfully fettered.

Although this second or *civil* assembly is distinctly called that of the Tribes, yet a division of the voters by tribes was at length used in the *military* assembly also. The tribes in general were called to vote by a fixed routine; but the tribe which was to vote *first* was chosen by lot. Again, the vote decided, out of the centuries in this tribe which should vote first. Hence arose the adjective *Prærogativa*, as epithet of the tribe or century which was first asked for its vote. The lot was sacred, and its effect on the public mind might seem incredible. According to CICERO, the rest of the tribes regarded the vote of the Prærogativa as an auspicious omen, and (as it were) a divine sanction: so that without fail they elected to office whatever candidate obtained that vote. Out of the singular superiority exerted by that tribe, arose at a later time the metaphor of the prince's *prerogative*, to mean his *special legal privilege*.

Earlier than both these assemblies, before king SERVIUS TULLIUS, Roman legislation was conducted by another body, called the Assembly of the Curies. There is great controversy about its details. For conciseness, I must state my own belief summarily. I believe with NIEBUHR, that its members were solely Patricians, and I make no doubt that it represents to us the old Sabine Assembly. Curia was a Sabine word, in Latin meaning *guild*. I compare it to the French (Gaulish) Cour, meaning *court* in every sense, but in Latin restricted to the figurative political meaning. There were 30 guilds, each guild had one vote, determined by the majority of its members. SERVIUS TULLIUS the Latin king, who enfranchised

the Plebeians (principally Latin) by introducing the military vote, left to the patrician assembly of the Curies (largely Sabine and Etruscan) only religious interests. Such were, in private affairs, the marriages, wills and adoptions of patricians; in public affairs, the State-augury, the control of all religious formalities, and a power of veto over every public act in which some religious *flaw* was discovered, *i.e.*, some defect in religious form. It is only in such matters that the Assembly of the Curies appears in history. In the days of CICERO it had become such a shadow, that each Cury was ordinarily represented by its beadle, the patricians disdaining to go to it in person. The beadles bowed assent, to whatever the consul or chief pontiff said to them. In fact, long before the Punic wars, the veto of this assembly (depending on religious formalities) was reduced to a nullity, by enacting, that when mere notice of a bill in the other assembly had been given,—before the voting took place, the Curies should give their assent to it. So extreme an indignity shows that the veto had been used for faction only, and that the Senate equally with the people felt it to be a simple nuisance. Yet religion (according to their idea) absolutely required the assent of this assembly. It was well that the beadles were able to give it.

While the assembly of the Curies dwindled and vanished, that of the Tribes was ever encroaching. It finally gained the right of electing all the magistrates except the three highest orders, Censor, Consul and Prætor. It also won on the magistrates, taking patronage from them, and electing by its own vote. It took to itself all new business, all extraordinary appointments. Through the pernicious refusal of the Senate to vote the powers needful to great exigencies, this assembly gradually usurped the executive government. Finally it enabled CAIUS JULIUS (CÆSAR) to arm himself against the State and set up a military power before which the law was helpless. But that was more than a century and a half later than the battle of Cannæ.

I proceed to speak of the Magistracy. In Rome it was originally military and never lost its too military character. The highest magistrates were the two consuls, really Captains General, elected for one year. At first they had the prerogatives as well as insignia of royalty; but either could in most matters stop the action of the other. The political execution of SPURIUS CASSIUS, by a terrible sacrifice established that the consul was the servant of the Senate. The consuls until B.C. 365 were both patricians, and elected the Senate at their will, as the king had formerly done. This aided the policy of keeping popular patricians out of the senate. But when a decisive Reform Bill was carried, after 10 years' struggle, which enacted, among other matters, that of the two consuls at least one should be a plebeian, the Senate betook itself to lessen the consul's power, in order to lessen the prize won by the plebeians. They first stripped the consulate of its judicial functions (a measure wise in itself) and established an annual Prætor as judge. Next, they appointed two Censors to take the registers of property with a view to taxation and keep the roll of the Senate. Before long, a *tribunicial* law was passed, *Lex Ovinia*, (and it is very remarkable if this law came from the people, not from the Senate) which committed to the Censors the duty of electing the Senate, under oath that they would put *all the best men* into it.

Thus the old consulate was distributed into three sets of officers, Consuls, Prætors and Censors. The number of Prætors, or judges, was gradually increased: but the consuls and censors always remained two. The censors, though civil, not military, became higher in estimate than the consuls, because a rule was early adopted, to make no one censor who had not been already consul: hence it was a cumulus of dignity. The Prætor, on occasion, was able to convene the Senate; especially for his own business.

The oath of office taken by the censors was highly effective, and was perhaps the wisest matter of detail in the whole system. It seems to have been imitated in other cases, to

avoid the abuses of patronage. At least we know from CICERO (Pro Cluentio 43, 121) that the Prætor, in forming a select jury, took oath that he would put into it *all the best men;* and that even when a mere *clerk* was wanting, two prætors and two curule ædiles elected him under a similar oath (Pro Cluentio 45, 125, scribam jurati legunt.) It is possible that the best administrative reform for England would be, to impose on every holder of public patronage the solemn declaration that he will select for the office the best man he can find.—Previously the consuls had followed mere party; but from the time that this oath was taken by the censors, the Roman senate improved, until it became the prime and the pride of the nation. The Censors kept the roll of the Senate, and prepared a new copy after every five years. Their election took place every sixth year only, and they vacated office after 18 months, since this space of time seemed sufficient for their duties. They before long took the liberty of omitting from the roll any senator who had disgraced himself; and as this met with applause, they thus earned the right of expulsion. They even assumed a universal right of putting any citizen into any class, so as arbitrarily to increase a man's taxation or lower his honour. This invidious power was very seldom used, and therefore never legally questioned and destroyed.

The Prætorship and Censorship, though at first wholly patrician, could not long be kept from the plebeians. Each office, like the consulship, had the exterior costume of royalty, both robes and throne. The Prætor had also *six axes* following him, as a token of power over life and death. Each consul had twelve axes, but in the interest of freedom it was obtained that they should not be carried within the strict limits of the city. The Prætor was often employed as a general, and then displayed his axes, the badge of military despotism. CICERO'S phrase for the conquest of a country, is "to cast it under the axes." Greek writers sometimes denote the Prætor as the *six-axed general.* The Consuls and the Prætors alike had what

was called *the greater auspices*, which allowed them to become commanders-in-chief, and thereby, if highly successful in war, to receive the honours of a *Triumph*. This was a great military procession, conducted in true oriental style, such as is painted in Egyptian tombs or sculptured on Asiatic rocks. It was probably a Tuscan importation from Lydia.

Next in authority after Consul, Prætor and Censor, came the Ædile. There were two Ædiles called *Curule*, from sitting in a royal ivory chair: these were originally patrician: there were also two plebeian ædiles. The title Ædile implies, that they had to look after the *buildings* of the city; and they did administer the sacred and public edifices. But also the whole of the local Police devolved upon them. Over foreigners and slaves, perhaps also over freed-men, they had a very summary jurisdiction. Residence did not confer civil privileges, and every citizen was a privileged person: hence the children of foreigners and freed-men were for ever accounted foreigners and freed-men. This is similar to what is called freedom or citizenship in London, and once obtained in all our chartered cities. Thus in Rome a large population was under the despotic jurisdiction of the Ædiles.

I have spoken of the Tribune of the Plebs. Originally he was not accounted a Magistrate, because he was elected by and had duties towards the plebeians only, who were but a part of the people: and he was never called Tribune of the People, but, to the very last, Tribune of the Plebs. The power of this officer was ever on the increase. He began by protecting plebeians from arbitrary acts of the executive, especially from illegal levies or unjust degradation in the army. He proceeded to forbid levy of troops, when he believed that their object was simply to get the people under the consul's axe. He took next a far greater step,—to impeach consuls for gross mismanagement as generals: this (I cannot but believe) must have been at the bar of the *military* assembly; but the process was exceptional. It was nevertheless one rung of the ladder by which the tribune climbed up. Already having right of

harangue to the plebs, he claimed to be heard in their cause by the Senate, and gradually won both voice and seat in the Senate itself. I have stated that he extorted an initiative of legislation in the Assembly of the tribes. Ultimately he obtained a right of summoning and consulting the Senate, and (strangest of all) a Veto on every civil act, executive or senatorial. This amounted to a Veto on all legislation; for he could stop a law in the assembly of the Tribes by his own native right, and prevent a law in the other assembly by putting his veto on the Senate's initiation of it. Long before this vast power was complete, young and noble plebeians obtained it, who, aspiring to be consuls, had no wish for a feud with the Senate. In fact, in all the earlier times of the republic the total result of this anomalous magistracy was clearly for good. It was then a *protective* force against an enormously powerful social aristocracy. It never could become the reformer and reorganizer of conquered peoples, whose institutions had been perniciously destroyed. Young men, who tried so to apply it, had not sufficient moral force. Its peculiar privileges finally did but furnish tools to the usurper who for his private ambition compassed the overthrow of the institutions of his country.

The lowest of the high Magistrates was the Quæstor; originally a public prosecutor. When criminal prosecutions began to be otherwise managed, he (gradually perhaps) found his functions limited to prosecution for wrongs done to the treasury; as, by not paying taxes: thus he became simply a Finance-minister. Each consul had his quæstor to accompany the army: so had every military governor of a province. There were also two quæstors of the treasury in Rome. These officers in Rome itself had chiefly duties of routine, and to execute the financial orders of the Senate; but in a province, they had often an arduous and critical task, beyond those of our young civilians in India, to furnish money for the public service almost without other control than that of the governor.

In general, it became a constitutional rule that no one

might hold office for two years together; but a year of private life had to be interposed. This rule was introduced into the consulship first, by the ambition and jealousy of the aristocracy: at last it was imposed even on the tribunate. But in great public danger, in order to continue a general in command, the People insisted on dispensing with this law.

The high officers were not only elected by popular vote, as perhaps in all ancient republics, (that is, by the vote of a Folkmote,) but they were almost always *candidates*, and supplicated the people by many condescensions, often unseemly and unmanly. This coarsely democratic and offensive appearance remained even when things were verging to oligarchy. But in times of severe danger, as eminently in the Punic wars, every thing became stern and grand. Very few coveted to be commander-in-chief, often it was hard to induce men to accept the post. Every effort was made to find the best man and strengthen his hands. But when Rome ceased to have any military equal, all things changed rapidly for the worse.

The *Religious* officers were not strictly Magistrates; but they must be mentioned, as they were numerous. Then, as now, Rome was, in her own way, an extremely religious city. The Pontiffs were the highest priests: they voted together as a College, and took cognizance of the whole religious system. They may somewhat remind us of modern cardinals, with the Chief-Pontiff presiding. The word Pontiff is abridged from the Latin Pontifex, whence our adjective *Pontifical*. It is generally explained *bridge-builder*, by a derivation which I have never been able to believe. I venture to interpret it as equivalent to Pompifex,* conductor of the processions. Next in dignity were the Flamens, whom I compare to the Deans of Cathedrals. Each was attached to a special temple,

* In Greek, Pempe becomes Pente. The Samnite Pontius is the Sabine or Umbrian Pompeius, the Latin Quinctius. — I have since ascertained, or at least persuaded myself, that in the Iguvine Tables *Pontes* means *Pompæ*, processions, and so I have translated. An officer is there appointed, expressly to conduct the feasts and processions.

and had no cure beyond it. The three Flamens of the principal temples came next in popular estimate to the Chief Pontiff. The College of Augurs stands next. After it the College of Fetiales, or Heralds at Arms; who judged of international law, and all the religious formalities of treaties and war. The Haruspices (or Inspectors of Victims) were Græco-Etruscan, not Sabine or Latin; and, though sometimes consulted, had no public establishment. The Salii, or priests of Mars, had two colleges.

All religious officers were chosen for life. None of them had any political power whatever, but they had high social distinction. They could hold civil and military office also, if the duties did not clash. Celibacy of priests was unknown, but the priestesses of Vesta were nuns. The cruelty of burying them alive for reputed unchastity (generally after some public calamity) was practised in ancient, and has been imitated by modern Rome. Vacancies were generally filled in the colleges, just as in our Universities, by what was called *coöptation;* that is, the surviving members of the college elected into the vacancy. But the augurs for a century back had already been elected by the people at large.

Also the Chief Pontiff afterwards, by a law passed when CICERO was a child, was elected, not strictly by the "people," but by a *minority* of the Centuries, the *majority* not voting. This was a subtle device, comparable to our *Conge d' élire,* or permission granted by the Crown to elect a certain person Bishop. In each case the object was, to effect a political election, and yet evade religious scruples.

It is high time for me to speak more particularly of the SENATE. I have called it, the ancient king's Privy Council. The king laid before it what he pleased, asked each senator to speak in turn, and expected him to speak only to the purpose of the question. The Consul, representing the King, retained this right, even when he was confessedly the Senate's spokesman to the people. He convened the Senate on the rightful days, and on any emergency at his own discretion:

and he could impose severe, almost unlimited fines, on a Senator who absented himself.

The power vested in the senator imposed a duty of attendance. This is a striking diversity from our Parliament. A senator who desired to travel, accomplished it in later times by the fiction of a *free embassy*, granted to him by the Senate at the request of the consul. It made him an ambassador, without stating to whom he was sent.

Though the consul was the actual President, there was also in social estimate one private senator who bore the title chief or Princeps; and from this has been derived the title *Prince* to all Europe. Indeed all senators who had held eminent offices with distinction were called Chiefs, *Principes;* but one of these was placed by the censors, for honorary distinction, first in the roll. This gave him a great moral power, like to that of the leader of a party in our Parliament; but he was not the head of a party: he was head of the whole senate. AUGUSTUS CÆSAR coveted for himself exclusively, and kept, this title, Chief of the Senate, Prince; but the title Consul he shared with others: thus Prince assumed the regal idea.

The Senate, I have said, had not the formal duty of originating business, and did but speak and vote on that which was laid before it. Nevertheless its moral influence was great with nearly every consul; or, if one consul was restive, the other generally became more than ever complaisant. In the earliest days of the republic, before the authority of the Senate was consolidated, and while the consuls appeared little less than kings, the Senate took a very strong measure to enforce its authority, and succeeded in establishing a precedent of vital importance. It passed a decree that a Dictator must be named, and who the Dictator must be, and commanded one of the consuls to name him. The Dictator held power for six months only, but was superior to both consuls, and could either use them as his subordinates or condem them to inaction. He was followed by 24 axes, to

denote his double power. What would have happened, in early days, if both consuls had steadily refused to name the dictator, we do not know; nor how the decree of the Senate could have been passed. We know cases, in which the consul yielded sorely against his will. In the later civil war, it was ruled by CAIUS CÆSAR that a prætor (having, as the Consul, the *greater auspices*) was able to name him Dictator. By seizing the right of appointing a Dictator, the Senate was able on critical occasions to correct an erroneous judgment of the people,—if the consuls of the year were untrustworthy as generals,—and it also won a powerful tool for supporting aristocracy against popular votes. On the contrary, at a time when the senate was yielding to popular rights and the consuls behaved wilfully, the tribunes of the plebs rallied to the Senate's support. On one remarkable occasion the tribunes threatened to imprison the consuls, if they opposed the Senate's will; and by the threat, which at the moment was acceptable to the Senate, permanently raised their own importance.

With such forces in reserve, the Senate kept the reins of government in its own hands. All the men who in past years had held high offices in the State with distinction and success were sure to be in the Senate; which in this respect is like our modern English Privy Council: but what is very unlike, they all attended the meetings. Their collective weight with the people was overwhelming. No one breathed the idea, that the taxes ought to be voted by the people, and not by the Senate. Custom established for private senators the privilege of occasionally overstepping the question put to them by the consul, and saying (in the public interest) whatever they pleased. If the Senate at large applauded, the consul generally gave way. In fact every prudent man saw the necessity of empowering the Senate to superintend the entire republic. Officers who changed every year could not do it. The consuls or the censors were often opposed in opinion, sometimes were privately at vari-

ance. The Senate had to set the policy of the empire, and, having set it, to force the officers to execute it. Thus the State always acted as *a whole*, and not by alternate parties, as Whigs and Tories. Hence great steadiness, but also too great obstinacy.

In a military emergency (B C. 324) the Senate negociated with the tribunes to get the people to vote that the outgoing consul should retain his command in the next year: hence the title *proconsul*. This was intended quite patriotically, simply in the public service: but in the result, it gave a great increase of power to the Senate,—more and more, as wars became greater and more lasting; and perhaps aided peculiarly in turning the constitution back to aristocracy, and sustaining the policy of ever renewed war.

At first, the Senate voted only on occasion what consul or prætor should be continued in his command during a war. Afterwards it became a custom in peace that every consul or prætor should have the option of proceeding to a province as governor after his year of office in Rome: but the Senate still retained the right of directing to which province each officer should be sent. To hinder it from punishing popular consuls by appointing them to insignificant provinces, CAIUS GRACCHUS carried a law that the consular provinces should be fixed more than eighteen months earlier, before it was known who would be elected consuls. But the Senate, even then, had to enact the magnitude of the army for the province, the number of lieutenants, if a war was apprehended, and all the salaries. This immense patronage made it impossible for an ambitious officer so to court the people, as to be indifferent to the good will of the Senate.

In England it is assumed that no Parliament can set the policy and expect the ministers to obey. We are told that it is impossible: that a Parliament is incompetent for it, and it would be too humiliating to ministers. But the Senate of Rome did it, for three or four centuries, and the proud con-

suls of Rome had to submit. But perhaps we do not elect Senators as ably as the Censors did? Well: there is something in that; but not everything. For, in fact, HANNIBAL subverted the senatorial election also. In the battle of Cannæ he slew so many senators, that the remnant created a dictator to fill up the empty benches: and this dictator, QUINTUS FABIUS BUTEO, to lessen his responsibility, followed a method of routine, putting into the senate all who had either borne offices or earned trophies in war, until he had got enough. Thenceforward the censors seem to have interpreted their oath by the practice of this dictator. War never-ending exterminated the real citizens; masses of freedmen and foreigners, dependents on the aristocracy, took their place. Popular elections, at least as little judicial as English elections, raised men to high offices, and hereby into the Senate. Nevertheless, even so, the Senate showed its power to dictate the policy of a great empire and control the public servants, as long as any wisdom could avail against armed and unscrupulous ambition.

Every high magistrate, from censor to quæstor, had a right to attend the senate, and, if they were in Rome, did ordinarily attend it. Each spoke without being asked, whenever he had official information to give; but no magistrate voted in the senate, nor was asked to speak in any routine. But the private senators had become distributed into Orders, differing only in dignity as our dukes, marquises, earls, &c. They were called Censorii, Consulares, Praetorii, Ædilicii, Tribunicii, Quaestorii, according to the high offices which they had held: and the consul presiding asked the opinion of every person in each Order separately, generally taking the Chief of the Senate or consuls elect first, and then each Order in its turn, from highest to lowest. Every one down to the Quaestorii, had a right to speak; thus a debate might be prolonged several days: but no proceedings could go on after sunset,—another remarkable contrast to the British Parlia-

ment. A few persons who had not borne office were generally put into the Senate by the censors. These voted on a division, but did not speak; and were called Pedarii.

The policy of the Senate was what one might expect from an assembly of old military officers. It was prompt, energetic, imperious, unrelenting, tenacious: often very rash, as it was harsh, with much military and little civil foresight. It looked to immediate, not to ultimate results; but on the whole it expressed the highest wisdom of Rome.

In the second Punic war it is difficult to say that the Senate showed military wisdom. When HANNIBAL entered Italy with only 20,000 men, they dispersed their forces into Spain, Sicily and Greece, and left him for 17 years master of the field. It suggests to me a sphinx moth, which persists in killing and eating up smaller insects, while an anatomist is cutting out his stomach. So the Senate tenaciously clutched at Sicily, Spain and Sardinia, which were to be the prizes of war, while HANNIBAL was devouring their entrails. The Senate could not know, that the Italians would not seize their opportunity. Had they armed against Rome with half the resolution which they showed 125 years later, the empire must have been overwhelmed. But as the Spaniards disliked to be aided by Lord Wellington, so the Italians were averse to the military lead of HANNIBAL, and rather tolerated than actively helped him. Hereby it is clear, that in no case could Carthage, though victorious against Rome, have become mistress of Italy.

I have pretty fully exhibited the *legislative* and *executive* organs of this great and peculiar Republic. To expound the *judicial* organs, a history and perhaps a lawyer's knowledge is needed, so great and so continuous were the changes. I have spoken of the Prætor as a judge; but he was not a professional lawyer, trained like an English judge. Prætors were annual officers, looking to military promotion. Nevertheless, Law was to Romans both literature and science. Every Patron habitually gave legal advice to all his Clients, (that is, to his sworn dependents,) and opened his doors at sunrise to admit

them. The whole political education of every young Roman of high family was in Law; hence all Roman officers are likely to have had great tact in these duties. In modern Europe Hungary best represents ancient Rome as to this matter.

But only in the provinces was the prætor an arbitrary judge. In Rome the jury system was native, just as in Athens. According to the original idea, the assembly of the people was the great jury. An injured man used to utter the cry, "I appeal to the people," while he certainly had no power himself to summon the people. The tribune of the plebs, when he rescued a plebeian from the severities of the Executive, might sometimes obtain for him a hearing from the people; but such a case must obviously have been quite exceptional. Oftener, the College of Tribunes would assume to judge his case: there were also in very early days boards of judges, called Duumviri, Tresviri, Decemviri, Quindecimviri; that is, boards of 2, of 3, of 10, of 15. Important cases, official, or Italian, were heard judicially by the Senate. In the days of CICERO a wonderful trial took place, by a process long obsolete, in which TITUS LABIENUS, tribune of the plebs, accused before the assembly of the Centuries a harmless old gentleman, for treason said to have been committed 37 years earlier. I cannot here go into details. I allude to the case only as certain proof that the assembly was originally capable of acting as a high court of justice: so POLYBIUS testifies, but perhaps with an eye to official misbehaviour. But in the later republic a large roll of citizens was formed (according to methods and rules frequently changed) out of which select juries might be taken by the Prætor for important trials. Summary jurisdiction prevailed for all smaller matters, and magistrates assumed powers of the haughtiest military kind. I have already named the judicial power of the Ædiles, especially over those who were not citizens.

Finally, I ought to remark on the social strength of the aristocratic principle, rising out of original clanship. The Sabines who founded Roman institutions were in several

things like to Scotch Highlanders, and their *gentes* (which we translate clans and houses) were like the Highland *septs*. The members of a Roman clan were of old known at once by their costume, whether by the peculiar plaid or the way of wearing it, or by the dressing of the hair. As a single name (Campbell or Ker or Gordon, &c.) was given to every member of a Scotch clan, so at Rome the name Fabius, Æmilius, Sergius, &c. Noble Romans ordinarily had three names, as PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO. The first is the personal, which we call the christian name, as PUBLIUS. The second CORNELIUS, is the name of the clan. The third, SCIPIO, is the name of the family. The clan often contained many families. Greeks, Hebrews, Carthaginians had but one name each, as THEMISTOCLES, DAVID, HANNIBAL: the Romans always had at least two names of which the second was hereditary. Out of this arose *surnames* to nearly all Europe. Certainly Germans, Gauls, Spaniards, Britons, Hungarians, borrowed the practice from Rome. Whether the Scotch Highlanders had it all along, I would gladly know: I suppose they had. These surnames had great moral weight in Rome. From the head of the house of FABIUS, of VALERIUS, of CLAUDIUS, a special hereditary policy was expected; and similarly among plebeians from a DUILIUS or a LICINIUS. Thus devotion and party feeling became hereditary. Policy was in general continuous, and developed itself by a sort of law. Royalty having vanished, the sentiment of client to patron became similar to European loyalty; I mean, loyalty of lieges towards a royal dynasty. But it must be added, that to enter clientship was voluntary, being undertaken by a definite mutual oath. The vote of the client in the assembly was given as the patron pleased, it being a sacred duty of the client to promote the political greatness of the patron. As *patron* means "great father," I conjecture that *client* meant "son." In fact *clan* means *son* in Etruscan, as is now conceded. Irish *clann* (offspring) is perhaps the same word, and Welsh *plant*. If the sons of a client, desiring to vote freely, refused to take up clientship, it was likely to cause a feud

against them in the family of the patron. In this way great bitterness arose in the early republic between the mass of the rustic tribes and the heads of tribes or of great families. But those days were past. The orders of the Roman State were no longer reckoned as Patricians and Plebeians, but as Senators and People. *Senatus Populusque* was the formula for the whole State: and the Senate was not hereditary, but was perpetually produced out of the People, by the act of the People. In the central and best period of the republic, while Aristocracy was really elective and meritorious poor men rose into high office so often that no one swelled with pride against them, Democracy was much more than a name. Nevertheless, alike earlier and later, Aristocracy stood not on merit, nor on popularity, but on family influence, and is the truest title of this complicated Roman polity.

END OF SIXTH LECTURE.

SEVENTH LECTURE.

On the Roman Empire.

The fourth lecture of this series treated of certain ancient monarchical empires. In Western Asia, we count in long array Assyrian, Chaldean, and Median, Persian, Macedonian; then, Parthian and Persian again, with Græco-Roman; afterwards Arabian, Seljuk, Ottoman. Over Europe only one great empire has been established,—that of Rome. Her sway did not include Germany, Poland and Russia; indeed forest, swamp or the roaming habits of the thin population forbade, nor did the inhabitants exist as nations in the estimate of the civilized peoples. To them Rome seemed to be mistress of the world, when eastward she reached to the Euphrates and Armenia, northward to the Danube and Rhine; while southward she had conquered the entire north coast of Africa and was arrested by desarts or mountains only.

This great power could not fall by the attack of mere barbarians from Russia and Germany, until it had been long wasted from within by misgovernment and civil war. Its earliest mischief was irremediable. The conquest everywhere was fatal to small freeholds, as well as to political independence; it multiplied vast domains, aggrandized capitalists and slavery; disarmed whole nations, and forced them to rely for their protection against highway robbers on the trained armies of the distant foreigner. The wise administration of seven laborious emperors, Augustus Cæsar, Tiberius Cæsar, Vespasian, Trajan and his three successors, spread

over two centuries, could do no more than palliate the cardinal vices of the social state. During the consecutive reigns of the four great chiefs, TRAJAN, HADRIAN and the two ANTONINES,—a period of about eighty years,—the empire was perpetually growing weaker. TACITUS, in TRAJAN'S reign, already discerned it; [urgentibus imperii fatis.—De Germaniâ, *ch.* 33.] hence the bitter gloom which overspreads his snarling pages.

Even under the republic the citizens of Rome were not quite equal. After the superiority of Patricians over Plebeians had become little more than a shadow, there remained the distinction between Romans and Latins. Thirty Colonies had been founded by Rome in various parts of Italy, to which was given a half franchise, entitled *the Latin Rights.* They were named the Latin Colonies, after all Latium had been thoroughly incorporated with Rome. These Latins had full freedom (as then understood) each in his own colony, and freeholds in the soil; but no right of voting in the Roman assemblies, nor of holding Roman dignities. Nevertheless, any Latin who obtained high office in his own colony, thereby became a full Roman citizen, and was eligible to Roman office and the Roman Senate. This effectually cemented the colonies with Rome. It is just as though in America all members of the several States were admissible to Congress and the Cabinet, on the single condition of having first borne high office in his own State. The Latin Colonies were always centered in a town strongly fortified, and by their never failing loyalty saved Rome in her worst struggles. They also spread the imperial language over Italy, so that Umbrian, Oscan, Etruscan and Greek finally disappeared. Rome likewise excelled in her vast military roads, which with military colonies, colonial fortresses, systematic improvement of weapons, and the hereditary pride of her armies, chiefly assured her permanent military superiority. After every war, territory was seized: on part a military colony was planted, the rest was made Roman domain, and sooner or

later became the possession of some Roman aristocrat. Every war enriched the Roman generals, captains and a few of the luckier soldiers: all taxation of provincials enriched the Roman farmers of taxes, of whom I must presently speak: all new government works, such as roads and fortifications, enriched contractors and employed a host of underlings. Thus avarice drove Rome on to an endless series of wars, as causeless and as pernicious as those of any Asiatic invaders. When the word Empire first arose, we do not know; but word and thing had their origin in high antiquity. The word was needed by king ANCUS MARCIUS, when he conquered Latin towns and held them in subjection.

Empire, in Latin *Imperium*, was the military word for *command*, and in civil life gave the same offensive idea as *command* and **dictate* in English. Between citizens, in civil life, no Empire could exist. But a conquered people, unless admitted into citizenship, were "under Empire," subject to command. For a little while the Latins were under the empire of the Roman republic; so afterwards many Etruscans and other Italians. The word Emperor *(imperator)* simply meant the Roman *commander*. AUGUSTUS CÆSAR, to avoid the title king, while engrossing all the powers of despotism, called himself Prince *(chief)* of the Senate, Emperor *(commander)* of the army, and Tribune of the plebs or common people.

Even before the Roman power had gone beyond the narrowest line of Roman territory, Empire may be said to have existed over men who lived on that small area, and were not citizens. I must describe their condition under the republic in its prime.

Below the Romans and Latins, on the area governed by Rome, were resident foreigners, freedmen, and slaves. Foreigners were treated in Rome probably as well as in most

* I think that Impero must be literally = Greek ἐπιτάσσω, and *Paro* have for its primitive sense Range, Arrange.

ancient States, and slaves not worse, under like circumstances. Freedmen were often brought into citizenship by favour of their patrons, that is, of their late masters: but in general they and their descendants constituted a large body, called *libertini*. They were petty shopkeepers and clerks and jobbers; pecuniarily as well off as similar classes in English towns. They had little chance of legal redress, if personally outraged by a Roman of good family. Against poorer citizens they probably defended themselves by numbers and by natural weapons, without aid from the law. On the whole the *Empire* of Rome cannot have pressed much on any of these men. They were exempt from conscription for the army, which was really an immense boon. To us they may appear better off than the rustic Romans. It is true, they were wholly without political significance; but so are our women. The Roman peasants paid dearly for such political consequence as they possessed. So do the Ottomans, as compared to Christians, under the Turkish Empire.

Taxation may have pressed hard on the foreigners and freedmen in those times in which the Roman peasants (the warrior-caste of Rome) were terribly distressed by the enemy. But, soon after the Punic wars, all war-taxes on Romans came to an end, and the enormous burden of warlike expense was cast chiefly on the provinces beyond Italy. Conscription for the army lay very heavy on the Italians, who were the first to feel the severity of Roman Empire, and indeed were largely dispossessed of land for the aggrandizement of the conquering State. But nothing so uniformly harassed and ground down the provinces beyond Italy under the republican empire, as the execrable system of taxation, which may be sketched in few words.

The Senate ordinarily passed some general decree concerning the sum to be raised for the public service, and left to the governor sent from Rome to assess it and digest the details, or, in an entirely new province, this might be done by ten special commissioners at the first settlement. When

it had been guessed how much the taxes of a province would yield, the conquerors, too busy to organize a civil government, sold them in public auction to a voluntary company of contractors in Rome, who engaged to "work the revenues" (exercere vectigalia) themselves. The contractors were called *publicani*, and in the magnitude of the sums which they advanced to the government are comparable to our ROTHSCHILDS and BARINGS. They sold in shares to others: thus a vastly diffused interest arose, which became an Order in the State, between Senate and People, and a great political power. This moneyed Order was called the Knights, because rich men in old Rome were used to serve in the cavalry, sometimes with their own horses.

The contracting companies organized a large staff of under-officers, as tax-collectors, surveyors and police, who were almost irresponsible. A governor who interfered against them was treated by the companies as robbing them of their legitimate dues. Of course they had to collect, not the exact sum which had been paid to the government, but the same increased by the expenses of collecting and by the interest on the capital; and the contractors were in a position to dictate what interest was proper. All interest at Rome was normally high, in part because it was theoretically illegal. When Romans lent money in the provinces, the Senate in vain tried to keep the interest down to twelve per cent. per annum. This was treated as a legal minimum. The contractors sometimes got military forces from the governor to aid in collecting the revenue, and committed wanton cruelties, (to strike terror, it may be supposed;) but in general their own police sufficed to terrify. The only limit to extortion was found in the competition to be expected from another company, if the gains in any province were reported to be excessive. Thus the Roman government virtually sold the conquered people into the hands of irresponsible capitalists, to be fleeced at their discretion. This was the ordinary state of repose and ease.

But if a neighbouring war was to be carried on, extraordinary demands were made. The cultivators were expected to contribute largely in farm-produce, labouring cattle or war-horses. Peasants and stout men were pressed into service to aid the necessities of the camp. Large sums of money were required of the towns, to be paid down at a near date: and if ready cash was not to be had, a Roman money-lender was sure to be at hand offering to advance it,—of course on his own terms. The unfortunate town could not plead inability, when it had only to borrow at 20 or 30 per cent: thus many flourishing towns were mortgaged under military compulsion. However great the severities, no Roman governor was likely to be punished at Rome, but rather to be secretly thanked if his sincere object had been to assure Roman victory. Of this we may be sure by the tone in which CICERO defended FONTEIUS, precisely in such a case; nor can Englishmen wonder at this, who know how the accusation on WARREN HASTINGS failed, and how boldly CLIVE defended himself in the House of Lords.—It must be added, that in every war, the neighbouring *free* and *independent* cities and kings, who had treaties of peace and friendship with Rome, were expected to furnish supplies of war, under the name of free gifts, nearly as if they had been subjects: and to refuse would have been dangerous. It may remind us of the large contributions to our Punjaub and Afghan wars from our good friend the king of Oude; which he probably gave less from good will than from fear.

The Roman governors under the republic were ordinarily appointed for one year, which was often extended to three. POMPEY the Great first, I believe, held a province for five years; LUCULLUS had been quæstor in Asia much longer. The Senate voted to the governor all his appointments of money and men; and though the allowance to the governor himself was sure to be liberal, the very princely state which these great officers assumed was liable to outrun it, unless they economized at the expense of the provinces. Every

Roman commander, on progress through any province, expected free quarters and free travelling for himself and his train; these were provided extempore in military fashion: and since they avoided the sea whenever they could, and rather went round by land, as from Italy to Greece or Spain or Thrace, the movement of high officers to and fro was in itself a great oppression. Just so, in India, every British officer on march is a pest to the country and to the crops in proportion to his pretensions, that is, to the size of his escorting force. The short term of command increased that evil, and inflicted many others worse. A governor who held power for one year was a heavy loser (as CICERO found in Cilicia) if he restrained the liberties of his suite and pacified them by his own generosity. Most governors expected to return enriched; but to get rich in one year was impossible to the honest and scrupulous. Their despotic power enabled them to make any kind of grant, such as we call jobs and monopolies, provided they did not interfere with the tax-contractors; and their function as arbitrary judges opened still more offensive sources of gain. CAIUS CÆSAR went to Spain as prætor overwhelmed with debt; (our writers estimate it at two millions sterling;) and after one year returned free from debt and very rich: yet Spain was then esteemed a poor country.—He did but follow the example of hundreds before him. No one censured him, nor was his honour at all dimmed. On the contrary his dignity rose with his increased wealth, and he brought back the reputation of a good administrator.

TIBERIUS CÆSAR, after the overthrow of the republic, watched every provincial governor carefully, and continued in command every one whose rule was steady, moderate and unostentatious. Such conduct appeared to the historian TACITUS strange and censurable. He tells us that some imputed it to spite against the Roman aristocracy, to whom the Emperor grudged the honour of being governors, thinking that the fewer had it, the better; others said, he had the infirmity of distrusting his own judgment of men; which

went so far, that he sometimes even named them for the provinces, and after all, would not let them go: hence, when he had once found men that were trustworthy, it was more comfortable to him to make no change.—That is probable enough; but it was more comfortable, not to the Emperor only, but to the provinces also; a thing which the philosophic TACITUS had full capacity to understand, if intense prejudices had not blinded him.

On the whole, the system of robbery established by the Roman republic seems as rude and as ruinous as any thing from a Persian or Assyrian invader. It damaged every part of Italy in proportion to the length of time which it continued. All the oldest possessions were worst in desolation. The neighbourhood of Rome itself was made a wilderness, where the highwayman was feared up to the very walls. Sicily, the oldest province, was that which had suffered most cruelly. Each new conquest in turn becomes a temporary strength to the empire, when the older ones decay.

The power of centralizing armies gave to the imperial system strength against any single nation from without, and made it seem destined for Chinese permanence. How intense was the suffering of the Greek cities under it, is awfully attested by the deed with which the Mithridatic war commenced. In one day, in all the cities of Asia, all Romans were massacred,—women and children, civilians and military, without discrimination. Eighty thousand are said to have perished. Now the Greeks of that day were not a cruel, passionate or vindictive people. They were long accustomed to be domineered over by Macedonians, Persians or Lydians, and had never done anything of the kind before. They were a garrulous people, who could not easily keep a great secret. They were at that time without any well defined patriotism, and at all times had furnished men in plenty willing to take bribes from an enemy. Yet on this occasion they must have been sternly secret, incorruptible, and unrelentingly fierce. It gives a frightful notion of the universal misery which Roman

conquest inflicted. Perhaps the lesson to Rome was not wholly useless; but CICERO, speaking to the public assembly in Rome 23 years later, declares that Roman armies are more dreaded in the peaceable towns of Roman allies than the armies of an enemy.

After Aristocracy in Rome was trodden under the heel of a crafty and daring general, who pretended to take up arms in defence of the sacred tribunicial rights and for the Roman constitution; the provinces, though shaken anew by civil war, on and off, for 20 years, soon gained very sensible relief. Whatever could be done by sagacious administration, would have been done by AUGUSTUS CÆSAR, if he could have given up the inveterate lust of fresh dominion. He has the reputation even from GIBBON, of arresting encroachment; yet he added to the empire a very large area. He conquered and kept Western Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, Bavaria, Switzerland, the Pyrenees and all that remained independent in Spain or France up to the Ocean and the Rhine. He extended the frontier temporarily to the Elbe, but was driven back by the insurrection of ARMINIUS. He conquered Egypt and Nubia, and made an unsuccessful attempt on Arabia. It was not from moderation, but from military disaster, that he acquiesed in the Rhine as his frontier. He took measures for invading Britain, and was drawn off only by an insurrection in Spain. HORACE, in a well-known ode, anticipates that Britain and Persia will presently be added to the empire. Military operations on such a scale must have delayed the recovery of the provinces; yet AUGUSTUS took sincere pains to bridle the provincial governors, and husband the public resources. His successor TIBERIUS CÆSAR was entirely pacific, very economic, liberal to relieve every city distressed by calamity or unduly burdened, a keen watcher of every high official, resolute to enforce the law on high criminals, and wholly averse to all expensive pageantry. The principles established in these two reigns continued unchanged under their fatuous successors; whose madness checked, but could not destroy, the general

improvement. Nevertheless, when we read TACITUS'S panegyric on his father-in-law AGRICOLA, it might seem as if the worst practices of the republic remained in vigour under most governors, AGRICOLA being a splendid exception. The historian's elliptical language implies the proceedings to be notorious; moreover the expositors regard them as alluding to the charges of CICERO against the infamous VERRES. "The provincials (says TACITUS) in mockery are ordered to lock their barns and sit outside, to buy corn and then sell it at an assigned price. Out-of-the-way roads and distant places are announced to which they are to carry it, merely for the gain of a few persons." "Such things (he adds) are felt to be harder than the tribute itself." According to the eminently learned SISMONDI, the great country of Gaul, which at first added vastly to the resources of Rome, and by its numerous opulent cities made a prodigious display of grandeur, was so far from real prosperity under the imperial institutions, that her cultivators were miserably pauperized, and became a nation of abject serfs. The language put by TACITUS into the mouth of CALGACUS, implies that the historian knew the Britons to feel the Roman yoke intolerable; for the complaints are not the common-places of conquered men, but ugly and formidable specific charges.

It may be proper to give some details of the military system by which this vast empire was conquered and kept.—Every Roman citizen, under the republic, was liable to serve 20 years in the infantry or 10 years in the cavalry. The young aristocrats served in the cavalry from the age of 18 to 28, and then might be elected Quæstors (finance-ministers,) commencing a civil career. While in the army, they tried to obtain the high post of *military tribune*, (which with us may be rendered Major or Colonel,) in earlier days by favour of the consul, afterwards by election of the people. The infantry was taken almost entirely from those rustics, who were not wholly without property. Such as were too poor to pay income-tax might serve in the navy, but never in the army, before MARIUS.

They were entitled, *capite censi*, "those registered by the head." The conscription was severe in the extreme, and at length dispeopled Italy of freemen. The consul's serjeant picked out at pleasure every strong rustic,—a freeholder, or son of a freeholder; it does not appear that each district had to bear its own percentage. But so long as the army was a ladder by which any poor man might climb to eminence, the conscription was borne cheerfully; the prizes were remembered more than the blanks. Of course aristocratic merit was earlier and more surely rewarded.

Every year a new army (two legions) was raised for each consul. This implied that every levy was but for a year. Nevertheless, the men often reënlisted, and when wars proved obstinate, the levies were kept on for two or three years at least, and at length for much longer time. The consuls also were continued in command, with the title pro-consul, after their year of office was expired. In the later republic this went so far, that it was very rare for a consul to take the field at all, until his proper year was ended.

Originally the Romans had the Sabine arms and mode of fighting, with oblong shield, and perhaps a huge Highland broadsword. The Tarquins brought in the Greek arms and mode of fighting in the close battalion called *phalanx*, with spear and round shield. Afterwards the Samnite arms were adopted, and the oblong shield once more prevailed, with sword and javelin; but in the arrangement called the *legion*, the line of troops stood wide apart, which became characteristic of Rome. The javelin needed immense practice and great strength of arm to throw it with effect. Its use reminds one of Homeric battles. The sword finally accepted was that of Spain,—short, broad, two-edged and pointed, in all which respects it resembled an American *bowie-knife*, or that of the Goorkhas in Northern India. They thrust with it, foot to foot, under the enemy's shield, and it cut through a man's ribs. No wounds more appalled an enemy. The soldiers stood near six feet apart, so that an army drawn up for battle covered

a great space. This gave it a critical superiority over the phalanx. Only a very superior force could out-flank it. Random arrows did not so easily hit the men. It could venture without disorder on to rough ground which would have been ruinous to the phalanx. Each man acted for himself, and his bravery was seen by others. Against Cavalry the legion had no such protection as the phalanx; yet the legionary soldier was formidable by his javelin and had room for evading the horse. The elephants of HANNIBAL at Zama actually went through the Roman army and came out behind without damaging it; which gives a strange view of the legion's flexibility. Nevertheless, cavalry armed with arrows were peculiarly dreaded by the legion. The discipline was more than severe: it was cruel: and to this the Romans seem to have been reconciled, as necessary to victory. Lastly, they were used every night to fortify a camp with ditch and stakes, so as to sleep within a real fortress. Having no artillery to fear, which in modern times would expose close ranks by night to fatal attack, they encamped within the narrowest possible space, to economize circumvallation. But everything was orderly. Every soldier knew how to find his own place or his general's in the camp, every street and every gate. Not even in Spartan warfare was routine more systematic; but in Sparta individual genius was paralysed and progress arrested. The general at least was in Rome free from trammels; and the soldier had abundant opportunity of showing personal enterprize, which was sure to be rewarded. Nevertheless, while consuls were elected by favour of the people, under family influence, frequent incompetence in the general was certain, and many disasters were caused by it.

But the Roman armies were by no means made up of Roman citizens only. The *allies* fully doubled their number. By allies were at first meant all who had Latin citizenship; next, the word was applied to foreign Italians. With the growth of the empire it became necessary to go beyond Italy for troops. In the great war against the Italian allies, B.C. 90,

the Senate took Gauls and Numidians into its armies. Soon after, there was no nation from which Rome did not borrow soldiers. At first, mere barbarians might be accepted as auxiliaries, fighting in their own way under native commanders; but ere long, many of them were proud to be armed and trained in Roman fashion. The prevailing policy was the obvious one of transferring the troops of each country to fight in another, so as to leave each in turn defenceless.

The Roman cavalry was always inferior. Against HANNIBAL they were in great difficulty in this respect, until SCIPIO seduced MASINISSA to come over with his Numidian horse. The Gallic cavalry was afterwards a great accession to Rome. But at no time did the Romans know how to use this force very effectually. Some of their worst defeats, from HANNIBAL and the Parthians, were by cavalry attack: by the horse of JUGURTHA METELLUS was all but overwhelmed: CAIUS CURIO, lieutenant of CÆSAR, perished by Numidian cavalry. But while they kept away from the regions of great plains and uninhabited steppes, while they were in hilly or enclosed country, their infantry was on the whole very self-sufficing.

So long as republican Rome was an encroaching and paramount power, but not yet conscious of irresistible strength, her process of conquest was cautious. She did not after her first successes assume direct administration, but waited until a new generation grew up, which had never known independence, and looked up to Rome as the head of the world. When the sentiment of freedom has sufficiently died out, the country is declared *a Roman province;* all natives are expelled from high office, and men from Rome occupy the judgment-seat, the civil executive, and the royal palaces, displaying their troops and the terrible axes in the streets. These steps of conquest were adopted in so many cases, that it cannot have been accidental. They must have conduced in the highest degree to the stability of the empire.

The similarity of the British proceedings in India to this Roman caution is very striking. We cannot have imitated consciously, but like circumstances suggested like conduct. It is the more wonderful that in the matter of *adopting citizens* we never followed Roman precedent; for the Roman practice in this respect is explained to our schoolboys, in commenting on the fact that PAUL of Tarsus was a Roman citizen.—The Romans, in conquering any State, were wisely solicitous to secure within it powerful partizans. They inquired, whether during the war there had been in it any party favourable to them; whether any individuals had earned odium as partizans of Rome, or had done kindnesses to Roman citizens in danger or to Roman prisoners. For such merits they bestowed on individuals the honour of Roman citizenship, generally as a result of commendatory letters from the Roman general. I say, it is wonderful that the East India Company has not upon prudential policy, on deliberate principle, independently of the Parliamentary Charter, admitted into high office native Christians, Parsees, and our most eminent friends from other religions. To make at least *a part* of the conquered people absolutely equal to the conquerors, is the obvious dictate of common prudence; is a mere translation of the maxim, *Divide et impera.* But we have preferred to set up since 1833 a specious promise of equality, which in practice the Hindoos find to be words and wind.

By the splendour of any great empire men's minds are apt to be dazzled; for it concentrates in the court, in public works, or in the army, the spare energies of millions. Nor is it to be denied or doubted, that under the CÆSARS many great nations, freed from war on the soil, had large physical prosperity. Perhaps no country owed so much to Rome as Africa. How much of it was already done by Carthage, and how much more she would have done, had Rome allowed her, we cannot say; but as a fact, Africa was never, before or since,

so prosperous and so populous. Perhaps under French rule Algeria may recover her Roman greatness; but not in our lifetime. In Spain, Gaul, Britain and other parts of Europe, a more rapid development of industry took place, than would have happened without Roman rule; but it was at bottom like the prosperity of a slave-plantation. TACITUS himself felt it profoundly. This comes out, when he comments on the zeal of the young Britons for Roman literature, Roman dress and habits,—which AGRICOLA encouraged. "Such things (says the historian) the silly people termed civilization *(humanitas)*, when it was really a part of slavery."

In fact, under Roman empire, the elements of reading and writing were of necessity widely spread, and public schools were very active in Italy; for, the Roman government even from its infancy, under the old kings, was eminently addicted to registration, and needed such a number of clerks as would have amazed an Athenian. Rich men were numerous, with abundant leisure,—men of nations not deficient in capacity,—and far more than our classical literature was open to them. Yet after the empire under AUGUSTUS becomes a fixed necessity, taste rapidly declines, three or four writers alone in all the following ages can be said to show originality, much less genius: puerility and bad taste abound, nor could even art be saved from declining. When we see all the same phenomena in Greece after ALEXANDER the Great, it is impossible to doubt that they resulted in each case from the necessity of submission to an overwhelming central despotism. It may be added, that in modern Spain the phenomenon has recurred. Great genius was shown by Spaniards while the influence of free institutions lasted: but after PHILIP II. their energy was spent.—In the Roman empire physical prosperity (such as it was) could not endure, unless guarded against wolfish governors, central tyranny, and barbarian invaders by strong arms and stout hearts. But the mass of the people were debarred from military exercise and weapons: their spirit

was broken to the Roman yoke. If a German horde overran them, they had to cry out to "the government" for aid, and were quite helpless, if the army of occupation (for such it was) had marched off for some civil war. The first thing absolutely needed for the permanent welfare of every country was, that it should have some force in its own hand, some clear concession of right to resist injustice,—with spirit and skill to use its weapons, legal and material. But resistance to authority, however unjust, was precisely the thing which no Roman government, republican or monarchical, would ever endure. The frightful destruction of Fregellæ, a loyal Latin city, for a little high spirit, by the will and deed of the consul OPIMIUS,—for which he is praised by CICERO,—shows how cruel was the Roman jealousy of the least murmuring against authority. Therefore the empire could do nothing but emasculate the constituent nations, and at best fatten them in parks, at worst abandon them to butchery.

Let us suppose the problem to present itself to MARCUS ANTONINUS. "How to enable each province to resist the illegalities of its governor? or the tyranny of a mad CALIGULA, of a CLAUDIUS, who did whatever his freedmen or his wife bade him;—or finally, of a profligate NERO?" He would presently find that to make resistance successful, no province must be overawed by a foreign army in the hand of its governor; but each must have its defence in its own hands, by its own troops. Even an ANTONINUS would see nothing but insurrection and rebellion in such a remedy, and would account it worse than the disease. The great disease was military despotism: but that was the very essence of the Empire. What was MARCUS ANTONINUS himself? A good man, a philosopher, a pious man; but still in his own consciousness a military despot. Not his virtues, but the prætorian troops, made and kept him Emperor.

In the second century of the imperial monarchy, any resistance on the part of the new aristocracy in Rome to the

principle of an Emperor for life was unimaginable: likewise all desire of secession had vanished from the hearts of every great province. It was therefore undoubtedly *possible* for TRAJAN, HADRIAN and either ANTONINE, with perfect safety to concede by a series of edicts in the course of 20 years a real local freedom, coupled with enactments for gradual breaking up of slavery and of great estates, the evil of which PLINY had avowed. It was equally *possible* for them, without the slightest risk, to diminish the prætorians, until they should become a mere guard of honour; and to place the election of the Emperor's successor effectively in the hands of the Senate, after securing that the Senate itself should be filled by the representatives of every province. To have acted thus would have saved Europe the throes of 1,800 years' convulsion, bringing it to a point far in advance of our present attainment. But such wisdom, such eccentric genius, would have been all but miraculous. No example of a free empire could be pointed out. It was, no doubt, assumed to be an impossibility. Therefore, to unite Europe in a great federation is a problem still future.

AUGUSTUS CÆSAR first established that dangerous army, the prætorian troops, as his body-guard; but he did not allow them to see their own strength. They were kept carefully apart, and were dealt with in detail. Nevertheless, the Senate knew their numbers, and the hopelessness of resistance. They were largely foreigners, for some time Germans. They received double pay in idleness, having ordinarily no severer service than that of escorting the emperor to pleasant watering places. A donation was given to them by the will of AUGUSTUS, and they ever after expected it on the accession of a new prince. Thus from the very beginning, the monarchy stood on a foreign army, devoted not to the Senate, but to the family of the CÆSARS. This army in the back ground made every attempt on the part of AUGUSTUS or TIBERIUS to assume a legitimate and constitutional position seem to the aristocratic Romans a

gratuitous hypocrisy. No one then understood that at least it was a beneficial hypocrisy, tending in the long run to depress military rule and again exalt the Senate. Things were made worse, when SEJANUS persuaded TIBERIUS CÆSAR to bring the troops together into one camp. What were his arguments, we do not know; but none other seems possible, than that this display of force would terrify disaffected nobles, still (as he said) ready to conspire against the emperor. Undoubtedly they did inspire terror, and they caused the memory of TIBERIUS, most unjustly, to be hated tenfold beyond that of AUGUSTUS. Supported by this formidable army, CALIGULA, NERO and COMMODUS were able to play the madman. What modern does not see the hopelessness of an Empire permanently working well, with such a foundation?

But if an Empire which could be nothing but a military despotism could give no prosperity but what is material, degrading, hollow, and ending in fatal collapse; the thing that was to be wished for, was, that it should be arrested in the progress of conquest. If Carthage could have stood, Greece would also have stood, Egypt would have stood; the Italians would have received presently equal rights with Rome, as the only mode of winning their loyalty. A Republic of nations would have arisen around the Mediterranean. Between antagonist powers would have been stable equilibrium and secular progress, as now.

The analogies between the Roman Empire and the British Indian Empire may inspire anxious fears concerning our own future. Sir CHARLES METCALFE warns us that we also stand upon an army. But the differences are as great as the similarities: chiefly in this, that the conquerors of India are but a very small part of the British nation, and are responsible to its Parliament; while the nation has nothing to gain, for its pride, honour or lucre, by withholding from Indian peoples their rightful independence. Insurrection may wrest India from our grasp: but if it do not, the day will come, when the

people of the United Kingdom will insist that India shall be governed in the *interest* and for the *pride* of India, as the only course safe and honourable for England. No Roman decay will in any case follow to India from our empire, however grave our mistakes or our crimes; but a new life and a nobler future.

END OF SEVENTH LECTURE.

A DEFENCE OF CARTHAGE.

THAT which we call Ancient History, is but a fragment. None but civilized States can have a history: and even civilized States cannot transmit their history to later ages, when their literature perishes. In the basin of the ancient Mediterranean, we reckon among the civilized,—earlier than Greece and Rome,—principally the Egyptian, the Lydian, the Etruscan and the Phœnician races. Of these the oldest and most venerable was Egypt; but the mystery of its hieroglyphics was so cumbrous, that we cannot wonder at the entire loss of its literature. On the contrary, we must look on the loss of Lydo-Etruscan and Phœnician literature as a calamitous accident. The ancient Tyrians had native historians, whose works were known to the Jewish writer JOSEPHUS: Carthage also had native writings: but the Romans neglected all foreign literature except that of Greece, and the Greeks in general despised all foreign languages whatsoever. Thus we have information concerning Tyre and Carthage only through the accounts of their rivals and enemies. We hear something of their works and actions, but we never can listen to their sentiments and judgments; hence they are to us as statues or machines, rather than as men. Yet their deeds testify not only to their greatness, but in some respects also to their wisdom.

Perhaps even the youngest part of my hearers is aware, that nearly all nations of Europe are regarded by modern

scholars as having a deep-seated relation between their languages, which are entitled Indo-European or Indo-Germanic. In this group the ancient Greeks and Italians are both contained; and probably the Lydians and Etruscans. But on the other side the Tyrians and Carthaginians belong to a widely different stock, by German speculators named Shemitic, but among ourselves more recently Syro-Arabian, or, by a still more comprehensive term Hebræo-African. They are an offshoot of the great race which has peopled Babylonia, Assyria, Syria, Arabia, Abyssinia; but are more distantly related to the Egyptians and to the wide-spread nations of ancient Numidia and Mauritania. The Sidonians and Tyrians, whose language was a mere dialect of Hebrew, were the carriers of the ancient world. Like the Hollanders, they were pent up into a narrow territory, and by way of compensation they made the sea their possession. In the earliest times while Egypt possessed no foreign dependencies, the total want of ship timber seems to have disabled her from maritime voyages; so that in the Homeric age the Sidonians were unrivalled as traders. Carthage, a colony of Tyre, like our Australian or American colonies, had many advantages over the mother city. The colonists carried out with them all the experience, knowledge and skill acquired in long ages at home, and settled where land was abundant, and where no vested interests or vested abuses, could embarrass the progress of the young society. But Carthage was not the only nor the first Punic colony on that coast: she was only the most prosperous, and as such, the head of the African confederacy.

Tyre and Carthage, while they existed, were active civilizers of the world, and valuable friends to all who would accept their friendship. Yet they have not been happy enough to attract the sympathies of later times; partly, because their literature has perished, and partly because their art was principally industrial. The skill and enterprize of Carthage in Cyclopian building is acknowledged by the

Romans: but what we might say of English towns, was true of the Punic structures,—that no material and visible remains could survive their political greatness. Neither elegance of sculpture nor grandeur of temple-architecture, came forth out of Tyre and Carthage to impress the imagination and excite the interest of our modern ages: hence perhaps in some degree a harsher judgment of historians against them. Yet as regards the Syro-Phœnician people in general, if we may not dwell on so isolated a phenomenon as the gigantic temple-architecture of Baalbec, it ought not to be forgotten that the most intellectual of implements had its origin with them. All the Alphabets used by Christians and Mussulmans flow out of the Phœnician fountain. China and Egypt invented symbolic writing, but India, Babylonia and Phœnicia developed true Alphabets. Religion is that which chiefly stimulates grand and beautiful Art, but Commerce appears to be the true mother of prose literature.

The Phœnician cities on both continents, like those of Greece and Italy, were constitutional and free; governed originally by kings, but with public assemblies and sure laws. There was also this in common in the constitutional history of them all, that the royalty was first weakened and at last vanished; so that the later stage was a contest of aristocracy and democracy. But the Punic States, alike in Phœnicia and in Africa, equally with the Etruscan cities, in contrast with Greece and Italy, deserve honourable mention for their freedom from domestic wars. The bloody conflicts of Greek against Greek, and of Latin against Latin city, fill many a painful page of our histories. It must have arisen from deep-seated causes that so very opposite a picture meets us in the antagonistic races; and the mere statement of the fact shows that there was in the Punic populations either more wisdom and justice,—the parent of better organic connection; or some more powerful cement of their moral union. So much the more do we regret the loss of their literature and history.

The annals of Carthage overlap those of Greece and Rome, by her struggles for the island of Sicily, where the two nations met: indeed the history may be said to fall into three natural periods,—the Etruscan, from B.C. 878 to B.C. 480; the Syracusan, from B.C. 480 to B.C. 264; and the Roman, from B.C. 264 until Carthage was destroyed in B.C. 146. Accordingly, our information concerning this celebrated city is chiefly derived, either from the Sicilian DIODORUS, (who narrates the wars of Carthage against Syracuse,) or from the historians of Rome,—POLYBIUS, LIVY, APPIAN. We have no reason to suppose that any of them, or the authorities whom they followed, had access to Punic literature, understood the Punic tongue, or had seen the Punic people in their own homes, as friends and companions. The picture which they set before us is wholly external, and such as presents itself to an enemy's eye: in fact, it is credible, that a French dramatist draws of the English nation a picture as near to the truth, as a Sikeliot or a Roman drew concerning Carthage.

We must neither wonder, nor hastily believe, when we find current in antiquity vague aspersions against Carthage of *cruelty* and *faithlessness*. LIVY, who receives the doctrine of Punic faithlessness as orthodox and unquestionable, nevertheless furnishes us with facts which show Roman faithlessness in abundance, but nothing similar on the side of Carthage. In the pages of POLYBIUS the superior good faith of Carthage is still more prominent; nor (I believe) can any other result be made out from DIODORUS in the comparison of Carthaginian with Greek. Accordingly, most of the moderns acquit Carthage on this head; and we are perhaps pretty well agreed that "Punic *faith*" was as respectable as that of any historical nation of antiquity. Nevertheless, many of the moderns assail Carthage with great severity on *other* points, and in a manner which seems to me unknown to the ancients in general:—for the cruelties of her religion, the narrowmindedness of her monopolies, her violences to the subject population, her treacheries to her hired armies, her

ferocities in conquest, her rigour and stupid ruthlessness to unsuccessful generals, the silliness of her distribution of patronage and of her whole army-system. Even the fair-minded ARNOLD gives a general assent to these censures, and rejoices that HANNIBAL was conquered. MICHELET, who sees England in Carthage, reviles her with great gust.—I think therefore it is not amiss to spend a little time on a review of the moral position of Carthage in the ancient world. But first, I must dwell on the mere external picture,—as it presented itself in successive eras to Greeks and Romans.

ARISTOTLE saw the Punic power, as a remarkable cluster of United States, rooted first on the coast of Africa, but spreading perpetually into the interior by an admirable system of colonization; which drained off all the poverty of the towns to people the fertile country,—wildernesses where the indigenous barbarians were satisfied with a roaming life. He knew that the forces of the republic pressed hard upon the Greeks of Cyrene. He was aware that the internal constitution of the States, like all highly developed organisms, was complicated and peculiar. To him it appeared to deserve high praise for its balance between aristocracy and democracy. Royalty had already disappeared. The isocratic spirit of Commerce, with its newly risen wealth, as usual, undermined the power of the old noble families. So systematic was colonization, by sea and land, that the coast of Algiers was studded with Punic towns; exploring expeditions sailed to great distances, and some colonies were planted even on the Atlantic coasts of Morocco. How arduous is the undertaking to blend into one community a more civilized with a ruder and foreign people, the English nation is perpetually reminded among the Erse-talking population of Ireland, as well as in the colonies. That the native Africans should not often have felt the Punic rule oppressive, was impossible; and wars against the independent tribes were very frequent: nevertheless, towns and villages of mixed population arose, called by the Greeks *Liby-phœnicians*; and

in the next century these had been so effectually Punized, that no troops in the Carthaginian armies were more faithful. The Punic influence seems to have operated far more efficaciously than that of Egypt for the civilization of Africa, from several reasons combined: 1.—because there was among the Punes (as the Latins called them) no system of caste or scruple of religion, to prevent social intercourse and intermarriage with the Africans; 2.–because Egypt was surrounded by desarts which for want of water could not be cultivated, while around Carthage in many directions the fertile land was endless; 3.—because the maritime system of Carthage enabled them to choose numerous points along the coasts for their colonies, wherever the land and the harbours were good. Nor did the influence which Carthage diffused, unman the nations which received it, like the boasted civilization of Rome. Time only was needed, to blend the Africans into a free and willing union with Punic cultivation.

In the days of ARISTOTLE moreover Carthage was not only a great *African* power, but laid claim to the supremacy both of many smaller islands, and even of Sicily and Sardinia. Islands were naturally coveted by her, as uniting value with security. Colonies planted on them could be made safe against the native barbarians, without becoming either strong enough to resist and defy the mother country, or indifferent to connexion with her. At an early period,—we do not exactly know when,—the coast of Sardinia fell under the power of the Punic confederacy, although the interior mountaineers remained independent: Corsica passed into the same hands, perhaps only when the power of Etruria was overthrown. We know more distinctly the eras of the Carthaginian wars against Syracuse, which indeed are a history in themselves, and a very remarkable one. When we look to the position of Carthage, close to the modern Tunis; when we consider how short was the run across to Sicily,—and how desirable to secure safe retreat from storms at moderate distances in the coasting navigation of the ancients,—we cannot call it cupidity

in the Punic states, to have sought and obtained little islands, promontories and ports in several parts of the coast: and, once obtained, they seemed to the Carthaginians necessaries of existence, as now Gibraltar, Malta, and a passage through Egypt appear to an English ministry. It would have been well for Carthage, and for the world, if she had restrained her desires to these, which were on the western end and northern coast of Sicily: but by aspiring to conquer all the coasts, she fell into interminable conflict with the Greeks, the only nation just then a competent antagonist to the Punes. The date of the first great war is B.C. 480, the very year in which XERXES invaded Greece. This coincidence is so remarkable, that DIODORUS among the ancients, and some of the moderns, have believed that the attack was brought about by the policy of XERXES, who used the intrigues of his Phœnician subjects to stir up the Carthaginians to this enterprize. But HERODOTUS tells a simpler and more probable tale. XERXES had no capacity for intrigue, or he could have subdued Greece ten times over.

The same internal factions, which were the curse of Greece, distracted the colonists in Sicily; and the tyrant of Himera called the Carthaginians in, to aid him against the tyrant of Agrigentum. They landed at Panormus, which (though the name is Greek) was their own city; and Sclinus is especially named as their ally. We can scarcely doubt that the violent factions among the Greeks tempted the Punes to interfere, and gave them reasonable hopes of success. The forces here and elsewhere ascribed to the Carthaginians are counted by the hundred thousand. The enormous variety of estimate warns us that we must not take them for genuine enumerations: nevertheless the armaments must have been great when a hundred thousand men is the lowest number assigned.*

* In the war of B.C. 480 the Punic force is 300,000 infantry according to HERODOTUS and DIODORUS: the latter adds 2,000 ships of war and 3,000 merchantmen. In the war of B.C. 410 DIODORUS tells us that EPHORUS ascribed to HANNIBAL 200,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry; but

The outline of DIODORUS'S story is, that the Carthaginian general's cavalry were all lost in a storm, and his whole army presently destroyed, by his mistaking foes for friends. After this severe blow, the Punic forces for seventy years avoid the Sicilian Greeks, and make no similar attempt, until Segesta, which had entangled Athens in the fatal Syracusan war, plays a similar part with Carthage. Becoming desperate when the Athenian armaments were so miserably destroyed, Segesta formally surrendered herself to the Punes, in order to escape the vengeance of SELINUS: and they were unable to refuse such a bait. By accepting the cession of Segesta, the Punic confederacy became involved in a series of wars against Syracuse which with short cessations lasted from B.C. 410 to B.C. 338, when by the splendid successes of TIMOLEON the Punic territory was limited to an extremely narrow strip of land. The war of AGATHOCLES follows, which is still more deadly to Carthage, who in it was attacked at home. No other great State of antiquity known to us ever endured so dreadful a series of disasters in so short a time, and came out of them unhurt. No historian, as far as I am aware, ancient or modern, has impeached the truth of this history: nor do I distrust it: but the result is, that the Sicilian Greeks, after 90 years of war in which they are always finally victorious, are left exhausted and prostrate; while Carthage, always repulsed with dreadful loss, grows stronger and stronger, and is all but mistress of the island, when Rome interferes against her.

In the greater part of the Syracusan wars, Carthage fights more by money than by men, for the bulk of her forces are mercenaries. Nevertheless, the losses encountered by them of

TIMÆUS reduces the force to 100,000 infantry. DIODORUS gives him 60 ships of war, 1,500 merchant ships and immense machinery of war. In the war of Motya (DIOD. XIV. 54) IMILCON comes too late, with 300,000 infantry, 4,000 horses, 400 chariots, 400 ships of war, 600 ships of burden,—says EPHORUS. TIMÆUS again reduces the force to 100,000 brought by sea and 30,000 collected in Sicily.

one vast army after another would probably have overthrown the finances of any other State in the ancient world. Besides, in this interval, Carthage suffered two severe pestilences at home, two wars against revolts of the Libyans, and one against Sardinia, stirred up by a belief of her weakness. Moreover AGATHOCLES invaded Carthage itself, by bold good luck escaping their cruisers, and desolated the quiet land, where the beautiful villas of innumerable merchants were surrounded by gardens and orchards and cultivated fields,—all unfortified, and unsuspecting of an enemy. At so terrible a crisis, BOMILCAR one of the Carthaginian generals, who was aiming to make himself tyrant,—thinking to profit by confusion, manœuvred in the enemy's favour, and betrayed his colleague's army. His treason soon came to light; but this only drove him into open fury, with massacre of his own unarmed countrymen. He was quickly overpowered; yet to recover the mischief he had done, in the presence of an active enemy, was difficult. Four years did this merciless conflict continue, stirring up moreover disaffection in the Punic States,—(some of which AGATHOCLES occupied,)—and insurrections among the Libyans: yet, I say, the end of it is, that Carthage comes out apparently stronger, while Syracuse and Sicily decline.

How was this possible? I do not doubt, it was because the Sicilian towns were held by tyrants, of whom AGATHOCLES is a terrible specimen; a man without a heart and without a law,—daring, keen, unrelenting, with wonderful insight of the present, and no foresight or no care for the future. On the contrary, the Carthaginians acted by law and rule, with constitutional forms and legal scruples, which may often have exposed them to momentary disadvantage against an enemy, but secured in the long run the rights and interests of citizens. At the same time, the welfare of Carthage was based entirely on honourable and highly intelligent industry; and since the law assured to all men the fruits of their toil, no amount of pecuniary loss was possible, which the energies of individuals

did not in a few years replace. The atrocities of tyrants emptied the fields of Sicily, and peopled the towns with new and wretched citizens: the Punes suffered no great internal loss of men, and never aggravated in peace the ravages of war. At the same time their manufacturing industry brought unlimited supplies of corn from Sardinia and from other parts, when temporary causes impaired the harvests of Africa; and their system of custom-duties was profitable to the treasury, without painful pressure on those who paid the tax. In some of these respects Carthage was sufficiently like England, to make Monsieur MICHELET'S spite against her natural.

In the first Punic war the exhaustion of Carthage seems to have been greater than any thing in her Syracusan struggles. The ravages of REGULUS indeed were but for one season, and cannot have equalled those of AGATHOCLES: but it was new to the Carthaginians to be driven off the seas, and the naval superiority temporarily attained by the Romans probably distressed the finances of Carthage more than any thing else. This exhaustion of finance, and the stipendiary demands of Rome on concluding peace, made it simply impossible for the Punes to pay their mercenary armies: hence it entailed a still more horrible, bloody, desolating, implacable war against these fierce barbarians, in the course of which the Romans faithlessly seized on Sardinia. Yet also out of these miseries Carthage arose. Though she had lost Sicily and Sardinia, her influence was widely spread in Numidia, whence she derived a most formidable cavalry; and by means of the good will which diffused itself from Gades or Cadiz, an old Phœnician colony, HAMILCAR and his son-in-law organized great armies in Spain, and established a Carthaginian leadership over a large part of that warlike land. Neither Rome, nor any city of Greece, shows an elasticity so surprizing. For, within twenty years of the dreadful intestine war which attacked her when already prostrate, she assumes the offensive against Rome, urged not by necessity alone, but with just calculations

of hope,—and she all but conquered. If SCIPIO overcame HANNIBAL, it was not on the field of battle, but by intrigue and smooth speeches. His majestic demeanor, his personal kindnesses, his plausible liberalism, won over the Spaniards and the ablest chief of the Numidians—MASSINISSA, the leader of the Carthaginian cavalry in Spain. These were the arms which subdued HANNIBAL and Carthage.

Looking now at this rude outline of events, we see in the Punic confederation free United States, whose power is based on personal industry and public law,—colonizing a wild continent,—blending the rude natives with itself and with its own arts and freedom,—averse to the profession of arms,—coveting islands and fortresses not for military ambition, but for the extension of commerce,—maintaining armies and warlike fleets only as the guards of its civilization: for, (since their pay was a serious drain on the treasury,) ordinarily, we may presume, the armaments were restricted to that which self-defence required. Land it had enough lying wild; it had no motive in the growth of population for encroachment on agriculturists. To its commerce Good Will was necessary; and to its rapid restoration after disasters, internal Good Government. Even without closer knowledge of details we may pronounce this to be an organization which deserved to live in antiquity; which also would have been a most valuable counterpoise to Rome.

For on the other hand in Rome I see a power which lived by agriculture and by rapine; a power, which, to extend its agriculture, drove out every neighbour people, and then extirpated its own agriculturists to fill its armies. Hitherto, it would seem, the *pastoral* nations have been the most tumultuous and marauding; next to these, the mere *agricultural* populations are warlike and encroaching; but the more a State develops manufacturing industry, the less does she need new territory for the new births, the weaker is her desire to invade her neighbours' land, and the stronger are her interests in general peace. Indeed, it is clear that a nation

in which foreign commerce predominates too much, is apt even to love Peace more than Justice, and to fall into a dangerous weakness. There was enough of this tendency in Carthage for Rome to act upon, if she had wished; but Rome had no wishes, and no interest, but that of unscrupulous aggression. Every year gave to the new consuls a new army; and the business of that army was, to conquer for *itself* new farms, and for the *nobility* new revenues. Thus Rome was the type of systematic and ruinous Robbery, Carthage of flourishing Industry: yet historians have convinced themselves, it was for the good of mankind that Rome should conquer, and Carthage be destroyed.

That the political morality of Rome was inferior to that of Carthage comes out strongly in the narrative itself. Carthage was powerful while Rome was weak, and no whisper has reached us from Rome that she abused her superiority. She had a fleet of war, and commanded the seas; the Romans were long very weak on the sea, and forgot (if they ever knew) how to build large vessels. In this period of two centuries and a half there were three treaties of commerce between Carthage and Rome, which implies more or less of actual dealings, while Carthage was in full maritime dominion. After this long period of amity, the Romans hear that the Carthaginians have been called to aid the Greeks in Sicily against a powerful army of Italian mercenaries which has massacred the peaceful inhabitants of Messana, possessed itself of that critical city, and established itself as a piratical State. In fear lest the help thus given should gain to the Carthaginians the good will of the Greeks, and make them leaders in the island, the Romans declared war upon them. So scandalous a ground of war was new to the Romans, who had just executed atrocious vengeance of an army of their own for the very same crime in the opposite city of Rhegium; and the Senate was so ashamed of the affair that they would not vote the war. Yet they might have stopped it easily by their overwhelming influence with the people, if they had but pronounced the war impious, as

they felt it to be. Instead of this, they remained silent and allowed the consuls to persuade the people to the war by the base argument that the army would get plenty of spoil. War being decreed by the people, the Senate conducted it at once for the conquest of Sicily, and treated every Siculian town which did not instantly accept their dominion with the same severity as though it were a rebellious subject,—like Austria towards Venice. The refusal to exchange prisoners with Carthage was so inhuman to the brave Roman captives, that we cannot dwell much on the ferocity which so bitterly followed up a war so wickedly begun. Let it be understood that we have all the facts minutely stated by POLYBIUS, a warm panegyrist of the Romans.

Surely the great thing wanted in antiquity for the conservation of every thing good, was, what we now name, a Balance of Power. Every human force, which is allowed to think itself omnipotent, will infallibly be abused: and such was the force of Rome. It was a principle with the Romans, (as with the English in Kâfir-land and in India,) never to make peace until they could dictate the laws of peace. While this goes on, Justice has little chance. But if MASSINISSA had remained on the side of Carthage, or if the Italians had earnestly aided HANNIBAL, the stubborn Senate of Rome must have yielded. The principle would have been established, once and for ever, against Rome, that Force is not everything, but Right counts for something; and that in the conscience of nations there was a standard of higher import than the arrogant will of usurping Rome. Would not this have been wholesome to all the after-history of man?

But I must come to closer quarters against Carthage, to pry into her defects. Defects she had, no doubt, and in plenty; else she would have been unconquerable; for justice gives strength to the strong. Her most fatal immorality, as I view it, lay in the nature of her armies, which consisted partly indeed of pure Punic blood, largely of Africans, but still more extensively of hired barbarians,—Spaniards, Sardinians, Italians, Ligurians and Gauls. When men take up arms as a

duty, and especially as a sacred duty for their country, all the evils of war are softened by the very fact; nor are the soldiers necessarily demoralized even by the perpetration of terrific cruelties. On the contrary, *all* hired armies, bound to have no judgment of the right or wrong of the cause in which they fight, are a dreadful machinery for perpetuating into milder and juster times or places the atrocious injustices of the more barbarous: and of such armies, those which consist of foreigners are by far the worst, since the love of gain is with them the single and avowed reason for becoming tools of bloodshed:—there is not even a pretext of patriotism and duty to screen the enormity. But when, besides, these mercenaries are barbarians, far lower in mental and moral culture than the State which employs them,—when they are so ignorant and estranged as not to understand its motives or even its language,—to sympathize with its policy, identify themselves with its glory, rejoice in its grandeur;—when pay and plunder and a speedy return home is consciously the sole object of their bloodshed, without any sense or imagination of right, any ideal to be glorified, or even any pride of discipline and traditionary honour,—an army of such men is only a set of gregarious wild beasts. From beginning to end it was ruinous to Carthage. The power of amassing such forces by money stimulated her to the fatal ambition of conquering Sicily. When she had attained perhaps the very height of her real prosperity, B.C. 410, she took by storm the city of Selinus, but after a resistance so violent and persevering, that the victorious barbarian army was infuriated and entirely unmanageable. Its atrocities against the unhappy population made it afterwards impossible for Carthage to conciliate the Sicilian Greeks. The enmity induced in them was such, that (it may seem) they needed* to be extirpated, if Sicily was

* Nevertheless in the course of more than a century the intense cruelties of the Sicilian tyrants must have caused forgetfulness of the massacre of Selinus, and gradually brought about a state of things far more hopeful to Punic dominion.

to become Punic: but Carthage did not understand that, and persevered in her attempts. This probably was her very greatest mistake in policy. If she had devoted the prodigious sums, which she lavished against Sicily, to the deeper basing of her strength in Africa;—if she had opened great military and commercial roads into Numidia,* and erected suitable fortresses in the interior, (such as she well knew how to build,) in Roman fashion,—being in all other respects neither wiser nor better than she was, she would probably have become so mighty an African power as to despise alike REGULUS and SCIPIO: her native African forces,—excellent heavy-armed troops and always faithful,—would have had nothing to fear from Rome.

Moreover, the dangerous character of these mercenary armies reacted for evil on Carthage in other ways. First, it accustomed her to intense military severity, and forced her to justify any atrocity in her generals, which seemed necessary to repress the troops. MICHELET gloats over a dreadful story told by DIODORUS, how a Carthaginian army mutinied for want of pay,—how the general deceived it into landing on a small island, then sailed away, and left the men to perish. They all died of starvation, and their white bones gave a name to the island. I will not venture to suggest unbelief of the story. It is credible to me, although I do not greatly trust DIODORUS in such a matter. But I may allude to a parallel. In the opening of the first Punic war, as POLYBIUS tells us, king HIERO of Syracuse, a humane and wise man, finding his mercenaries to be rather unmanageable, purposely so posts them that they are cut to pieces by the enemy. This deed is actually praised by POLYBIUS,—himself a mild and thoughtful man,—without any sense of its perfidy and cruelty.

* North Africa is deficient in navigable rivers; hence the more urgent need of good military roads. Probably it was the indisposition of Carthage to contemplate the sinking of vast sums of money in African roads, which drove their imagination to the sea and to Sicily, where if victorious, they seemed about to reap the fruits of victory with greater ease and security.

We must not exact from the Carthaginians a higher morality than from POLYBIUS. This writer indeed gives a most hideous description, what sort of thing a mutiny in a Carthaginian army was,—when the troops had no language in common, and could not be addressed by the general, and understood nothing but the words "Strike! Fling!" In that dreadful conflict HAMILCAR would gladly have saved the lives of the mutineers, but by no terms could he pacify the frenzied and atrocious creatures. He therefore found nothing left but to kill them by famine and under the feet of his elephants.—Reading all this, we must not wonder either that Wine was totally forbidden in the armies, or that a Carthaginian general was allowed every ferocity against his own troops.

But next, came the new danger, that the general might use the armies against Carthage, since they had no patriotic feeling or civilian's honour: and inasmuch as on several occasions attempts of this nature were made,—(indeed these armies developed temporarily more than one Punic CÆSAR,) it became necessary to subject the generals themselves to a rigorous tribunal. They were liable to fines, banishment and death by verdict of the Sanhedrim, or great Court of 104, the supreme Justiciary of Carthage,—for treachery and even for cowardice. If some of the tales told were true, the evil would only have been exasperated. A general at the head of 20 or 50 thousand foreigners will not come home quietly to be crucified for nothing, but will get up a revolt first. When I read how our Admiral BYNG was sent out with ill-conditioned ships, and, at the advice of a Council of War, declined to attack a very superior French force, and on his return home was shot by a Court Martial:—when I think, if all English literature were to perish, and this tale were reported by a French admiral, how some future Germanized philosopher of South America would moralize concerning England, and what general deductions he might draw concerning English character and institutions;—I make some allowance as to partial information concerning Carthage. Indeed, when the Carthaginians

are said to crucify a guilty general, it is possible that he was first slain, and then crucified as a disgrace: for in the case of MAGO, whose stupidity or cowardice gave up Syracuse to TIMOLEON, we read that he slew himself, and was crucified when dead. The number of incompetent generals in Carthage, was very great; which is not wonderful, when promotion in their army was systematically bought;—another curious coincidence with England. How much *we* have suffered from this cause, others may define: but Rome, as well as Carthage lost many a fine army by the influence of favour and of money in military promotion. It is inferred from the notices of ARISTOTLE and POLYBIUS, that civil offices in general were purchaseable in Carthage. NIEBUHR observes, that the Roman habit of exacting enormously expensive shows of the Ædiles was virtually a selling of those high offices to which the Ædileship was a step. We find no reason to believe that the civil offices in Carthage were ordinarily ill-filled, though in the great wars many abuses and peculations crept in, as happens to all other States.

Although the Punic population of pure blood generally valued their lives too much to become private soldiers, they were eminent for discipline and bravery when real occasion required. In the fatal battle against TIMOLEON at the river Crimêsus, the native Punic force was intercepted in a disastrous position, and attacked by a hurricane of rain in its face. Its dreadful destruction has led to the preservation of details, all of which denote its perfect armour, elaborate training and high bravery.—In the last sad days of Carthage, when Roman perfidy has first stript her of her arms and of her corn and of the children of her nobility, and then announces that the city must be razed;—no military nation could have behaved more bravely, or resisted longer, than did the town-population of Carthage.

Not only is the punishment of crucifixion regarded as peculiarly Punic, but the practice of torture also is ascribed to them, as in the death of REGULUS. Even if no one example

is clearly attested, the general belief pervading DIODORUS and POLYBIUS seems to convince modern historians that the Carthaginians were a cruel people. In this belief I should probably acquiesce, only that opposite facts come out as soon as we get distinct attestation. Let us not forget, that torture of accused persons was practised in England, until the reign of JAMES the First; that the laws of Rome, and of Greece alike, allowed, and sometimes commanded, the torture of innocent slaves: let me add, that the Roman CRASSUS crucified 6,000 prisoners of the army of SPARTACUS along the roadside, and his countrymen thought it a glorious deed. If the tender mercies of Rome were reserved for pure and legitimate Quirites, while the severities of Carthage fell indiscriminately on aristocracy and on populace, there would be in the latter method a wholesome security against misplaced and gratuitous cruelty. At the same time it must be remembered; neither DIODORUS nor even POLYBIUS, nor (as far as we know) their informants, had been present in the Punic Sanhedrim, to hear its sentences or see their execution; on the other hand, the Romans did meet HAMILCAR in Sicily and HANNIBAL in Italy, and knew much indeed very authentic concerning them;—a great deal more than they liked. LIVY says that HANNIBAL was esteemed *avaricious* by his countrymen, (whom he dunned for money to carry on the war,) but *cruel* by the Romans, whom he slaughtered and burned out by tens of thousands. Nevertheless, in the description of his cruelty, there is nowhere any such thing as putting men to torture, crucifying them, or burning captives alive to the Carthaginian god, or any of the ferocities which some would lead us to expect. In short, in comparison with the Romans, HAMILCAR and his son HANNIBAL are courteous, chivalrous and mild. In the war of Sicily HAMILCAR in vain strove by example to induce the Romans to allow burial of the dead: HANNIBAL also, having slain MARCELLUS, buried him honourably: but the Romans, when they have overpowered HASDRUBAL and his army, cut off his head and carry it half the length of Italy, for the barbarous

satisfaction of flinging it over the Punic lines to the insult of HANNIBAL.—After the battle of Cannæ, HANNIBAL, being straitened for money, would gladly have allowed all the Roman prisoners to be redeemed:* but the Roman senate is so inhuman to its own brave countrymen, who by the general's incompetence are fallen into the enemy's hand, that it refuses to redeem them, expressly because it knows that HANNIBAL wants money, and will necessarily become oppressive to the Italians, if he does not get it. This refusal must have exasperated HANNIBAL to the extreme; yet neither LIVY nor POLYBIUS (both of whom admire the conduct of the senate,) think it worth while to tell us what HANNIBAL did with the captives. We cannot doubt that he put them all to the sword, when it had been proved in the first Punic war that the barbarous senate would not exchange prisoners, and now, that it would not redeem them: thus imposing on HANNIBAL the necessity of either feeding them for no end, or else executing them. If ever there was a time at which Carthage burned prisoners to her gods or otherwise put them to death with torture, this was the fit time. From the day when conciliation became impossible, the great object of HANNIBAL was to destroy and terrify. The Romans had pronounced the war implacable, and the senate had deliberately abandoned the prisoners. If HANNIBAL had crucified or burned them, or even slain them on the altar, I believe we must have heard it from POLYBIUS and LIVY: and

* LIVY tells us, (22, 57) that HANNIBAL addressed the captives in "a sufficiently mild" speech, saying; that "he has no implacable war against Rome; the contest is for dignity and empire. His fathers had given way to Roman bravery: now in turn, he hopes they will give way to his bravery and good luck. He therefore gives leave to redeem the captives, &c., &c."

ARNOLD (vol. iii. p. 154) ascribes to HANNIBAL, in the text of his history, "acts of the most inhuman cruelty" towards the prisoners, but in his note he confesses that the silence of LIVY and the testimony of POLYBIUS ought to make us slow of belief.—If ARNOLD had lived to edit this volume, perhaps he would have made the Note and the Text change places.

if at such a crisis of exasperation he did nothing of the kind, it is hard indeed to believe that such cruelties were an ordinary Carthaginian practice.

It may here be added, that in the Syracusan wars, according to DIODORUS himself, the palm of cruelty is undoubtedly carried off by the Greeks. The provocation indeed began with the untractable mercenaries of Carthage, during hot blood, at the siege of Selinus; but cruelty was deliberately retaliated with usury by the entire Greek population after the capture of Motya, which was treacherously attacked in profound peace, during a pestilence in Africa. Again, in the war of AGATHOCLES a Punic general named HAMILCAR falls alive into the hands of the Syracusans: and though he had been only a public and honourable enemy, he is given up to the kinsman of the slain and put to death with every refinement of cruelty and insult. This is DIODORUS'S own tale (20, 30), and he has nothing similar to tell against the Carthaginians.

It is rather amusing to read modern invectives against the avarice and violence of the Carthaginians for having a Preventive Service on their coast, and forcing all merchandize to pass through their custom-houses. If England alone offended in this way, one might understand the censure as an attempt to pierce us through the sides of Carthage: but neither France, nor Germany, nor Austria, nor Russia, have yet thrown down their custom-houses, and renounced the desire of taxing foreign importation. Such declamations, I confess, make me feel that modern historians are under an evil bias against Carthage, and in other things are likely to depreciate her unduly.

Are we really to forget how modern a development of morality is the doctrine of Free Trade, if indeed it has at all forced its way out of Economy into Morals? In ancient times Piracy was too much dreaded, to allow free intercourse of foreigners; and where this fear declined, still all commerce was regarded as a just monopoly to him who had opened a

market. The commercial States everywhere naturally take the lead in the career of monopoly: and England who established her Navigation Laws, and sought to ruin the trade of Protestant Holland, of Ireland, and of her own colonies, cannot throw the stone at any ancient State for this sin. We have ourselves only recently changed our course; and the despotic States of Europe, beginning with Spain, and ending with Russia, have always been as anxious for exclusive commerce as their power has permitted. Carthage had nothing isolating and misanthropic in her institutions; and this is all that we could exact in her justification. Indeed it is probable that her foreign commerce promoted intermarriages even with the cultivated Greeks, her most dangerous rivals; for HERODOTUS carefully tells us that HAMILCAR, the king or consul of Carthage, who led the great armament against Sicily in B.C. 480, was born of a Syracusan mother.

It is certainly curious, that besides all the other analogies of Carthage to England, the imputation of *perfidy* should lie on both; "Punic faith" being not a commoner taunt, than "perfidious Albion." The *cause* of this can only be assigned by surmise. Towards small barbarian cities the Punic faith does appear to me to have been very like that of England to Genoa, to Venice, to Parga, to Sicily. Carthage made alliance with many petty towns in Sicily for the convenience of her wars; and when beaten, made peace without the least provision for their interests. From the Siculian barbarians, as I suspect, came to Greeks and Romans the imputation of perfidy against her. In fact, great powers which do observe to other great powers scrupulous faith, are seldom as scrupulous towards little ones.

But I must address myself to the *religion* of Carthage, against which the moderns make their chief attack. That the Punic, Syrian, Babylonian religions had originally certain great enormities of practice as well as of theory, cannot be denied. The wild speculations, wilder fears, and fantastic follies of rude men, blending with reverential sentiment,

generate well-meant but monstrous religion. This is disgraceful, only when upheld in later and more refined ages, which ought to outgrow the follies and cruelties of childhood. All these nations in times of public suffering sought to appease the Deity by sacrificing whatever was dearest to the worshipper: especially, for a parent to devote a child was the highest merit. We know that this was an original dogma of the religion. Our sole question here is,—Did it remain a deadly reality, after Carthage had become an accomplished and powerful community?

The accusation of Carthage, as far as I am aware, rests mainly on three passages of DIODORUS and one of PLINY; and as PLINY may seem the more unprejudiced witness, I will first quote his words.—Nat. Hist. 36, § 4, 12. "The figure of HERCULES, (says he) standing on the ground, at the entrance of the portico Ad Nationes" [he means, in Rome,] is not set in a temple, "but remains without honour. Before this figure, the Carthaginians every year made sacrifice with a human victim."—We know by the testimony of LIVY (22, 57), that the Romans, after the battle of Cannæ, buried alive in their forum a *Greek* man and woman, and a *Gaulish* man and woman: he adds, that they were buried in a place "*already before* dyed with human victims, a kind of sacrifice by no means Roman." When we see to what hideous superstition Rome descended in times of terror, any thing similar is of course credible concerning Carthage. But PLINY does not confine his statement to moments of critical danger; he says, the Carthaginians sacrificed "every year." I shall presently state specific reasons for disbelieving him. I now remark only, that the Romans had enough political reasons for degrading the statue of the Punic deity which they had carried in triumph to Rome, nor had they any sympathy with Punic as with Grecian sculptures or rites. The idea might easily grow up in Rome that the absence of all honour to this statue, was, from its association with human victims.

At the same time, as regards the sacred immolation of

prisoners of war, I think the reprobation of it has been too onesided. The practice seems to me to have been originally the humane device of a priesthood to limit butchery. In the hot blood of battle, a commander will in vain bid his conquering troops to spare life: but if the priests order that the soldiers, instead of slaying, shall reserve men for solemn sacrifice, superstition may win what was denied to discipline and to humanity. Even ferocious soldiers will in cold blood think the public sacrifice of twenty men a pretty good atonement; when, without such interference of the priest, victims would have fallen by hundreds. Nevertheless, by such inventions an immediate humane end is bought at the expense of permanently degrading the character of the Deity; and Truth, when violated, seems in the long run always to avenge herself on us. What was the prevalent theory of Carthage on such matters, no Carthaginian has told us: but the closer we can look into the great HANNIBAL and his contemporaries, the less reason does there seem to prefer either Greeks or Romans to them.

I have already observed, that if ever the Carthaginians had intense provocation to be cruel to prisoners of war, it was when the Roman senate refused to ransom the captives of Cannæ: yet the silence of POLYBIUS and LIVY forbids us to believe that HANNIBAL sullied his victory by any act of cruel superstition. How, in the face of this, can one believe PLINY'S statement, that the Carthaginians *every year* offered a human victim to HERCULES? Such a sacrifice would imply, that they needed no stimulus of terror and revenge. If HAMILCAR, as magistrate of Carthage, in time of peace, ungoaded by danger or passion, could tranquilly slay human beings to the god, as a yearly matter of routine; is it credible, that in the exasperation of resentment and pride of victory HANNIBAL would have been *more* tender to the Romans whom he had subdued in fight,—whom also the Roman senate held so vile, —than his father and grandfather had been to innocent victims at home?

It is often stated, on the authority of THEOPHRASTUS, that after the repulse of the Punic forces from Sicily, B.C. 480, GELO imposed on Carthage the duty of abstaining from human sacrifices. We may almost infer THEOPHRASTUS to have known, that in his day no such sacrifices were practised; and in so far, it is a contradiction to PLINY; especially if their cessation dates from so early a year as B.C. 480. If indeed Punic superstition had been strong, no foreign treaty could have suppressed it; for Carthage was in no sense reduced under GELO'S power. What were THEOPHRASTUS'S sources of knowledge, I am quite unaware, and therefore cannot discuss the question. But HERODOTUS, in relating the defeat as told by the Carthaginians, says, that HAMILCAR was engaged in offering whole burnt offerings,—(the narrator does not say, *human* victims; which he certainly would have said, if he had meant it,)—and when the general saw his army routed, he threw himself into the fire: for which the Carthaginians celebrated his memory with the highest honours, just as XERXES honoured the satrap BOGES for a similar death.

But I stated, that DIODORUS supports PLINY;—that is, so far as the course of his history is carried down. He does not speak of the latest times of Carthage, but of her conflict with the Greeks of Sicily. During the siege of Agrigentum (B.C. 407) he represents HAMILCAR as sacrificing his own son (xiii. 86). A century later, he states (xx. 14) that the Carthaginians had cheated their god for a long time, by buying foreign children and bringing them up as their own, and at last sacrificing them. This (says he) went on undiscovered, until AGATHOCLES was desolating the land. Then inquiry was made, and the deceit was found out: so they selected 200 children of the principal men of the State, and sacrificed them by public authority: and as many as 300 persons, conscious of guilt, gave themselves up to the flames.

To me it is simply incredible, that such a system of trickery was ever secret: the historian who makes that statement, seems to show his credulity. Also for another reason

I am led to doubt of his main fact. Neither when REGULUS was in Africa, nor when SCIPIO reduced Carthage to still harder straits, nor in the third Punic war, when Roman treachery and overwhelming force were about to consummate their last vengeance;—I say, on none of these occasions do the narrators from the Roman side attribute any of these superstitions to their enemy. Are we to imagine that Carthage had undergone a great religious change in the few years which separated AGATHOCLES from REGULUS? That is hard to believe: but if so it were, it would denote in Carthage an inward power of moral progress unparallelled in antiquity, so as in fact to supersede my vindication. On the other hand, the Sicilian Greeks were possessed with very hostile feelings towards Carthage; and hearing the report, that their religion approved of such sacrifices, might interpret any large fire in the enemy's camp or city to be a celebration of such dreadful rites. Indeed, this very idea is suggested by another strange story in DIODORUS (xx. 65), which is the only remaining head of accusation. After a victory over AGATHOCLES, the Punic general prepares to sacrifice to his god the handsomest captives as a thank-offering: but the ministers are so clumsy with the fire, as to burn down their own camp with dreadful destruction to themselves. DIODORUS moralizes on the judgment of God, which retaliated their impiety on their own head: but we are forced to conclude, that they had very little practice in these fiery offerings, if they were so unhandy in the management.

In this connection I may notice, that, according to QUINTUS CURTIUS, during the siege of Tyre by ALEXANDER the Great "some persons proposed to renew an ancient custom" (such are his words) "of sacrificing to Saturn a boy of free parentage; and unless the elder men, who were at the head of affairs, had opposed, dire superstition would have overcome humanity." Thus we find, that a hundred years before the great HANNIBAL, this cruel rite had been thoroughly disused at Tyre; and when the fanaticism of a few strove to revive it, the men in authority

were its opponents. Carthage, the colony, is not likely to have been more conservative of antiquated superstition than Tyre, the mother city. Tyre had undergone no social revolution, violently to overthrow its old creed. An established church finds it hard to uphold in a colony the traditional authority which it has attained at home: hence on the new soil of Africa and with a more extended intercourse, barbarian superstition must have died out somewhat more rapidly than at Tyre.

Another curious account in DIODOROUS may be here named. When a Libyan insurrection breaks out after a war with DIONYSIUS (xiv. 77) the Carthaginians are affected with superstitious terror; but instead of sacrificing their children, they resolve to worship the Greek goddesses CERES and PROSERPINE! This they take pains to do, by help of Greeks, in the most orthodox Greek fashion. Thus they had no bigoted and immovable attachment to their native ceremonies, but, as early as PHILIP the Great of Macedon, they were open to influences from Greek religion.

One more topic may be briefly touched. The poems of HOMER tell us of a sacrifice of Trojan warriors by the savage revenge of ACHILLES; which the poet abhors: but he gives us no hint that AGAMEMNON sacrificed his daughter, or that such sacrifices were believed acceptable to the gods. Nevertheless in the later poets such enormities are freely imputed to the heroic age, and are as devoutly believed, as by DIODORUS the Carthaginian sacrifices. Does not this show that a greediness of credulity as to such tragic horrors is a human weakness, for which the historian must make allowance.

And now I have done. Let it not be supposed that I am holding up Carthage as superior in religion to Italy or Greece. In public good faith and in political justice I think that she was really superior to Rome and to Athens: but as to religion not one of the three States will bear moral criticism. Our information is too fragmentary for minute comparisons. It suffices to say, that there is nothing in the practical and

public development of the Punic religion to degrade Carthage below the other great historical States of antiquity, or forbid our sympathies with her memory.

Did not my limits force me to close, I might have dwelt on the topic, how rapidly Rome degenerated, after the day when HANNIBAL was overpowered. Altogether, the blindness of the wisest nations in their wars is a striking fact. Wars accepted to maintain sacred right,—when prosperous, add vigour and noble spirit to a nation. Wars of selfishness, if successful, may be fatal by their success, as that of Rome against Carthage: but oftener, they cause lingering struggle, and turn to the advantage of some third party. Thus, the evil conflict of Carthage with Syracuse wasted both powers, confirmed tyranny in Grecian-Sicily and in Italian-Greece, facilitated the overthrow of freedom in Greece proper, and ultimately caused all to become victims of Rome, whose power was in infancy when the strife began.

END OF "A DEFENCE OF CARTHAGE."

ON LIBERAL TEACHING OF MATHEMATICS.

In so far as Mathematics belongs to universal education, the object of the teacher is *liberal* and not *technical;* hence to make his pupils rapid or even accurate calculators, is of very secondary importance to that of giving them a true insight into the nature of calculation itself. When this has been obtained, they can of themselves improve by practice. Nevertheless, the end of liberal culture is never won, by those who *so* value the effects of the science on the mind, as to undervalue the science itself. No effects at all will follow, unless the pupil aims to master the science, as in itself a worthy reward of exertion. Hence, it is not sufficient to talk or hear *about* the solutions of problems and the performing of operations; but the mind must be called out into activity, and must learn to solve and calculate. In short, here, as in all education, our great aim is, not to communicate mere *results*, but to impart a *power*: and the difference of these two things is so great and important, as to deserve to be dwelt upon a little.

He who learns the dry events and dates of history, learns a *result:* so does he who learns the weights of minerals,—the temperature at which various substances melt,—or the relation between the three sides of a right-angled triangle. All of these results may become *powers*, in the hands of one who knows how to use them; but unless the reasoning faculties

are duly cultivated, and the relation of one truth to another is well understood, the knowledge of these things is liable to be a mere useless burden on the memory. In a more and more advanced state of knowledge, every truth becomes an instrument towards the discovery of new truths beyond; and as far as may be, a pupil ought to learn what use to make of the truths communicated. In teaching the mechanical arts, it would avail little to exhibit a chisel or an axe or a turning-lathe, or to expatiate on the qualities in which the perfection of these tools consists, unless the hearer saw them actually used, and learned to handle them; after which, they become to him new *powers*. Till he has seen them used,—and that, slowly enough to allow his mind to follow the process,—they can at best excite barren wonder. To speak generally, the civilized man is eminently distinguished by the variety, power and complexity of his tools. The savage often uses an oystershell or a bit of bone or a stone-hatchet, with a persevering skill that astonishes us; but with these he aims only at immediate results, and not to generate new powers. Yet a beautifully carved mace (cut perhaps with a shell and a nail), being an end in itself and serving no end beyond itself which a rough club might not serve, is far less valuable than a chisel and a plane, which may perform an infinity of other work. So too in more abstract knowledge we uniformly find the successive advances of science marked by the increasing value set on elaborate tools. Such a tool, for instance, is the dictionary of a foreign language; which, as a result in itself, is of no interest except to a professional linguist; yet as a power for opening knowledge beyond, may be of immense value. Such a tool again is every mathematical table,—say, a Multiplication Table, or a Table of Logarithms. In itself it cannot have much interest; but to him who knows how to handle this tool and discerns its various applicability, it ceases to be dry and barren.

In all learning therefore, the pupil needs to see (if possible) what use the teacher makes of his knowledge when he has

got it; for that is learning to use the tool. Herein lies the great difficulty of making lectures on History instructive. On this account the *manner* of teaching is sometimes of as much importance as the thing taught: and in Proper Science it is peculiarly to be desired that the mode of proceeding from step to step should, as far as possible, be such as can be used in an infinity of cases widely diverse from that before us. Such was La Place's advice to mathematical teachers:—"Adhere," says he, "*to general methods*, and you will see your pupils advance."—The elementary and easy parts of every mathematical subject generally admit of being treated by special methods, which fail when applied to higher problems. Such special methods La Place disapproves, because they are not available to the learner as a new power. If on the contrary the easy first problems are treated by *general* methods, which will equally avail afterwards for harder questions, the pupil is hereby armed beforehand. When he approaches an after problem, perhaps he can even solve it of himself, and this is a delightful discovery to him. *General* methods of reasoning are on this account familiarly called "*powerful* methods" by mathematicians; and it is emphatically characteristic of modern mathematics to be comparatively incurious of all special results,—such as, the properties of this or that elegant curve,—except when they take their place in the great arsenal of the science, as instruments that subserve further investigation.

There was a time,—some reminiscences of which still linger among us,—when it was a feat much valued, to find the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle, accurate to a large number of decimal places; and he who had calculated it to 20 decimals seemed to have conferred a greater boon on the science than he who had reached 14 decimals. Now however, the only thing cared for is,—not, to have *actually* achieved such or such a definite result, but—to be *able* to achieve by moderate time and effort, whatever accuracy any real problem may require.

But to treat the questions of the *shop* as the only *real* problems of Arithmetic, appears to me quite illiberal. Nay, it seems more instructive and better, to say as little as possible about shillings and pence, about feet and inches. In every problem, let us take but a single unit of each kind, as a pound, a mile an hour. Let us deal with fractional parts, first as in Vulgar Fractions, and teach all their properties; next, as in Decimals. Whoever once understands these well and on principle, will easily adapt them to any special requirements. Again, let the pupil be familiarized with many forms of serial progression, all in pure numbers; first the natural numbers 1, 2, 3, 4...; then the odd and the even separately; then by addition of the natural numbers you have 1, 3, 6, 10, 15... and by addition of the odd numbers you get the squares 1, 4, 9, 16,... It then becomes an interesting problem, to prove that the last, *however far carried*, will be squares. Further, the idea of two numbers *increasing together* becomes thus familiar, and may be in many ways illustrated; as the foundation for the theory of Variable quantities. In Geometry this may be taught from the very beginning: thus, the Area and the Circumference of a circle, vary with the Radius, and each of them is a "function" of the radius. But in my view, all the operations of elementary arithmetic should be taught by methods as general as those of algebra, and with algebraic signs, but not *letters:* so also, all the simple problems of arithmetic should be solved exactly in the same way as an algebraist obtains his equations, *i.e.* by common sense, and without any technical rule. So soon as problems arise which demand some analysis or *inverse* proceeding, the algebraic x or unknown quantity should be introduced, and the pupil will find no need of rules. In this way arithmetic leads towards and merges in alegbra. Letters $a\ b\ c$ belong to the second or even third stage, not to the first.

It is natural for Art to go before Science; and practical problems, eliciting Art, will be in each case our best introduction to Science. But every process of art is best remem-

bered, and grave errors are most certainly avoided, when the *reasons* for the process are learned *soon after* the process itself. A perfect agreement as to the very best mode seems to be here unattainable, and perhaps to different minds different methods are best adapted. I mean, for instance, that it cannot be absolutely settled, whether a pupil ought *first* to be taught how to extract the square root of a number, and *afterwards* learn the reasons, or whether the reasons should go first. Provided, however, that the rules and their reasons be never very far separated, pupils of average intelligence will learn successfully in either way. Nor is it by any means essential, that general theorems be demonstrated in the form which an abstract mathematician would choose. For beginners it is sufficient, and is generally better, to spare to the utmost the formalities of proof, and be satisfied with such a mode of statement as shall carry conviction to their minds that the truth is absolute and necessary. One mystery indeed of mathematics is the singular difficulty of *proving* various truths which certainly ought to be proved, yet which the mind discerns as true at first statement. With beginners I would rather enunciate these as principles to be assumed, than trouble them with the proof. The great point is, to lead the mind *to discern for itself*, and not to rest on *memory* for the rules which are to guide the art and practice. But if it be not trained to such discernment, not only is the difficulty of remembering any complicated operation great, but if any error be made, it will be as easily an enormous as a venial one. And this is universally a danger in that system. A boy who performs arithmetical operations without knowing why, will often use the Rule of Three *Direct* where it ought to be the Rule of Three *Inverse*. Altogether, this makes the whole system of current "Rules" a very dangerous one: for so long as the pupil needs a rule, he needs also to be told which of several rules is the right.

When the moderns universally hold so comprehensive views in Mathematics, I have never understood with what consistency so many Englishmen still uphold the works of

EUCLID as practically valuable to learners, in the present stage of science. This admiration indeed is still warmer in appearance than in fact; for the very greatest liberties have been taken with EUCLID's works. Of his 12 books we never read the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th—and of the 12th book few read more than the two first propositions. The definitions of the 5th book have been remodelled in almost all the modern treatises from ROBERT SIMSON downwards, who in other parts also has introduced considerable alterations. In more recent times, LEGENDRE in France, PLAYFAIR in Scotland, ELRINGTON in Ireland, have largely deviated from EUCLID's methods: it is difficult therefore to avoid suspecting that the continued adherence to SIMSON'S Euclid in England is connected with the general attachment of our schools to antiquity. Be this as it may, it seems impossible to deny that the whole plan of EUCLID'S Geometry is the very reverse of that which LA PLACE'S apophthegm would recommend. Instead of imparting general methods, he limits us to specialities. He gives us narrow results, which are not powers. He does not lead the learner to aspire at any thing higher than has been set before him. Nay, his definitions are generally so narrow in their conception, as to shut up the mind in immature and inaccurate notions. He even sometimes gives a succession of different definitions of the same term, and none satisfactory. Thus he first defines *similarity* in the case of similar arcs of circles. A totally different definition of it is given in regard to similar triangles; and a third, in the case of similar rectilinear figures. After all, none of these definitions will apply to similar curves, nor does the learner gain a hint that such curves may exist. Nay, the circle is treated as the only imaginable curve, and the technical words introduced in connection with it are unduly limited or imperfectly explained. Thus in regard to the *contact* of a straight line and a circle, the sole definition of Contact used by him, is, that the line "shall meet and not cut;" which is both insufficient and unnecessary. For the tangent line may sometimes cut a

curve; namely at a point of flexure as in the middle of an S; and when this happens, the contact is far more intimate than is possible with the circle. Indeed the whole subject of curvature, extremely important as it is, is evaded, not treated, by EUCLID;—naturally: for one who ignores all curves but the circle, will never understand even circular curvature: and according to EUCLID'S great admirer, ROBERT SIMSON, the characteristic excellence of his 5th book is that it *evades* the difficulties of incommensurate ratio. This might be a merit, if all that we cared for was the establishing of certain theorems convenient in mensuration: but it is surely a great defect, if it hides from the learner, (as in fact it does carefully hide,) the nature of the difficulty to be encountered.

These remarks are not intended to depreciate EUCLID'S merits *in his own day*. He was, among the Greeks, a useful and honoured geometer, just as HIPPOCRATES was an eminent physician. But if any modern school of medicine were to enact the study of HIPPOCRATES as the first step for medical pupils, no doubt it would become a duty with many, so to write concerning the defects of HIPPOCRATES'S knowledge as to seem to undervalue him. The same is the case with EUCLID. His notions, compared to ours, were necessarily very limited, and therefore he could not take a commanding view of his subject: and if his *logic* were ever so perfect, he would still exercise a very cramping effect on a mind which fell beneath his influence. It is generally very unfair to give to young pupils any problems of difficulty to be solved by EUCLID'S methods; for it is ten to one that the teacher himself solves them only by some higher method. No *power* is imparted in the few books of Euclid put into the pupil's hand, though an active intellect may develop for itself ways of analysis out of the synthesis put before it.

I cannot but feel, that his whole treatment of the Straight Line, the Plane, Parallels, and Proportion, is extremely uninstructive. Curvature, of course, he did not understand. He seems more anxious to establish his theorems, than to enlighten

the student as to the essence of what he is talking about. On all these subjects, almost a new treatise is needed as a commentary on Euclid, to undeceive or at least to enlighten the learner, who is plunged into difficulties gratuitously.

Again, it has pleased EUCLID to limit his demonstrations by the arbitrary rule, that he will never conceive of any mathematical form which he has not shown how to construct *by rule and compass.* To confine himself to these two instruments was natural, but is needless; and the effect has been to destroy all compactness of beauty in his treatise, and to give it a most miscellaneous and disorderly aspect. Subjects which ought to be joined are *dis*joined, and the reader does not know *why* he is led away to this and that new subject. EUCLID appears to take his steps like a man floundering in deep snow, who seldom walks straightforward, but plants his foot wherever he guesses he shall find a bottom. When we look back at the path we have traversed, we find, no doubt, that it has brought us to our resting place; but it has been as winding as a river. This arises out of the feebleness of the method. The ancient road was forced to take shape from the materials of the soil; the modern one drives straight at its end, unimpeded by any such obstacles. In fact, so conscious was EUCLID of the unshapely character of his treatise, that, in books which we omit, he reduced his results to a more orderly form; and after treating of ratios in so peculiar a manner in his 5th book, he treated them anew in another book by means of numbers. But for the low state of arithmetic and algebra in that day, he perhaps would never have preferred the form which he has given to Geometrical science. Other points may be here touched. All Mathematical science is difficult to teach *in a class,* because of the disparity in the minds of pupils.—But the difficulty is greatest, when, as generally happens in Euclid, the propositions are so ranged in a single continuous chain that to miss one link makes all fall to the ground. To avoid this, all the propositions of science ought (I think,) as far as possible, to be deduced out of first principles, and not merely one from

another. In this way indeed, not only is the accidental loss of a part less fatal, but a deeper appreciation of the science itself is attained, and a far stronger conviction that it is not merely consistent with itself, as some mere hypotheses may be, but is based on irrefragable truth. This tends altogether to sounder habits of thought. To have a firm confidence in the truth of broad principles, is one of the virtues in which English natures are peculiarly apt to be deficient; and mathematical culture fails in one of its great aims, if it does not impart this. Once more, Geometrical Truth ought to be so cultivated as to impart a feeling of Geometrical Beauty. To the uninitiated the very name of this may seem ridiculous, and the satirical poem (or rather its name) The Loves of the Triangles, may be suggested. But it is certain that many great mathematicians have had an enthusiastic feeling of Beauty in their science, and one of them wrote a high flown apostrophe (or I might almost say) *hymn* to the Equiangular Spiral, as the type of Resurrection. What is more, unless the *imagination* is stimulated by the perceptions of Beauty and Symmetry, it is doubly difficult for the *memory* to retain mathematical truth. The teaching therefore should so exhibit the reasonings, as to be not only intelligible, but also elegant.

In Geometry, I think that the general idea of a Limit, as well as of a Ratio, should be explained among the Elements, and that every definition, as well as every process, should be made from the first as general as possible. The idea of *Loci* and of *generating* the surfaces or lines of which we need to speak, as also of Variable Quantities should be made prominent from the very beginning; and the learner should soon be made aware that a Circle is only one out of an infinity of possible curves. But more particularly would I press, that to get a full and intimate conception of all the *Definitions* is of higher value than to remember the miscellaneous *properties* of figures. Some properties indeed are so characteristic, that they are exchangeable with definitions; these particularly need to be

known. But there is no worse evil in mathematics than not to know distinctly what it is we are talking about; hence definition is the first great matter. Moreover even without studying the higher mathematics, we may understand many statements made concerning discoveries in them, if only we are acquainted with the definitions, and this is a reason for learning the meaning of words which belong to far higher investigations than we are disposed to pursue. Those who do not read Trigonometry or technical Astronomy will do well to understand such terms as sine, cosine, ellipse, parabola, latitude, poles; and I believe that even those persons who have no taste for the *reasonings* of mathematics find pleasure in getting clearer ideas on such subjects. To become intimate with things themselves is the way to reason soundly concerning them; and geometrical forms are many of them elegant and interesting. To generate them mechanically is the best basis of definition. The idea that to introduce Motion into Geometry, confounds it with Mechanics, is a fundamental mistake. Motion introduces the science of Mechanics, only when we take cognizance of Force, Time, Velocity.

I cannot but think that the Metaphysical part of Geometry should be reserved to the end; and that in the earlier treatment we ought to use, (as freely as we find convenient) any such Assumptions or Postulates as every learner will discern to be rightful. But *they must be prominently set forth as Assumptions*, and never smuggled in as Definitions. This is the very mischievous procedure of our current Euclid, in regard to the Plane and to Proportion. In regard to the Straight Line and Parallels the treatise is more honest; for it propounds *Axioms* concerning them. But as these are axioms in a different sense from most of the Axioms, there is still something to be regretted. That the 12th Axiom concerning Parallels is very ill-chosen, we have a right to assert, since we find it to be abandoned in the best modern treatises, such as LEGENDRE'S. Yet I confess, I have a deeper complaint:

it is, that the *definition* of Parallels is false. For: what are Parallel Circles? Surely not those which, being prolonged ever so far, never meet. Nay, but Circles which are everywhere *equidistant*. This is the only true definition. Parallelism means nothing but Equidistance. So correct the definition, and the postulate needed will not easily be taken amiss. The following will do. "If a straight line has *two* points in it equidistant from another straight line in the same plane, *all* points in it are equidistant from that second line." Then, by corollary, the two lines are Parallel. * * * * *

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ELOCUTION,

AS A PART OF GENERAL EDUCATION.

THE English nation is not at all disposed to undervalue cultivation of the voice and ear in Singing and Music. Especially for Ladies these are felt to be elegant accomplishments. Yet it cannot be denied, that Elocution, as a general training, has been exceedingly neglected among us. If any one has a special impediment in speech,—a tendency to stutter, or some unpleasant lisp, then (it is admitted) an Elocution-master may be called in. And if but few appreciate systematic teaching as beneficial to mere utterance, still fewer understand how Elocution bears on the understanding and on the sentiments; how it exacts a perception of syntax, and opens the full meaning of poetry. The sound Elocutionist is, in my belief, by far the best and truest expositor and lecturer upon our native literature. These topics will give me large matter for my present address.

It may be well first to advert to two prejudices which are current, disparaging to elocutionary teaching. First, it is said, that Nature is a sufficient, and the best guide. Next, that the study of elocution makes people theatrical and affected. I shall treat these objections consecutively. They are met on the surface of society too often to admit of my neglecting or dissembling them.

First, those who maintain that we have only to abandon ourselves to NATURE and all will go right, cannot deliberately intend to lay this down as a universal, nor even as a general truth. Listen to the speech of an uneducated peasant. Does he, or does he not, speak "naturally?" Certainly neither his utterance of syllables and elementary sounds, nor the intonations of his voice, are exactly what you would wish to hear from your sons and daughters. Nature in each individual is not always perfect, but is often directly the opposite. We have our natural foibles, our peculiarities, of which it is desirable to get rid: moreover if one boy have a peculiarity very marked, he perhaps becomes unawares Elocution-master to a whole troop of play-fellows; so that, first in one village, next in a whole district, a local trick of utterance is propagated. We all know, that of mere vowels and consonants there is in each nation a definite sound, which is received as that of the most cultivated and refined society: words also are understood to be made up of these, with the accent on a definite syllable. Therefore, neither do we approve of giving to English vowels French sounds, nor of pronouncing a word with a wrong English vowel, as *pisantry* for *peasantry*. In maintaining that Nature suffices for good elocution, people really mean that those who have been brought up in what is called "good society" learn from that society the pure sounds of our language. This must be entirely admitted. Educated parents and other elder kinsfolk, are themselves the best of all primary teachers; and of course, we do not calculate on hearing from the lips of the gentry the coarse or inaccurate sounds of provincial rustics. Not but that the study and analysis of the rustic sounds has its instruction. From some we hear foreign vowels, and in the brogue foreign consonants: but (as a general remark) in nearly all there is something *superfluous*. If in sport we imitate the speech of another, or, as it is called, "take him off," we do this by marking and perhaps slightly exaggerating every peculiarity; just as in

caricature an artist gives prominence to every feature which deviates from the standard. A peasant adds to his vowels some note of emotion when no emotion is intended, or some musical circumflex when nothing in the grammar requires it. General Uncouthness is the result of all emphasis out of place. In refined persons and in the more refined sex the very opposite fault is to be expected, namely, that Tameness which results from timidity and from the absence of emphasis. Nevertheless, it is not much to concede, that, so far as *conversation* is concerned, few ladies who have been reared in refined circles need training in elocution :—if *this* be what is meant by the sufficiency of Nature. Reading, not conversation, is the trying test; and in the case of men, we might add, public speaking. In addressing a vast crowd, nearly every thing has to be sacrificed to the single effort of being audible. With this I have at present no further concern than to observe, that great accuracy and clearness in the articulation of consonants will often make up for deficiency in the volume of voice; and that even here a judicious teacher may certainly give to a speaker much aid. How the Elocutionist develops in his pupil a due understanding and feeling of Literature, will be presently set forth.

I pass to the second objection or prejudice, which is sometimes stated in this form; that, in expressing sentiment and emotion, Nature herself will supply the appropriate modifications of utterance; but that if we study them, it makes us THEATRICAL and affected.—True, as regards our own daily emotions; but how does this apply to reading? By reading what another has written or said, we do not forthwith put on his actual feelings; we do not get his heart inside us. In imitating what we suppose him to have felt, we are of course liable to over-act as well as to fall short. *Hypocrisy* in Greek meant *oratorical delivery;* good reading is in some sense the acting of a part, an imitation, a hypocrisy. If we will *not* act a part, our reading is wooden, tame or otherwise disagree-

able; but of course we may act it badly, and a teacher may teach badly. To read theatrically would assuredly be a fault. It would also be a fault to dance across a drawing room instead of walking: but if ladies, from being taught to dance, fell into this fault, we should impute it to bad taste, or to want of judgment in their teachers.

What is meant by being "theatrical?" Two stages of contrast exist, and ought to exist, between the recitation suited to a chamber and that which is adopted in a theatre. *First;* in a very large room and numerous audience, whose heads break the wave of sound and set it straying in cross eddies, all the secondary tones of voice need to be somewhat louder and more marked. As scene-painting must be coarse and bold, so must recitation in the amphitheatre; for, what is delicate is ill-discerned, and that is in general alone effective which is highly coloured. Not only must the general flood of voice be more copious, but the minor intonations must have more than proportionate energy. Thus grief is made deep grief, joy is rapturous joy, hope is thrilling hope, fear is trembling fear, and so on: moreover, the art of the dramatist throws in, between, some tame or silly buffoonery to relieve (I suppose) the tension of the nearer part of the audience, who might be worn out by too continuous a spasm of emotion. Whether all this is high art or a depravation of art, it does not belong to me to discuss; but certainly it is to this that huge theatres lead. Amid the buzz to be ordinarily expected from a vast audience, and the broken surfaces on which the voice falls, the cultivation of delicacy is difficult, and is ill repaid. Thus theatrical utterance is not a mere magnifying of common speech, but contains a peculiar magnifying of its modifications, and of every thing emotional. It may therefore be compared, not so much to the view of a human face seen through a common magnifying lens, as to the view given by one which at the same time exaggerates the distinctive features. In short, it is in some sense a caricature; just as is the old Epic poetry, where all passions

and powers are greater than in nature.—But *besides*, there is such a thing as the moderated or private theatrical style. In it, no great volume of voice is needed, and no exaggeration ought to be admitted: nevertheless it differs from simple reading. For by the number of actors, by the continuity of representation, and by the consistency of the assumed characters,—not to speak of dress and scenes,—the imagination of both speaker and hearer is far more keenly excited than by an ordinary reader, or than by the speaker of a single speech, unsupported by circumstantials. The actor throws himself into the assumed personality with more self-abandonment: completer imitation is attempted; and the hearers, wound up by preparation, follow with intenser sympathy. Hence we accept with pleasure expressions of passion, which would be too deep for our ordinary unprepared mood. As it is proverbial that the sublime is but a step from the ridiculous; as bombast and rant are a staple of the farce writer; so in common reading too much *pathos* becomes *bathos*, and offends.

All this may be frankly admitted, nay, strongly insisted upon, without at all admitting that even exercises purely theatrical tend generally to theatrical reading or speaking. It would be as just to say that dancing tends generally to fantastic walking. The individual, not the art, must be in such case blamed. Indeed, I have been assured by one who made practical elocution the business of his life,—to whose teaching I was much indebted in my school-boy days,—that in a vast majority of cases the great difficulty is to induce the pupil to imitate and reproduce *strongly enough* the sounds uttered by the master. He said, that unless the master's tones are somewhat overdone at first,—that is, somewhat theatrical,—many pupils do not hear and understand them. That this is true, I do not dare to assert: but I can believe, that the case of the Elocutionist is similar to that of the Writing Master. If a parent remonstrated against his daughter being taught to write text hand,—said it was too masculine, and that he wished for more delicate and fluent writing; it would be

replied, that the object of the magnified hand is to cultivate the eye into an accurate idea of the forms to be aimed at. The practice may easily be overdone: yet the principle is reasonable. I have heard it said, that artists never more successfully strike off in few lines the likeness of a human countenance, than when they have first learned to draw a caricature of it. For, a caricature exaggerates every peculiarity, and one who knows what these are, has afterwards only to soften,—to subdue,—and he gets the effective likeness, no longer extravagant. Taste, which adds the final perfection to works of art, is not a creative, so much as a repressive and retrenching faculty. In the history, alike of individual minds, and of Art in general, including poetry, the Creative and Shaping power must come first, and is comparatively rugged, massive, perhaps extravagant; afterwards follows the Taste which sobers, chastises, refines. If it be clearly understood that the pupil shall not be left in the first stage,—just as in writing he must not stick in large text; but, on whatever scale he begin, he must soon come down to small hand and end in running hand,—the teacher of Elocution must be allowed to take his own course with beginners, and must not be put into trammels by our fear and dislike of theatrical utterances.

But what is it that he has to teach? His subject has four different heads, of which the first and most necessary is in many cases achieved without him. It is, *Articulation*; or the expressing of single words, as they might be read in a dictionary, with the pure and true sounds. The children of the gentry, especially young ladies who have been taught at home, have seldom much to blame in their speech. Special impediments and inaccuracies are exceptional. Nevertheless, very few boys, and (I presume) still fewer girls open their lips as widely as they ought, if they are to be heard distinctly. A certain laziness leads very many to allow their lips to intercept the voice, with the result of mumbling and confusion of sound. The lips must necessarily close momentarily or the teeth come

down on the lower lip, to sound the lip-letters, (the *labials,* b p f v,) but in the intervals the mouth should be kept well open; and a volume of sound proportional to the apartment should be sustained. Again, to get power for this, breath must be taken fully at each critical division of a sentence. These are perhaps the chief matters, under the head of *Articulation,* which are needed ordinarily in a class of the best selected pupils. Nevertheless it is generally instructive to go into the various systems of consonants and of vowels, beyond anything that is contained in the grammar of a single language, since it is by contrast that sounds (as all other things) are best understood. It is well for the pupils' ear to appreciate exactly the errors of provincial vowels, the difference of French and English a, u, o, t, d, r; the different lisps of r, the essential character of the consonantal brogue in Ireland, as well as the organic actions which distinguish English t, French t, English th and Irish or Oriental t. All such practice conduces to accurate and easy enunciation.

The four heads of Elocutionary teaching may be denoted as Articulation, Inflexion, Intonation and Rhythm; and I must dwell further on the three last. *Inflexion* is the musical sliding of the voice up or down, as when one sounds a violin string with the bow, and simultaneously runs the finger of the left hand up or down, pressing the string against the finger-board. The interval through which the note uttered by the voice rises or falls, depends on the state of emotion. In joy (for instance) in acute grief, and in anger, the rise or fall is greater than in tranquil speech; while in melancholy it is smaller, and something of monotony is felt. But whether the voice is to rise or to fall, depends upon the *grammar* of the sentence; in fact, Inflexion may be called a grammatical index. We cannot fail to note at least *four* inflexions; the extreme rising, the extreme falling, the middle falling, and the middle rising: besides which, there are *circumflexes* of the voice, in which rise and fall are combined. The extreme

inflexions are best heard in a question which puts an alternative: as: "Is it líght? or dàrk?" Here, without affectation the rise may be strongly marked, even without emotion. The sound is best heard, when prolonged upon a final vowel. "Is it néw? or old?" The voice upon an ordinary nominative before a verb is simply sustained; but when a nominative is composed of a long phrase, with a slight pause at the end before the verb, the extreme rising inflexion at the pause marks the completion of the complex nominative: and similarly at the close of a hypothesis, just before what grammarians call the *apodosis*.—When a sentence is broken into two, with the former part complete in grammar, yet in thought incomplete without the latter,—the former seems naturally with us to end in the *middle* falling or half-falling inflexion; while the penultimate inflexion is the middle or half-rising, preparing the mind for the close. The following sentence may exhibit all four inflexions, if it be understood as completing all that we are urging,—

"When the Romans were poór, (1) they robbed mankìnd (2): but when they became rích (3), they slew one another (4)."

Here (1) marks the extreme rising inflexion, as appropriate to *poor;* (2) marks the middle falling, on the syllable—*kind;* (3) marks the middle rising, on *rich;* and (4) denotes the extreme falling. As a second illustration of the four inflexions, I give the following; although it is not essential so to read the sentence.

"Men's évil (1) manners live in bràss (2): their vírtues (3) we write in water (4)."

It would not be natural to give the middle rising inflection to *virtues*, unless we intended a final close to the train of thought with the word *water*. Once more; I take a passage of acute grief, in which the rise of inflection is extreme.

Oh Cromwell Cromwell!
Had I but serv'd my Gód (1) with half the zeal
I serv'd my kíng (1), Hé (1) would not in my age (4)
Have left me naked to my ènemies (3).

But, I must now add, no nation can on these matters lay down the law to other nations. As far as I can learn and discover, the French differ decidedly from the English, and the Scotch have a peculiarity of their own, which laughs to scorn all our rules. A few words on this topic are essential. In English, each word has an accent of its own, fixed on one syllable; and it seems to us to consist in a *stress*, not in musical elevation, except in regard to certain words called Interrogative. Perhaps in all there is really some elevation, though we are hardly aware of it; but the elevation of note accompanying our accent is certainly less than in Greek or Italian. But the Scotch just reverse the rule, and *depress* the musical note of the accented syllable; whence the strange waving sound which we call *sing-song* in the Scotch. Such a phenomenon brings into strong light the impossibility of appealing to "Nature" for the decision of controversies concerning speech. We must confine ourselves within the limits of English, and within them study what best harmonizes with its own analogies, and at the same time best brings out the sense. We ourselves have anomalies of principle. Thus, when a question is asked by means of an interrogative particle, we drop the voice at the end; but if the question be asked by a verb without a particle, (in which case the reply is necessarily either Yes or No,) we raise the voice ordinarily to its extreme pitch. Nevertheless in Latin, Greek and some other tongues, an interrogative particle is added in the latter case also. It is possible, that we regard every such question as mutilated, being only the first part of an alternative. Thus: "Is he cóming? *(or nȯt?)*"—When the portion, *or not?* is suppressed, the inflexion preceding it retains still the extreme rising inflexion. Nevertheless, this suffices to suggest that different nations might decide on a different practice. Indeed we ourselves, if a question has to be repeated, drop the voice, as if in token of impatience, and as though we added; "Tell me;" *imperatively.*

The *circumflex* is common in lively, vehement or unrestrained utterance, but nearly vanishes in a subdued or diplomatic style. To speak of it vaguely,—it adds to the intensity of emphasis, and can generally be superseded by inserting particles. Thus: "Sell my field to *you?* I would not sell it to the *king*." Here a wave of the voice is admissible on each of the emphatic words, each wave being a circumflex, but of opposite kind. We may paraphrase the sentence into a less familiar form: thus: "Shall I sell my field to *one who has so little pretensions as* you? I would not sell it *even* to the king." Circumflexes are then no longer needed. And so much may here suffice to say about them.

It will be seen from what has been said, that Grammar is generally that which decides the right inflexion. But Grammar must be understood to include something of Rhetoric, as well as of Logic. When a grammarian composes a periodic sentence, he is ordinarily supposed to know from beginning to end the form which it is to take, and how much it is to include. This may be called the Logical view. But in fact, it most often happens in speech that we begin, not knowing how we shall end; and we pile up, as we proceed, fresh clauses which had not been fore-intended. This being so natural and common, it is often best to read a sentence as on this hypothesis, which may be called that of Rhetoric. When a series of words in apposition occurs, there may be several different ways of reading them, none of which can be called wrong, though one way may be too artificial, another decidedly the most natural. If I wish to recount 3, 4, 5 or more objects, and know from the beginning the exact number, I shall probably put the particle *and* before the last, and sustain the voice until I come to the last, which will then have a falling inflection, if it end the sentence or complete the thought. Thus: "I had in my pocket a clásp knife, a piece of córd and a sailor's neèdle-case." But if the series of things is not completely remembered from the first, the voice drops on each if the sense be complete. For example, let me

take CLARENCE'S imperfect enumeration of the things seen in his dream.

> I thought I saw a thousand fearful wrècks,
> A thousand mèn, that fishes gnàw'd upon;
> Wedges of gòld, great ànchors, heaps of peàrl,
> Inestimable stònes, unvalued jèwels.

In this pronunciation, (the voice dropping where the grave accent is marked,) it is assumed that the speaker felt his thought completed at *wrecks*, and again at *men;* then, as after-thought, added a description of *men*. But the voice will be sustained on *men*, if from the first mention of a *thousand* he intends and foreknows the whole line. Again, the three last clauses are not coördinate and descriptive of different things, but the *pearls* are species, the *stones* and *jewels* are genus, containing the pearls as a part. Evidently then the two last clauses are after-thought, being attempts to say the thing better: hence the voice must drop. But it might be sustained on the words *gold* and *anchors*, if at the beginning of that line the speaker already had in his mind the three sets of objects which the line enumerates, and conceived of them as making up a whole. In this way the same passage often admits of several ways of reading it; yet one, perhaps, most to be approved. The same holds as to *emphasis*, which, as it were, stands between my second head, Inflexion, and my third, Intonation. In part through the defect of our language or want of skill in using it, mere grammar fails to show which word in a sentence is emphatic. Latin, and still more completely Greek, may denote the emphatic word by a light particle, or by the arrangement of words. Our particles are too heavy, and generally prosaic, or the exigencies of metre throw words into a wrong order. Hence it is often an open question with a reciter, what is the best mode of emphasis. Sometimes indeed he prefers to sacrifice in it the guidance of metrical accent. These remarks will show how much there may be to study in detail.

But we are led on to the third head, which I called *Intonation.* It carries us beyond mere grammar, into the sphere of emotion, and peculiarly affects the vowels. It may also give a certain spasmodic force to consonants. Every vowel, without losing its own nature, or its fundamental peculiarity as English, admits many modes of utterance suited to different states of feeling, besides that tremulousness which weakness, old age, grief, or a conflict of several emotions may cause. Those who have never looked closely into the subject will yet easily convince themselves of this, by considering how differently they utter the interjection oh! under different passions,—fear, surprize, admiration, pain, longing desire, pity, tender remembrance, or pleasure at some little discovery. Fear, surprize and pain need no literary illustration. But I may select a few examples of other sentiment.

Oh glorious sight! *oh* mighty day to come! *(admiration)*
Oh for a lodge in some vast wilderness! *(desire)*
Oh pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth! *(compassion)*
Oh then, I see, queen Mab has been with you. *(playful pleasure)*

The vowel *o* admits all the same varieties of sound, when it is in the middle of a word; and the same is true of other long vowels, e, a, i, oo. A short vowel passes so quickly, that it has fewer modifications. It is even possible to graduate intensity of the same feeling on the same vowel, in a sort of climax. Thus, with the long *e* sound in *dear.*

Dear lost companions of my tuneful art,
Dear as the light that visits these sad eyes;
Dear as the ruddy drops that warm my heart:
Yê dîed amid your dying coùntry's cries.

Tender feeling is generally in a tenor voice; when it deepens into grief or mingles with indignation it descends into a bass, or culminates into a high note. Here *Ye* and *Died* admit of a powerful circumflex.

It is not a mere fantasy to compare the sounds of the vowels under strong emotion to geometrical forms. In abrupt

command, pride and self-assertion, a vowel (such as the pronoun *I*) ends abruptly and square, perhaps explosively; while in tenderness it tapers off gradually and is elongated: in hope it swells into greater fulness than at the origin, but continues smooth to the end: while in harsher passion the sounds are grating or tremulous, and have less purity. Practice in many such forms of expression not only enables a person to put forth the utterances of passion, on occasion; but, what is far more to be desired, it implants so keen a sense of what they mean, as to conduce to an avoidance of them, when they are not wanted. The rustic, as I said above, clogs his enunciation with a disagreeable superfluity of intonations which have no meaning whatever. To polish these away leaves the effigy of our speech well shapen and smooth, with nothing that can be caricatured.

It is impossible to *describe* with full accuracy, and for any valuable purpose, the various intonation which passion gives to speech. It must be learned, partly by hearing it from the lips of a teacher, partly by our inward sympathy. Duly to excite this, the mind needs to be somewhat wound up; hence a reading somewhat continuous is in general needed, before the learner can throw his heart into the feeling of the subject. It may be added, that, by reason of the soul's unity, our whole person can scarcely help moving in harmony with the assumed sentiment. The effort of Imagination will hardly succeed, unless we allow all the parts of human nature to move together. If it be possible, yet it is difficult, to give to the voice the tones of compassion and tenderness, and not assume also the countenance of compassion and tenderness. If the voice is rightly to imitate fixed determination, so perhaps must the eye and the other features. Up to this point, it must be confessed, that the study of elocution is theatrical. Nay, to the beginner the stronger imitation may be easier than the weaker, if no sufficient excitement of the imagination be gained from more delicate expression: or, to

put it otherwise, possibly a stronger development of the passions in a *teacher* may usefully wind up the imagination of the *pupil* to a milder expression of the same.

After Articulation, Inflexion and Intonation, it remains to speak of Rhythm. There ought to be some rhythm, even in prose. Prose is so often ill-written, that, to read it, is peculiarly difficult. Talk is natural, prose is artificial. A periodical style may be, and often is, painfully long-winded and complex. When parentheses intervene, it is often difficult to sustain the connexion of the parts; moreover the proper emphasis is often not discerned until too late. A style too short or too devoid of periods, is apt to be disagreeably monotonous, like a modern street of dwelling houses. If the structure of several sentences in succession, all short, be cast on the same mould, it is very hard by any skill of reading to avoid unpleasantness. The same is true of Poetry, if the divisions of the line, called Cæsuras, are too little varied. A wooden hurdy-gurdy jingle will then follow, unless varied emotion redeem it from this ugly fault. But in general, Poetry has in its metre a better and more marked rhythm than Prose; and because it is in this respect more artificial still, more careful instruction will not be lavished on it in vain. To those who imagine that Nature without cultivation suffices for good reading, it may be proper to present the fact, that Nature does not suffice to decide whether poetry shall be *read* or *sung*. In the earliest development, when music and poetry were alike rudimentary, it would seem that the poetry was everywhere sung, as now among the musically-disposed Africans, and (I believe) among Arabs. But such music is very simple, and becomes a monotonous recitative, of which our ears are soon tired. Few persons will bestow more praise on it, than to say, that it is certainly better than the doggrel sing-song which the uneducated invent,—most naturally! The polished Greeks and Romans became so accustomed to a few recitatives, as to dispense with the aid of the lyre for them; but all the

newer and more complicated poetry was set to music, and their metres were determined by *musical time*. On the contrary, our metres are determined by the *prose-accent* of words, not by musical time at all: hence our metres are strictly *Oratorical*. Time with us plays a secondary part, but not to define the metre; only to add fulness, smoothness, or force. The ancient Greeks totally neglected the prose-accent in their metres; the Latins allowed to it a secondary influence, which grammarians disguise as a law of cæsura. When two different principles thus combine, taste and experience are exercised to blend them aright. An Englishman, in reading his native poetry, must bring out the law of the metre just clearly enough to catch the ear, but not so forcibly as either to be mechanical, or drown other qualities. To no small extent a good reader will cast a veil over a poet's bad execution: he may often disguise monotony, hurry over weakness or delicately assist it. When the metre (especially what is called Anapæstic) is too jumping, he may subdue it into steadiness and equability. If the matter have weight and the expression dignity, much may be done to redeem the imperfections of form: and such cares, towards the older, more rugged and negligent poetry, may be called filial duteousness, when the substantial merit deserves them. But, to attain any such skill in reading, is a cultivated art, and must not be ordinarily expected as a wild growth. In learning to play on a musical instrument, and even in singing, a pupil often is required to execute conjunctions of sound perhaps difficult, which have no beauty in themselves: yet by this exercise the *power* of delicate and prompt expression is gained. So in Elocution many utterances may be studied and practised which are not likely to be much used, if nevertheless they conduce to cultivation of the ear and command of the voice. Nay, dull pupils are sometimes wakened up, and lazy pupils abashed, by that which to Elocution is Satire; I mean, by that out-and-out perversion of reading which turns faults to

ridicule. Thus to exhibit the absurdity of very monotonous reading, or of a wooden pomposity, a teacher may read the same piece with the humdrum tones of a schoolboy, and again with the sonorous recitation of a magistrate's clerk. After this, if he read it in the correct mode, the contrast brought out may cause it to be better appreciated by the untrained ear. To avoid encouraging that very evil taste and very easy trick of turning what is beautiful or noble into bombast, it may be safer to confine such ridiculous exhibitions to sentences of no intrinsic interest or value.

I hope it has been seen, in the above, how valuable a mental exercise is the practice of recitation. It will often happen that in the private reading of a piece of poetry,—say, a speech of tragedy or an elaborate ode,—a young person carries off but a tame and dry conception; but on hearing it powerfully read, finds that it has a depth of feeling and variety of allusion which had previously escaped notice. In order to read even with right inflexions, a sound understanding of the syntax is needed. This is something. But it is far more, to enter into the delicate shades of sentiment or deeper emotions, which lie beneath the letter, and are not really expressed on the page. No reading of poetry or of classically written prose conveys the whole sense to the hearer's heart, unless there is feeling in the utterance; and to be able readily to express the feeling of any proposed passage, is a high test of delicately cultivated sentiment. The Elocutionist is the best commentator on a noble literature; for he comments, not by dead notes written *about* the thing, but by bringing the thing *itself* into the hearer's mind and heart, by causing that heart to commune with and share the author's sentiment, and as it were weep or rejoice with him. Science may cultivate the Understanding and the power of pure Reason; but only literature, teeming with moral thought, can cultivate the Sentiment. To inculcate,—to preach,—is ordinarily of little avail; but utterances coming, as though

unawares, out of the heart find a way to the heart. That a pupil understands and feels what has been written, is in no way so well proved as by his reciting the words with judgment and feeling.

But let me not be supposed to think that *all* emotion alike deserves to be studied, contemplated, imitated and as it were blazoned out elaborately. On the contrary, to me the great depravation of Art seems to lie in lavishing it on unworthy subjects. Art ought to *select* what is beautiful or otherwise noble, not waste itself on the odious or worthless. The objection to what is called Theatrical, (against which I have hitherto contended as overstrained or out of place,) is sometimes only a less accurate phrase for objecting to harsh, fierce, envious, malicious, proud, revengeful or otherwise base emotions, as objects to be dwelt on closely, to be assumed in imagination, and expressed by the voice. Most of these are peculiarly odious from a female mouth; many of them, I am disposed to say, from any mouth; and at least they need to be severely kept down.. The speeches of Satan in Milton are to my feeling a most painful subject for oratorical exercise. When detestable utterances cease to be a pain to us, they begin to deprave us. What motive can there be, adequate to justify dwelling on them and filling imagination and memory with them? Yet, excluding the fierce, the malicious, the coarse, and (what perhaps of all is worst) the voluptuous; we have abundant material for the oratorical exercise of either sex. Simple narrative, light and easy dialogue, the sweet, the pathetic, the complaining, the pitying, the mirthful, the congratulatory, the reproving or mild upbraiding, besides the virtuously indignant, the gravely tender, the solemn and the religious,—afford us surely sufficient exercise of Elocution. Perhaps even virtuous indignation should come forth with chastened tones from a woman's mouth: on that I will not dogmatize. But I insist, that indignation, virtuous scorn and hatred of evil furnish a complete exercise of all the harsher

and sterner tones, without putting into the lips of boy or girl any sentiment intrinsically hateful.

Under such limitations, with such precautions, I hold Elocution to be a valuable part of general Education. It remains only to say, that, like Vocal Music, it is peculiarly fitted for class-teaching. Pupils who are dull of ear, and do not at first learn well from the master, sometimes learn gradually from the recitations of other pupils and from the successive repetition. I therefore look with high hope to the ultimate success of this too much neglected accomplishment.

NATIONAL LOANS.

MARCH, 1862.—ON MR. CHASE'S FIRST BUDGET.

THE present generation of Englishmen has well-nigh forgotten all alarm about depreciated bank-paper suggested by our own history. But the state of Austrian and Turkish finance, to which of late the Russian also has seemed to be tending, keep up among us a wholesome jealousy, and make it certain that Parliament would unceremoniously reject all schemes of unconvertible paper money, which seems so advantageous to some ingenious theorists. That when a government spends more than it receives, it is very apt to play hurtful tricks with the currency, is seen plainly enough. That, under the same circumstances, it is generally glad to get large loans, is also plain. Borrowing and beggary are so near akin in private life that it is natural to suspect that in public affairs also they cannot be dissociated. On the other hand, there is an old-fashioned school, perhaps not very small, though it seldom speaks loudly, which laughs at our national debt as a harmless bugbear, and calls it a great convenience. The late Lord MACAULAY, keenly as he bantered SOUTHEY for the notion that the national debt is "a momentous benefit to the country," nevertheless looked somewhat compassionately on the alarms with which the historian HUME regarded the growth of the debt in its earlier stages. The ease with which England has borne that weight, under which the Continent

expected us to sink forty-five years ago, has possibly aided to corrupt the despotic powers into a belief that they might dare with impunity all that we have dared in matter of debt. The Hungarians indeed, whose parliament always protested against Austrian loans, and never would commit themselves into any participation, took a harmless vengeance in a jocose tale, which may be read in Mrs. PULSZKY'S pleasant *Traditions of Hungary.* A Hungarian knight therein mortgages his estate deeply, encouraged by a profound friar, who had taught him that among animals man is distinguished, not by strength, or skill, or industry, but by "ability to borrow." "A day will come," says the inspired man, "when civilization will be tested by the use which the nations make of their greatest human prerogative, CREDIT; when those will be the most powerful missionaries of civilization who have the largest national debt; though there will always be narrow-minded fools to preach financial reform, unaware of the constitution of mankind, and of their glorious privilege."

The popedom, as RANKE informs us, took the lead in this civilizing process,—mortgaging of the taxes. The Turks, as they were last to enter the European system, so have been last to imitate our inveterate vice; nor is any power likely to suffer more from it. In truth, it is a practice which, like all other uses of credit, is profitable or ruinous according to circumstances. In private business, mortgages made judiciously, by those who have property but need money, are not only legitimate, but necessary; while debts contracted by a poor man beyond his power of paying are obviously a short road to ruin. Moreover, excesses of this kind may be borne, though not without mischief, by a thriving power, which every ten years is more populous and richer than before; and yet may easily prove destructive to states which, like Turkey, are in a process of chronic dwindling. It is a wholesome symptom that, even in the case of so flourishing and youthful a power as the United States, English opinion has shuddered at the enormous loan disclosed in Mr. CHASE'S first budget.

We rejoice in the alarm which it excited, although the objections made to it were in several respects overstrained. Vast as was the cost of war fifty years ago, it is much greater now. A steam navy, by reason of the engines and the consumption of coal, involves expenses undreamed of in former years. The recent improvements in fire-arms make cannons, rifles, and revolver-pistols far more costly instruments than their predecessors were. The cost of the new ammunition—long balls and shells—is immense. Moreover, owing to the high wages of America, and the high scale of physical comfort in which the lowest classes live, the maintenance of soldiers is set at a price previously unknown. Further, as the treasury and the arsenals had been fraudulently emptied, an enormous expense was to be suddenly incurred in undertaking a great war; and since to develop the whole strength of the North in the shortest possible time was an obvious precept of *economy*, the magnitude of the first year's expense was far beyond previous experience. When the amount which Mr. CHASE was borrowing was first announced, before all the circumstances of it could be tranquilly considered, it is not wonderful that the prevalent sentiment in England was that of disapproval and censure.

Behind all the other questions involved in national debt, lies deeply hidden that of its *morality;* and to evade this inquiry is the last thing we should desire. The morality of a pecuniary transaction is not of a highly recondite character; nor do we need other aids of analysis and investigation than those familiar to political economists. In approaching this investigation, the matter of first importance is, to reduce the problem to its greatest possible simplicity, and exclude every thing extraneous. Afterwards we must add, first one, and then a second circumstance, ever approximating towards the actual case, and consider how far they affect the results. Let us then begin by supposing all the taxable property of a nation to be accumulated in the hands of one man; moreover, to exclude merely political complication of the problem,

suppose the government, which taxes, to be wholly exterior to the community, as in fact the case with the Queen of England in India. We will imagine the government in some one year to desire an extra 200,000*l.* for a small war. When the demand is presented to the taxpayer, he grumbles so much that the government consents to *borrow* the money of him, and promises him 5 per cent. upon it in future years. On this understanding he parts with his 200,000*l.* willingly, and rejoices in his heart at the 10,000*l.* a year which he is going to add to his fortune. But when the year ends, he finds 10,000*l.* to be added to the yearly taxes as interest of the debt; and as he is the only tax-payer, this sum is necessarily exacted of him, but is immediately after repaid to him as interest on his patriotic loan. The same process is repeated in every successive year. Hence he needs no deep financial knowledge to discover that he in reality paid down as a *direct tax* the 200,000*l.* which he was graciously permitted to advance as a loan. The capital went from him in the first year, and no accession of money from interest on it (whether it be called 5 per cent. or 50 per cent.) ever replenishes his coffers.

If, instead of *one* tax-payer, there had been *ten* of equal means, and every one of them advanced exactly one-tenth part of the loan, each expecting to receive 1000*l.* a year as interest, the case would be as before. For each would have to pay exactly 1000*l.* a year more as taxes, if we suppose the system of taxation to be strictly just. Evidently also, if three of them clubbed together as partners, taking a threefold portion of the loan, expecting 3000*l.* as interest, but paying an increase of 3000*l.* in taxes, they also would have lost entirely the money paid as a loan. Thus we safely reach the conclusion, that *in whatever proportions property is held, and by however many persons,* yet, *if all contribute to the loan in the exact proportion of their wealth,* and taxation is in that same proportion, there is no difference whatever between supporting the public expenses by a loan or by immediate taxation, *so long as these same persons, and* NO OTHERS, *pay the interest of the loan.*

Change the case. Suppose only two tax-payers, A and B, equally wealthy; and that when the demand of 100,000*l.* each comes upon them, B shows himself so reluctant, that the government resolves to borrow the whole 200,000*l.* of A, who (at 5 per cent.) now counts as before on an accession of 10,000*l.* to his fortune. But since A and B are each taxed an extra 5000*l.* to defray the interest of this loan, A finds that he has added only 5000*l.* a year to his income, and this is merely the interest of the 100,000*l.* which he paid to the government *beyond* what would have been his assessment had there been no loan. On the other hand, B pays 5000*l.* a year as a penalty for having evaded the payment of 100,000*l.* in the previous year. This suggests what might have come about had the government insisted on direct taxation. Namely, B (whether unable to bear the thought of paying down so large a sum at once, or, from finding himself deficient in *cash*, however abounding in property) applies to A for a loan of the 100,000*l.* which the government insists on exacting, and promises to reimburse him by 5 per cent. upon it annually. In consequence, A pays 100,000*l.* for himself direct to the exchequer, and lends a second 100,000*l.* to B, which B pays as direct taxation. Thus, when the year ends, A has to receive 5000*l.* from B, exactly as under the former hypothesis, when A paid the whole 200,000*l.* as a loan to the exchequer. It comes to the same (*if we suppose* B *to be solvent*) whether A lend the 100,000*l.* to B, or lend it to the government.

Most readers will see of themselves that it does not affect the argument, if we suppose the symbol A no longer to represent an individual, but a commercial company such as those of the Roman *publicani*, or one presided over by a BARING or ROTHSCHILD. If we first imagine A to contain a hundred or a thousand persons holding equal property (therefore equally taxable), and holding also equal shares in the government loan, this does but distribute amongst them, first, the burden of the loan, next, the advantage of its interest. Nor does it make any difference whatever to B,—who evades in the first

year the large sudden extra-taxation, and in after years pays as interest on the sum evaded, the very same amount of new taxes,—whether A be an individual or a company. Also, if we separate the payment made by the company A into two parts, —the one being that to which the individuals are liable, on the principle of immediate taxation proportioned to their wealth, (which above was 100,000*l.*)—then in considering their advancing the second 100,000*l.* as loan, we see it to be quite irrelevant to this argument whether they hold shares in the loan just proportioned to their wealth, or in any other proportion whatever. It is the same to the government, which has in every case to raise the same amount of new taxes on the same payers, and to refund them to A. It is the same to B, who pays the same sum.

So again, if B, instead of being an individual, is a company or nation of men differing largely in wealth, neither does this any way change our conclusion, provided that all taxation is in exact proportion to wealth. They still buy the immediate convenience of exemption from a large sudden payment by having to pay perpetually in future years. They pay this to the government (which for their convenience has borrowed it of A), exactly as they would have had to pay interest, had they themselves borrowed it of A, when the government relentlessly demanded instant payment.

The dealings of the Roman republic in its provinces may serve to exhibit how much less merciful is direct and sudden taxation than the modern system of loans, *if* money *must* be had; that is, if the refusing of the loan do not force the government to go without the money, whether by not entering on war, or by some other economy. A Lucullus or a Pompey is about (we will suppose) to lead an army into Armenia. The senate sends out to him a certain amount of money and warlike supplies, and orders him to make requisitions on a large scale from all the towns and petty kings in Asia Minor. The proconsuls in Ephesus, Nicomedia, Cilicia, &c. of course obediently respond to his demand. He himself puts pressure

on the kings. Every city, town, and village is called upon for large contributions. The country farmers have to pay in corn, sheep, and horses, all of first importance to an army; but of the towns money is demanded, which the general intends to lay out according to circumstances. In many places money was probably forthcoming; but if, as often happened, the towns had already been largely drained of gold and silver, they had no resource but to borrow it. The accommodating omnipresent *publicanus* readily offered to lend the sum required, and the very fact of his offer necessarily made the proconsul relentless in his demands. The town which was able to borrow the money could not pretend inability to pay the tax; and the *publicanus* had admirable facility in screwing up the rate of interest, under the stringent demands of immediate payment which warlike necessities enforced. We know from CICERO'S letters that Roman knights, whom he regarded as agents of his virtuous friend BRUTUS, exacted of the Salaminians 4 per cent. *per month*, in spite of the decree of the senate, which set 1 per cent. *per month* as the maximum. Without going back to times of pagan cruelty, we cannot but see how much more merciful to all rather needy people it is (if needy people must be taxed), that the exchequer should borrow the money *for* them, rather than force them to borrow of a professional money-lender. For, of necessity, his risk is so great in lending to the poor that he must charge a high rate of interest. The oppression would be unendurable if individuals had to borrow on the strength of their own credit. Supposing the new taxes to be assessed upon towns and parishes, and each district to raise them as they pleased, as the Turks used to deal with the Greeks, it is possible that no loans at all would be requisite, but the demand might be every where answered by direct payment. But if there were any unfairness in the taxation, such as is difficult to avoid in a complex nation, we should see the same result as in the Roman empire, viz. the town or parish collectively would burden itself with debt; and though it would not be drained

at the horrible rate which the moneyed orders of old Rome thought reasonable, it would certainly pay on a far higher scale than a GLADSTONE, a PEEL, or perhaps even a PERCIVAL, ever sanctioned. Thus *from immediate taxation loans may come back on the community in a worse shape.*

It may not be uninteresting to consider the position of things which would almost necessarily be introduced by a machinery of taxation analogous to that of ancient Athens. As our object is scientific, not historical, we need not pretend to be very learned and accurate; but it lies on the face of that history, as developed in the times of DEMOSTHENES, that the citizens were formed into classes with a special view to taxation. When extra expenditure was essential for military service, a war-tax (εἰσφορά) was decreed; for the idea of the State itself contracting a loan did not find entrance. Each class (συμμορία) was intended to contain citizens of very diverse taxable capacity, which strongly contrasts them to the graduated classes of the Roman republic. The tax was decreed at so much per cent. on men's registered property; perhaps from one-half per cent. to one per cent. But since it was found extremely difficult to collect the tax from the poorer citizens, the richer members of each class had the honourable office of advancing to the State the sum assessed, with permission to get the money back "at their ease," as a learned writer ingeniously expresses himself. Now although patriotism and the desire of popularity may go some way in reconciling richer men to pay poorer people's taxes, this must evidently find a speedy limit. Either the rich will manage to get their own property immensely undervalued, and by other injurious devices evade proportionate taxation (which, if we believe the invectives of DEMOSTHENES, must have been the door of escape which the rich men of his day discovered), or they must be armed by the State with most formidable powers (such as Roman *publicani* generally obtained from proconsuls) for enforcing the repayment of the taxes which

they have advanced. In fact, we see here reproduced the state of things to which allusion was made hypothetically above. Athens does not contract a loan herself, but, by enacting a direct war-tax, drives her poorer citizens to borrow it of the richer. Whether the same process is that which made the Roman plebeians of the early republic in perpetual debt to the patricians—when war-tax and quit-rent were claimed of them, in spite of their lands being ravaged by the enemy—this is no place to discuss. It suffices to press the fact, that when large moneys must be had suddenly, immediate taxation may be ruinous to the present generation without any benefit to the next.

Of course, if the government were to borrow at a higher rate of interest than the average of private borrowers would have to pay, it would defraud the nation in the future for the benefit of the money-lenders. But such a state of things is hardly possible. It could exist only where the extraordinary tax would be laid solely on those who have tangible property to mortgage, and where the credit of the State was extremely bad. It is not on this side that our hypothetical cases have unfair advantage over actual ones. Undoubtedly we have hitherto introduced as a postulate, what has nowhere been realized in fact, viz. that a system of taxation shall press with strict equability on all, being proportioned to every man's total wealth. On this ground, it may be said, our argument unjustly favours the system of State loans. But it must not be forgotten that the objection is two-edged. For if the substitute for the loan is to be immediate taxation, that taxation (by hypothesis) is tainted by manifold unfairness. This is in each case to be lamented; and inasmuch as men of equal property have unequal income, and men of equal income have very unequal parts of that *disposable*, every scheme of taxation must often press with great inequality. But, in fact, unless we mistake, this very thing is the chief argument *for* State loans, instead of being an argument against them. If England,

in a new war, needed to raise fifty millions additional in the year, then precisely because it is far harder, without unfair inequalities, to lay on new taxes to the amount of fifty millions than to the amount of three millions, (that is, six per cent. on a term of years for a loan of fifty millions), therefore it is better to enter into such a loan. To this is to be added, what is generally more important still, that the new machinery requisite to raise an additional fifty millions by taxes wholly new, would be very wasteful; while, if old taxes be increased in amount, every evil of those taxes is intensified. When they are levied on articles of consumption, they promote adulteration or smuggling, and in numerous ways cripple industry. When they come as a sudden demand of *cash*, whether as tax on income, or assessed on houses, on pieces of property, or on rank, they entail on a whole community severities analogous to those which a poll-tax is liable to inflict on the poor.

We have of late seen the income-tax put up and down so often, and some of our statesmen seem to count so pleasantly on its certain operation when they want money suddenly, that a few more words here on that subject may be allowed. First of all, to prevent misconception, we must distinctly state it as economically undeniable that, where conscientious tax-paying may be counted on, an immovable income-tax is not only the best of all taxes, but in process of time is not felt to be a tax at all. The sum claimed by the tax is then never reckoned by the payer as his own. A professor of chemistry, in estimating his professional income, deducts from the fees of his pupils not only the hire of his rooms, but also the expenses contingent on his experiments. If he be a member of an educational college, which accepts the fees for him, but intercepts one-quarter or one-third to defray the general expenses, he is sensibly in the position of a tradesman from whose earnings the government intercepts one-quarter or one-third to maintain the public defence. If he was born into the system, all his style of living is accommodated to it; nor would

any other pressure be felt by a ten-per-cent. income-tax when it had lasted fifty years than is felt by every man who has 900*l.* a year, and inwardly wishes it were 1000*l.*, or has 90*l.* a year, and wishes it were 100*l.* But the case changes entirely as soon as an *increase* of the tax takes place. The demand being of cash, the payer must lessen other outgoings, which, in the first place, distresses all who are living up to their income, and secondly, impoverishes some trades which lose their custom. And if in a couple of years the tax is taken off, the injustice is felt widely, that it has pressed on transitory income as severely as on perpetual. This complaint (we hold) is economically a blunder, when made against a *perpetual* income-tax, such as Mr. BABBAGE contemplates; but if the tax lasts but for a year or two, the validity of the objection is undeniable and glaring. The longer the tax lasts at its fixed rate, the less is the injustice done to transitory incomes. Yet tradesmen never cry out against its remission, which sufficiently denotes that their real objections to it rest on other grounds than that of *comparative* unfairness. As traders, they have no doubt special discomforts from it; but these are not at all abated by a lowering of its rate, which are felt equally whether it exact two per cent. or ten per cent. Again, in common with all men, they feel the inconvenience of a sudden call to pay down in cash a large sum not previously counted on; yet perhaps this inconvenience is still more severe upon men of fixed income than upon tradesmen, especially since the former habitually live nearer up to their income than is the case with those who are in thriving business.

We need not interrogate economists in particular; for on the surface of history and of life we see how much easier to many men are payments in kind than payments in cash. In old England, as in Illinois or in Croatia, it might be easier for the mass of the thriving cultivators to contribute to the government two pounds' worth of produce than one pound in hard money. Either by assessment or by income-tax, to

demand of a people cash,—beyond a narrow limit, which is determined by the industrial development,—is to commit the cruelty of ordering a universal forced sale of goods, and would drive even Indians into passive resistance. This it was which made our *kings* borrow money of the towns and of the wealthy guilds of London, before the idea of *national* debt by permission of Parliament had arisen. This also it is which suggested to kings in old days, wherever prosperity was high, to keep large hoards of the precious metals in their own treasuries. It is possible, even now, to inquire whether the great constitutional governments of modern times have been wise in entirely discarding the principle of national treasure held in reserve. Where a king governs as well as reigns, a rare instance of economy may be found here or there; but most kings, early or late, have been either indebted or needy. Of course, royal debt and royal treasure are in intense contrariety. To keep money idle while paying interest on borrowed millions, would be a wasteful absurdity, except where the sum kept in hand is so moderate as to be analogous to the ready cash in the pocket of a man who is paying interest on borrowed capital. If the government, upon principle, has habitually lived below its income, and has reserved the balances in a treasury, it is ready for great exigencies. Such a course of conduct demands so much prudence and self-control, that it may seem a paradox to ascribe it to Oriental kings. However, the fact is, that a king of old Persia (for instance) defrayed the greater part of the ordinary expenses of his government by accepting presents *in kind;* expected the subject peoples to bear the expense of his court and retinue wherever he journeyed; and had no urgent need of gold, except for his seraglio and immediate household. Whatever gold was paid in as tribute went into the treasury; and but little came out, except to bribe Greek orators, or to subsidize the petty rivals of some outlying enemy. That the Persian or Assyrian, the Indian or Turk, did not borrow, was due less to the prudence with which he husbanded his resources than to the boldness with

which he could commit rapine on subject populations, while he softened it by indiscriminate acceptance of every thing valuable, whatever its kind. To us, while we pay enormous interest on old debt, all idea of a vast national treasure in reserve is wholly unpractical; yet, if it were effected, it would supply the unusual demands of one year, at the expense of *the past.* And this suggests to inquire whether the opposite method, that of loans, casts this extraordinary expense on *the future,* as is generally supposed to be an axiom. We desire to examine the matter by aid of the reasonings above laid down. In the hypothesis hitherto discussed, we have supposed A and B to be alike taxable subjects of the ruling power. The problem is a little more complicated, yet not essentially different, if the government borrow of some *foreigner,* C, who is not taxable by it, and promise interest, which will of course be paid by its subjects. To them, if we separate economy from general politics, it matters not whether the lender be native or foreign, except in the extreme case of the loan exceeding the entire taxable property of the community, which might happen with a small or infant state. So long as the lenders are subjects, the ruling power *cannot* borrow more property than its subjects possess. When the lender is a foreigner, the theoretic possibility of such a thing arises. The moral right of a government to borrow on no foundation of property at all, and leave the debt to its successor, is certainly not an axiom of politics any more than of private life.

It must be taken for granted that the *movable* wealth of a people is the absolute property of the existing generation. It is made for consumption, and nearly all of it will perish without use, if not used. If it be wholly applied to transitory indulgence, or wasted in wars which bring not even the pleasure of victory, the next generation will be far worse off than if a large part of it had taken an abiding material form serviceable to posterity, or had been expended in raising the intellectual and moral state of parents and children alike.

But it is one thing to say that our fathers might have done better for us, and ought to have done better; it is another to say that they have defrauded us by unjust compacts: and it is only on the latter question that we here write. Returning to our argument as developed above, we need hardly insist that so long as B pays interest merely for the tax which he evaded, he is not personally injured. But we add, if B bestow property on β, then neither is β wronged by having to pay, in proportion to that property, the tax which was incident to it in the hands of B. Thus the interest on national debt is justly claimed of the inheritors of *that* property which was taxable and liable to be sold for payment when the loan was contracted. The moment we touch on those *immovable* possessions which a nation has not created and does but transmit, a question of great delicacy arises concerning absolute property. Certain "rights over land" are, by legal enactment, bought and sold; which process we popularly call, selling the "land." It is not necessary here to entangle ourselves in any transcendental argument; it suffices to say, that whatever may justly be sold is justly taxable; and when bequeathed, will justly transmit the burden of a tax, under the safeguard, that any future holder who finds the tax excessive may free himself by disowning the inheritance entirely. With this proviso, it evidently follows that whatever is bequeathed may justly be burdened with the payment of interest on loans earlier contracted; and so long as this is the *sole* effect of government loans, it is an entire mistake to speak of them as "throwing a burden on posterity." On the contrary, by economizing the national welfare, by saving us from unproductive industry, from stagnation of commerce, or forced sales, in which the rich may get richer, but the mass of men are impoverished,—in so far the loans have been beneficial to the future of the nation. The sole question which remains is, whether the industry of those to whom *no* property has been bequeathed can justly be held liable to pay interest on loans which ought to have been laid on the property of a past generation.

If we do not narrow the question to the exigencies of modern Europe, obvious cases present themselves in which all will justify a moderate mortgaging of the industry of the future poor. We now regard it as an axiom that every poor child is born free; but of old, foreign conquest often led to the selling of the conquered into slavery. If Thebes, when attacked by ALAXANDER the Great, had been able, by aid of a loan from Corinth, to repel him, the poor Thebans of the next generation, in paying towards the interest of that loan, would have blessed their fathers for redeeming their liberty at so light a price. But (unhappily) we have no need to run into old paganism for illustrations; they rise spontaneously close at hand. As one possibility, imagine that the great civil war in America, on which our interest is so deeply fixed, were to reach such a stage that the leaders on both sides dreaded lest a large fraction of their supporters refuse any longer to endure its sacrifices, and yet on each side there were too much of strength and determination for any complete submission. Suppose the "Republicans" of the North to insist on (at least) the gradual extinction of slavery, the South to insist on compensation, and the "Democrats" of the North to refuse to bear a dollar in the cause. If, in such a crisis, President LINCOLN were to make peace on condition, *first*, of a complete reunion and amnesty; *next*, of freedom for every child less than ten years old, and for all hereafter born; *thirdly*, that all children thus freed should pay through their whole lives a heavy poll-tax to those who would have been their owners (a tax similar to that which many a Russian serf left at large used to pay to the great nobleman who was his legal owner), —certainly the blacks thus freed would warmly thank the president, as having made for them an excellent bargain. And evidently, to them it matters not whether the poll-tax claimed of them is paid direct to the planters, or goes into the treasury as interest of a loan which was negotiated to compensate the planters. Moreover, if, instead of a poll-tax, they paid merely duties on tea and cotton-shirts, on iron

tools, or on higher foreign luxuries, this would but make the tax decidedly lighter to them.

It is not our intention here to apply these reasonings in any detail to the proceedings of our fathers and grandsires, who, in contracting this or that national loan, left its interest as a perpetual burden on the general finances of the country. Suffice it to state our conviction, that the total pressure of our indirect taxes upon a poor man is now far less than that of a single bad law,—such as was the old corn-law. Good legislation is not measurable in money to the poor, but it has money's worth; and if they have not inherited property from the past, they have at least received a freedom of industry such as but few nations in the world have yet attained. Moreover,—without defending financial proceedings which no living English statesman would imitate,—we may reasonably believe that the poorest class of tax-payers of this country would receive much less pecuniary benefit from a total remission of their taxes than from further improvements of the law (perhaps even now impending), or from a practicable elevation of their class-morality. We have seen the vast results of abolishing a few bad commercial laws. What may follow from facilities for the sale of land, which will at once attract more capital to the soil, and bring small freeholds within the peasants' reach? or again, from sanitary improvements and national education? Nor may we forget how much is going on in the direction of the last, from penny postage, abolition of stamp-duties on newspapers, and from the recent abolition of the paper-tax.

So much we have said as due honour to the legislation of the last thirty years, not to justify our more distant ancestors, who cannot be justified. But the general doctrine on which we would insist may be now summed up, viz. that "when mankind has attained that stage of moral development which disowns slavery and serfdom, which recognizes the right of men to their own sinews and free industry, and professes that this is a free inheritance; we ought not to mortgage the labour

of unborn men, except in struggling for national existence, and with it for law and for all the rights of free industry." This implies the limit of time beyond which no national loans in the future ought to reach. Restrict them to forty or fifty years, and no injustice is done to posterity. We say nothing paradoxical, but that only which the good sense of men on both sides of the Atlantic has long since pronounced. In most of the separate States of the American Union the power of mortgaging the taxes is constitutionally restricted to a moderate limit of years; and among ourselves the doctrine is already prevalent, that although the pressure of a great effort is fitly "spread over a number of years," it ought in no case to be transmitted to posterity.

If we apply these analyses to Mr. CHASE'S great loan, we shall probably find there all the circumstances combined which in any case best justify loans. First of all, the war is being fought primarily for the possession of vast dominions of immense pecuniary worth. The South, which has rebelled, cannot be taxed during the war: but, if conquered, will be taxed in its full proportion after the war, to bear the expenses which its rebellion has caused. The "territories," as yet not much advanced beyond wildernesses,—to win which for slavery the South avowedly made the war,—may, in years to come, even by direct sale, yield many millions to the victorious government. The white inhabitants of the South are kept in ignorance, indolence, and poverty by the ascendency of principles which exclude capital and education. Upon the victory of the North, labour will be made honourable in the South, capital will flow in, and the white labourers who then shall have to pay in part interest on Mr. CHASE'S loan, will have ample compensation in the new status which it will have earned for them. But what shall we say of the slaves? Why, that so long as they remain slaves, they will not be taxable; the loan cannot rest on them, and the war, at least, will make their future less dark and desperate. On the other hand, if (what seems to us quite inevitable) the future policy of the

Union shall be avowedly to extinguish slavery,—by however gradual steps, with or without compensation to this or that master,—in every case the blacks who shall, when enfranchised, pay taxes for this loan, are not likely to join in English invectives against Mr. CHASE'S iniquitous casting of burdens on posterity. But, in fact, fifty years do not reach "posterity."

Perhaps we ought not wholly to pass over the objections, either plainly stated or obscurely imagined, against loans, as though they depressed wages, raised interest, and depreciated the currency. As to the currency, its depreciation is a bad thing; and yet, in comparison to the ordinary calamities of war, not a very bad thing,—in fact, it is but a trifle by the side of the miseries involved in having one's country the seat of war. Yet to connect its depreciation with loans is a gratuitous fancy. In so far as a loan is a *bonâ fide* transference of money from hand to hand, it can produce no effects on the currency whatever. Whether the government spends my money or I spend it myself; whether in taking money from me it promises to reimburse me, or makes no such promise,—in neither case can it make a gold coin or a bank note thereby more or less valuable. All that the loan can do is, to raise or sustain the rate of interest, and a like tendency belongs to new taxes of the same amount. For the payers of the taxes, if they pay in ready cash, have thereby smaller cash-balances at their bankers', in consequence of which the total of the loanable money is lessened by precisely that which the government takes from the nation. We have not space to develop all the hypotheses; but it will be found that a loan to the government, and an equal loan asked and *obtained* by a new mercantile company, cannot yield different economic results, as long as the company's concerns repay no profit to the shareholders. Then, as to the depression of wages, all use of capital less productively than might have been, assuredly has this tendency. Thus every unsuccessful bank, every foolish railway or steamboat undertaking, every bubble

scheme of the day,—which collectively waste millions,—tends to keep down wages. So does the wasteful expenditure of war; and this, precisely in the same way and to the same extent, whether the money for the war be obtained by new taxes or by loan. In passing we observe, that in a thriving nation mere third-rate wars, or other expensiveness of government, can do no other mischief to trade or to wages than precisely that which the caprices of fashion do, namely, disappoint this or that trade by a sudden change of demand. For if the nation saves capital continuously, it is (hitherto) impossible to find wise and safe investments for it. More is wasted in foolish schemes when taxes are less, and less when taxes are heavier. But if the nation, instead of hoarding, loves to spend in indulgence, then the government, by coming down with a new tax, does the spending for them. This assuredly lessens their physical enjoyment, but does not lessen the national capital, nor affect wages—we mean, so long as the taxes come out of superfluity. The taxes are necessarily spent upon workmen's wages, though generally upon a very different set of workmen; less on opera-dancers, paintings, jewels, upholstery, more on gunsmiths and carpenters.

Equally erroneous is the vague idea, prevalent in some quarters, that loans tend to drive gold out of the country. During our own great struggle with the first NAPOLEON, immense sums of gold were sent out of this country for the uses of the army, and were necessarily very slow in returning, since our commerce with Europe was crippled by our own blockade. How could any other result have happened if the government expenditure had been based wholly on taxation, and not at all on loans? When the gold was taken away from the bank, and suspension of cash payments followed, a guinea necessarily became at length more valuable than a pound-note and a shilling, because merchants could pay foreign bills with guineas, and could not pay them equally well with notes. The same thing must have happened when we suffered several bad harvests together, from whatever cause

the deficiency of gold arose. But the mere borrowing of money has no tendency whatever to drive gold out of a country; indeed, if foreigners are invited to lend, it is at least as likely to bring gold in. Whether, in any particular year, more or less gold is likely to be found in the country, depends on the course of trade. War or peace, loans or taxes, are irrelevant to the question.

A substitute for immediate taxation, closely analogous to a loan, is that of issuing a fixed quantity of government paper as a compulsory legal currency. This evades the difficulties of cash-payments and of new taxes; it has for the people all the advantages, while to the government it brings none of the disadvantages, of payment in kind. Yet, even when the solvency of the Government is undoubted, such a measure is apt to lead to a hoarding and vanishing of the gold. Not that this will prove the issue of paper to have been in excess of what is needed for the home-market. It probably will always be somewhat in excess; but long before there is time for this cause to take effect, depreciation of paper and hoarding of gold ensues, either because the balance of trade is adverse and a call is made for gold to send abroad, or because such a crisis is already speculated on as about to come. Let the danger of inconvertible paper be rated as high as it may seem to deserve, it is an instrument of too great value to be wholly disused, although despotic powers have long since abused it to an extreme. The less a nation is dependent on foreign commerce, the less it has to fear from a currency which the rest of the world disowns. Hungary, in 1848-9, was quite satisfied with KOSSUTH notes. The portentous miscellany which makes up the currency of the Confederate Southerners passes the more easily with them because the blockade almost annihilates their foreign trade. In any case, as their community consists of a virtual nobility, with plebeians and slaves, with no mass of wealthy traders, or indeed middle-class, money-loans of the European kind would have been difficult or impossible. All the world over,

the landed gentry, whether called princes, squires, senators, or planters, are apt to live up to their income, and are not always good paymasters, much less good lenders. The lenders are men who keep up no great show at all commensurate to their actual opulence, being, as it were, full reservoirs of portable, exchangeable wealth, ready to overflow in any direction. Professional money-lenders of the international class on so great a scale as Europe sees them, are perhaps an abnormal growth, and not a desirable appendage to our civilization. They are great conveniences to needy princes who are struggling to break the barriers of law; but it is hard to discern any advantage from them to Europe collectively, or to the cause of right and order in any country. Of all government loans, none need to be scrutinized with so great jealousy as those which are contracted of the foreigner. When they are entered into secretly by the cabinet or dynasty, without cognizance of the nation, it would be impossible to blame the nation for repudiating them, except as imprudent. The occasions are few indeed in which the exigency is great enough to justify foreign loans, even when contracted with universal good-will; for a half-settled State, which borrows on the basis of its wild land, cannot count on ability to keep its promises; nor is the desire of getting rich a little faster any justification of such loans. Only ten years ago the Russian debt was imagined to be a very legitimate one, and its credit stood high; for the great money-lenders can hardly be any thing but blind worshippers of whatever is now powerful, and seldom look far enough to consider that a dynasty which needs to borrow from abroad, *because* it is all-barbarous under the surface, has great internal revolutions to undergo.

In an industrious and free nation, when a vast extraordinary expense is cheerfully sanctioned by the deliberative as well as the executive organs, it is sure to be in harmony with the national mind, and cannot fail to meet ready support from the public, the real owners of the national wealth; nor

is it likely that distress will be felt from the absence of such money-lenders as Amsterdam and London furnish.

Nor is this all. Hitherto these great lenders, if we are to believe the excuses of statesmen, have been able undesirably to dictate to the governments. For the convenience of re-selling, they prefer that all interest be in the form of a *perpetual* annuity; and by demanding unfairly high payment for a terminable annuity, they press the government into precisely that course which makes loans unjust, inexpedient, and, in the long run, highly dangerous. No European State, however flourishing, has got more and more free of debt with the progress of time, except indeed by bankruptcies. England herself, in forty-seven years of European peace, broken only by the Russian war,—and after fifteen years of unexampled prosperity,—has not paid off as much as was borrowed in three years. When debt is perpetual, and ambition is perpetual, and prosperity cannot be perpetual, a dark future is prepared. When loans are contracted by a private chat between a minister and two or three money-lenders, to whom it would be absurd to impute patriotism, the terms made for the future of a nation are far less favourable than those which a really energetic parliament, backed up by public sentiment, imposes. We have been defending the system of loans as better than that of enormous new taxation; but when interest is perpetual, we cannot defend it, and its seductiveness needs a most stringent control. In a real national crisis, where the heart of the people goes with Parliament, and Parliament warmly supports the executive, it is possible for Parliament to fix, not only the limit of borrowing, but also the limit of interest and limit of time. National spirit will still secure that the money shall be forthcoming. In their Punic war, the Roman Republic successfully contracted of the citizens loans, without any interest, to be paid in instalments when possible. Such are the sacrifices which may be counted on from those whose country is the seat of war; but even in less extreme exigency no

difficulty will be found in restricting the duration of indebtedness, when a nation concurs in the measure. The experience both of the separate States of the American Union and of the Federal Government, show that the difficulty pretended is either fictitious or is caused by the undue dependence of our ministries on a few great money-lenders. The phenomena of our building-trade may here be cited. Every day shows with what readiness both builders and occupiers consent to buy the ownership of houses for a limited term of years, conceding the final rights to some great landlord. Those who so willingly purchase a house, which is to last ninety-nine, or sixty, or twenty-five years, would not refuse to take shares in a government loan because the interest was to cease after thirty-five years. If once Parliament were to lay down a positive rule on this subject, not only would all the evils to be apprehended from future loans vanish, so that we might have their advantages without their dangers, but we should gain courage to terminate our old, and certainly dangerous, debt. Those only would have reason to grieve who think that the desire of a minister to put a particular king on Spain, on Silesia, on Afghanistân, or perhaps on Mexico, are just grounds for contracting an interminable debt.

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